Now, as to the notion of whether attributes such as mass existed prior to there being someone to coneptualise such an attribute:
James R seems to have one view, that mass didn't exist prior to human conceptualisation of mass, and this is indeed held to be the case by some philosophers: Spinoza, for example, said "By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence”.
So absent the intellect, the attribute ceases to exist.
He would also espouse there being a single property for each object, that property being the object's essence (its extension).
He would also espouse there being an actual underlying substance (so not "bundle theory", then).
David Armstrong, in his Instantiation Principle, said that attributes only exist if it is instantiated by an object.
If there is no object in the universe that has the attribute, then that attribute does not exist, although this considers the universe as a whole, both spatially and temporally, such that if the attribute was, is, or will be instantiated then it is said to exist.
So under this Principle, even if one agrees that mass is only an attribute once conceptualised by humans, it does exist as an attribute now, and thus has always existed, even if not exmplified previously.
Taking it back to what arfa brane said: "How do you know there's still a rose left if you discount all the "attributes"? (#post 41), which is the basic question that Hume's theory tries to resolve as "nothing".
And James R's response: "This is the old "if a tree falls in a forest and nobody is watching..." debate. Another one for the philosophers." (#post 52)...
While I see this as an unfortunate sweeping aside of an interesting issue with an apparent non sequitur (in that it seems to miss the point arfa brane was making) it does at least highlight a consistency in thought, but one that is difficult to ignore further: why does a property of a thing no longer exist just because those who conceptualise it are not there to do so?
If the universe had no mass prior to humans conceptualising "mass", how could the universe have formed as we see it now?
What we conceptualise as "mass" may be a concept that only has meaning to those that conceptualise it, but it does represent something about the thing in question.
That something doesn't just disappear because one can't formulate the thoughts or words to express it, surely, at least not within the realm of science, does it?
Sure, Spinoza et al might define their understanding of an attribute as only being relevant to human conceptualisation, but does science do that?
Our expression, our concept of that something may not be a precise description of what is actually going on, but nonetheless that something is still there, I'd suggest.
I'm interested to hear why you think otherwise?
James R seems to have one view, that mass didn't exist prior to human conceptualisation of mass, and this is indeed held to be the case by some philosophers: Spinoza, for example, said "By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence”.
So absent the intellect, the attribute ceases to exist.
He would also espouse there being a single property for each object, that property being the object's essence (its extension).
He would also espouse there being an actual underlying substance (so not "bundle theory", then).
David Armstrong, in his Instantiation Principle, said that attributes only exist if it is instantiated by an object.
If there is no object in the universe that has the attribute, then that attribute does not exist, although this considers the universe as a whole, both spatially and temporally, such that if the attribute was, is, or will be instantiated then it is said to exist.
So under this Principle, even if one agrees that mass is only an attribute once conceptualised by humans, it does exist as an attribute now, and thus has always existed, even if not exmplified previously.
Taking it back to what arfa brane said: "How do you know there's still a rose left if you discount all the "attributes"? (#post 41), which is the basic question that Hume's theory tries to resolve as "nothing".
And James R's response: "This is the old "if a tree falls in a forest and nobody is watching..." debate. Another one for the philosophers." (#post 52)...
While I see this as an unfortunate sweeping aside of an interesting issue with an apparent non sequitur (in that it seems to miss the point arfa brane was making) it does at least highlight a consistency in thought, but one that is difficult to ignore further: why does a property of a thing no longer exist just because those who conceptualise it are not there to do so?
If the universe had no mass prior to humans conceptualising "mass", how could the universe have formed as we see it now?
What we conceptualise as "mass" may be a concept that only has meaning to those that conceptualise it, but it does represent something about the thing in question.
That something doesn't just disappear because one can't formulate the thoughts or words to express it, surely, at least not within the realm of science, does it?
Sure, Spinoza et al might define their understanding of an attribute as only being relevant to human conceptualisation, but does science do that?
Our expression, our concept of that something may not be a precise description of what is actually going on, but nonetheless that something is still there, I'd suggest.
I'm interested to hear why you think otherwise?