Determinism and Reason

baumgarten

fuck the man
Registered Senior Member
I have a question. The thesis of determinism, of course, is that all events are determined by antecedent causes according to unchanging natural laws. These events include human learning and knowledge; natural laws determine not only what we learn, but how capable we are of understanding anything. If there is no free will and the truth of our reason is out of our control, then, how can we ever know that the reason and perception, which give us our knowledge of natural laws and determinism, faithfully corroborate the True Natural Laws? For that matter, without a free will to give us the inherent ability to break free of misconception and analyze the world with inviolably accurate logic, how can we know anything?
 
baumgarten said:
I have a question. The thesis of determinism, of course, is that all events are determined by antecedent causes according to unchanging natural laws. These events include human learning and knowledge; natural laws determine not only what we learn, but how capable we are of understanding anything. If there is no free will and the truth of our reason is out of our control, then, how can we ever know that the reason and perception, which give us our knowledge of natural laws and determinism, faithfully corroborate the True Natural Laws? For that matter, without a free will to give us the inherent ability to break free of misconception and analyze the world with inviolably accurate logic, how can we know anything?

Just to be sure I'm not going off on a tangent here, could you elaborate a bit?
 
baumgarten said:
I have a question. The thesis of determinism, of course, is that all events are determined by antecedent causes according to unchanging natural laws. These events include human learning and knowledge; natural laws determine not only what we learn, but how capable we are of understanding anything. If there is no free will and the truth of our reason is out of our control, then, how can we ever know that the reason and perception, which give us our knowledge of natural laws and determinism, faithfully corroborate the True Natural Laws? For that matter, without a free will to give us the inherent ability to break free of misconception and analyze the world with inviolably accurate logic, how can we know anything?
We can't, which (among other things) is why strict determinism is clearly false. The study of chaotic phenomena ("chaos theory") has securely put strict determinism to rest. Not to mention quantum mechanics.
 
samcdkey said:
Just to be sure I'm not going off on a tangent here, could you elaborate a bit?
I'm speaking solely within the context of determinism. If my knowledge and thoughts are all controlled by the laws of nature, how can I know that they accurately represent reality? If I am actually mistaken about something, then there is no guarantee that natural laws will cause me to become aware of my mistake. It would seem I cannot trust reason to show me any erroneous belief I may hold, because natural laws beyond my control may have caused my own process of reasoning to go awry of true reason. The same goes for my senses. If neither reason nor the senses can be trusted, then, what can I use to justify my beliefs? More specifically, if I am a determinist, how can I justify my belief in a greater "transcendent" reality (natural law) that dictates my behavior and experiences?

superluminal said:
We can't, which (among other things) is why strict determinism is clearly false. The study of chaotic phenomena ("chaos theory") has securely put strict determinism to rest. Not to mention quantum mechanics.
What about chaotic phenomena makes them nondeterministic? From what I understand, modern determinists tend to argue that chaotic phenomena are still deterministic even though they are unpredictable. Plenty of phenomena in nature are far too complex to predict, and yet no one asserts that any of them possess free will. As for quantum mechanics, the theory is highly interpretive, and a determinist would no doubt favor the Bohmian "hidden variables" interpretation.
 
baumgarten said:
What about chaotic phenomena makes them nondeterministic? From what I understand, modern determinists tend to argue that chaotic phenomena are still deterministic even though they are unpredictable. Plenty of phenomena in nature are far too complex to predict, and yet no one asserts that any of them possess free will. As for quantum mechanics, the theory is highly interpretive, and a determinist would no doubt favor the Bohmian "hidden variables" interpretation.
Ok. By deterministic, you mean always predicated upon some previous set of conditions. Fine. And "free will" implies an ability to choose an infinite variety of courses of action based on a given set of initial conditions. If I choose type the word "troglodyte" here and now, how would a determinist deconstruct the key conditions that make that choice of word (or any word at all) predetermined or inevitable?

Or am I misinterpreting the thrust of your questions?
 
superluminal said:
Ok. By deterministic, you mean always predicated upon some previous set of conditions. Fine. And "free will" implies an ability to choose an infinite variety of courses of action based on a given set of initial conditions. If I choose type the word "troglodyte" here and now, how would a determinist deconstruct the key conditions that make that choice of word (or any word at all) predetermined or inevitable?

Or am I misinterpreting the thrust of your questions?
Supposedly if the complete and exact history of conditions leading up to your typing of the word "troglodyte" could be known, an analysis of the data would lead one to the inevitable conclusion that you must type "troglodyte." Everything is a result of cause and effect, says the determinist. (Interestingly, David Hume pointed out that cause and effect can only be firmly established as perceptions, and besides acting in such a way as to lead us to draw logical connections between past and present, the universe itself really has no sense of causality.)

Since perfect data on the state of the universe up until the present are obviously not available, I now wonder how else the proposition that all accords to cause and effect might be justified. And, bringing that back into the context of my original question, if our sense of reason is determined by nature and so possibly (probably?) less perfect than actual natural law, how can we be assured of the true validity of any such justification?
 
baumgarten said:
if our sense of reason is determined by nature and so possibly (probably?) less perfect than actual natural law, how can we be assured of the true validity of any such justification?
I would argue that it is impossible. All we can ever achieve (IMO) is the state in which our theories and predictions exactly match what we observe. Whether those observations correspond to an "actual" reality is probably a meaningless question. Aye?
 
baumgarten said:
I'm speaking solely within the context of determinism. If my knowledge and thoughts are all controlled by the laws of nature, how can I know that they accurately represent reality? If I am actually mistaken about something, then there is no guarantee that natural laws will cause me to become aware of my mistake. It would seem I cannot trust reason to show me any erroneous belief I may hold, because natural laws beyond my control may have caused my own process of reasoning to go awry of true reason. The same goes for my senses. If neither reason nor the senses can be trusted, then, what can I use to justify my beliefs? More specifically, if I am a determinist, how can I justify my belief in a greater "transcendent" reality (natural law) that dictates my behavior and experiences?

I need to think about this for a bit but two things come to mind immediately.

1. predictability
2. defined conditions

Within these two parameters, determinism may be bi-directional (i.e. not only how it will be in the future but also how it was before)

However, the laws of nature (which define the conditions) as we know them are conceptually limited by our personal capacities and hence for us the world can only be imperfectly deterministic.

One could hypothesise that using the best tested conjecture provides us with the most rational model of predictability within the known laws of nature and as long as prediction is possible, that model can provide a basis for our beliefs.

As a determinist, your understanding of the natural laws would define your version of reality, but you must be prepared to expand your vision to include additions or variations in these laws as revealed by greater knowledge and exploration of "truth" or "ultimate reality".
 
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baumgarten said:
I have a question. The thesis of determinism, of course, is that all events are determined by antecedent causes according to unchanging natural laws. These events include human learning and knowledge; natural laws determine not only what we learn, but how capable we are of understanding anything. If there is no free will and the truth of our reason is out of our control, then, how can we ever know that the reason and perception, which give us our knowledge of natural laws and determinism, faithfully corroborate the True Natural Laws? For that matter, without a free will to give us the inherent ability to break free of misconception and analyze the world with inviolably accurate logic, how can we know anything?


Consciousness is free will, and this is why we rule the universe. The material world adapts to our will, it's the clay that we molded to create life.
 
baumgarten said:
As for quantum mechanics, the theory is highly interpretive, and a determinist would no doubt favor the Bohmian "hidden variables" interpretation.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell's_Theorem :D

It seems it hasn't been conclusively proven yet, but if I understand the article correctly, if it is, the 'hidden variables' interpretation will be dead in the water.

baumgarten said:
For that matter, without a free will to give us the inherent ability to break free of misconception and analyze the world with inviolably accurate logic, how can we know anything?
Without free will, it makes no difference. I think the determinism vs free will debate is one place where it's sensible to appy a variation of Pascal's Wager:

If you assume free will exists, and it does, you can take advantage of it. If it doesn't, your assumption makes no difference, and wasn't 'your' assumption anyway.

If you assume it doesn't, and it does, then you waste the opportunities it grants. If it doesn't, again, it makes no difference, and you were pre-destined to assume it didn't exist anyway.

Either way, it's only sensible to choose to behave as if free will exists. (If it doesn't, then your assumption is wrong, but you couldn't have changed it anyway, so it's not like you're morally culpable or anything.)
 
Zephyr said:
Either way, it's only sensible to choose to behave as if free will exists. (If it doesn't, then your assumption is wrong, but you couldn't have changed it anyway, so it's not like you're morally culpable or anything.)

That is a good analysis.

Its interesting though how few our real choices are:

The things we cannot choose are often so much more important to our identity:

where and when we are born

our parents, color, nationality

our language and culture

our health

whether we are good looking or not

whether we are intelligent or not

our creativity and talents

our disposition and personality

how and when we die.

Some of these things we can tweak with technology or effort, but our basic identity is not of our choice.

Why then does the concept of free will consume us so much?
 
samcdkey said:
That is a good analysis.

Its interesting though how few our real choices are:

The things we cannot choose are often so much more important to our identity:

where and when we are born

our parents, color, nationality

our language and culture

our health

whether we are good looking or not

whether we are intelligent or not

our creativity and talents

our disposition and personality

how and when we die.

Some of these things we can tweak with technology or effort, but our basic identity is not of our choice.

Why then does the concept of free will consume us so much?

Actually you do choose all of these things, except for your personality, which you cannot choose but you can alter later on, so even that can be chosen.
 
TimeTraveler said:
Actually you do choose all of these things, except for your personality, which you cannot choose but you can alter later on, so even that can be chosen.

I'm not even going to ask.
 
To steal from Kant - free will is only worth anything when determinism exists. If the foundation of your free choices are not based on your prior knowledge or experience, and is truely free, then your choice is random, and means nothing.

Chaos theory 100% doe NOT elimiate determinism, it deals specifically with very complex, *deterministic* systems.
Quantum mechanics, however, suggests that either 1) pure randomness can exist, and therefor pure determinism cannot, or 2)that what we currently see as random is actualy the product of an underlying deterministic system which we cannot yet see or test (thin striong theory or Variable Speed of Light theory, etc, etc.).

So to comment on the OP: you cannot know anything as a truth; it is impossible to ever know for sure that any of this exists. There will always be the "brain in a jar" theory (that your "life" is a fiction inveted by your brain, which actually lives in a jar on some shelf somewhere).

However, as pointed out by Zephyr, usefullness is key. While you can't know 100% about anything, you can know enough to get something done. Usefullness does not require full understanding, though the more understanding, the less likely that side-effects will come back and bite you in the ass down the road.
 
samcdkey said:
I need to think about this for a bit but two things come to mind immediately.

1. predictability
2. defined conditions

Within these two parameters, determinism may be bi-directional (i.e. not only how it will be in the future but also how it was before)

However, the laws of nature (which define the conditions) as we know them are conceptually limited by our personal capacities and hence for us the world can only be imperfectly deterministic.

One could hypothesise that using the best tested conjecture provides us with the most rational model of predictability within the known laws of nature and as long as prediction is possible, that model can provide a basis for our beliefs.

As a determinist, your understanding of the natural laws would define your version of reality, but you must be prepared to expand your vision to include additions or variations in these laws as revealed by greater knowledge and exploration of "truth" or "ultimate reality".
That makes a lot of sense. It calls into question what we mean by "laws of nature," though. What is a law of nature? Is it an artificial rule that seems to accurately describe the behavior of an ultimately un-knowable external reality, or does it have an independent existence, like a Platonic form, that drives natural behavior? Determinism implies that everything is at least theoretically ultimately knowable, so the latter would probably be the preferable answer.

superluminal said:
I would argue that it is impossible. All we can ever achieve (IMO) is the state in which our theories and predictions exactly match what we observe. Whether those observations correspond to an "actual" reality is probably a meaningless question. Aye?
Perhaps, if all knowledge came filtered through the senses, it would be a meaningless question. However, there is some knowledge that appears to come to us almost exclusively a priori. To use an example from geometry, is a circle "actually" all points on a two dimensional plane that lie some distance r from one point C? Or is that just an observation of something? Maybe it is a rule that we made up to approximate the features of so-called "circles" in the real world. A determinist would say that the constance of the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter is a law of nature; but no physically observable circle-like object actually exhibits this exact ratio. So is it really a law, or have the "real" laws (if they exist) determined that we only believe it to be one?

If we answer with the latter, then, as Zephyr pointed out, determinism becomes a moot philosophy. These True Laws are then completely beyond comprehension, and thus have been so far removed from the human experience that whether they actually exist or not is irrelevant. In such a case, there is no reason not to believe that we do have free will.

Since determinism insists that there is no free will, then, we must assume the former. That the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter is constant is a true law of nature whose existence and validity can be reached through the use of reason - which brings us back to the first question of inherent, determined fallacy.

So the question of "actual" reality, or Truth, defines determinism in a sense; and at the same time it hints at an interesting paradox within its own tenets.
 
baumgarten said:
That makes a lot of sense. It calls into question what we mean by "laws of nature," though. What is a law of nature? Is it an artificial rule that seems to accurately describe the behavior of an ultimately un-knowable external reality, or does it have an independent existence, like a Platonic form, that drives natural behavior? Determinism implies that everything is at least theoretically ultimately knowable, so the latter would probably be the preferable answer.

Based on my own views of objective reality ( the interpretation of subjective perceptions of "real" phenomena), I would say that a "law of nature" is a pattern that is repetitive in this objective reality and is also a testable conjecture.

If we think of the human brain as a pattern seeking organism which categorises fragments of information by inherent qualities and presents them as a "whole" image, a law of nature would be a kind of mould into which many sets of fragments fit in such a way as to create a similar picture. Since our experience to date has shown that we need not completely discard any of the old moulds, merely fine tune them, we are realtively "safe" in assuming such moulds to be deterministic in nature; interestingly, the very act of accepting these moulds also negates our free will, since any changes or variations in the moulds imply a rejection of the existing model.
 
I have a question.

If determinism is the stance that all phenomena are causally linked in a continuous chain of causes and events, is it not obvious that determinism is a simple and accurate statement about how the universe operates?

Determinism does not postulate that all events are predetermined, just that there are no mystical or truly "random" occurrances.

I guess saying that something causes every event seems a tad obvious to me.
 
superluminal said:
I have a question.

If determinism is the stance that all phenomena are causally linked in a continuous chain of causes and events, is it not obvious that determinism is a simple and accurate statement about how the universe operates?

Determinism does not postulate that all events are predetermined, just that there are no mystical or truly "random" occurrances.

I guess saying that something causes every event seems a tad obvious to me.

If determinism is the stance that all phenomena are causally linked in a continuous chain of causes and events...

Then you have no free will.
 
superluminal said:
I have a question.

If determinism is the stance that all phenomena are causally linked in a continuous chain of causes and events, is it not obvious that determinism is a simple and accurate statement about how the universe operates?

Determinism does not postulate that all events are predetermined, just that there are no mystical or truly "random" occurrances.

I guess saying that something causes every event seems a tad obvious to me.

Finally.... someone with open eyes here.

Thank-you superluminal.
 
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