Some Manner of Title Goes Here
Click to complete her faith.
Okay ... so:
Yazata said:
That would appear to be a contradiction.
I think that Jan might have a stronger point if he/she reworded it like this: "Believing in the existence of something does not mean that you have faith in that thing", where 'faith' means something like 'trust', 'confidence' or perhaps 'dedication'.
And:
Jan Ardena said:
Please point out the contradiction .
If I believe you are male, it doesn't mean I believe in male. That much should be obvious to anyone. Once I know you are male, belief automatically gets upgraded.
Okay, Jan, this is a matter of basic definitions: Accepting that "God" is real is the functional definition of theism.
One doesn't "believe in male" in this context. More directly:
"If I believe you are male"? Okay, who do you believe is God?
If you are tempted to say the question doens't follow, that's kind of the point. This part of your response is
non sequitur at best.
It's also worth pointing out that if you believe one is male, you must necessarily believe that "male" exists. I get what you're after, but that particular formulation just didn't work.
What you seem to be mixing here is
theism and
religious faith; the two are not the same thing. Proper panenthism, for instance, not so much requires no specific faith, but would tend to speak against it until one can properly and objectively determine the will of God, which in any case will never happen, anyway.
To wit, Adilbai Kharkovli, on Sufism:
It has been said that there is no human community yet known which has no religious system. Certain it is that everyone who comes across the Sufi activity in any form will related it to what he (or she) already assumes to be religion. A study of the words and doings of the Sufis, however, seems to show that they will at one point appear to be supporting the local relgiious exprssion, and at another opposing it. The confusion arises simply because the Sufis are teaching, not promoting their beliefs. Where their teaching accords with local beliefs, they will appear to support these, where it deviates, it will appear to oppose the religious structure of belief. (170)
This is a straightforward religious argument, regardless of how Sufis prefer to portray themselves. That is, were Sufis perfectly consistent in this, then, yes, Kharkovli would be penning a basic truth instead of postulating a religious argument, but were Sufis perfectly consistent they would not be Sufis.
The fascinating aspect is what that paragraph sets up:
The Sufis themselves are frequently on record as teaching in this vein; though their attitude is generally expressed in terms which were better understood in the past. As an example, the phrase, "Sufism is the inner aspect of religion" can quite easily be seen as meaning: "Sufi teachings, over a period of time, become coverd by social, emotional and other accretions which are established into religions. The living tradition of Sufis, however, continues. Viewed from the religionist's standpoint, of course, the Sufi element is the inward component, and the rest is the balance of religion.
Put even more succinctly, the Sufi is saying, "Sufism is a teaching designed to re-establish a link with the divine. From time to time this is revitalised when religious systems have become too covered with accretions to operate as teaching entities and have subsided into organisations of social action, power-seeking or mere panoply." (170-171)
Like I said, it's a straightforward religious argument. And the bit about re-establishing a link with the divine comes up in various movements. But setting Sufi hubris aside―re-establishment of a link with the divine is itself a religious accretion―Kharkovli's claim chases an element deeper and more occulted than everyday religious discourse tends to account for.
The Sufi expression makes it stand out more: There is an abstract truth, an abstract reality, an abstract cause that transcends perception and comprehnesion; this is the core, the inner aspect―this is why we have religion at all. Oracles have sought answers within the mysterium; monotheism acknowledges ineffability; the legend says no mortality can rightly countenance God Itself. Consider your or my finite brain; consider the size of the Universe―it seems unlikely we can conceive of the actual truth represented by the abstraction.
This difference stands out to me: Perhaps I wouldn't have noticed except I have before encountered people who would define religion as "belief in God". That particular rhetoric is intended to lighten the study load for critics; in throwing out all other elements affecting religious belief, expression, and development, some atheistic evangelists hope to make their task a bit easier. Ordinarily I would say set them aside, but in this case it provides a reasonable contrast.
You seem to be arguing in some strange, rarely―if ever―delineated rhetorical territory.
For instance, you argue: "There would no need to have any faith in you, unless I had no choice but to rely upon you for something I needed, that could only come from you."
In the first place, do you believe that anyone exists? Just the idea of a person.
It's easy enoughy to accept that people exist. Ironically, we Americans went through this weird chapter where it turns out a man named John Barron never actually existed.
Do I believe people exist? Yes.
Do I believe John Barron exists? Not that particular John Barron. While there are real people in the world named John Barron, the record persuasively suggests this particular person named John Barron did not actually exist.
Do I believe Yazata exists? How about Jan Ardena? Yes. Do I believe you are human beings? I mean, actually
people? Yes. Indeed, anyone who proposes otherwise will be offering an extraordinary proposition: Nothing about the produce of either of your postings suggests you are bots. Is it possible that neither of you exist as individuals? It is possible that you are composite characters authored by multiple people for each name, but that would be an extraordinary assertion. It is easy enough to believe that Yazata exists. It is easy enough to believe that Jan Ardena exists.
Do I believe in God? It's a tricky question, but only because of market demands about the answer. I acknowledge the word "God" describes something that must be accounted for. The closest thing to divinity that would include is akin to an Unmoved Mover or Unnamed Namer, and in that context the actual name of God will be written as a mathematical formula. As it is, "God" is a three-letter, one-syllable word that, in its abstract monotheistic context represents a valid factor in philosophical calculation. Until we find a better word, certain statements like, "God works in mysterious ways", and, "We are fashioned in God's image", can actually be construed as true. (To the one, we are finite beings; to the other, chaos constrained reflects its constraints.) But that's it. Monotheism, to me, becomes inherently panentheistic; anything else limits God, thus making a the concept of boundlessness and oneness into a finite and severely delineated concept.
Do I believe in the monothestic godhead named Jehovah? No. Allah? No.
I am neither theist nor atheist nor agnostic; I am
apathetic. I genuinely don't care whether or not God exists, because in the end it's all the same, anyway. The math is the math, and the reason we spend time developing intricate rituals and concomitant obligations―the creed, code, and cult of religion―is pretty much because we don't like what the math tells us.
To wit, I don't need God to tell me to not get on my daughter. My Ferenczi shields are deployed to maximum right now, but the thing is that I'm a father. My job is her best interest. I don't need God to tell me it's wrong; I don't need the law to tell me it's wrong; I don't need Szandor Ferenczi to explain why it's wrong. But that's the thing. Apparently there are a lot of people who do.
Right and wrong are right and wrong. The only thing God ever seems to do is complicate that notion because, as the Sufis put it, the rest is the balance of religion.
Theism itself is a word that describes belief or acceptance that God exists. The faith you're describing is more particular; the difference between the acknowledging belief and effective faith is much akin to the difference 'twixt God and religion.
Abstractly, you seem to be asserting a particular distinction whose form is best applied in a different context; I don't think it properly applies here. I think Sarkus is correct on the basic point, and Yazata's advice sound. The difference seems a matter of definitions, and yours seem shifted one or two places in an abstract direction. That is to say, I recognize the form, but not according to the name you're applying. You seem to be looking at the difference between acknowledgment of God as an abstract proposition and faith unto a particular God within a specific religious construction.
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Notes:
Kharkovli, Adilbai. "Those Astonishing Sufis". Sufi Thought and Action. Assembled by Idries Shah. London: Octagon Press, 1990, pp. 167-177.