The Persistent Self

[greenberg]

Other things being equal, if T1 is more ontologically parsimonious than T2 then it is rational to prefer T1 to T2.

In that case, my stance in this thread is the superior one, as it is the one that is the most ontologically parsimonious one.

Positing a self that is always conscious (albeit of different things) is more ontologically parsimonious than positing a self that has breaks in its consciousness. Because if it is sometimes not conscious, then how do we know it is still the same self after an episode of unconsciousness? There are several assumptions we need to accept as valid if we are to posit a self that has interrupted consciousness (e.g. that the senses and the principle of inference are veritable sources of perfect knowledge).

Positing a self that wills is more ontologically parsimonious than positing a self that does not will. Because if a self does not will, then how does action, including experience, come about? And if a self wills only sometimes, but other times not, then how is this to be explained - coincidence, higher power? Again, it is more ontologically parsimonious to posit a self that wills all the time, but wills different things.

Positing a self that is dependend on external objects and stimuli to give it objects to be conscious of on upon which to act out its will is more ontologically parsimonious than positing a self that is not. A self that is not dependend on external objects and stimuli to give it objects to be conscious of on upon which to act out its will is solipsistic. And we all know what it means to arrive at solipsism.

 

[greenberg]

To put it another way: it seemed to me the negative and potentially unfounded assumptions of scientists slipped into the conversation as if these were not subjective guesses about objective ontology.

I think this is precisely what happened: philosophy limited by empirical science.

 

[Mr. Hamtastic]

Persistant self. That's silly. That's like saying your appearance never changes. Your self evolves with time. When I was 7 I thought I was GIJoe. At 21 I thought I could rule the world. At 31 I try not to have my kids watch GIJoe type things, and I fear those that do rule the world. All of these things are bits of self. Self is like an office building. When an idea is no longer useful, you demolition that area, and build back a new idea. Description of self would be the ever changing directory of tenants. Self doesn't do anything of it's own accord. Self just sits there, being changed or maintained all the time.

 

[Simon Anders]

In that case, my stance in this thread is the superior one, as it is the one that is the most ontologically parsimonious one.

I can't decide, but I will keep up my line.

Positing a self that is always conscious (albeit of different things) is more ontologically parsimonious than positing a self that has breaks in its consciousness. Because if it is sometimes not conscious, then how do we know it is still the same self after an episode of unconsciousness? There are several assumptions we need to accept as valid if we are to posit a self that has interrupted consciousness (e.g. that the senses and the principle of inference are veritable sources of perfect knowledge).

My line would be to say there is no self, there is merely experience. There is no need to posit a subject. This is adding an unnecessay entity. There is a field of experience. A now.

Positing a self that wills is more ontologically parsimonious than positing a self that does not will. Because if a self does not will, then how does action, including experience, come about? And if a self wills only sometimes, but other times not, then how is this to be explained - coincidence, higher power? Again, it is more ontologically parsimonious to posit a self that wills all the time, but wills different things.

Possibly, if you take actions as entities. Or, rather action and inaction as various entities. I am not sure if that is the intent of that 'rule' of parsimony. Though I acknowledge that differentiating between verbs and entities is not an easy thing to do.

Positing a self that is dependend on external objects and stimuli to give it objects to be conscious of on upon which to act out its will is more ontologically parsimonious than positing a self that is not.

Why is that?

 

[Simon Anders]

I think this is precisely what happened: philosophy limited by empirical science.

I think I encouter this a lot in my discussions here and I would like to be fluent at explaining it: both in general and in specific cases. Any help with that would be appreciated. (case by case, in general, in a separate thread) In any case I was glad you understood what I meant. It feels very slippery to my mind.

 

[Simon Anders]

Persistant self. That's silly. That's like saying your appearance never changes. Your self evolves with time. When I was 7 I thought I was GIJoe. At 21 I thought I could rule the world. At 31 I try not to have my kids watch GIJoe type things, and I fear those that do rule the world. All of these things are bits of self. Self is like an office building. When an idea is no longer useful, you demolition that area, and build back a new idea. Description of self would be the ever changing directory of tenants. Self doesn't do anything of it's own accord. Self just sits there, being changed or maintained all the time.

So is it still you? Did the 7 year old 'grow up' but is still the same guy 'really'. If you look forward to what you will do in ten years is this 'really' a waste of time because it will be someone else? Or will it be a changed person who is, 'really', you?

 

[Mr. Hamtastic]

The core of self, which is what I think you are talking about, remains unchanged, but I think this is something that may be formed in the womb or shortly after birth. A baby looking at it's fingers is adding to that core self. That core self is just a foundation stone. It is persistant as the rest of the self changes. For example, I use the same name as an intoduction to a stranger as I did at age 4. This is an example of a very early learned edit to self. Before I had a name for myself, I simply was. Thus, you can strip off even the name, the self remains. It's nothing fancy, but there it is.

 

[swarm]

swarm
I would say the person is more resilient than its notion of self, which really is just the current self reference held by the brain.

I think he is over working the "story" angle as a metaphor. I would say it is much more than just fictive because who you think are actually informs you about who you really are.

Simon Anders
It seemed that these two quotes might contradict each other. If not, then I am not clear what you mean in both.

By person I mean the physical person, in particular the brain which constructs and maintains a notion of "self" based on its memories. The notion of self is mainly held in short term memory and can be wiped and then rebuilt from the more permanent memories as long as those remain available and coherent.

However it is not "just made up" as might be implied by the term "fictive." It is based on the memories of actually living as that person. Nor is it just a "story" with no impact to or from the physical reality of who the person is.

An idea that creates an illusion of coherence over time.

I would say that there is without a doubt a degree of coherence over time and it is extremely obvious when this coherence is lost or radically altered. For example I've always liked chocolate and in particular dark chocolate. If I suddenly stopped liking it people would notice and find that odd.

But there is no reason to believe the experiencer in ten years will be the same. Not simply in terms of its attributes, but at all.

I disagree and I think you are playing games with the term same, trying to make it mean "unchanging" when it is an innate part of life to change over time.

I have seen someone go through this. The changes are miniscule, after a certain recovery period, compared to long term - or even some shorter term - changes in people.

The change was dramatic in the cases I saw.

Is the body the pattern you mentioned earlier that changes but still remains the same?
The body has every cell replaced.

Actually that is a misnomer. Some cells are replaced quickly, mouth and stomach lining, some not at all such as many neurons and female reproductive cells. Also replacing parts is not a problem as long as the integrity of the pattern is not degraded.

Only an insignificant percentage of atoms are the same.

Replacing parts is not a problem as long as the integrity of the pattern is not degraded.

The brain changes radically between the ages of 7 and 20. There is a difference in mass, also. Base levels of hormones. Response patterns. Neural maps of the brain. Neurotransmitter levels. The behavior of that body.

Replacing and even altering parts is not a problem as long as the integrity of the pattern is not degraded.

It would seem to me that if you base continuity on the body, you are forced to accept percentage-based levels of continuity, at best. Focusing on the body also presumes that relations are external to identity.

You are neglecting that this particular pattern is self repairing, flexible, adaptable and capable of incorporating growth and change.

Ideas that are functionally efficient and traditional may not have concrete referents.

Functionally efficient is sufficient in this case.

There is no reason to assume the experiencer is the same at a later date.

There is every reason to assume this and it is in fact the assumption. If you want to contend otherwise you need to offer more than your dissatisfaction with the status quo.

But that the self a body does at 7 is the same self that the body does at 21 seemed unfounded.

The two are the same and the fact that the one becomes the other and no other is sufficient. You point to what is not relevant and act like it should be.

 

[Mr. Hamtastic]

swarm-So a car that has all of it's parts changed is still the same car if the frame remains the same, even if it's appearance and power are changed dramatically?

 

[greenberg]

My line would be to say there is no self, there is merely experience. There is no need to posit a subject. This is adding an unnecessay entity. There is a field of experience. A now.

There is no self, there is merely experience?
If there is no self, how can there be experience? For there to be experience, there needs to differentiation, at least some kind of selfhood.

Moreover - If all is one, non-duality, there is no self, then how come people wonder about "who they really are"? They are possessed by the illusion of selfhood? Which came out of where? The oneness?

Possibly, if you take actions as entities. Or, rather action and inaction as various entities. I am not sure if that is the intent of that 'rule' of parsimony. Though I acknowledge that differentiating between verbs and entities is not an easy thing to do.

There is the possibility to posit a self that does nothing. But that is a redundant notion then, and, according to the principle of ontological parsimony, should be omitted.

Why is that?

I also said:

A self that is not dependend on external objects and stimuli to give it objects to be conscious of on upon which to act out its will is solipsistic. And we all know what it means to arrive at solipsism.

Trying to resolve solipsism is ontologically very expensive, so to speak.

 

[glaucon]

What a low blow. I am very disappointed in you.
Arguing from an absolute negative!

I hope you are joking.

Not at all.
And I fail to see how it's a 'low blow'.

I won't go so far as to say absolute, but factually, there is no consistent self.

 

[glaucon]

This sounds like External Relations. That relations are external to identity.

Further
Self-sufficient:able to supply one's own or its own needs without external assistance.

I know no such selfs.

But perhaps you had another meaning in mind.

Nope, you've understood me correctly.
External sources of course play a role, but it is this 'self' that makes sense of them.
If the 'self' is to mean anything at all, it cannot be contingent upon them.
So, perhaps I'll recompose "self-sufficient", to self-directed.

 

[glaucon]

I think there is something untenable in here. I think it centers on the use of the word 'body'.

This word is a reification of a vast number of experiences - and the editing of some of these involved due to culture and individual tendencies.

True enough; both public and personal conceptualization of 'body' is a transient thing. And yet, it is ever-present.

It is, generally, a term which is part of some sort of (posited) 'Real', objective ontological world. I think most people immediately think of some map of the body when the word is used and not some less objective gestalt culled from experience.
...


edit: added thought. I think in context in the discussion with greenberg, you can refer to the untenability of referring to a real Ontological realm (on his part, as you are claiming, implicitly) and bring in body as a necesary component of self, or, in fact, the self. To me the only way to back this up is to refer to the objective ontological claims of science which root all experience in the body in addition to saying what the body is, and then the scientists often go further to say what the body is not.
...

Regardless of how we elect to organize 'body' (grant it a particular ontological status..) the simple fact is that it is always attendant to our conception of self. At the very least.

I must say I'm surprised at how problematic this 'body' question has become. None of us have had a non-body experience. The material component of the question of the 'self' is, to me, an a priori. And I mean that in the strictest of senses, not as part of some Rationalist explanatory theory.

 

[glaucon]

A whole day and no activity?
Odd.

I can see both greenberg and S.A. are online right now, no doubt preparing some posts.

I was just about to compose a Limit Set for this discussion, but perhaps I'll wait and see what comes...

 

[glaucon]

OK, here's my Limit Set.
For now anyways... I'm sure some will have problems with some of these parameters....


1) The term 'self' is synonymous with the referent of the usage of the indexical "I".

2) Under ordinary circumstances (i.e., not drunk, drugged, insane, etc.) the usage of the term is always done so without error.

3) Usage of the term is concomitant with a material body.

4) The user of the term thereby has privileged access to, and directed control over that which it refers to.

5) The term must therefore, refer to something particular and unique (though not necessarily static) to the user.


Note: as a limit set, these are therefore 'bare minimums'. They only necessarily exclude anything that directly contradicts anything here.

 

[onemoment]

glaucon: The user of the term thereby has privileged access to, and directed control over that which it refers to.

The user of the term thereby has privileged access to, and directed control over that which it refers to.

This is a rather hasty deduction. Can you substantiate it? How do you explain my earlier post that what the mind perceives happens a time after the fact. As this is so, at what point is this 'indexical I' the 'direct contol (er)' over that to which it refers? And can we really 'see' this control or is it just a story that is playing in the mind as stories do. The mind can know the subject/object (because it has named it), but can it ever know the real cause? Isn't cause just a matter of perspective and interpretation? Just mind stuff?

When the mind does not refer to this 'I' is it still there? Are we dependent on saying 'I am' to know that the Self exists? Is the 'Self' only thoughts of the mind? If not, then to what do we refer when we say 'I'?

Any description in the mind, of what this Self is, presupposes an observer of reality and this observer seems to be no more than the thoughts in/of the mind. Could we be making a mistake to be looking in the mind for answers on what this Self is – this mind created self that is nothing more than changing thoughts of what the Self might be?

Perhaps we need to look at what might be there prior to the interpretations of the mind. Perhaps there, there may be a reality upon which we can all agree. We have spent so much time looking to the mind for answers, perhaps we need to spend equal time exploring the notion that what we are is beyond both body and mind for I do not have to think that ‘I am’ to know that there is something constantly or persistently there.

 

[glaucon]

onemoment,

Thanks for the interesting thoughts.
Alas, you've entirely misunderstood the intention behind my post.

Regardless, I have some comments:

This is a rather hasty deduction. Can you substantiate it?

You've misread my post.
It's not a deduction.
It doesn't need to be substantiated.

How do you explain my earlier post that what the mind perceives happens a time after the fact.

Firstly, the mind doesn't perceive; the senses do.
You're correct regarding the temporal difference, but that has nothing to do with the topic at hand.

As this is so, at what point is this 'indexical I' the 'direct contol (er)' over that to which it refers?

You've misread again: the indexical is not what is directing; the 'self' is.

And can we really 'see' this control or is it just a story that is playing in the mind as stories do.

Neither. Control is behaviour, and as such, is neither of the two options you provide.

The mind can know the subject/object (because it has named it), but can it ever know the real cause?

"Know"? I disagree. This assumes that the subject/object distinction goes beyond the mind.
And why the need for a 'real cause'?
You're overcomplicating the issue.

Isn't cause just a matter of perspective and interpretation? Just mind stuff?

Although this is way off topic, I would have to agree with you on this.

When the mind does not refer to this 'I' is it still there?

No.

Are we dependent on saying 'I am' to know that the Self exists? Is the 'Self' only thoughts of the mind?

Yes, and yes.

If not, then to what do we refer when we say 'I'?

Nothing but a word.

Any description in the mind, of what this Self is, presupposes an observer of reality and this observer seems to be no more than the thoughts in/of the mind.

I have no problems with this (Although, to be fair, I would have stopped at "observer", and excluded "of reality.").

Could we be making a mistake to be looking in the mind for answers on what this Self is – this mind created self that is nothing more than changing thoughts of what the Self might be?

Not at all; I'm fine with all of this. If the 'self' is anywhere, it is in the mind (as you say).

Perhaps we need to look at what might be there prior to the interpretations of the mind.

Firstly: this assumes that there is some sort of 'prior thing'.
Secondly: an examination of this sort is pragmatically impossible.


To reiterate:
The entire point of my post was to bring the discussion back to form somewhat. What we need is to set some sorts of limits to scope, to establish parameters within which we may work.

 

[onemoment]

glaucon: You've misread my post.
It's not a deduction.
It doesn't need to be substantiated.

Well, then, I have a problem with your parameter because I deduce from what you said that ‘the referent of the usage of the indexical I’ can only be the mind. What else is the ‘referent’ in your sentence; ‘the referent of the usage of the indexical "I".’ It looks like there are a few loops in that sentence. What else but the mind can refer to anything? Or do you mean it is what the mind refers to as ‘I’ – but even then the mind’s reference is always in the picture and this ‘I’ is separate and apart from the totality of what is perceived and the ‘mind’ rules the roost.

glaucon: the mind doesn't perceive; the senses do.

What I should have written is that ‘the mind translates after the fact’. And how can this not have anything to do with the topic of ‘What is the persistent self?’? I am suggesting that perhaps what is ‘Self’ is, is beyond mind if all the mind does is translate what is already there.

glaucon: You've misread again: the indexical is not what is directing; the 'self' is.

i.e. The user of the term thereby has privileged access to, and directed control over that which it refers to

I understand you are saying: The Self is the user of the term, is referring to the ‘I’. And I take that one step further to ask ‘What is referring to the ‘I’ but the mind?’. I therefore deduce that the idea ‘I’ is in control’. Just the idea and nothing more than that for that is all ‘I’ is, it does not describe the actual Self. There’s that mind loop again.

Posted by onemoment
And can we really 'see' this control or is it just a story that is playing in the mind as stories do.

glucon:Neither. Control is behaviour, and as such, is neither of the two options you provide.

Control is only a story we tell about behaviour – if we don’t tell a story, then what control is there? Isn’t control a cause, and interpretation based on conditioning.

glaucon: "Know"? I disagree. This assumes that the subject/object distinction goes beyond the mind.
And why the need for a 'real cause'?
You're overcomplicating the issue.

No, it does not assume this at all, quite the opposite. It assumes the subject/object relationship can only exist in the mind and its on-going interpretation after the fact. No complication in this at all.

Also, what else is ‘known’ except for what the mind ‘knows’ – it tells a story about what it knows but the knowing of Self or something (whatever we call this persistence) is there with or without stories.

Originally Posted by onemoment
Isn't cause just a matter of perspective and interpretation? Just mind stuff?
gaucoma: Although this is way off topic, I would have to agree with you on this.

It’s not off the topic at all. We are using the mind and finding answers in the mind as to what the Self is so maybe that is the error and why it is that the truth is so elusive.

Originally Posted by onemoment
When the mind does not refer to this 'I' is it still there? ”
gaucoma:No.

You say the ‘I’ is not there when we are not thinking about it – you are right, the thought of the ‘I’ is clearly not there when we are not thinking about it – derrrrr – but that sense of being/persistence, of ????? is still there and this is my point. Mind does not have to be there for that ?????? to be there.

 

[Simon Anders]

However it is not "just made up" as might be implied by the term "fictive." It is based on the memories of actually living as that person. Nor is it just a "story" with no impact to or from the physical reality of who the person is.

Our stories have impacts, absolutely. So there can be elements of self-fulfilling prophecy in terms of attributes, but none in relation to identity.
(as an aside I think Glaucon's position is not the same as yours)

I would say that there is without a doubt a degree of coherence over time and it is extremely obvious when this coherence is lost or radically altered. For example I've always liked chocolate and in particular dark chocolate. If I suddenly stopped liking it people would notice and find that odd.

Certainly some attibutes often continue. But many change. The 7 years to the 22 year old has radical changes in these attributes and behaviors. If these are the self or evidence that it is the same person, shouldn't all the changes at least force us to speak in terms of percentages of identity?

I disagree and I think you are playing games with the term same, trying to make it mean "unchanging" when it is an innate part of life to change over time.

Not playing games. If I have a pattern of blocks and I over a period of time slowly replace all the blocks and change the pattern it this 'thing' has changed. It is fundamentally no longer the same. My wife could come home and say 'Oh, look at Simon's pattern. The pattern he keeps on the kitchen table.' And in some abstract sense, not really revelent to the blocks, since this is a metaphor, she can use the definitive 'the pattern' or the possessive Simon's pattern. While, in fact I could have built up the original pattern on another table in another room in the original shape with the blocks in the original pattern.

Our blocks are replaced. Beyond that a great deal is added. And the patterns are changed.

I still see no evidence that it is the same person - who has changed. It could just as easily be another person, which, in fact, is what I think it is.

The change was dramatic in the cases I saw.

I thought your point was that they reconstructed the same self. I misunderstood. I thought the point was the abiilty to reconstruct the same self. I was contrasting it with people who after a time are very different people - taking this literally or figuratively for now.

Actually that is a misnomer. Some cells are replaced quickly, mouth and stomach lining, some not at all such as many neurons and female reproductive cells. Also replacing parts is not a problem as long as the integrity of the pattern is not degraded.

Degraded is generally a negative term. The incredible changes in the brain in adolescence is at worst neutral. It is true that some cells do not reproduce, but interestingly enough the hippocampus, in change of memory, does make new cells and vigorously. Since much defene of continuous identity or selfhood is based on memory there are problems right there. Also the interconnections between cells change radically, pathways get strengthened, atrophy, etc. Levels of neurotransmitters, hormone levels in the body, patterns of brain use - via MRIs - can be see to change over time also. All this is reflected in the changes in behavior, tastes, attitudes, interests, and so on. If, as you said before the self if what the body does, it is doing something quite different.

At what point does change in something make it something else?

Replacing parts is not a problem as long as the integrity of the pattern is not degraded.

Ibid

You are neglecting that this particular pattern is self repairing, flexible, adaptable and capable of incorporating growth and change.

To me is not an issue of repair. I am not saying something bad is happening. I just see no evidence that it is the same self that is changed.

Functionally efficient is sufficient in this case.

It might be for others, but for the actual person in question, whether or not it is the same experiencer is an issue.

There is every reason to assume this and it is in fact the assumption. If you want to contend otherwise you need to offer more than your dissatisfaction with the status quo.

I am glad you see it as an assumption.

The two are the same and the fact that the one becomes the other and no other is sufficient. You point to what is not relevant and act like it should be.

I pointed out in my block metaphor that this 'becoming' is fragile. Perhaps technology will reach a place where one could atom by atom replace a person's parts with others AND build the original human. I don't even see that as far fetched with nanotechnology.

Which one would be the first experiencer?

 

[Simon Anders]

Nope, you've understood me correctly.
External sources of course play a role, but it is this 'self' that makes sense of them.

Isn't this a conceptualization (meaning this as a transitive active, creative process on an object) of the separate self. Once this separate self is conceptualized then we can conceive of it as self-directed by interpreting the causal relationship with this self as authority?