The "Stage Theory of Theories" - Cause for Concern?

@ Parmalee

Interesting thoughts. Surely also the dominance of Logical Positivism (even to those not directly familiar with it) has/had a great deal to do with the overwhelming antirealist sentiment in physics over the last century or so, quantum physics in particular. The weirdness of the quantum world virtually fits hand in glove with positivist doctrine, i.e. science properly understood concerns itself only with what is observable.

What's interesting about discussions with working physicists in places such as this -- and I recall first noticing this years ago on TheVat's site -- is that they tend to be thoroughly imbued with a vaguely positivistic ideology, probably without even being aware of the causes of their particular worldview, which they then extend to encompass all of science. It all comes across as very doctrinaire: there is only one way to approach science. Anyone else doesn't know what they're talking about. You see this reflected in comments such as "Science can't tell us how nature is, only how nature behaves" and "Our models do not even purport to describe reality".

Compare your own:

What is surprising is when fairly bright people can't get outside of their own narrow worldview enough to even entertain the merits of other world views.

with what John Clauser says, whom I quoted before:

[John] Clauser recalled that during his student days "open inquiry into the wonders and peculiarities of quantum mechanics" that went beyond the Copenhagen interpretation was "virtually prohibited by the existence of various religious stigmas and social pressures, that taken together, amounted to an evangelical crusade against such thinking."

"Quantum: Einstein, Bohr, and the great debate about the nature of reality", Manjit Kumar, p356


Through it all, however, there have always been one or two independent spirits, not so easily tamed by the prevailing social zeitgeist, e.g. David Bohm, John Bell, and of course, dear old Albert.

Indeed, realism is in danger of becoming -- dare I say -- fashionable again in physics with the rising (as far as I can discern) popularity of the Many Worlds view. Whatever you happen to think of the view yourself, the proponents could not be more clear: "Shut up and calculate" isn't good enough for science!
 
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P.S.

What is surprising is when fairly bright people can't get outside of their own narrow worldview enough to even entertain the merits of other world views.

I can think of no better example of this than current attitudes to Intelligent Design. Can you?

Anything will be entertained -- no matter how preposterous (e.g. the kind of crap that keeps Lawrence Krauss in Ferraris, and that lovely Sabine fulminates against) -- just so long as there is no trace of the dreaded G-word.

This will be denied, of course, lip service to open-mindedness duly paid: "Show us the evidence and we'll happily entertain it" -- which is exactly like talking to an Islamic fundamentalist: "Show me the evidence that Allah does not exist and I'll carefully consider it".

No prizes for guessing how these exchanges invariably go lol.
 
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This is very strange. It's like a lab scientist being dismissive of theoretical science. But it's especially odd as both Dawkins and Harris dabble in the political a fair bit, and perhaps psychology to a lesser degree. IOW, areas for which "rigor" has to be conceptualized in a very different manner. Dawkins, for instance, has frequently said that he finds Social Darwinism deplorable. Great, I agree. Then he'll go on about blah blah blah without bothering to note that Social Darwinism hasn't really got a damn thing to do with Darwin. That's kind of an important detail to overlook! The idea of Social Darwinism, as best as I can determine, is founded almost entirely upon some twisted and contorted notion of "survival of the fittest". It's about as much to do with Darwin as Naziism is to do with Nietzsche. Dawkins might be more persuasive if he considered it's fallacious foundations in the first place.

Even the gentlest of men, Charles Darwin, has one or two very disturbing passages (in "The Descent of Man", I believe). Perhaps you're already familiar with them. I'll try to track them down if you're not.


As promised . . .

"With savages, the weak in body or mind are soon eliminated; and those that survive commonly exhibit a vigorous state of health. We civilised men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check the process of elimination; we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we institute poor-laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save the life of every one to the last moment. There is reason to believe that vaccination has preserved thousands, who from a weak constitution would formerly have succumbed to small-pox. Thus the weak members of civilised societies propagate their kind. No one who has attended to the breeding of domestic animals will doubt that this must be highly injurious to the race of man. It is surprising how soon a want of care, or care wrongly directed, leads to the degeneration of a domestic race; but excepting in the case of man himself, hardly any one is so ignorant as to allow his worst animals to breeds."

"The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex", (second edition, 1874)
 
This is liable to raise the temperature of the room, but I completely disagree. The modern eugenics program was largely instigated by Darwin's very own cousin (Francis Galton). David Stove in his wonderful "Darwinian Fairytales" describes Darwinian doctrine as an "incitement to commit crime". I'm in full agreement.

For readers' consideration, I quote from the abovementioned David Stove. I have this on a PDF file so if you want more . . .

(all emphasis in original)



It will perhaps be said, in defence of Darwinism, that many and enormous crimes have been committed in the name of every large and influential body of ideas bearing on human life. Whether that is true or not, I do not know. But even if it is, there are great and obvious differences, among such bodies of ideas, in how easily and naturally they amount to incitement to the commission of crimes. Confucianism, for example, or Buddhism, do not appear to incite their adherents to crime easily or often. National Socialism, by contrast, and likewise Marxism, do easily and naturally hold out such incitements to their adherents, and indeed (as is obvious) owe a good deal of their attractiveness to this very fact.

It is impossible to deny that, in this respect, Darwinism has a closer affinity with National Socialism or Marxism than with Confucianism or Buddhism. Darwin told the world that a 'struggle for life', a 'struggle for existence', a 'battle for life', is always going on among the members of every species. Although this proposition was at the time novel and surprising, an immense number of people accepted it. Now, will any rational person believe that accepting this proposition would have no effect, or only randomly varying effects, on people's attitudes towards their own conspecifics? No. Will any rational person believe that accepting this novel proposition would tend to improve people's attitudes to their conspecifics - for example, would tend to make them less selfish, or less inclined to domineering behaviour, than they had been before they accepted it? No.

Quite the contrary, it is perfectly obvious that accepting Darwin's theory of a universal struggle for life must tend to strengthen whatever tendencies people had beforehand to selfishness and domineering behaviour towards their fellow humans. Hence it must tend to make them worse than they were before, and more likely to commit crimes: especially crimes of rapacity, or of cruelty, or of dominance for the sake of dominance.

These considerations are exceedingly obvious. There was therefore never any excuse for the indignation and surprise which Darwinians and neo-Darwinians have nearly always expressed, whenever their theory is accused of being a morally subversive one. For the same reason there is, and always was, every justification for the people, beginning with Darwin's contemporaries, who made that accusation against the theory. Darwin had done his best, (as I said in Essay II above), to separate the theory of evolution from the matrix of murderous ideas in which previously it had always been set. But in fact, since the theory says what it does, there is a limit, and a limit easily reached, to how much can be done in the way of such a separation. The Darwinian theory of evolution is an incitement to crime: that is simply a fact.

It is perfectly possible, of course, and indeed it constantly happens, that publishing a certain proposition is an incitement to crime, and yet that the proposition is a true one. If a large amount of money, or drugs, or firearms, is unprotected at a certain place, and I publish this truth, then I incite to crime: indeed, 'the greater the truth, the greater the incitement'. This is merely an instance of what every sensible person knows: that there are truths which morally ought not to be told to children, to the moribund, to people whose sanity hangs by a thread, or to the criminally-inclined. So I do not mention Darwinism's being an incitement to crime as a reason for thinking that it is false. I mention it as a fact worth knowing, which is almost never stated, but is, very often indeed, wilfully concealed even by people who know it perfectly well.
 
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As an example, consider Alan Sokal's Fashionable Nonsense. It's certainly not all bad, but there are definitely moments where I find myself wondering if he is being deliberately obtuse.


Since he got dragged in here . . .

"We fundamentally agree with what Feyerabend says about the scientific method, considered in the abstract: "The idea that science can, and should, be run according to fixed and universal rules, is both unrealistic and pernicious." "

-- Alan Sokal, "Cognitive Relativism in the Philosophy of Science" in "Beyond the Hoax" p198
 
Among all the dross that has been written on this site (yes, the search continues lol) about The Scientific Method over the years, by far the most sensible post I've seen so far is the following by our very own C C (surprise surprise :) ) dating back to 2017. I hope he/she won't object to my reproducing it below.

("What Qualifies as Science?", General Science & Technology, post #77, my red emphasis added).




QUOTE

Reference to "scientific method" in the non-plural and global way is a lingering prop to humor folk who refuse to give up on that particular belief.[*] The current content filling that idea of a "globally applicable SM that is not a toolkit of many specialized and contingent techniques" can very well be modified or replaced by any future generation of textbook writers (still doggedly catering to that earlier fable) that has a reason to do so. Whether it's a claimed reason that it "improves science" or whatever other platitude would soothe the members of the sensitive / prickly congregation or fellowship of SM believers.

It's not as if whatever fashionable mask the impotent SM prop is wearing today or tomorrow would amount to a hill of beans to a working science community that ignores the publicly cherished fable to begin with (i.e., back to the perspectives of Percy Bridgman and Peter Medawar with respect to the latter).

[*] (footnote) Though also for occasional pragmatic reasons, rather than riding on the momentum of blind custom / tradition alone. A few examples in the Anderson / Hepburn quote further down.
  • William F. McComas: MYTH 4: A GENERAL AND UNIVERSAL SCIENTIFIC METHOD EXISTS

    The notion that a common series of steps is followed by all research scientists must be among the most pervasive myths of science given the appearance of such a list in 5 the introductory chapters of many precollege science texts.

    The steps listed for the scientific method vary somewhat from text to text but usually include [...] The universal scientific method is one of science educations’ most pervasive “creeping fox terriers.”

    The multi-step list seems to have started innocently enough when Keeslar (1945a b) prepared a list of a number of characteristics associated with scientific research [...] This list was refined into a questionnaire and submitted to research scientists for validation. [...] Textbook writers quickly adopted this list as the description of how science is done. In time the list was reduced from ten items to those mentioned above, but in the hands of generations of textbook writers, a simple list of characteristics associated with scientific research became a description of how all scientists work.

    Another reason for the widespread belief in a general scientific method may be the way in which results are presented for publication in research journals. The standardized style makes it appear that scientists follow a standard research plan. Medawar reacted to the common style exhibited by research papers by calling the scientific paper a fraud since the final journal report rarely outlines the actual way in which the problem was investigated. Those who study scientists at work have shown that no research method is applied universally.

    The notion of a single scientific method is so pervasive that many students must be disappointed when they discover that scientists do not have a framed copy of the steps of the scientific method posted above each laboratory workbench. Close inspection will reveal that scientists approach and solve problems with imagination, creativity, prior knowledge and perseverance. These, of course, are the same methods used by all effective problem-solvers. The lesson to be learned is that science is no different from other human endeavors when puzzles are investigated. Fortunately, this is one myth that may eventually be displaced since many newer texts are abandoning or augmenting the list in favor of discussions of methods of science. --(PDF) THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF THE NATURE OF SCIENCE: DISPELLING THE MYTHS

UNQUOTE


Here's that PDF . . .


And to see the original post . . .

 
From the PDF above (my red emphasis added) . . .



THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF THE NATURE OF SCIENCE: DISPELLING THE MYTHS

William F. McComas
Rossier School of Education - WPH
Univerisity of Southern California
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0031

Adapted from the chapter in W. F. McComas (ed.) The Nature of Science in Science Education, 53-70. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

The “myths of science” discussed here are commonly included in science textbooks, in classroom discourse and in the minds of adult Americans. These fifteen issues, described here as “myths of science,” do not represent all of the important issues that teachers should consider when designing instruction relative to the nature of science, but may serve as starting points for evaluating current instructional foci while enhancing future curriculum design. Misconceptions about science are most likely due to the lack of philosophy of science content in teacher education programs and the failure of such programs to provide real science research experiences for preservice teachers while another source of the problem may be the generally shallow treatment of the nature of science in the textbooks to which teachers might turn for guidance. Some of these myths, such as the idea that there is a scientific method, are most likely caused by the explicit inclusion of faulty ideas in textbooks while others, such as lack of knowledge of the social construction of scientific knowledge, are the result of omissions in texts.

As Steven Jay Gould points out in The Case of the Creeping Fox Terrier Clone (1988), science textbook writers are among the most egregious purveyors of myth and inaccuracy. The “fox terrier” refers to the classic comparison used to express the size of the dawn horse, tiny precursor to the modern horse. This comparison is unfortunate for two reasons. Not only was this horse ancestor much bigger than a fox terrier, but the fox terrier breed of dog is virtually unknown to American students. The major criticism leveled by Gould is that once this comparison took hold, no one bothered checking its validity or utility. Through time, one author after another simply repeated the inept comparison and continued a tradition making many science texts virtual clones of each other on this and countless other points.

In an attempt to provide a more realistic view of science and point out issues on which science teachers should focus, this chapter presents and discusses fifteen widely held, yet incorrect ideas about the nature of science. There is no implication that all students, or most teachers for that matter, hold all of these views to be true, nor is the list meant to be the definitive catalog. Cole (1986) and Rothman (1992) have suggested additional misconceptions worthy of consideration. However, years of science teaching and the review of countless texts has substantiated the validity of the following inventory presented here.
 
Finally, I'd suggest some caution in reading Mr McComas' "myths of science". It's certainly a huge improvement, but I fear he's doing a wee bit myth perpetuation of his own!
 
(They do sometimes explore philosophy of mind, to a degree, but it's always in a very instrumental or technical manner
Christof Koch comes to mind.

Still catching up with the last four pages. So far, all I can say is most scientists strike me as instrumentalists. For those following along here, maybe a brief review of the anti realist view is useful.

 
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Christof Koch comes to mind.

Still catching up with the last four pages. So far, all I can say is most scientists strike me as instrumentalists. For those following along here, maybe a brief review of the anti realist view is useful.

I doubt this is the case, though it may possibly true of a lot of particle physicists (needless to say, a tiny proportion of all scientists). Most of the scientifically educated people I've discussed this with think there is an objective reality to be modelled, and that the models of science partially represent that reality, but often only one aspect of it and/or approximately.

As ever with these things, the tendency try to force people into opposing extreme camps (so that we can have a nice knockdown argument about it all) loses nuance.

As I so often find myself repeating on these forums, it seems to me the key concept that is so often not taken into account is that theories are models. However they are modelling something real and the better the model the closer to reality they probably are. I do not think that is instrumentalism, or not in the extreme, e.g. "anti-realist", way instrumentalism is often characterised.
 
I can think of no better example of this than current attitudes to Intelligent Design. Can you?

Anything will be entertained -- no matter how preposterous (e.g. the kind of crap that keeps Lawrence Krauss in Ferraris, and that lovely Sabine fulminates against) -- just so long as there is no trace of the dreaded G-word.

This will be denied, of course, lip service to open-mindedness duly paid: "Show us the evidence and we'll happily entertain it" -- which is exactly like talking to an Islamic fundamentalist: "Show me the evidence that Allah does not exist and I'll carefully consider it".

No prizes for guessing how these exchanges invariably go lol.

If we're talking Intelligent Design proper, I find that deeply problematic, to put it mildly. Whether it's more appropriate to characterize it as a con or as a conspiracy, I don't know. That said, cons and conspiratorial elements are common to everything from scientism to Scientology to Catholicism and Evangelical Christianity, so it's hardly unique in that respect.

If we can separate some of the ideas from all of that, as much as is possible or feasible... I don't know. In some respects, there are aspects not dissimilar to a panentheistic perspective, I think. On the other hand, there are aspects not unlike ideas posited occasionally even in better science fiction.

But with ID, or anything ostensibly like ID, but not really ID, any potential for reasonable discussion seems to be hindered by the proliferation of bad actors on the internet. I don't know why this is, but it does seem that whenever someone introduces this idea on the interwebs, they are almost, without fail, speaking from the perspective of ID orthodoxy. Of course, they always seem to pretend otherwise until like page 10 or 12 or something.

I think there's a potential for an engaging discussion to be had, it just doesn't ever seem to happen.
 
Still catching up with the last four pages. So far, all I can say is most scientists strike me as instrumentalists. For those following along here, maybe a brief review of the anti realist view is useful.

A few things to say to that.

My impression is that instrumentalism, or some kind of antirealist stance in general, is extremely rare throughout the sciences as a whole. Scientific realism is the unreflective or pre-reflective common sense position, and it takes a heavy dose of philosophy to disabuse one of the notion.

How many geologists do you know, for example, who do not think tectonic plates are real? Indeed, I suspect they'd (in general) be utterly bemused by the question "Are tectonic plates real?" You'd probably get a blank stare to begin with. They may think you are quite mad. When they finally understood what is being is asked, you might hear "Have you lost your mind? Of course they're real!".

(cf. Ask a physicist about the reality of superpositions of states, say. He may say yes or he may say no. It's unlikely, though, that he will think you mad.)

Likewise, how many chemists do you know who are skeptical of the existence of atoms, or biologists who doubt the reality of genes or natural selection? How many psychologists think that pain or beliefs are "useful fictions"?

There is of course one glaring exception: physics, and in particular, quantum physics, as exchemist notes above. Compare:

What's interesting about discussions with working physicists in places such as this -- and I recall first noticing this years ago on TheVat's site -- is that they tend to be thoroughly imbued with a vaguely positivistic ideology, probably without even being aware of the causes of their particular worldview, which they then extend to encompass all of science. It all comes across as very doctrinaire: there is only one way to approach science. Anyone else doesn't know what they're talking about. You see this reflected in comments such as "Science can't tell us how nature is, only how nature behaves" and "Our models do not even purport to describe reality".


As noted in the quote above, a great many physicists, thoroughly imbued with Bohr-esque thought in their education, espouse a vaguely antirealist or instrumentalist position which, due to philosophical naivete, is often incoherent. Also due to philosophical naivete, they assume (unreflectively) that what applies to them in physics applies to all of science. And then scientists in other disciplines, due perhaps to the respect commanded by physics as the science par excellence, start thinking (unreflectively) that what applies to physics must apply to them as well.

Instrumentalism makes a great deal of sense when applied to quantum physics: it's extremely hard (cf. impossible) to for us to conceive of how something can be both a particle and a wave; it's extremely hard (cf. impossible) to for us to conceive of how a cat can be both alive and dead, or perhaps neither alive nor dead, existing (or not!) only in some inconceivable (literally!) superposition of states.

On the other hand, it doesn't make much sense at all when applied to dinosaurs or hurricanes!

Antirealist positions of various kinds, including instrumentalism, can of course be formulated in a perfectly coherent and consistent way. Whether it is the appropriate stance to adopt is another matter to be addressed separately.



Let me give an example of possible incoherency.

On a standard instrumentalist position, scientific theories, or at least those containing unobservables, are merely tools or instruments, as the name suggests. Tools or instruments do not have truth values; they are neither true nor false. For example, if a theory prima facie asserts (i.e. seems to assert) that electrons have a mass of X, say, this is not to be read literally. Appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, on the instrumentalist view, no such thing is being asserted; it is not being asserted that exists a tiny invisible thingy with a mass of X. This is all a "useful fiction".

Such assertions, though, apparently making claims about unobservable reality, can be translated into claims pertaining only to observable reality, which have truth values, thus can be tested for truth or falsity.

Now since, on the instrumentalist view, scientific theories (containing unobservables) do not have truth values, are not to be read literally, moreover make no assertions about unobservable reality, then anyone declaring allegiance to instrumentalism and who goes on to further assert that scientific theories are falsifiable, or that scientific theories yield knowledge of unobservable reality (photons et al), has lapsed into incoherency. Obviously, that which has no true value (T/F) -- e.g. a hammer -- cannot be shown to be either true or false.



You may recall, Mr Vat, I got myself into a lot of trouble on another site a few years ago (not your own site, but you were there) for pointing out the incoherencies defended by the site moderators, presumably working physicists. Why did this happen? Observe:

* It was first asserted that "Science does not describe reality" and "Scientific theories/models do not even try to describe reality" and suchlike.

* Properly qualified, and applied to physics, and especially quantum physics, this is a sensible enough position, indeed Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg said very similar things themselves. It can be contested, of course, and people like Einstein and Schrodinger did contest it, but it's not a ludicrous or an incoherent position.

* But notice, what was asserted is not "Physics does not attempt to describe reality" but rather "Science does not attempt to describe reality".

* Presumably what has happened is that those making the assertions have heard or seen the former claim -- perhaps during their physics education -- and inadvertently altered and expanded it to encompass all of science. They also -- critically! -- fail to distinguish between observable reality and unobservable reality.

* "Physics does not attempt to describe unobservable reality" is a common enough and arguably sensible (Einstein et al would demur, of course) position. By contrast, "Physics does not attempt to describe observable reality" or simply "Physics does not attempt to describe reality" is an insane claim -- no one in their right mind asserts this! Bohr may insist that "there is no quantum world" (an endorsement of instrumentalism if ever I heard one) -- physics is not even trying to get unobservable reality right. Physics, however, like every other science, is deeply concerned about getting observable reality right. If your tool or instrument does not fit the observable facts (patterns on screens or whatever), you consign it to the nearest dustbin!

* To try to illustrate the absurdity of the claims, if you recall, I took matters to the other extreme from subatomic physics invoking Jane Goodall and her chimpanzees. I asked, hoping they'd see the confusion for themselves, "Are you seriously trying to tell us that Jane Goodall is not trying to get reality right? She's not really trying to describe the behavior of chimpanzees? Ms Goodall regards chimps as useful fictions?", and so on.

* The results were predictable. I was accused of trolling, lying, arguing in bad faith -- all the usual slings and arrows -- shipped off to the furthest gulag posthaste, and the rest is history lol.




Oh finally, as another example of incoherency, consider the scientist who pledges allegiance to instrumentalism, and then proceeds to tell us that some subatomic particle (the Higgs boson or whatever) was recently discovered. How a "useful fiction" can be discovered is left as another exercise to the reader.
 
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If we're talking Intelligent Design proper, I find that deeply problematic, to put it mildly. Whether it's more appropriate to characterize it as a con or as a conspiracy, I don't know. That said, cons and conspiratorial elements are common to everything from scientism to Scientology to Catholicism and Evangelical Christianity, so it's hardly unique in that respect.

I find it hard to make sense of this, with all due respect. Are you suggesting that the proponents of ID do not sincerely believe that, for example, our universe being created is a better explanation than whatever atheistic science has to say on the matter? They do not sincerely believe that the origin of the cell -- in all its dizzying complexity -- is better explained by intelligent design than natural forces?

As I've noted numerous times, these are not positions I endorse myself, but they do not strike me as ludicrous positions, moreover I see no reason to doubt the sincerity of the proponents.


But with ID, or anything ostensibly like ID, but not really ID, any potential for reasonable discussion seems to be hindered by the proliferation of bad actors on the internet. I don't know why this is, but it does seem that whenever someone introduces this idea on the interwebs, they are almost, without fail, speaking from the perspective of ID orthodoxy. Of course, they always seem to pretend otherwise until like page 10 or 12 or something.

I think there's a potential for an engaging discussion to be had, it just doesn't ever seem to happen.


I'd say it goes both ways. Any suggestion to the dogmatic defenders of scientism that the cell, for example-- in all its unbelievable complexity -- did not come about through natural forces incurs a "block". It's not a reasonable suggestion to be entertained even if not believed, it's not plausible even in the slightest, and you'd have to be some kind of brainwashed hillbilly to think otherwise.

It will not even be allowed to be placed on the table for consideration. The end. Period. Full stop. Now puh-LEASE stop this silliness and let's get back to Lawrence Krauss (or whoever) with his sensible and properly scientific theories of multiple universes where pigs can fly, Lawrence Krauss is the sexiest man who ever lived, and Scotland wins the World Cup seven times in a row.
 
From the Wiki article on instrumentalism linked by TheVat above:


Constructive empiricism as a form of instrumentalism​

Bas van Fraassen's (1980) project of constructive empiricism focuses on belief in the domain of the observable, so for this reason it is described as a form of instrumentalism.



This is the fella I like, the position I'm most sympathetic to.

As opposed to some other forms of antirealism (e.g. Logical Positivism), van Fraassen holds that the statements in scientific theories -- including those containing unobservables -- are to be understood literally. That is to say, a statement such as "Electrons have a mass of X" is asserting just what it appears to be asserting, namely, there exists something called an electron and it has a mass of X. Contra Logical Positivism, no translation into respectable observation language is required.

This is the semantic component of constructive empiricism. It follows, therefore, that theories can be true or false. For these reasons, I'd say it's peculiar to characterize constructive empiricism as an instrumentalist position.



Van Fraassen's position is generally regarded as being antirealist, however, not because of its semantics, but because of its epistemological skepticism, viz., there is insufficient warrant to believe any statement or theory containing unobservables. The most that science can hope for is to produce theories that are empirically adequate -- i.e., theories that get observable reality right -- not theories that are true.

Science, on this view, cannot produce knowledge of unobservable reality. Some theories might just happen to be true, by a fluke perhaps, but that's another matter. Being right through luck, without proper justification, does not constitute knowledge.


James actually says something very similar earlier in the thread (e.g. see post 386). Perhaps other readers felt I was being dismissive. I wasn't.
 

Constructive empiricism as a form of instrumentalism​

Bas van Fraassen's (1980) project of constructive empiricism focuses on belief in the domain of the observable, so for this reason it is described as a form of instrumentalism.

- Wiki page on instrumentalism


[ . . . ]

Me: This is the semantic component of constructive empiricism. It follows, therefore, that theories can be true or false. For these reasons, I'd say it's peculiar to characterize constructive empiricism as an instrumentalist position.


Now compare with what the Wiki page specific to constructive empiricism says, and notice the inconsistency:


Bas van Fraassen is nearly solely responsible for the initial development of constructive empiricism; its historically most important presentation appears in his The Scientific Image (1980). Constructive empiricism states that scientific theories are semantically literal, that they aim to be empirically adequate, and that their acceptance involves, as belief, only that they are empirically adequate. A theory is empirically adequate if and only if everything that it says about observable entities is true (regardless of what it says about unobservable entities). A theory is semantically literal if and only if the language of the theory is interpreted in such a way that the claims of the theory are either true or false (as opposed to an instrumentalist reading).

[ . . . ]

Constructive empiricism opposes scientific realism, logical positivism (or logical empiricism) and instrumentalism. Constructive empiricism and scientific realism agree that theories are semantically literal, which logical positivism and instrumentalism deny. Constructive empiricism, logical positivism and instrumentalism agree that theories do not aim for truth about unobservables, which scientific realism denies.
 
So far, all I can say is most scientists strike me as instrumentalists.

If what you were telling us here is correct, and the majority of scientists take a instrumentalist view of scientific theories, then what we would typically hear being expressed is something like the following:


* Theories -- being mere tools -- are neither true nor false, at least as these terms are commonly understood. The aim of a scientific scientific theory is to save the phenomena, as they say, or "fit the facts", and nothing more.

* If an instrumentalist does use the words true/false, he is using them in a nonstandard way: "true" is identified with empirical adequacy. If, for example, two dozen or so theories of quantum mechanics exist (as is the case), all positing different and incompatible unobservable mechanisms and processes (as they do), then insofar as they are all empirically adequate, they are all true. They are true in the same way that the "Mummy and Daddy" theory and the "Santa Claus" theory are both true, just so long as they save the phenomena. All the various and incompatible accounts of the ghost ship Mary Celeste mystery are also true in this nonstandard sense.

* Again, assuming standard usage of the words true/false. scientific theories can neither be shown to be true (i.e. proven) nor shown to be false (i.e. falsified). The reason for this has nothing to do with evidence. Scientific theories, like hammers and screwdrivers, are not the kinds of things than can be true or false. The terms do not apply. No amount of evidence will prove or falsify a hammer or a screwdriver or a scientific theory; they're not in that line of business, as it were. They are not asserting anything. Scientific theories, however, may be appraised for empirical adequacy, i.e., how well they "fit the facts" or "save the phenomena".

* The unobservable posits in scientific theories (e.g. photons, genes, dark matter, spacetime) do not exist. Again, it's not a matter of insufficient evidence. These things are not advanced as candidates for the furniture and architecture of our universe at all. Once again, they're not in that line of business. They are useful fictions, and nothing more. They serve the same function in scientific theories as, for example, "ideal gas" and "point mass" do. They are not meant to be real. To take such statements literally is to misunderstand what a scientific theory is.

* Scientific theories do not explain. They explain nothing, hence they yield no understanding at all, at least as far as unobservable causes, processes, entities, and mechanisms are concerned. Scientific theories are analogous to the bare formalism of quantum mechanics: it describes and predicts what is observed; it does not explain why.



Once again, duly noting the glaring exception of antirealist sentiment in quantum physics, I don't think many scientists talk this way. How about you, Mr Vat?



What would a genuine, real world, flesh-and-blood instrumentalist sound like then?


He would sound like Ernst Mach insisting that theories of atoms are not to be taken literally: Atoms are useful fictions.

He would sound like Andreas Osiander who wrote (without Copernicus's knowledge) the preface to the 1543 De revolutionibus orbium coelestium: This is not to be taken literally. It's a useful tool and nothing more.

He would sound like Pierre Duhem:

"[A physical theory is] an abstract system whose aim is to summarize and classify logically a group of experimental laws without claiming to explain these laws"

"The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory", p7



Can you even imagine Richard Dawkins, say, shrugging his shoulders and telling the world "The theory of evolution is a useful tool and nothing more. It is not to be understood literally. We're not telling you what really happened.".

Perhaps your powers of imagination exceed my own. Flying pigs, yes, perhaps even Scotland winning the World Cup or outsprinting you Yanks in the Olympics lol, but not that.
 
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But notice, what was asserted is not "Physics does not attempt to describe reality" but rather "Science does not attempt to describe reality".

* Presumably what has happened is that those making the assertions have heard or seen the former claim -- perhaps during their physics education -- and inadvertently altered and expanded it to encompass all of science. They also -- critically! -- fail to distinguish between observable reality and unobservable reality.
FWIW, the strongly antirealist form of instrumentalism is not what I was suggesting as the commonly held view. More that most scientists hold physics to be fundamental, and believe that much of that does not pull the veil off reality. Explanation, as everyone here has noted, has multiple tiers. While a geologist finds tectonic plate movement to be real enough and often an adequate explanation for many findings, he may acknowledge that the interacting fields within those plates ARE useful fictions - i.e. no one really knows what a field IS. That's why whiskey is for sipping and quantum field theories are for arguing about. I guess what I'm driving at is that the deeper you go into the nano scale, the more instrumentalist you get. One can be realist about granite and granola, but anti realist about quantum phenomena that do not seem to be real independent of an act of observation. Perhaps one need not sign up for either realism or AR as some definitive purity position?
 
FWIW, the strongly antirealist form of instrumentalism is not what I was suggesting as the commonly held view. More that most scientists hold physics to be fundamental, and believe that much of that does not pull the veil off reality. Explanation, as everyone here has noted, has multiple tiers. While a geologist finds tectonic plate movement to be real enough and often an adequate explanation for many findings, he may acknowledge that the interacting fields within those plates ARE useful fictions - i.e. no one really knows what a field IS. That's why whiskey is for sipping and quantum field theories are for arguing about. I guess what I'm driving at is that the deeper you go into the nano scale, the more instrumentalist you get. One can be realist about granite and granola, but anti realist about quantum phenomena that do not seem to be real independent of an act of observation. Perhaps one need not sign up for either realism or AR as some definitive purity position?
Yes that seems to me a lot better.

Regarding QM, I came to the realisation at university that there comes a point at which a pictorial representation, a physical image one can have in one’s mind of what is happening in nature, is no longer possible. The model IS the mathematics, and one thinks in mathematics and not in pictures any more. This was both exhilarating and disconcerting, seeing as mathematics is abstract rather than physical. So that did rather lead one to an instrumentalist outlook.

The chemical elements, molecules and ions and their behaviour, on the other hand, seemed very concrete and obviously real. Yet there were also non-mathematical theories that were semi-real, if I can put it that way.

One example is the “arrow pushing* ” that we use to describe reaction mechanisms in organic chemistry. Physical chemists and quantum chemists tend to be a bit dismissive of that as representing how bonding electrons actually behave in the course of a reaction, yet the technique gives excellent results in terms of predicting the outcome. When doing organic chemistry one works within that framework and treats it as real, but when one comes up for air one recognises it’s just a methodology and not necessarily to be taken entirely at face value as describing exactly what nature does.

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow_pushing

Chemistry is thus interesting to consider, regarding the realist/instrumentalist debate, as it has a foot in both camps. It is concerned with far messier and more complicated systems than physics, necessitating the use of approximations and semi-quantitative techniques and much more tolerant of inexact predictions from theory, due to complexities that cannot realistically be modelled. Yet one is in no doubt, for the most part, of the reality one is dealing with.
 
FWIW, the strongly antirealist form of instrumentalism is not what I was suggesting as the commonly held view. More that most scientists hold physics to be fundamental, and believe that much of that does not pull the veil off reality. Explanation, as everyone here has noted, has multiple tiers. While a geologist finds tectonic plate movement to be real enough and often an adequate explanation for many findings, he may acknowledge that the interacting fields within those plates ARE useful fictions - i.e. no one really knows what a field IS. That's why whiskey is for sipping and quantum field theories are for arguing about. I guess what I'm driving at is that the deeper you go into the nano scale, the more instrumentalist you get. One can be realist about granite and granola, but anti realist about quantum phenomena that do not seem to be real independent of an act of observation. Perhaps one need not sign up for either realism or AR as some definitive purity position?

Yes, these things are often presented as an all-or-nothing deal, i.e. you're either a realist across the board or not. I don't think it has to be this way, though once again, one must be wary of lapsing into incoherency. For example, if a scientist follows Niels Bohr in insisting on the principle of complementarity, is he asserting that it's useful to think of light or electrons as waves in some circumstances and particles in others? Or is he asserting that electrons really are waves/wavelike in some circumstances and really are particles in others?

One can, for example, adopt a position of entity realism, claiming that science gives us good reason to believe that (certain) unobservable entities really do exist, while theories containing these entities fall short of being true. Entity realism turns out to be quite hard to defend though! The unobservable posits in scientific theories tend to come and go like Frank Sinatra's wives: here today gone tomorrow.

This, in turn, leads others to defend a position known as structural realism, as we've mentioned before. You can't rely on scientific theories being true, and you can't rely on its unobservable postulates being real, but you can rely on the retention of certain relationships even through massive theoretical upheaval. Steven Weinberg, a staunch realist, argues for something like this. Having read Kuhn et al, he's too savvy to succumb to excessive realistic cockiness, if you will.


Chemistry is thus interesting to consider, regarding the realist/instrumentalist debate, as it has a foot in both camps. It is concerned with far messier and more complicated systems than physics, necessitating the use of approximations and semi-quantitative techniques and much more tolerant of inexact predictions from theory, due to complexities that cannot realistically be modelled. Yet one is in no doubt, for the most part, of the reality one is dealing with.


To this I'd just add, in case it's not clear to all, that realism-antirealism depends not on the subject matter itself, but rather on the attitude that scientists adopt to that subject matter. These attitudes of course will vary from scientist to scientist.

It goes without saying that certain subject matters (e.g. quantum physics) invite -- though do not compel -- a more antirealist approach. The Many Worlds view, for instance, is invariably presented in a realist manner by its proponents. By contrast, you'd have to be mad as a hatter to adopt an antirealist position toward, say, chimpanzees or dinosaurs.



Speaking to all readers, I think we should also be careful not to confuse instrumentalism with other forms of antirealism. Instrumentalism is a form of antirealism; it is not identical with antirealism. Take dark matter as our example.

Various positions one might adopt include the following:

* Scientific Realism: I believe dark matter is real. I think there is sufficient warrant (i.e. enough evidence) for believing this. I could of course be wrong.

* Constructive Empiricism (à la Bas van Fraassen above): I don't believe dark matter is real. The theory is indeed making an assertion about the existence of dark matter (a question of semantics), but I feel the epistemological warrant is insufficient to commit to a belief in its existence (a question of epistemology). There isn't enough evidence. I remain agnostic.

* Instrumentalism: I don't believe dark matter is real. The theory is not even making any assertions about the reality of dark matter (a question of semantics). It's a "useful fiction" like "ideal gas" and "point mass". The theory is not to be read literally. Questions of epistemology (Is there sufficient evidence, etc.), then, do not even arise.
 
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The “myths of science” discussed here are commonly included in science textbooks, in classroom discourse and in the minds of adult Americans. These fifteen issues, described here as “myths of science,” do not represent all of the important issues that teachers should consider when designing instruction relative to the nature of science, but may serve as starting points for evaluating current instructional foci while enhancing future curriculum design. Misconceptions about science are most likely due to the lack of philosophy of science content in teacher education programs and the failure of such programs to provide real science research experiences for preservice teachers while another source of the problem may be the generally shallow treatment of the nature of science in the textbooks to which teachers might turn for guidance. Some of these myths, such as the idea that there is a scientific method, are most likely caused by the explicit inclusion of faulty ideas in textbooks while others, such as lack of knowledge of the social construction of scientific knowledge, are the result of omissions in texts.

As Steven Jay Gould points out in The Case of the Creeping Fox Terrier Clone (1988), science textbook writers are among the most egregious purveyors of myth and inaccuracy.


On a slightly different note, it's not just science textbook writers. Times have moved on. The above applies in spades to the massively influential Youtube science educators such as Professor Dave, Forrest Valkai, and AronRa, whose name I keep seeing mentioned around here.

All three are absolutely clueless about the philosophy of science, thus a great deal of what all three assert in no uncertain terms to an unsuspecting public is complete and utter rubbish!

One might as well listen to Kim men ta lee il (the new president) lecture on North Korea. You have been warned lol!
 
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