Entities and attributes in science

We should probably start with this:

Do you understand what I've just put to you? Please let me know, because this is important if you and I are going to have a good faith discussion about this.

As you were just caught↑ misrepresenting↑ me, you should probably be very careful about how you use the words "good faith".

There's nothing mysterious about what I mean. I gave you a simple (first order) test for distinguishing attributes from entities. If you're still confused, I don't know how much more I can help you. I've spent most of this thread patiently trying to educate arfa brane about this. I doubt you've read through all of that. Now you want me to start the process again just for you, it seems.

While that paragraph is nonsense, it's also rude; the primary purpose of your posting is the condescension. You praise yourself easily along the way—

Now, I thought I did a pretty good job in my last reply to you, filling you in and trying to get you up to speed on what arfa and I have been arguing about. But it seems you're stuck in approximately the same place he is.

—but what's actually missing is anything more substantial and useful. Of course you thought you did a pretty good job; it's part of what you do, as expected as your misrepresentation of others.

Maybe I'm just wrong when I think that this stuff ought not be hard for most people. Maybe most people have a trouble distinguishing entities from attributes, concepts from objects etc. Maybe the people I mix with most often are outliers, and you and arfa represent the norm. It's a surprising discovery, if so.

Maybe you could to try being honest; that ought not be so hard for you.

What you said doesn't address my point (from the thing you quoted), at all. Can't you see that?

Did you not understand what you quoted from me? If you did, why the non sequitur response? Why not engage with what I wrote, instead?

See, James, that's just nonsense. "Why not engage with what you wrote?" you ask, but go back and actually look at what was quoted: I acknowledged your side issue that gravity and lightning are different: "Yes," I said, "but that's a different discussion." And then I addressed your fake indignance: Don't put words in your mouth? I didn't, so quit complaining about make-believe. Again, it ought not be so hard for you to be honest.

You're following arfa's playbook - attempting argument by ridicule or argument from incredulity. You need to do better than that.

And that sort of fluff is the easy way to skip out on making any more substantial argument.

You wrote↗, "If "red" is "something we do", then "red" cannot be "a fundamental part of the rose." This is fallacious, and then you retreat into "even if". The problem is in your misrepresentation: I said, "Calling the 'color' 'red' is something we do"; this is different from, "If 'red' is 'something we do' …". You need to stop misrepresenting people.

Not in dispute (at least, for the purposes of this current debate).

Well, remember, James, something you call putting words in your mouth might simply be someone observing an inevitable result of your argument.

Note your wording, though: the wavelengths we describe as red. Interesting that "we" are somehow involved, again, in this rose, despite your assertion that the redness is entirely to be found in the rose.

The "assertion that the redness is entirely to be found in the rose" is your own misrepresentation.

If the wavelengths we describe as red still exist even if we are not there to observe and describe them, then your focus on the point "that 'we' are somehow involved" is fallacious at best.

You missed the point, again. This is not an argument about language or the words we use to label things.

Fallacious. Your focus on the point "that 'we' are somehow involved" is a ridiculous word game. What we call red is our decision; those wavelenghts exist regardless of what we call them.

If you were coming to this argument in good faith, I presumed you would have taken some time to read what came before - you know, so you would be up to speed on what arfa and I have been arguing about, and so you could usefully contribute.

Instead, it seems you've just jumped in, not having bothered to find out what the discussion is about, and now you expect me to get you up to speed by repeating the things I have already spent many posts explaining to arfa.

Of course, you're not coming to this in good faith, so it doesn't matter to you that you're trying to make me jump through those hoops again. In fact, that might be your aim, for all I know.

If you could take your focus off trying to one-up me, for a moment, you might actually learn something. But I don't think you want to do that.

Do you feel better for having said all that? Those four paragraphs are actually exemplary of what appears to be your specialty. Remember, that there was "no value in retreading common ground" was part of a word game.

Again, someone who misrepresents as much as you do ought to be very careful when using the words "good faith". For instance:

I skipped over them because they were irrelevant. None of what you wrote about the relativity of velocity is in dispute. Therefore, there's no reason to side-track into that, here.

Well, remember that you huffed about, "There is no way, without an observer specified", yet all three paragraphs in question include observers. The whole point of the huff was to huff so you could feel good about wagging, "Getting the picture yet?"

We might, then, take the moment to notice the contrast: That something is not in dispute is what you say later, but in the moment you wagged according to false pretenses. The later statement that something was not in dispute does not necessarily have anything to do with what was said in the moment.

You missed the point, again … Let's not have you confusing Usage #1 and usage #2 again in this discussion. Okay?

The ellipsis omits seven return-strikes spent in setup for the condescending punch line. Anyway, like I said↑, dorkjoking the difference between weight and mass might be something one in twelve American high school physics teachers might try, but your usage didn't really go anywhere.

Now, think about your statement "the mass of the rose is the rose". Is your use of the word "mass" there a usage #1 or a usage #2? Are you talking about the entity, or the attribute?

Are you unaware that sometimes it actually matters what the mass actually is?

What seems to be the problem is that you would refuse to look at any context in which that is actually true.

If you're not sure, you shouldn't be having this discussion, and you especially shouldn't be trying argue that I am wrong or have argued "fallaciously".

Such admonitions are the most apparent purpose of your word-games; again, this is not out of character for you. And the string of false pretenses required to reach this point illustrates what I mean↑ by the flip side being no words at all insofar as addressing your sleights and fallacies is futile; each time around, it's just a shift of subject and more huff and wag.

Which, to bring it 'round, is why—

Do you understand what I've just put to you? Please let me know, because this is important if you and I are going to have a good faith discussion about this.

—you should probably be very careful about how you use the words "good faith".

Usage #1, yes. But I have been talking about Usage #2 with arfa.

Do you understand what this discussion is about, yet?

There are a couple answers to that, James: One is to suggest it's about you insisting on a definition you were careful to design, but when asked about how it works you would evade by referring to Arf, and I still don't see why he should be the one explaining your definition. Just a shift of subject, and more huff and wag.

There isn't one. It doesn't matter. The point is: beauty is an attribute, not an entity.

It is not simply an extraordinary comparison, but also—

We might say something like "red light has wavelengths in the range 600 to 700 nanometres", sure. But even that is a pretty fuzzy definition. (Is somebody really going to quibble and say "That light has a wavelength of 599 nanometres, so it's definitely not red!"?)

—extraordinarily weak. I mean, come on, James, that one is laughable. "Beauty" versus "599 nanometres"? Did you lose an argument, once, about whether something was orange or red? Or, more seriously: In all that occurs in the Universe, according to its rules such that, as we have it, the math works out, "beauty" does not appear in the math, but blackbody radiation at 700 nm, or 600, or 599, does. "Beauty" is simply an inappropriate comparison.

But it doesn't really matter. Having a scientific definition doesn't make something an entity, in the sense I have defined it.

There are a couple things amiss, there:

"Having a scientific definition doesn't make something an entity" — This appears to be fallacious. You are not going to convince me that a whale is a fruit.

"in the sense I have defined it" — And there it is. How reliable is that definition?​

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It makes a difference. To wit—

arfa's confusion here - and yours too, it seems - is more basic. You're both apparently having trouble telling the difference between the entities and the attributes. This, despite the fact that I have offered you a simple thought-experiment you could use to decide which is which. That is, I have given you an operation definition to distinguish the two, which is something every good physicist wants when he defines things.

—it's one thing if an operation definition is something every good physicist wants, but how reliable can it be if you need refer to someone else, who you disagree with↑, to explain how your definition works in practice. It's one thing if you were "quite careful" about your definition, but in that sense it is remarkable that you should require we "Ask arfa".

I don't think your operation definition is reliable; you clearly didn't think it through, and it's general purpose seems to be something to simply insist on over and over again.

Yes, different attributes have different relationships to entities. So what?

The difference between wavelength and mass is considerably more subtle than the difference between beauty and anything so fundamentally scientific, but there is a difference.

Furthermore, you were straw manning about straw men, so that, "So what?" is just more shift and wag. Remember↑, you're still out on some pseudoscientific limb pretending "beauty" is scientific the way "red" or "gram" is.

Now, then, let's talk about your dishonesty, James, because you are very dishonest:

Compare the competing definitions of "physical thing:

James R: a physical thing is something you can put in a bottle and look at.
arfa brane: a physical thing is something that has physical units.
Tiassa: a physical thing is .... ?​

Now, you have yet to tell me what your definition is. Now would be a good time for you to do that.

You claim charge is a physical thing. Okay. How so? Explain. Would this be a fair repesentation of your definition, then:

Tiassa: a physical thing is something that does something.​

If so, then okay. It's a start, I guess. But it does nothing to clearly distinguish attributes from entities. Do you have anything more specific to offer?

That labored setup is actually a misrepresentation. Observe, you illustrate with a dialogue, in which you suggest I have yet to tell you what your definition is, and then you ask if something would a fair representation of my definition. The actual discussion on that point was much more straightforward. See #77↑, in which you asked Arf, "So, I ask: in what sense is the charge a "physical thing"?" and then #80↑ in which I suggested you were being fallacious and as the first point of explanation of what that meant answered your question. That is, there is no mystery, James; you don't have to guess. It's right there, in the second paragraph of #80:

In that sense, your question is fallacious: You pretend the Coulomb as a thing that is, in order to ask your question. But the answer is in the word "is". In what sense is the charge a physical thing? In the sense that it is. In this case, in the sense that it does something.

So, no, James, you didn't need to put so much effort in to pretending confusion.

The answer to your question about offering anything more specific is to point out that your complaint that my definition doesn't "clearly distinguish attributes from entities" is completely arbitrary on your part; see Arf at #70↑, "the attributes of entities, whatever that's supposed to mean", and James R at #77, "When you say 'attributes', I'm not completely sure what you mean". Furthermore, having labored so hard to suss out my definition, you somehow missed a part: Anything more specific? Well, like I said, Arf is looking at an existential level in which the rose, being of a different velocity, is a different rose. And I also suggested that, to you, the rose is an object, while in Arf's consideration, every component of the rose is an object. More directly, I explained that in the moment of circumstance that is, the rose is what it is, and if the moment of circumstance was different, the rose would still be what it is, but that something that it is would be different. You kind of skipped over some of that, the first time through, so perhaps this is a good time to remind that part of your confusion would appear to come from your own priorities and comprehension.

Again↑, you miss a lot when you skip out on context. Like I said, akin to what the charge did to that person over there.

I think I'll skip over the details of how a lightning strike causes injury, because that will take us too far into the weeds.

Right. Whatever you say. Because that's how it goes, right? Most certainly, it wouldn't be because you already know that at some point, this charge you say is only a representation of an idea that isn't a real physical thing interacts with other things that you consider real physical things, such that we can observe the results of that interaction; that is to say, my rough-hewn definition is fulfilled, and your not-quite arbitrary, carefully devised word game finds itself insufficient to cover the gap.

So, how does it go, approximately: A negative charge seeks its highest potential, and under certain circumstances interacts with another charge resulting in an energy transfer; at the scale of lightning, there is no question that charge is interacting with the matter and charges in its pathway.

Or, alternately, as like charges repel each other, simply imagine the difference between a basic kinetic experiment playing marbles, or billiards, or just having a newton cradle on your desk. As a classroom experiment, it would make a difference if each of what you would consider the real physical things were impacting surface to surface or repelling field from field.

See above for my definition. (Remember: baby steps before you run the 1500 metres.)

Now it's your turn. Give me your best definition of "physical thing". See if you can do better than arfa brane. Go.

You already have it: It does something; that is, it exists and interacts with other things.

For the purposes of this discussion, I am happy to concede that all subatomic particles are real things.

Okay, so we now come back to the question of how long something must last, which you have previously dismissed as "irrelevent" in order to wax self-righteous.

Baby steps. Once you have demonstrated you can get to first base on what this discussion is about, then we can add nuance, if you like.

And this sort of cheap self-gratification is what all your dishonest puffery is about.

Sadly, when you talk to an expert, the expert will sometimes talk down to you.

Just like you're an expert on religion.

That's the thing, James, it's really clear that you're bullshitting. And that's the problem. Indeed, it's what #128↑ was about, in case you missed it↑. It's like when you said to Arf:

But that would require you to have a discussion in good faith. Both you and Tiassa are apparently beyond that.

Given that you have been caught misrepresenting other people for the sake of your huff and wag, you should be very careful how you use the words "good faith".

If you're unwilling to learn from experts - including being talked down to on occasion - then you're probably going to remain uneducated.

Well, to the one, your specialization in talking down to people includes subjects in which your expertise severely lacks. To the other, you're caught out bullshitting and even misrepresenting, so the self-righteous moral pretense fails.

Remember: That another is wrong does not mean you're not bullshitting. Oh, right: That another is wrong does not mean you're right. You're playing a word game; again, you're insisting on artifice when hewing to your "understanding of 'a real physical thing'".

And your condescension really is consistent with your behavior in other subjects where you are, quite apparently, not an expert.

Thus:

I'm not at all surprised at your non-response. Clearly, you were out of your depth from the start. You've made a wise choice to back out, before you make yourself look even more incompetent (on this topic).

Next time, perhaps you'll think a little more carefully before you bounce in and presume to start lecturing me about physics or philosophy.

No, James, like I said, posted in good faith. And like I said↑, convince me you're not dicking around.

You're an expert, Arf is wrong; that these two things are true would not preclude that you're playing word games for the sake of childish moralistic self-gratification. And, again, that kind of wag and huff is pretty consistent with your behavior in other subjects.

If you cannot keep things honest in a discussion, it might be better to back away.

After all, you're such an expert and so right, that you should not need to behave this way.

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Tiassa:

Again, you posted a lot in your last two posts, and yet still almost entirely failed to engage with the actual point of dispute. Instead, you spent most of your time trying to disparage me with ad hominem attacks.

If we remove the personal slights and attempts at meta-commentary from your posts, there's just not much substance there, unfortunately.

Like I said previously, it seems you're so focussed on trying to one-up me in your own mind, that you seem unable to discuss the matter of contention with any sense of perspective.

Look, if you're upset because you think I'm an arrogant son of a bitch who you feel needs to be put in his place, that's one thing. I understand why you're all emotional and stuff. But the other thing here is that one of the two of us knows what my dispute with arfa is about, while the other has given no sign that he either understands it or that he is willing to think it through. You're so busy taking issue with everything I say - and more focused on how I say things, rather than on what I say - that you're not even getting close to engaging with the substance of what I've told you.

Do you think you could try laying off the personal meta-commentary, at least until you understand my side of the argument with arfa? I want to see evidence that you understand, not just discursory claims from you and attempts to put me in my place with ad hominems. I am sure there is common ground to be found here, but if you're not willing to budge an inch to concede any common ground, or to even admit that you understand something I write, there's very little hope that we can make any useful progress in this discussion/debate.

So, I'd like to see you try a little in your next reply. I have low expectations at this point, but there's always hope.

Now, I'm going to reply to your post, but I'll probably skip over the repetitive personal insults and some of the misguided meta-commentary because, frankly, all that is a waste of my time, besides being just plain rude. So...
Try to be specific, if you're going to make accusations.

By why waste time like this, with a hide-and-seek game with post references? Why not just state how you think I misrepresented you?
While that paragraph is nonsense, it's also rude; the primary purpose of your posting is the condescension.
What you're seeing there is a reflection of how you addressed me. I don't like arrogance. I have a (possibly) bad habit of mirroring arrogance with arrogance. But, as you're aware, I didn't start this.

Perhaps you could try giving the whole condescension thing a rest, on your end, and we'll see how we go from there? I'm happy to follow your lead, either way, so think carefully about how you want to proceed.
You praise yourself easily along the way but what's actually missing is anything more substantial and useful.
Yes, I did (do). And no, that's not missing. For starters, you need to want to engage with the substance. There are no signs you have done that, yet.
You wrote↗, "If "red" is "something we do", then "red" cannot be "a fundamental part of the rose." This is fallacious, and then you retreat into "even if". The problem is in your misrepresentation: I said, "Calling the 'color' 'red' is something we do"; this is different from, "If 'red' is 'something we do' …". You need to stop misrepresenting people.
I already covered this, but see below, as you continue with the same mistake: thinking this is about the use of language.

For now, please be aware that I agree with you that human beings invent words for things, like "red" and "mass". That does not imply that "red" and "mass" are not things to be found, in some sense, "out there in the world". My contention, for the present purposes of this discussion, is that "red" and "mass" are attributes of physical objects and (most importantly) not entities, by which I mean the physical objects themselves.

Red is an attribute of a rose. A rose is an entity that has various attributes. The word "red" is arbitrary, but that doesn't mean the "redness" of a rose is arbitrary. This, I think, is a point of common ground between us.

Please indicate whether you (a) understand what I have put to you, and (b) agree with it, so far. If you disagree, please try to explain why, preferably without including personal insults.

There's more on "red" below.
The "assertion that the redness is entirely to be found in the rose" is your own misrepresentation.

If the wavelengths we describe as red still exist even if we are not there to observe and describe them, then your focus on the point "that 'we' are somehow involved" is fallacious at best.
We can leave aside the particular word "red", I hope, which is arbitrary. If we called it "grumf" instead of "red", it wouldn't materially affect this discussion, which is not about language.

You are saying, then, that the redness of a rose is not to be "entirely found in the rose", then. Am I correct, or is this a misrepresentation of what you're trying to say? Please confirm. I am not trying to misrepresent you. I am trying to understand your position. You ought to try to understand mine, too.

You say "the wavelengths we describe as red still exist even if we are not there to observe ... them". In that statement, I see the word "wavelengths" as problematic. But if you substitute the words "red light" for "the wavelengths" in that sentence, then I agree with you.

The word "wavelength" is problematic, because it describes an attribute of light (or a photon, if you prefer), and not an entity. You can't show me a wavelength in a bottle (by itself), but you can show me light in a bottle, because light (photons) is an entity.

Therefore, I disagree that "wavelengths" still exist even if we are not there to observe them, even though I agree that photons still exist if we are not there to observe them. The reason is that a wavelength is a number, like "600 nanometres". It is conceptual. It is not like an object you can bottle. Numbers in your head are concepts, not entities.

Please indicate whether you (a) understand what I have put to you, and (b) agree with it. If you disagree, please try to explain why, preferably without including personal insults.
 
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Fallacious. Your focus on the point "that 'we' are somehow involved" is a ridiculous word game. What we call red is our decision; those wavelenghts exist regardless of what we call them.
I hope that with the further explanation, above, you are able to see that this is not a "ridiculous word game". This is about determining which category things like "red" and "wavelength" and "light" and "rock" fall into: entity or attribute.

Do you see?

Please indicate whether you (a) understand what I have put to you, and (b) agree with it. If you disagree, please try to explain why, preferably without including personal insults.
Do you feel better for having said all that?
It was not about making me feel better. I was advising you to try playing the ball rather than the man. Can you do that?
Well, remember that you huffed about, "There is no way, without an observer specified", yet all three paragraphs in question include observers. The whole point of the huff was to huff so you could feel good about wagging, "Getting the picture yet?"
No, that wasn't the point. But I'm going to leave aside this bit of misunderstanding on your part, for now. We can go back to it later, if you like. The relevant point is that velocity is an attribute, not an entity. Do you understand what I mean by that? Do you agree?
The ellipsis omits seven return-strikes spent in setup for the condescending punch line.
It's a pity that - still - you have given no sign that you understand the entity/attribute dichotomy that I have offered up for your consideration.

Can you please try to restate that dichotomy in your own words, as evidence that you understand it? If you disagree with it, we can discuss that, but the first step is for you to show me that you understand what the discussion is about.
Anyway, like I said↑, dorkjoking the difference between weight and mass might be something one in twelve American high school physics teachers might try, but your usage didn't really go anywhere.
I don't know what this bit means, so I'm going to skip it for now. It looks like there's another insult in there. I'm not sure why.
Are you unaware that sometimes it actually matters what the mass actually is?
Isn't it obvious that I'm aware? It matters whether mass is an entity or an attribute, for instance.

Which is it, in your opinion? Or do you think this is a false dichotomy? Or what?
What seems to be the problem is that you would refuse to look at any context in which that is actually true.
Don't be silly. You're the one of the two of us who has so far completely failed to engage with the relevant point of dispute. I'm perfectly willing to discuss any context you like, but I want to you at least acknowledge what I have put to you, as a starting point. Not necessarily agree with me - just demonstrate that you understand. Can you do that?
There are a couple answers to that, James: One is to suggest it's about you insisting on a definition you were careful to design, but when asked about how it works you would evade by referring to Arf, and I still don't see why he should be the one explaining your definition.
I explained it to you. I have spent most of the thread explaining it to arfa. In this post, I have explained it again to you.

Show me that you understand the explanation. You don't have to agree with it, but show me you understand it. Can you do that?
It is not simply an extraordinary comparison, but also extraordinarily weak.
Firstly, note that you didn't directly address what I wrote, there. Secondly, you have given no reasons as to why what I wrote there is "extraordinarily weak". On the contrary, you have exposed no weaknesses in my position at all, yet. In fact, you haven't demonstrated you even understand it. I really hope you can remedy that in your next post.
I mean, come on, James, that one is laughable. "Beauty" versus "599 nanometres"? Did you lose an argument, once, about whether something was orange or red? Or, more seriously: In all that occurs in the Universe, according to its rules such that, as we have it, the math works out, "beauty" does not appear in the math, but blackbody radiation at 700 nm, or 600, or 599, does. "Beauty" is simply an inappropriate comparison.
Beauty and wavelength are both attributes, not entities.

You claim this is an inappropriate comparison, but you've actually given no reasons for your claim, so far. And you talk about huffing and puffing.
There are a couple things amiss, there:

"Having a scientific definition doesn't make something an entity" — This appears to be fallacious. You are not going to convince me that a whale is a fruit.​
This response is just more evidence that you didn't understand what we were discussing.

You complain about being misrepresented, yet here you are misrepresenting me - attemping argument by ridicule - or argument from incredulity.

A rose has a scientific definition. So does wavelength. But only one of the two is an entity. The other is an attribute. Do you understand this (not agree with it, necessarily, note)?
"in the sense I have defined it" — And there it is. How reliable is that definition?
Like I said, this is Philosophy 101, not Advanced Philosophy. This is basic ontology I'm trying to discuss.

So, how reliable is the entity/attribute dichotomy? Well, at an advanced level, I think it is actually problematic for various reasons. But neither you nor arfa has demonstrated that you're equipped for the deep dive, at this point. You haven't yet demonstrated that you understand what has been put to you, at the most basic level.

If we can get you past this first hurdle, then we can dive in deeper, if you like.
 
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....—it's one thing if an operation definition is something every good physicist wants, but how reliable can it be if you need refer to someone else, who you disagree with↑, to explain how your definition works in practice.
First, please be aware that I should have written "operational definition", there, not "operation definition". An operational definition of something is essentially a set of instructions for measuring the thing in some way. For example, an operational definition of "red" might involve specifying how to use a spectrometer to measure wavelengths in the range 600 - 750 nanometres. "Red" would be then be defined, essentially, along the lines of "if you use a spectrometer in this way, and measure a non-zero amplitude in the given wavelength range, then you can say you have observed red light".

Second, I did not refer to anybody else to explain how this works in practice, so I don't know what you're talking about there.
It's one thing if you were "quite careful" about your definition, but in that sense it is remarkable that you should require we "Ask arfa".
I don't know what you're referring to. You should ask arfa about arfa's position, not about mine. The only reason I would ask arfa to try to explain my position would be in an effort to determine whether he understands my position. It's the same reason I asked you. In general, in a discussion, it is a good idea to "check in" with your conversational partner, to make sure you're both talking about the same thing. Otherwise, unfortunate misunderstanding can arise.
I don't think your operation definition is reliable; you clearly didn't think it through...
You haven't given any reasons.

I have just given an operational definition of "red", above. If you don't think that is reliable, tell me why. Be specific.
The difference between wavelength and mass is considerably more subtle than the difference between beauty and anything so fundamentally scientific, but there is a difference.
Not an important difference, if we're talking about entities vs attributes, as far as I can tell.

Do you want to expand on what you mean?
Remember↑, you're still out on some pseudoscientific limb pretending "beauty" is scientific the way "red" or "gram" is.
I recall explicitly writing to you that there's no accepted scientific definition of "beauty". So, again, you appear to be misrepresenting me. Accidental, or deliberate?
That labored setup is actually a misrepresentation.
Again with that accusation? Well, okay. Let's dig down and see whether I misrepresented you.

I suggested:
Tiassa: a physical thing is something that does something.
And here, in this post of yours that I'm replying to, you quoted yourself as saying:
In what sense is the charge a physical thing? In the sense that it is. In this case, in the sense that it does something.
And then, further down in the same post, you say:
You already have it: It does something; that is, it exists and interacts with other things.
Now, my reading of these quotes is that they all say approximately the same thing. So what have I misrepresented, exactly? And how am I wrong in saying that what you wrote does nothing to distinguish entities from attributes? Please note that I discuss the idea of "interacts with" further, in this current post, below.
The answer to your question about offering anything more specific is to point out that your complaint that my definition doesn't "clearly distinguish attributes from entities" is completely arbitrary on your part...
No. It goes to the crux of our dispute.

Again, you just demonstrated that you didn't understand what we were arguing about. You just jumped on arfa's bandwagon, without even thinking it through and trying to understand.
; see Arf at #70↑, "the attributes of entities, whatever that's supposed to mean", and James R at #77, "When you say 'attributes', I'm not completely sure what you mean".
Yes, I'm not sure what arfa means when he says "attributes". And I explained why I'm not sure about that, complete with specific quotes from him.
Furthermore, having labored so hard to suss out my definition, you somehow missed a part: Anything more specific? Well, like I said, Arf is looking at an existential level in which the rose, being of a different velocity, is a different rose. And I also suggested that, to you, the rose is an object, while in Arf's consideration, every component of the rose is an object.
I'm happy to wait for arfa to confirm or refute your understanding of his considerations, rather than attempting to get to the bottom of his misunderstandings by proxy.

Let's concentrate on your position and mine, and leave arfa out of it.
 
(continued...)

More directly, I explained that in the moment of circumstance that is, the rose is what it is, and if the moment of circumstance was different, the rose would still be what it is, but that something that it is would be different. You kind of skipped over some of that, the first time through, so perhaps this is a good time to remind that part of your confusion would appear to come from your own priorities and comprehension.
This appears to be a convoluted way of you talking about how objects can change over time, yet still be identified as "the same" in some sense. There is an interesting discussion that could be had about that, but it's of no relevance to the entity/attribute argument.
Right. Whatever you say. Because that's how it goes, right?
I don't think that delving into the various physical processes that happen when lightning strikes a person is going to be useful in getting you to understand the entity/attribute distinction. So, I'll just concentrate on that part, if you don't mind.
Most certainly, it wouldn't be because you already know that at some point, this charge you say is only a representation of an idea that isn't a real physical thing interacts with other things that you consider real physical things, such that we can observe the results of that interaction; that is to say, my rough-hewn definition is fulfilled, and your not-quite arbitrary, carefully devised word game finds itself insufficient to cover the gap.
Your claim here is that "charge" interacts with "other things that you consider real physical things".

What do you mean by "real physical things", then? Entities, as defined previously? Or attributes? Or other conceptual ideas? Or what?

And what do you mean by "interacts with"?

For instance, on one interpretation, the concept "red" could be said to "interact" with a rose (a "real physical thing") in that the light coming off a rose satisfies the kind of operational definition of the "red" concept that I described previously. But, on another intepretation, the "redness" of a rose doesn't cause the rose to do anything. The redness is merely descriptive of the rose.

Do you understand why just saying that something "interacts with" something else is ambiguous?
So, how does it go, approximately: A negative charge seeks its highest potential, and under certain circumstances interacts with another charge resulting in an energy transfer; at the scale of lightning, there is no question that charge is interacting with the matter and charges in its pathway.
There's that form of words again: "interacting with".

Is the concept of "charge" useful in describing physical processes in a lightning strike? Undoubtedly. Could the process of describing something be called an "interaction"? I suppose so. But the concept of "charge" is not something that "does something" in a lightning bolt. It is the electrons in the bolt that are the entities that produce the physical effects, in reality. Charge is merely an attribute of those electrons.

Do you understand? (Not agree, mind. Understand.)
You already have it: It does something; that is, it exists and interacts with other things.
I do not dispute that "charge" exists - or "mass" or "beauty". I say they all exist ... as concepts. As attributes of entities.

Does "charge" or "mass" or "beauty" interact with other things? Well, it depends what you mean by "interacts with" - see above. But regardless of whether charge interacts with electrons or not, nothing in how it "interacts" turns charge into an entity, in the way that an electron is an entity.
Okay, so we now come back to the question of how long something must last, which you have previously dismissed as "irrelevent" in order to wax self-righteous.
I see no relevance. Please explain why you believe this is somehow relevant.
Just like you're an expert on religion.
I suppose something like that. I wouldn't call myself an expert on religion, exactly. I'd say I have some expertise about atheism and the ways in which it distinguishes itself from religion. But quiz me on the details of the Qur'an or even the bible, and you'll quickly discovery that I'm no theological scholar.
That's the thing, James, it's really clear that you're bullshitting.
It's really clear that you have yet to give a single sign that you understand what this debate is about. Perhaps you'll remedy that in your next post. We'll see.
Well, to the one, your specialization in talking down to people includes subjects in which your expertise severely lacks.
You're all talk and no action. If you think I lack the relevant expertise for this discussion, demonstrate it. Don't just bluster and whine. Demonstrate your superiority. That seems important for you, so better make a start, don't you think?
You're playing a word game; again, you're insisting on artifice when hewing to your "understanding of 'a real physical thing'".
You don't have to agree with the view I have put here. But you do need to show that you understand it, before you can criticise it. Your bluster and your ad hominems aren't working.

Please show me you can do better.
And your condescension really is consistent with your behavior in other subjects where you are, quite apparently, not an expert.
Again, rather than whining, you ought to demonstrate that I am not an expert and that you are the expert, if indeed that is the case.

I do not habitually claim expertise where I lack it. You are misrepresenting me, again.
You're an expert, Arf is wrong; that these two things are true would not preclude that you're playing word games for the sake of childish moralistic self-gratification.
It is possible that the real problem here is that neither you nor arfa is willing to show any give and take in a discussion like this one.

Maybe you have both secretly grasped the simple entity/attribute distinction I have put to you, but you're simply unwilling to admit that you have grasped it, lest my position should appear reasonable or rational (God forbid!).

Maybe you're unwilling to concede any common ground at all because you dislike me, for your different personal reasons, and you're unable to let that go for even a moment.

Whatever. The only assumption I can reasonably make is to take what you post at face value, and assume that you're both struggling - for whatever reasons - to understand something really basic about ontology.

If this is a charade you're playing at, all I can say is that it isn't making you look smart.

On the matter of "word games", I concede that the entity/attribute distinction I have put to you both is a kind of "word game", if you want to look at it that way. Labelling dichotomies is always a word game, in that language and description are inevitably involved. But I don't think this is what you mean when you say "word game". I think you're just throwing another insult, most likely.
If you cannot keep things honest in a discussion, it might be better to back away.
Sure.

So let me see you demonstrate your capacity for honesty by example in your next post. Don't skip out on the direct questions I have put to you. Engage honestly with the content. No more ad hominems in place of reasoned arguments, okay?
 
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Was it not David Hume who arrived at the "Bundle theory", whereby nothing exists other than a bundle of attributes.
There is no underlying substance, per the theory, in which the attributes are inherent.
There is just a bundle of attributes.
With the example of putting a rose in a jar, what is in the jar, exactly?
Let's strip out even just the obvious attributes of it: mass, colour, size, smell etc.
What is now left?
Can you describe anything at all without reference to one of its properties?
So what exists, other than those properties?

Food for thought, lest this thread not be considered sufficiently philosophical for some. ;)
 
Which is a property/attribute.
Well, a mass is a thing. You can touch it and weigh it.
An item's mass is simply a characteristic of the thing.

Which is evidence of the lack of preciseness in English more than anything else.
 
Was it not David Hume who arrived at the "Bundle theory", whereby nothing exists other than a bundle of attributes.
I'm not aware of that. It doesn't strike me as an idea that Hume would have subscribed to, although he might well have discussed it.
With the example of putting a rose in a jar, what is in the jar, exactly?
Let's strip out even just the obvious attributes of it: mass, colour, size, smell etc.
What is now left?
When you say something like "let's strip the mass out of a rose", what do you mean?

My argument in this thread has been that the mass was never in the rose in the first place. The same goes for colour and smell. "Size" is very vague. The rose has attributes like length and width, but those aren't, in the relevant sense, in the rose.
Can you describe anything at all without reference to one of its properties?
No. But that doesn't mean that attributes are entities. Have you followed the discussion to this point, or are you just jumping in cold?
So what exists, other than those properties?
The "stuff" that makes up the rose. A rose is made of atoms - protons, electrons, neutrons - arranged in a particular way. It's an object you can pick up and hold - unlike the colour red or "1 kilogram" or a nice rosy smell.

Having said all that, if we dig a bit deeper, it is reasonable to attack the entity/attribute distinction I have made, on various grounds. But nobody has managed to articulate a relevant objection to that dichotomy here, so far.
 
Well, a mass is a thing. You can touch it and weigh it.
An item's mass is simply a characteristic of the thing.

Which is evidence of the lack of preciseness in English more than anything else.
Thank you for this post which simply says that "mass", taken out of context, has multiple meanings.
 
I'm not aware of that. It doesn't strike me as an idea that Hume would have subscribed to, although he might well have discussed it.
He subscribed to it, at least with regard the theory of mind, but by extension to everything else.
When you say something like "let's strip the mass out of a rose", what do you mean?
You have a "rose".
One of its attributes is "mass".
So let's consider the rose without consideration of that attribute.
When you go through that process with all of its attributes, what are you left with?
My argument in this thread has been that the mass was never in the rose in the first place. The same goes for colour and smell. "Size" is very vague. The rose has attributes like length and width, but those aren't, in the relevant sense, in the rose.
Okay.
You're distinguishing between what you think are intrinsic and extrinsic properties.
So?
My question is: what is left once you strip out, or if you prefer "strip away" all the attributes of something?
No. But that doesn't mean that attributes are entities.
It doesn't mean that tomorrow is Friday, either.
Have you followed the discussion to this point, or are you just jumping in cold?
Does it matter to what I have asked, or to the points I am raising?
The "stuff" that makes up the rose. A rose is made of atoms - protons, electrons, neutrons - arranged in a particular way. It's an object you can pick up and hold - unlike the colour red or "1 kilogram" or a nice rosy smell.
Let's start with an easy one: the arrangement of the atoms, protons, electrons, is an attribute.
It helps distinguish one example of something from another.
As does, for that matter, location, or any other such property - such that we can distinguish between one thing with that particular property from one without it.
After all, if two things had exactly the same attributes, they would necessarily be exactly the same thing, would they not?
So you have the atoms, and each of those have their own property(s), do they not, intrinsic or extrinsic?
So strip away those properties.
Now what is left?

Fun, eh?
Having said all that, if we dig a bit deeper, it is reasonable to attack the entity/attribute distinction I have made, on various grounds. But nobody has managed to articulate a relevant objection to that dichotomy here, so far.
"Bundle theory" too shallow for you, then? ;)

Your notion of entity, from what I can gather, appears to ascribe it a priori the attributes of existent and, more significantly, material, although admittedly both those terms could need some level of unpacking, if so inclined.
There's nothing wrong with that, though, as this is a discussion of such things within science, and science assumes those things within its scope.
But be mindful of the what science assumes within its borders, and that it is silent on what is outside.
But I may be wrong at to your notions/definitions, since in this thread thus far I seem unable to find where you have clearly and succinctly defined what you mean by "entity" and "attribute", so perhaps you might do so here?

Just to aid, to me there is a distinction thus:
An entity is something that has distinct and independent existence, whether tangible or intangible, whether actually or potentially, physically or not.
An attribute is something that an entity can instantiate.
Attributes exist, and can instantiate other attributes.
But that's just my starting point, my "go to", so to speak.

It get's somewhat woolly as to what terms mean in philosophy, as you can imagine, as they do change depending on what area you are looking at, and even between philosophers.
Some might distinguish between object, entity, and thing, while others might not.
And some might use them interchangeably.
Science, as that is what this thread is ostensibly about, assumes the property of material existence for its scope, as you are doing.
As long as there is a clear definition, however, we should at least avoid confusion.

So, do you want to clearly and concisely detail what you mean by the terms, so that other readers don't need to hunt through what this thread has been for the past 15 or so pages?
Or at least point me to where you think you have already done so?
Thanks.
 
Because it has a different bundle of attributes, at least according to Hume's "Bundle theory".
So, I ask again, what is there other than the bundle of attributes?
:)
The unique set of values of those attributes, presumably. A sycamore has much the same attributes as a rose, but the values of those attributes are different, in a characteristic way. So if you (and Hume) mean a bundle, or set, of characteristic values of attributes, then I would not disagree. That is what we mean by an entity, I suppose.

But the original distinction remains, in that values of attributes (or properties) are merely abstract, e.g. a pink colour, unless you ascribe them to an entity, i.e. as one component of a-bundle-of-characteristic-attributes-that-always-go together and to which we have given a label, viz. an entity.

This is what one does in data modelling in fact. You draw a box on the data diagram and label it an entity. In that box you write all the attributes of interest of the entity. The box is just a label for the set of attributes.

So one entity might be a product, say Tellus 37. Another might be a drum. Each has attributes, the former including density, viscosity, zinc content etc. and the latter does also, e.g, volume, colour, gauge, You can then define another entity, a product/pack combination: Tellus 37 in drums, which will have both sets of attributes but also some of its own, e.g. gross and net weight. And so on.
 
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The unique set of values of those attributes, presumably.
Is there a difference between the same property with different values, and different actual properties, providing the "actual property" is defined sufficiently?
E.g. One could have an attribute "is X" where X can be valued between 0 and 100, thus two things have the same "attribute X" but one is of value 1 and another of value 2.
But one could define the attributes as "is X of value 1" and "is X of value 100", and thus they are now different attributes.
A sycamore has much the same attributes as a rose, but the values of those attributes are different, in a characteristic way. So if you (and Hume) mean a bundle, or set, of characteristic values of attributes, then I would not disagree. That is what we mean by an entity, I suppose.
I don't see a difference, other than the preciseness of the attribute's definition.
But the original distinction remains, in that values of attributes (or properties) are merely abstract, e.g. a pink colour, unless you ascribe them to an entity, i.e. as one component of a-bundle-of-characteristic-attributes-that-always-go together and to which we have given a label, viz. an entity.
Sure.
Abstract.
So what?
What is left?
Attributes are generally ascribed to a substance, so what is that substance / thing / entity, once all the attributes are stripped away?
Hume would suggest that there is nothing, that attributes are all there is, in one bundle or another.
This is what one does in data modelling in fact. You draw a box on the data diagram and label it an entity. In that box you write all the attributes of interest of the entity. The box is just a label for the set of attributes.
Sure.
When in an abstract such as data modelling are not all things necessarily abstract?
How, then, does that relate to the non-abstract realm?
What is the difference?
So one entity might be a product, say Tellus 37. Another might be a drum. Each has attributes, the former including density, viscosity, zinc content etc. and the latter does also, e.g, volume, colour, gauge, You can then define another entity, a product/pack combination: Tellus 37 in drums, which will have both sets of attributes but also some of its own, e.g. gross and net weight. And so on.
Sure.
We can differentiate between things due to their different bundle of attributes (I had to look up Tellus 37).
But that says nothing about what else those things are or might be, other than the bundle of attributes.
So when one talks of entities and attributes, are we not really talking only of attributes, and the bundle thereof?
What, then, is science putting in a bottle and claiming is an entity if not just attributes?
Or, if not, what is there other than the attributes?

Also, please bear in mind that this isn't a theory I necessarily hold to, only one that I have raised for discussion purposes, as it seemed both apt and interesting.

It also speaks, in some regard, to what Tiassa was saying in his definition of a physical thing: "It does something; that is, it exists and interacts with other things."
To wit, take two otherwise identical objects, one with the property of mass, one without.
Can the one without the attribute/property of mass interact with something else, or at least with another thing that also has no such attribute?
If not, but the thing with the attribute of mass can interact with another thing that has mass, can one not claim that the attribute not only exists, but it is the attribute that interacts?
And as such, as defined by Tiassa, is it not a "physical thing"?
And if attributes is all that anything is, how are those attributes (mass, charge, spin, colour, etc), whether intrinsic or extrinsic, not physical, as so defined?
Now, whether an attribute can exist on its own as such a thing that interacts, that is another question, and it is, per Hume, the bundle itself that gives rise to the "substance" of the thing, not any one property (although there is the property of being physical, which is rather a conundrum to get one's head around!).
I.e. rather than attributes instantiated by a substance, it is attributes alone, with their bundling offering what other theories (notably the opposite theory of "substance theory") would ascribe to the underlying substance that "bundle theory" doesn't require.

Again, I'm not supporting Tiassa's definition per se, only that it seems to have some merit and possible overlap when considering Hume's theory.
But then I may be wide of the mark as to the line Tiassa was examining, or maybe I'm just talking a load of nonsense.
This is philosophy, after all. ;)
 
Is there a difference between the same property with different values, and different actual properties, providing the "actual property" is defined sufficiently?
E.g. One could have an attribute "is X" where X can be valued between 0 and 100, thus two things have the same "attribute X" but one is of value 1 and another of value 2.
But one could define the attributes as "is X of value 1" and "is X of value 100", and thus they are now different attributes.
I don't see a difference, other than the preciseness of the attribute's definition.
Sure.
Abstract.
So what?
What is left?
Attributes are generally ascribed to a substance, so what is that substance / thing / entity, once all the attributes are stripped away?
Hume would suggest that there is nothing, that attributes are all there is, in one bundle or another.
Sure.
When in an abstract such as data modelling are not all things necessarily abstract?
How, then, does that relate to the non-abstract realm?
What is the difference?
Sure.
We can differentiate between things due to their different bundle of attributes (I had to look up Tellus 37).
But that says nothing about what else those things are or might be, other than the bundle of attributes.
So when one talks of entities and attributes, are we not really talking only of attributes, and the bundle thereof?
What, then, is science putting in a bottle and claiming is an entity if not just attributes?
Or, if not, what is there other than the attributes?

Also, please bear in mind that this isn't a theory I necessarily hold to, only one that I have raised for discussion purposes, as it seemed both apt and interesting.

It also speaks, in some regard, to what Tiassa was saying in his definition of a physical thing: "It does something; that is, it exists and interacts with other things."
To wit, take two otherwise identical objects, one with the property of mass, one without.
Can the one without the attribute/property of mass interact with something else, or at least with another thing that also has no such attribute?
If not, but the thing with the attribute of mass can interact with another thing that has mass, can one not claim that the attribute not only exists, but it is the attribute that interacts?
And as such, as defined by Tiassa, is it not a "physical thing"?
And if attributes is all that anything is, how are those attributes (mass, charge, spin, colour, etc), whether intrinsic or extrinsic, not physical, as so defined?
Now, whether an attribute can exist on its own as such a thing that interacts, that is another question, and it is, per Hume, the bundle itself that gives rise to the "substance" of the thing, not any one property (although there is the property of being physical, which is rather a conundrum to get one's head around!).
I.e. rather than attributes instantiated by a substance, it is attributes alone, with their bundling offering what other theories (notably the opposite theory of "substance theory") would ascribe to the underlying substance that "bundle theory" doesn't require.

Again, I'm not supporting Tiassa's definition per se, only that it seems to have some merit and possible overlap when considering Hume's theory.
But then I may be wide of the mark as to the line Tiassa was examining, or maybe I'm just talking a load of nonsense.
This is philosophy, after all. ;)
I don't really do this line by line stuff.
 
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