Maybe the OED needs an update!
Grabbing the nearest dictionary I have, I find the following definitions of 'faith':
- A strong belief in a supernatural power or powers that control human destiny.
- Complete confidence in a person or plan, etc.
- An institution to express belief in a divine power.
- Loyalty or allegiance to a cause or a person.
Comparing the two usages I gave, number 1 - using 'faith' to mean a kind of trust - covers similar ground to definitions 2 and 4, here. Number 2 - using 'faith' to pretend to know something you don't actually know - is exemplified by definitions 1 and 3, here.
Belief in divine or supernatural powers is an irrational belief, given the complete lack of evidence for any such thing. Anybody who expresses complete confidence in a supernatural power is pretending to know some things they don't know: that there is a supernatural power, and that it is appropriate to have confidence in it.
Personally, I might quibble a little with definition 2, above, on the grounds that I am wary about having
complete confidence in anything at all, although in many practical cases the difference between complete confidence and very high confidence doesn't matter much.
She's right about the problem of induction, of course.
I already wrote in post #16:
Importantly, the scientist is not pretending to know that the Sun will definitely rise tomorrow if she says this sort of thing. It's just her strong expectation that it will, based on evidence from the past.
There are no guarantees that past experience is a reliable guide to future performance, as any investor in the stock market will quickly confirm.
When it comes to science, my own view is that science is descriptive, not prescriptive. When we do science, we're not trying to dictate how the world must operate; we are merely trying our best to describe how it has operated so far, based on experience. Any predictions we make about future events, using our science, operate on the assumption that the laws we have discovered/invented will probably continue to work as well tomorrow as they did today. That's a pragmatic assumption, not a philosophically watertight one. Call it a rule of thumb, if you like. It seems to have worked out well enough so far - but, of course, that's no guarantee either!
Yes, of course.
We can't know the future until it happens, as Sabine says in her video. But that doesn't mean it's unreasonable to expect that the sun will rise tomorrow or that gravity will still pull things downwards tomorrow. On the other hand, philosophers will happily argue that it
is, in fact, unreasonable to expect those things. But, pragmatically, even the philosophers work on the assumption that the sun will rise tomorrow, in all likelihood.
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On the wider point, I find that the people who most often resort to philosophical skepticism, to the extent where
all knowledge has to be placed on an equal footing, are the sorts of people who are desperate to try to bring science down to the same level as religion or superstition. It's because they lack
positive arguments to support their religious beliefs. At some level, they realise they are pretending to know something they don't actually know. To compensate, they go looking for things that
nobody can know, and then complain that scientists don't know them and accuse them of hypocrisy as a result.
Another very common philosophical argument that religious apologists often raise is the one that goes "We can't know that
anything is real, so who are you, Mr Snooty Scientist, to question if God is real? We could all be brains in vats, for all you know!"
Well, yes, we might all be brains in vats, fed arbitrary laws of physics that could be easily changed at the whim of the Great Controllers at any time. But, pragmatically, it doesn't make much difference. We have to deal as best as we can with the universe that presents itself to us. While many things are philosophically possible,
science needn't concern itself with a lot of them. And in practice, there are very few people, if any, who are out in the world seriously worrying that they might, in fact, be a brain in a vat somewhere.
The implicit religious argument often seems to be: my belief in the Big Guy in the Sky is just as good as your belief that the sun will rise tomorrow, because neither of us can justify our respective basic assumptions about the world. One thing to note is that, in this example,
both people are assuming they aren't brains in vats and that natural laws will in all likelihood work the same way tomorrow as they did today, but
one of the two people is making a whole bunch of
additional assumptions that are clearly more dubious.