(continued...)
I asked Traverse "Why isn't ID science? And what would it imply if ID indeed isn't science? Does ID not being science (assuming that it isn't) really have any implications about whether or not ID is an open possibility regarding the origin of life?"
Traverse replied, "I actually have three degrees in Chemistry, and was top of my class at Honours level, so it's just that I'm thoroughly trained in hard STEM science & I don't feel any need whatsoever to justify my opinion of ID/creationism to you"
So James, do you really think that's a satisfactory answer to the questions I asked?
The point being that having degrees (hopefully) indicates some increased ability to justify one's views (in the subject area of the degrees).
Degrees don't substitute for having to justify one's views. It doesn't suggest that other people must credulously believe whatever the person with the degrees says.
I agree with you that argument from authority is a logical fallacy, including argument from one's own authority. Traverse, though, is not obliged to answer your questions if he doesn't want to.
I also agree to you that he didn't answer the questions you asked. But I did, at some length. It is puzzling that you haven't replied to my post, in which I directly answered the questions you asked. After all, if your aim was to get an answer to your questions, that aim has been achieved, has it not?
Otherwise, why don't atheists believe whatever people with doctorates in theology tell them about God and the divine?
That needs quite a bit of unpacking.
A person with a doctorate in theology can no doubt tell me lots of interesting and useful things about God and the divine, referencing such things as their own scholarship and the scholarship of other experts in their field of study, on topics such as archeology, textual analysis of "scriptures", research into the origins and alterations of those writings over the years, the history of thinking and actions of various religious authorities, and so on and so forth.
If that information is all fact-based, then I, as a atheist, am unlikely to have major objections to believing what they tell me. They are the experts in their field; they know a lot more about the relevant facts than I do.
The point where my willingness to believe them (or anyone else) stops is at the point where the facts trail off into subjective belief and speculation, because at that point their words lose their objective basis and become purely statements of their own beliefs (or of the beliefs of others, with whom they agree).
For example, if a Doctor of Theology tells me that a recent archeological dig has unearthed a location that corresponds to a magical fountain mentioned in various ancient scrolls, I am quite happy to look at the evidence and listen to his/her arguments in support of this as "fact". If said Doctor goes on to assert that the fountain is actually - really - magical, then I will be extremely skeptical of that claim, up until the point that it is established as a fact, supported by suitable objective evidence.
The same goes, of course, for all claims that the gods (of whatever religion) are real. Those claims, in my experience, invariably boil down to subjective belief rather than to objective evidence (fact).
I've always been a bit critical of the idea that ID is science in the narrow sense. (I've mentioned several reasons earlier in this thread.) But it's certainly a question of fundamental ontology.
The problem is: philosophy, including ontology or any other sub-field of it, doesn't do much for us in terms of digging up facts. Philosophy is more concerned with "if
this, then
that". To take a well-known example, Aristotle philosophised about such matters as why and how heavy bodies fall to earth, and he was utterly wrong in his description - contradicted by later scientific facts. Nevertheless, his opinions held sway in much of the western world for one and a half millennia, not least because he was an eloquent writer who was able to defend his views persuasively. The only thing missing was facts.
The universe displays order. That order seems to be isomorphic with human reason, such that employment of human reason makes us more likely to understand the order of reality. So where did the order of nature come from?
That's a complicated question with many possible answers. Even the question itself hides certain assumptions. I'm not going to try to unpack it in this thread.
If we assume that the universe has an explanation, cause or Source (
the principle of sufficient reason) it seems reasonable to hypothesize that whatever the Source of the order of reality is, it is at least as orderly and rational as its effect (phenomenal reality).
What seems reasonable is not always the truth. Common sense is often not a good guide; there is a ton of examples of that in the history of science.
Of course we don't really know that, it would just be a hypothesis. The question is why this hypothesis is supposed to be ignorant, laughable and worthy of contempt, when science perceives many questions that seem to call for an answer and hypothesizes about what the question might be.
I think you're projecting. You'd like to think, for some reason, that scientists aren't interested in the "explanation" for order in the universe, or whatever. But I think that, on the contrary, that's why a lot of people choose careers in science in the first place.
Expertise on chemical bonds or organic syntheses or whatever it is, is very relevant to discussions of the origin of life. Central, even.
I'm glad you agree with me on that.
But it isn't directly relevant to questions of fundamental ontology, the nature of science or demarcation problems.
Philosophy alone has failed over the last few millennia to provide us with a convincing answer about the origins of life. Science has made more progress on the question in the past 100 years than philosophy made in the previous 3000.
Not really. What philosophers of science tend to do is to observe scientists and what scientists do from an outsiders' perspective, and to draw conclusions about science and practice from those observations. Not all, but most, philosophers of science have humanities backgrounds, not science backgrounds. Where they have made mistakes, it is in importing assumptions of their own about science or the scientists and using them to draw conclusions, which has sacrificed some of their supposed objectivity.
This is not, by any means, to say that the body of work in the philosophy of science is wrong, in general, or anything like that. However, I think that there is some friction between what scientists think about what they do and what philosophers of science think about what scientists do. Since this is often a matter of opinion - a subjective assessment rather than a fact-based one - it's not an easy tension to resolve.