It highlights a key problem with the reductionist view of consciousness - namely that it's taking one big step outside of empiricism (which is the official modus operandi of empiricism)..... to reiterate again, I have no problems with empiricism. Its only when it is called upon to explain/justify things beyond its jurisdiction that I call foul. If you don't know the answer to something, what do you call upon to determine the least amount of additional assumptions? (One's values/presumptions?) And how would this have any bearing on the actual nature of things? Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image! In short, why can't you tow the actual line of an empirical examination of consciousness which would be something like "many of the higher functions of consciousness appear to be processed in the brain, but in the absence of a reductionist model of consciousness, we can not say more than that without entering the arena of speculation." What is the necessity for added assumptions?