Words have no Meaning

glaucon"Meaning" is nothing beyond the signification of relevance granted to a notion by its perceptor.

The problem here is that the OP is implicitly contrasting an artificial meaning with an innate meaning. This is further problematized with the ontological assumption of an innate meaning. Remove the non-subjective ontological status of meaning, and the problem dissolves: a meaning is specifically, and only given.
I stated quite clearly there is no innate meaning to a word. Words only gain meaning through usage. Words, like things themselves, are transient. They are symbols constructed to communicate what is recognized in the truth of existence.

The truth of existence is not dependent on words or the minds that create them.

When the truth of existence is observed or experienced, there can be an attempt to share this objective knowledge (a true experience) with another mind, and this is done by the use of subjective language. It is the words themselves which separate the second party from reality. They give a secondary view, a subjective view.

The first party has complete, actual interaction and experience with truth. If they hold this understanding separate from other experiences, they can experience, and know truth in a particular manner.
This is not scientific truth, for there are other truths, that are not scientific.
 
Words have a lot of "meanings."

For example. When I am writing I can find a great meaning in every word that I am using. Although it not be necessary for many people to find meaning in their words that they use some people for example I find an enormous ammount of actual meaning in words alone; so by that aviar was correct on page one.

And pardon for not reading the thread;
So yes. Words have a lot of meaning. Sometimes. And sometimes, they don't.
 
sisyphus__

The usage of words can have meaning. Or not.

This is because the meaning of the word is not in the word itself, it is in the mind of the reader or listener. When the word enters the mind, it gains meaning. No mind, no meaning (other than the obvious physical existence of the compositition making the letters).
Some words that enter the mind are meaningless (a foreign language, for example).
 
BeHereNow said:
When the truth of existence is observed or experienced, there can be an attempt to share this objective knowledge (a true experience) with another mind, and this is done by the use of subjective language.
"Subjective language", would be a language with no objects in it?
BeHereNow said:
It is the words themselves which separate the second party from reality. They give a secondary view, a subjective view.
Would that be because words are objects? A subject uses objects (words) to give a subjective view (to another subject)?

How can objects like words be a subjective language? Could objects other than words convey a subjective experience?
 
Holy deluge....

Well then.. in chronological order....



A function of context and application, sounds like some kind of agency.
...


Not at all. In fact, there's no such implication therein. If there is a relevant agent, it would be the user.

So, how many symbols are needed to convey "meaning"? What are the requirements of "context", or "application"?
One symbol can convey meaning, but how is unambiguous meaning (like we tried with the Voyager plaque) conveyed...? Or is it impossible?


The relationship is not one of necessity, merely one of sufficiency. One could easily hold that a singular symbol can convey every possible meaning (e.g., the Tao). Similarly, there are no requirements of context and application; it is the user who defines the symbol's usage. It is also the user(s) who is responsible for any errors in interpretation.


If you're wandering in a big desert, all you can see is a vast sea of sand. There is no "meaning", no features appear to convey it, just this same surface, a continuous 2-d plane.
Then you see a rock sitting, all by itself? How come there's this hard, lumpy thing where there should be sand? What's it doing here? Did someone else put it here?
What does it mean, this odd, hard lumpy rock thing? What if there's another one nearby (in some direction), is that more meaningful?



Not necessarily. Again, it is entirely contingent upon the user. A vast sea of sand can have momentous meaning: imagine that your observer in question is a displaced Inuit. Conversely, I could find that rock to be utterly insignificant, perhaps even passing notice.

Meaning is applied.


I'm going to play the devil's advocate for this one:
What exactly is wrong with the anthropomorphocentric belief in such a 'Ding An Sich' or 'Platonic Form' type of ontology?

Well, for one, I would say that it would be the height of arrogance. To believe that there are such entities simply because we can conceive of them??

I'll take Ockham's.....



I wonder how come many people have such distrust -and disdain- when it comes to the notion of something being a "convention".
Say "Language use is a convention" or "The way we are supposed to behave at the table is a convention", and they'll maul you, calling you a "pernicious relativist". (To say nothing of suggesting "Religion is a convention".)

You'll find most of them in the Religion Forum.

I pity rather than wonder of them.

To elect to disagree with any system that is de facto contingent upon the artifice of the human mind is to elect to beleive in some form of Rationalist (a la Descartes) or Idealist (a la Spinoza) ontology.


Oh. Hmm. I myself prefer platonic idealism, to a level. But I'm not sure how that's anthropomorphocentric. Those ideas actively projected in reality can vary and become more complicated, so it shouldn't conflict with "evolutionary outlook". Maybe platonic idealism includes more elements than I know.


See above, regarding arrogance.


I stated quite clearly there is no innate meaning to a word. Words only gain meaning through usage. Words, like things themselves, are transient.
...


I concur.

...
They are symbols constructed to communicate what is recognized in the truth of existence.

Or, what is recognized in existence.
(I don't believe in 'Truth'.)


The truth of existence is not dependent on words or the minds that create them.

That's your belief. I don't buy into Rationalist epistemology.


When the truth of existence is observed or experienced, there can be an attempt to share this objective knowledge (a true experience) with another mind, and this is done by the use of subjective language. It is the words themselves which separate the second party from reality. They give a secondary view, a subjective view.


ibid

The first party has complete, actual interaction and experience with truth. If they hold this understanding separate from other experiences, they can experience, and know truth in a particular manner.
...

ibid
 
Vlothii Subjective language", would be a language with no objects in it?
All language is subjective.

Originally Posted by BeHereNow
It is the words themselves which separate the second party from reality. They give a secondary view, a subjective view. ”
V Would that be because words are objects?
Words are not objects, they are symbols.

A subject uses objects (words) to give a subjective view (to another subject)?
Words are not objects.

How can objects like words be a subjective language?
Because words have no absolute meaning.
The have no objective meaning.

Could objects other than words convey a subjective experience?
Words are not objects. Symbols other than words can convey an objective experience in a subjective manner
 
glaucionI don't buy into Rationalist epistemology.
What do you buy into?


~ ~ ~ ~~ ~

Vkothii A symbol isn't an object?
No. An object may be a symbol, but a symbol need not be an object. We might say some symbols take form, and threrefore are representative of an object, but in their function as symbols, they are not objects.
Symbols can be something that isn't a "word"?
Agreed.
 
BeHereNow said:
We might say some symbols take form, and threrefore are representative of an object
What sort of "form"? You mean some symbols are objects, and some aren't?
BeHereNow said:
...but in their function as symbols, they are not objects.
How can a symbol not be some thing? Are you saying a symbol can be non-physical? If it's not actually there, how is it a symbol?
This is the bit I'm struggling with.
 
A symbol isn't an object?
Symbols can be something that isn't a "word"?


BHN is quite correct here.
The simplest example would be a number.


What do you buy into?

Depends on what we're discussing.

With respect to existence in general, and words in particular, I would say that I take a Materialist position as far as existence goes ( although, from an epistemological POV, I'd say epiphenomenalism) and a nominalist position as far as words (and indeed symbols of all sort) go.
 
BHN said:
An object may be a symbol, but a symbol need not be an object.
"A symbol can be non-material."
BHN said:
We might say some symbols take form, and threrefore are representative of an object
"A mental object can be a symbol."
BHN said:
...but in their function as symbols, they are not objects.
"But a symbol is not an object."..huh?
 
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glaucon said:
Can you think of something that cannot be an object?
If I "think of something", it's already an object, because I'm thinking (conceiving) of it.

Apparently a word isn't an object, according to BHN
A symbol is something that only sometimes "takes form" whatever that means.
Again, this is BHN's philosophy. He also says that "(in their function) as symbols" they (objects as symbols) are not objects. That's impenetrable.,,?

I can't, by definition think of something that "cannot be an object". This is non sequitur. If I objectivise something, by thinking about it, it's an object - a "mental" object.
 
If I "think of something", it's already an object, because I'm thinking (conceiving) of it.

Apparently a word isn't an object, according to BHN
A symbol is something that only sometimes "takes form" whatever that means.
Again, this is BHN's philosophy. He also says that "as symbols" they (objects as symbols) are not objects. That's impenetrable.,,?

I can't, by definition think of something that "cannot be an object". This is non sequitur. If I objectivise something, by thinking about it, it's an object - a "mental" object.

Ah.
We are in agreement then; it was a semantical issue.

Perhaps when BHN says "object" he is meaning to say something more precise....
 
I can't, by definition think of something that "cannot be an object". This is non sequitur. If I objectivise something, by thinking about it, it's an object - a "mental" object.
I'm not sure about this. Unless it is redundant - in the use of the word something, and even then...

If you are thinking of something, or thinking about it, this is not the mental object. The mental object is about that thing not the thing itself.

Also if I think especially of hypnogic states, etc., I wonder if 'mental object is appropriate. Their can be processes and relationships that are imagined - as a collective feltpictured something in motion. I don't know if that is an object.
 
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