The Persistent Self

[greenberg]

What's wrong with selfishness?
I'd say it's a fairly effective survival strategy.

Only some variations of selfishness are effective survival strategies, but not all.
For example, the selfishness that as its aim has immediate material profit, but disregards the negative long-term consequences of pursuing such an aim, is not an effective survival strategie. Witness the pollution that capitalism has brought about, and because of which our quality of life is seriously negatively effected.

Procedures people. We cannot hope to even discuss if we do not first define our terms.

But the definition of the term "self" is the aim of this thread, as far as I understand. We'll probably have to discuss things first, before we will be able to come up definitions.

As it stands, the only evidence (sic) we have at all of a 'self' is through recollection. Memory, it goes without saying, is hardly reliable.

This implies a definition of "self", part of which seems to be "The self is not something we could know in the present, but only as a recollection from the past".

Or, is your 'self' the totality of all played games?

The problem with the game analogy is that through all played games, there is that entity that has the controller in its hands, and can opt to end or start a game at any time. Which is to say, in ordinary life, there is no such continuous 'behind the scene' player.

We don't know that. If there is such a "player", it is not necessary that we would know of him, as not knowing of him - or knowing of him - might be part of the "game".
So we can't make a definiteve answer on this point.

Hey gb. Nice to see you back.

Hi there.

But, to be clear: you do not wake up one day not being you.

How come? Why not?
Does this has to do with my self, or with circumstances?
I imagine if I woke up every day in completely different circumstances without having any knowledge of what brought them about - say, one day normally in my room, and another day in someone else's room in Singapore, and the next day in a jungle in South America - I would be very confused.
But if one day I'd be healthy and another day wake up with a cold, I'd be much less confused.

Which suggests that our common sense of self is to a greater or lesser extent bound to our circumstances, but not exlcusively.

And yet I can clearly point out Lake Ontario to you on a map despite the fact that no one can tell me where the lake begins and the Atlantic Ocean ends....

So? You may point it out on a map, but this doesn't necessarily mean I -or anyone else- will see it as you see it.

Note also that your objection here begs some sort of definition of 'self' that you're making use of.

Sure. I am not fully aware of that definition yet, and I am in the process of developing it anyway. With a topic like this, I'm afraid the usual way to proceed - that is, to start with definitions - doesn't work, as it is the definition itself that is being sought after. Well, at least for some of us. But some others might have to refine, amend etc. their definitions.

And alludes to the evasive nature of the 'self'.

How come the self is evasive?


- Note I am putting these questions to anyone who wishes to respond, to further the discussion.

 

[swarm]

greenberg
How come the self is evasive?

People want it to be a thing and preferably indestructible and seperable.

Instead is an ephemeral pattern of the physical substrate. Changing, easily degraded and eventually lost.

 

[Simon Anders]

Change is in the nature of patterns.

Nature already can make an exact copy. But neither has improved status over the other. Twins are copies of each other and each is a full individual, the original.

This is not really an answer in relation to identity. Patterns change. If you change a pattern it can become a different pattern. What makes you think the changes in the patterns we see between a 7 year old named 'swarm' and the 21 year old named swarm are not significant enough to count as a change in identity?

Where is the proof that this is the same person?

(in a sense I am asking you to be specific. You have responded at a very high level of abstraction. Nothing wrong in that, in fact it can be very helpful. But what patterns are you referring to in Identity? for example.)

 

[Simon Anders]

.
"Self" is a memory of those successful journeys.

And if I forget one of those journeys am I still the same as the ones who had the journeys I remember, but not that one?

Your question is one of the grandest ever asked.
Thank you for sharing this time.
With optimism, I predict, this forum, and its instant
exchange of intelligence, represents the evolution
of "ourselves".

You're welcome. It sounds like you might have a different from usual idea of identity.

 

[Simon Anders]

You can get bogged down in what remains the same and what is changing. If you take the approach that the self is X and unchanging, then memory is merely a record of changes in the clothes that X wears.

The problem with that are 1) you put clothes over x, while memories are actual physical changes in x. 2) all of the matter in x is also changed during this time. X is all clothes.

Unfortunately to argue further on whether self is persistent, one needs an agreed upon definition of "self". Are we talking merely "consciousness"? Or are we talking personality?
And even then, with an agreed-upon definition / understanding, we can only answer the question (hopefully) for that particular understanding.

I agree, though I would say the burden is on those who think there is self that persists, especially if they are materialists, given the fact that all the matter is replaced. So what is this self they think persists?

Very few rationalists on this board would make the claim that lack of proof (or even lack of evidence) = not real. Without proof or evidence, at best one can say "I don't know" - which is what I understand the majority of rationalists on this board would say.

Yes, I agree. In the abstract, but in the concrete I could swear I have seen this not to be the case rather often.

An exact copy (and I do mean exact in every way) of a person would be a different person, by dint of having a different consciousness.

I agree. But isn't that what we are. Copies made of earlier 'selves'. Isn't that what our cells are doing, copying? Can the consciousness also be a new one with access to copies of 'memories' or, really to use a less weighted word, 'information' that has been passed down?

So - let me ask... would you define "self" as "consciousness"?
Or even broader - how do you think the two are related or interact?

To be honest I am being a devil's advocate for a reason I can mention later.
But can I not, like Heraclitus, view change and non-identity as primary, and ask those who advocate for persistance to explain what it is that this continued identity is based on?

 

[Simon Anders]

Howso?
What's wrong with selfishness?
I'd say it's a fairly effective survival strategy.

I am dropping this issue to keep our focus.

However, you're most significant point here is your description of the self as a fictive entity. Not only is the self a piece of fiction, it is a very useful fiction.

Fictive tends to equal imaginary. Are we conceding so fast?
It sounds like you may end up saying that something that is not true is a useful story because of x, y and z.

(and just in case you head in the direction of 'ah, you believe in objective truths, Simon,' I would argue that 'fictive' already has notions of objectivity around, rather than in, it. Fictive as opposed to _________. If all truths are only fictive - or for all we know are fictive - perhaps it is not the best word. I also get this vague feeling I will be facing a neo-Wittgensteinian view of language very soon.)

 

[Simon Anders]

Not necessarily. It depends on your understanding of

1. where this self comes from
and
2. in what relation it is to other selves.

There are several possibilities, but from where I am, not an infinite number of possibilities:

The self can come from:
1. coincidence
2. God
3. is self-created
("comes from other selves" is not a valid option, as it is simply a regression begging the question)

A self can be in relation to others:
1. equal
2. superior
3. inferior

What say you?




Yes, let's.

I am dropping the selfishness issue - though it perhaps deserves another thread. I want to try and keep focus here - but that's just my urge, perhaps other will stay on it.

To be annoying, I mean, oh dear, to remain consistant with my stance - IOW that of denying the persistent self, gosh whatever that could be, what are people referring to? - I am not going to define 'self' let alone origins. I am trying, fairly or not, to shift this over to those who think some 'thing' is persistent. Let my naivte - or lack of a delusion in a fictive something - be the challenge.

 

[greenberg]

I am trying, fairly or not, to shift this over to those who think some 'thing' is persistent. Let my naivte - or lack of a delusion in a fictive something - be the challenge.

I can think of several things that are persistent about a self:
1. consciousness
2. will
3. dependence

There is always consciousness of something or someone. Consciousness of air, oranges, the state of the bladder, Wittgenstein, of dreams, of sleeping ... Of course, in some instances of consciousness, we are very familiar with the thing or person we are conscious of, and in others, not so - this we then usually call "being unconscious" or "sleeping".

There is always will for something or against something. Sometimes, we are aware of the will, sometimes not so much.

Dependence is connected to the two above. We are dependent on other things and beings to have something or someone to be conscious of. This is something that just doesn't go away. If it seems like it did go away, we get a desire to get it back.

 

[glaucon]

I am dropping this issue to keep our focus.

Cool.

As an aside though, I think it would be an interesting topic for a discussion on Ethics, but I fail to see its relevance here.

Fictive tends to equal imaginary. Are we conceding so fast?
It sounds like you may end up saying that something that is not true is a useful story because of x, y and z.

If it 'tends to', then that is a problem with people misunderstanding concepts.
"Atom" is fictive, yet not imaginary.
What I'm getting at here is a touch on ontology: the 'self' (whatever that might be...) cannot be discovered by physically dissecting a person.
And so, I concede nothing here.

I'm not sure what you mean by your last statement.
I will say however, that I don't think it's going to be useful to bring 'truth' into the question.....

(and just in case you head in the direction of 'ah, you believe in objective truths, Simon,' I would argue that 'fictive' already has notions of objectivity around, rather than in, it. Fictive as opposed to _________. If all truths are only fictive - or for all we know are fictive - perhaps it is not the best word. I also get this vague feeling I will be facing a neo-Wittgensteinian view of language very soon.)

lol

Nice prediction on my line of thought.

Fair enough; I'll avoid digressing into semantics.
I'll concede that by simply using the word fictive, objective is indeed invoked.
Hopefully what I said above will clarify my position, but if not, let me say this: at least, by fictive I mean necessarily not of physical origin. Akin to a memory, or a thought, or an image, the self is a purely mental event.

 

[glaucon]

But the definition of the term "self" is the aim of this thread, as far as I understand. We'll probably have to discuss things first, before we will be able to come up definitions.

Fair enough.
To proceed then, perhaps I'll reconstruct my meaning of an operating definition: what we need to do is establish some limits for the concept (which I see you get to later on in a different post..).

This implies a definition of "self", part of which seems to be "The self is not something we could know in the present, but only as a recollection from the past".

I agree.
This is indeed part of my definition of 'self'.

We don't know that. If there is such a "player", it is not necessary that we would know of him, as not knowing of him - or knowing of him - might be part of the "game".
So we can't make a definiteve answer on this point.

You are correct on all points here.
...which is kind of what I was hoping for.
Nicely done.
The point being this: the 'self' we seek, always 'points to' something else. Something hidden, obscured, or ephemeral.
This is the evasiveness of the 'self'.

How come? Why not?

You're about to answer your own question right here:

...
I imagine if I woke up every day in completely different circumstances without having any knowledge of what brought them about - say, one day normally in my room, and another day in someone else's room in Singapore, and the next day in a jungle in South America - I would be very confused.
...

my emphasis


See?

No?

You don't wake up one day not being you because then (in your example here) there wouldn't be an "I", and there would be no way for you(sic) to be "confused". The point being this: that 'you' wouldn't notice the difference; you couldn't possibly be confused, because for that confusion to be possible, you would have to have a continuity of self.

Which suggests that our common sense of self is to a greater or lesser extent bound to our circumstances, but not exlcusively.

Sure context plays a role; you could get really high on acid or mushrooms and 'lose yourself' or end up with no memory of that time. Regardless, I think it's fair to say that the 'self' is not environmentally maintained. And so, for the most part, we can ignore external circumstances.

So? You may point it out on a map, but this doesn't necessarily mean I -or anyone else- will see it as you see it.

Thank you; that's exactly my point.
Although we can all refer to something accurately and repeatedly, we're never really sure of what it is that we're referring to.

Sure. I am not fully aware of that definition yet, and I am in the process of developing it anyway. With a topic like this, I'm afraid the usual way to proceed - that is, to start with definitions - doesn't work, as it is the definition itself that is being sought after. Well, at least for some of us. But some others might have to refine, amend etc. their definitions.

Cool.
I was simply hinting that you seem to be making use of some sort of rigid, or objectively existent sense of 'self'.

How come the self is evasive?

See above. Also, thus, this thread.
However, what I'm really getting at here is what's known as the "reflexive identity". This is the source of the infinite regress problem. Referring back to my second comment here, the 'self' is never present. Until one turns one's mind to it... and then... it's only a memory.

- Note I am putting these questions to anyone who wishes to respond, to further the discussion.

Same here of course.


Again, nice to see you back gb.

 

[glaucon]

SA is correct.
As I've hinted at, we need to set limits to our concept. Without that, we cannot approach a definition. Persistent or, as I would say, continuous 'elements' or 'characteristics' can only guide us.

I can think of several things that are persistent about a self:
1. consciousness
2. will
3. dependence

Not sure about these.

The first is flat out incorrect: we often sleep, or are drugged, or can be knocked unconscious.

ergo, 'self' must tolerate non-conscious states.

The second is difficult at best.
What is will?

I'm not sure what you mean by the third:

Dependence is connected to the two above. We are dependent on other things and beings to have something or someone to be conscious of. This is something that just doesn't go away. If it seems like it did go away, we get a desire to get it back.

You seem here to be hinting at the old subjective/objective distinction.
Are you saying that our 'self' is somehow contingent upon the environment??

 

[swarm]

This is not really an answer in relation to identity.

Identity isn't anything in particular. You are who your are at the moment.

Patterns change. If you change a pattern it can become a different pattern.

Um, so?

You know this happens to people with significant head trauma. They wake up different people with no access to who they were, different likes and dislikes, etc.

They often mark the day the awoke as their new birthday.

For the sake of our continuity we give them their "old" identities, but you identity is what it is now, not then.

What makes you think the changes in the patterns we see between a 7 year old named 'swarm' and the 21 year old named swarm are not significant enough to count as a change in identity?

Because a 7 I self identify as swarm and at 21 I self identify as swarm and the community of people who know me agree.

Where is the proof that this is the same person?

Since identity is a matter of arbitrary assignment the proof is in the proclemation and acceptance of the same.

But what patterns are you referring to in Identity?

I think you are confusing the person with how the person is identified. There is a continuity of existence for the person.

 

[greenberg]

The first is flat out incorrect: we often sleep, or are drugged, or can be knocked unconscious.

ergo, 'self' must tolerate non-conscious states.

I said:

There is always consciousness of something or someone. Consciousness of air, oranges, the state of the bladder, Wittgenstein, of dreams, of sleeping ... Of course, in some instances of consciousness, we are very familiar with the thing or person we are conscious of, and in others, not so - this we then usually call "being unconscious" or "sleeping".

You seem to think that what is commonly referred to as "being awake" is the same as "being conscious". I am not making this equation, though.
I posit that the self is always conscious, but it is conscious of different things. And sometimes, this thing it is conscious of is the sleeping body, hence the notion that "we sleep".

The identification with the body is not a given. We sometimes identify with the body, and sometimes not. Sometimes we are conscious of the body (and the sensations/sense impressions that come with it), and sometimes not. As you read here, you are conscious of this text, but most other things are outside of your consciousness, at least on and off - you don't hear the clock ticking, you don't feel the tingling in your legs from sitting in the chair for hours, and you are not conscious of the hungry Africans. Unless you either deliberately turn your consciousness to them, or they somehow usurp it.

So I am using the term consciousness to mean something similar as "attention".

What is will?

The desire to do something, to bring about something, for things to be one way and not another.

You seem here to be hinting at the old subjective/objective distinction.
Are you saying that our 'self' is somehow contingent upon the environment??

Yes - in that our self cannot exist on its own, and cannot perform its function without there being an environment in which it can perform them.

 

[greenberg]

The point being this: the 'self' we seek, always 'points to' something else. Something hidden, obscured, or ephemeral.
This is the evasiveness of the 'self'.
/.../
However, what I'm really getting at here is what's known as the "reflexive identity". This is the source of the infinite regress problem. Referring back to my second comment here, the 'self' is never present. Until one turns one's mind to it... and then... it's only a memory.
/.../
Although we can all refer to something accurately and repeatedly, we're never really sure of what it is that we're referring to.

Sure, this is our everyday experience. But since when is everyday experience the norm by which to gauge how "things really are"?

And sure, Occham's Razor. But the justification to employ Occham's Razor differs from one instance of its use to another.
So why would we employ Occham's Razor here, and say that "Although we can all refer to something accurately and repeatedly, we're never really sure of what it is that we're referring to" this is how "things really are"?

And if we're not sure about something, then we can't make claims about it, and must maintain that several possible avenues of reasoning are open.

I imagine if I woke up every day in completely different circumstances without having any knowledge of what brought them about - say, one day normally in my room, and another day in someone else's room in Singapore, and the next day in a jungle in South America - I would be very confused.

You don't wake up one day not being you because then (in your example here) there wouldn't be an "I", and there would be no way for you(sic) to be "confused".

Or not. I think the sort of confusion I am mentioning above comes because we think the body is the self - and so when the body changes (becomes ill, or changes geographical position), "we" become confused. Yet, this is simply our everyday experience, not necessarily the be-all and end-all of existence or of how "things really are". See what I said above about everyday experiences and taking them as the norm.

And the fact is that depending on how we live our life, what makes for "everyday experience" more or less varies from one person to another, sometimes drastically.
Moreover, change takes place from one moment to the next. It is just that we can usually accomodate only for a particular range of changes (like waking up and finding a zit on your face, or knowing that the reason you are in New York and not in Baltimore is because earlier on, you got on the train from Baltimore to New York, etc.), but not necessarily for all changes (such as waking up 40 years old, even though you are sure that when you went to bed you were 30).

I think our ability to explain change is the deciding factor here, not the continuity of the material sense of self.

The point being this: that 'you' wouldn't notice the difference; you couldn't possibly be confused, because for that confusion to be possible, you would have to have a continuity of self.

What exactly does the continuity of self pertain to?
Merely the continuity of the body, and the external circumstances?

Regardless, I think it's fair to say that the 'self' is not environmentally maintained. And so, for the most part, we can ignore external circumstances.

In that case, there is only one option left: To posit the self as being an absolute, self-created, independent, objectively existent entity with a finite set of characteristics.

There could be all sorts of external circumstances - physical, geographical, social, divine ...
The self could be more or less contingent on some, fully contingent on others, and not contigent on yet others at all.

 

[Simon Anders]

Edit: Swarm, I realized I still wanted an answer to the issue of patterns. You said earlier that patterns could change. I agree, of course. It seemed like, in context, you meant that patterns could and yet be the same pattern. Which patterns were you referring to in the self or in 'us'?

Identity isn't anything in particular. You are who your are at the moment.

This sounds like a description of a non-persistent self.

They often mark the day the awoke as their new birthday.

And this also fits with that.

Because a 7 I self identify as swarm and at 21 I self identify as swarm and the community of people who know me agree.

This sounds like Glaucon's idea that it is fictive. A kind of folk belief.

I think you are confusing the person with how the person is identified. There is a continuity of existence for the person.

And what is this? What is it that continues?

Why posit an entity call it a person? Why break things down into subjects and objects - especially in a discussion of ontology? Why not simply say experience continues, but nothing else?

 

[Simon Anders]

"Atom" is fictive, yet not imaginary.

Someone imaged it as a good story for certain phenomena. Others now have other stories -'pre-collapsed waves' -, but recognize that 'atom' is an OK story in some contexts. How would you define the difference between imaginary and fictive - by the way I got imaginary from the dictionary definition of fictive, but I could have used fantasy and stayed with my OP.

What I'm getting at here is a touch on ontology: the 'self' (whatever that might be...) cannot be discovered by physically dissecting a person.
And so, I concede nothing here.

Oh, I knew that. Just being feisty.

I'm not sure what you mean by your last statement.
I will say however, that I don't think it's going to be useful to bring 'truth' into the question.....

What should our evaluation of a hypothesis be based on then? And when you used the word 'fictive', what made you bother? IOW it seemed you were saying it was ___________ and not __________. (which is what assertions do. what was this assertion doing, the one where you say it is fictive?)

lol

Nice prediction on my line of thought.

Ah, I should have put my prediction first, given the acknowledgment about fictive. (and I do have some memory of your position - or to remain consistant with my stance 'Information was accessed about that process labeled 'Glaucon' reveals certain argumentative patterns that therefore stand a greater chance of recurring, ha, ha.

Fair enough; I'll avoid digressing into semantics.
I'll concede that by simply using the word fictive, objective is indeed invoked.
Hopefully what I said above will clarify my position, but if not, let me say this: at least, by fictive I mean necessarily not of physical origin. Akin to a memory, or a thought, or an image, the self is a purely mental event.

The bolded portion is obviously key to your stance. I am all ears.

 

[Simon Anders]

Participants,,
Two general thoughts.
1) We seem to be defining the self (whether we think it exists or not) in terms of contents or lack thereof. I would like to raise the issue of internal relations. It is rather Euroamerican to think of 'selves' in terms of contents instead of the network of relations that 'self' has with other 'things'. If we take a strong internal relations stand - as, it could be argued, some Eastern cultures do, a self is the sum total of its relations - to family members, work, nature, etc.. The self is not 'in' the body.

I would argue that here again we have a very strong threat to the idea of the persistent self, given that relationships can and do change radically. I hope future responses will address this issue also, at least eventually.

2) I have always wanted to use a modified Ockham and rarely get to, given my beliefs, but YAY, I get to here.

Other things being equal, if T1 is more ontologically parsimonious than T2 then it is rational to prefer T1 to T2.

There is experience. There is information about experiences that seem to have gone before in time.

Why needlessly posit this entity THE SELF - one that is constructed via culture?
3) I am going to stay out of, generally, the lines of argument between, for example Greenberg and Glaucon. Again, in the interests of focus.

 

[Simon Anders]

I can think of several things that are persistent about a self:
1. consciousness
2. will
3. dependence

I seem to have had breaks in all of these. At least in terms of experience.

There is always consciousness of something or someone. Consciousness of air, oranges, the state of the bladder, Wittgenstein, of dreams, of sleeping ... Of course, in some instances of consciousness, we are very familiar with the thing or person we are conscious of, and in others, not so - this we then usually call "being unconscious" or "sleeping".

I have no idea if this is a persistence consciousness. Or a set of discrete consciousnesses or not discrete consciousnesses, but the one three years ago is no longer present and another has slowly built up.

There is always will for something or against something. Sometimes, we are aware of the will, sometimes not so much.

Again this seems like a phenomenon that could be continuous, but also might not be.

Dependence is connected to the two above. We are dependent on other things and beings to have something or someone to be conscious of. This is something that just doesn't go away. If it seems like it did go away, we get a desire to get it back.

Excellent point, see my post directed at participants above, point 1.
But...
Why break experience into subjects and objects? It seems to me the self you are describing is a very broad one and it is misleading to make it a subject. Why not simply call it experience?
I also feel there is something misleading about the level of abstraction. IOW spatial properties continue after the explosion of a nuclear weapon on a building. We can continue to speak of there being depth of space, where the building was, and time continuing, etc. - but I am not sure this means that the building continues or persists. (I feel like this was not quite a fair example, but someone I also feel like your abstractions are also not fair. Experience A ten years ago had will present. Experience T last week also had will present. Experiences between A and T had will present. Therefore we can conclude that something that is in part will persists from A to T. I feel like there is sleight of concept here.

Experience is persistent. But nothing else.

 

[onemoment]

If the mind/brain perceives things X seconds after the fact, at what point does this 'me' ever make a choice, ever do anything?

If I am the body and the body is ever changing - what stays constant of this body for me to call it 'me' and also on the point of the body, if I am the body then who is this 'mine' referred to when we say 'This body is mine'?

]If the true Self is the 'me' - a mind that perceives after the fact, a body that is ever changing - why is it that I feel so certain of something constant in who or what I am? And how true is this commonly held notion that the body/mind is what or who I am? Could I not just as likely be just this awareness that is always and ever here, unchanging and untouched by the stories that the mind tells about who or what I am?

Could this be all that the Self is?

 

[Enmos]

No the self is made of patterns. The patterns are formed by matter and energy.

Some people don't get the difference.