Sarkus:
Here are a couple of samples from your most recent reply. Added emphasis is mine.
The rest of your reply essentially makes a bunch of excuses for why people in general ought to accept 'faith' in sense #2 as a valid justification of knowledge claims, although you also say that you won't accept those excuses and that you don't expect I will accept them either. It seems like a quite muddled argument, Sarkus. Why do you want to argue for a standard that you, yourself, will not participate in accepting or adhering to? One rule for Sarkus, one for the plebians? Why?
I will reply point-by-point to your post, but this is really all that is necessary to show the flaw in your argument.
Here are a couple of samples from your most recent reply. Added emphasis is mine.
Sarkus said:You are implying here that the pretence comes from not being able to explain how one knows. This doesn’t apply to theists, to their belief in God. Their knowledge is justified by their faith, by the teachings they have had, by direct revelation in some instances etc.
Faith as justification, yes. Using the JTB criteria, if God does exist (i.e. the belief is true), then since they have justified it they can claim knowledge, right?
Your consistent argument is that 'faith' can somehow provide the justification necessary to have knowledge (a justified true belief). This is precisely what I am disputing. I am arguing that faith (in the unevidenced sense #2 that I described previously, in contrast to the evidenced sense #1 in which 'faith' means something more like a trust has has been earned) can never provide justification for a knowledge claim. It can't do that because appealing to 'faith' in sense #2 is an empty placeholder that is supposed to somehow substitute for evidence. All that 'faith' in sense #2 says is "I've become convinced that X is true. I can't explain to you whatever it was that convinced me, in any way that should convince you, so I'm just going to pretend that whatever it was provides objective justification for my knowledge claim."[An appeal to faith] is not an attempt. It is justification. It may not be justification that you (or I) accept for us to be able to consider their claim as knowledge, but it is justification nonetheless. It satisfies the basic JTB criterion, and maybe much more than that.
The rest of your reply essentially makes a bunch of excuses for why people in general ought to accept 'faith' in sense #2 as a valid justification of knowledge claims, although you also say that you won't accept those excuses and that you don't expect I will accept them either. It seems like a quite muddled argument, Sarkus. Why do you want to argue for a standard that you, yourself, will not participate in accepting or adhering to? One rule for Sarkus, one for the plebians? Why?
I will reply point-by-point to your post, but this is really all that is necessary to show the flaw in your argument.
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