Determinism and Reason

[S.A.M.]

Finally.... someone with open eyes here.

Thank-you superluminal.

So if I grab a beer everytime there is a football game can I accurately predict that a football game will always cause me to grab a beer?

 

[glaucon]

So if I grab a beer everytime there is a football game can I accurately predict that a football game will always cause me to grab a beer?

LOL

You seem to have an inept grasp of the concept of cause and effect.
Your Fallacy here is post hoc ergo propter hoc.

 

[S.A.M.]

LOL

You seem to have an inept grasp of the concept of cause and effect.
Your Fallacy here is post hoc ergo propter hoc.

I am asking about sufficient cause in cause and effect.

How would you determine sufficient cause?

Or to be clearer how would you eliminate all the possible negative hypotheses arising from a set of conditions to accurately predict an effect?

 

[baumgarten]

LOL

You seem to have an inept grasp of the concept of cause and effect.
Your Fallacy here is post hoc ergo propter hoc.

So you contend that everytime Sam grabs a beer, a football game happens?

 

[river-wind]

if, superluminal, there are no random occurances, and everything is a chain of cause and event, then were would free will come in?

While the general definition of determinism doesn't say "everything is predetermined!", absolute determinism (ie, NO randomness is allowed) strongly prevents us from making any non-per-determined choices.

 

[glaucon]

I am asking about sufficient cause in cause and effect.

How would you determine sufficient cause?

Although i fail to see how this relates to the topic at hand....


As we know well via Hume's fork, any complete analysis of cause and effect cannot be complete. To speak of sufficient, or even necessary causes is not only doomed to fail, but also impossible. The overall problem here is that people have difficulty in distinguishing determinism simpliciter, from the ordinary vulgar interpretation of teleological determinism. In no way whatsoever does a deterministic point of view imply an inflexible predictive power.

 

[superluminal]

if, superluminal, there are no random occurances, and everything is a chain of cause and event, then were would free will come in?

While the general definition of determinism doesn't say "everything is predetermined!", absolute determinism (ie, NO randomness is allowed) strongly prevents us from making any non-per-determined choices.

I agree.

 

[S.A.M.]

Although i fail to see how this relates to the topic at hand....


As we know well via Hume's fork, any complete analysis of cause and effect cannot be complete. To speak of sufficient, or even necessary causes is not only doomed to fail, but also impossible. The overall problem here is that people have difficulty in distinguishing determinism simpliciter, from the ordinary vulgar interpretation of teleological determinism. In no way whatsoever does a deterministic point of view imply an inflexible predictive power.

Without prediction, how would you define determinism?

 

[superluminal]

Without prediction, how would you define determinism?

My understanding is that philosophical determinism simply states that all events are predetermined by a causal chain of previous events. Not that future events may necessecarily be predicted at all accurately, just that we know they will be likned causally to what occurrs now.

 

[glaucon]

Without prediction, how would you define determinism?

Firstly, note that I didn't say that prediction was ruled out.

And quite frankly, I'd say superluminal has already quite adequately defined determinism for us. Determinism simply implies that for every event, one can trace backward and identify another event that determined the one in question.

 

[S.A.M.]

Firstly, note that I didn't say that prediction was ruled out.

And quite frankly, I'd say superluminal has already quite adequately defined determinism for us. Determinism simply implies that for every event, one can trace backward and identify another event that determined the one in question.

So the "other event" (football game) can predict the event (beer grabbing), or not?

 

[glaucon]

So the "other event" (football game) can predict the event (beer grabbing), or not?

???

I know you can read, and yet you seem stuck on this prediction idea.

Not.

Determinism
has
nothing
to
do
with
prediction.

 

[S.A.M.]

My understanding is that philosophical determinism simply states that all events are predetermined by a causal chain of previous events. Not that future events may necessecarily be predicted at all accurately, just that we know they will be likned causally to what occurrs now.

Let me put it this way:

If a set of conditions { A, B, C} leads to an event {D}, you have two metaphorical paradigms.

1. There is a natural law that states {A,B,C} will lead to {D}, so there is no free will.

However, this presupposes that

{A,B,C} are finite concepts and are themselves not subject to change.

We have no control over the occurrence of {A}, {B} or {C} in isolation or together.

There are no alternative effects of the combination of {A,B,C}, ie there is a pattern and hence prediction.

No other sets can lead to {D}.

2. The occurrence of {A, B, C} is a matter of choice or free will.

In which case, there is no cause preceding them, they are random, follow no pattern and cannot be predicted.

 

[S.A.M.]

???

I know you can read, and yet you seem stuck on this prediction idea.

Not.

Determinism
has
nothing
to
do
with
prediction.

Frankly I have no idea what you are getting at.

I define determinism as actions which have causal sequences; in my mind non-randomness indicates predictability.

 

[baumgarten]

Determinism has nothing to do with prediction.

One implication of determinism is that any event could at least theoretically be predicted, given good enough information about prior conditions. Although it is not per se the definition of determinism, at least the possibility of prediction is necessary.

 

[superluminal]

Let me put it this way:

If a set of conditions { A, B, C} leads to an event {D}, you have two metaphorical paradigms.

1. There is a natural law that states {A,B,C} will lead to {D}, so there is no free will.

However, this presupposes that

{A,B,C} are finite concepts and are themselves not subject to change.

We have no control over the occurrence of {A}, {B} or {C} in isolation or together.

There are no alternative effects of the combination of {A,B,C}, ie there is a pattern and hence prediction.

No other sets can lead to {D}.

2. The occurrence of {A, B, C} is a matter of choice or free will.

In which case, there is no cause preceding them, they are random, follow no pattern and cannot be predicted.

Ok sam. Let's look at this.

Can you give an illustrative example of paradigm #2? I.e. an example of an event with no cause? Keep in mind that random does not imply no cause, just that the cause is the result of a complex interaction of variables.

 

[glaucon]

Let me put it this way:

If a set of conditions { A, B, C} leads to an event {D}, ...

This is question-begging, amphiboly at the very least.
You're ttrying to analyze 'cause', and you begin with 'leads to'.

No other sets can lead to {D}.

You don't know this. Again, you're rigging the 'deduction'.

2. The occurrence of {A, B, C} is a matter of choice or free will.

How so? Why the spurious dichotomy?
While election makes sense here as one possible option, 'free will' doen't obtain. Free will is an ethical concept.

In which case, there is no cause preceding them,
...

Unclear, at best.

...
they are random,
...

ditto

...
follow no pattern and cannot be predicted.

Illicit conclusion. Simply because you've eliminated one possibility, this doesn't mean that the contrary must be true.

 

[glaucon]

One implication of determinism is that any event could at least theoretically be predicted, given good enough information about prior conditions. Although it is not per se the definition of determinism, at least the possibility of prediction is necessary.

As I've said, above.

 

[superluminal]

Frankly I have no idea what you are getting at.

I define determinism as actions which have causal sequences; in my mind non-randomness indicates predictability.

I think that in theory, determinism would imply predictability if the initial conditions were exactly known. However, I think that Werner Heisenberg showed that uncertainty (unpredictability) is ultimately fundamental to the nature of the universe, not just an inability to nail down the conditions with finer measurements. Fundamental that even in theory, causes and related events at the quantum level are impossible to predict.

 

[geodesic]

an example of an event with no cause

You have an electron in a known state. You measure its location. However, it is inherently unknowable why the particle is in the location that it is. Thus there is no (observable, if you're thinking hidden variables) cause for the event.