The "Stage Theory of Theories" - Cause for Concern?

[James R]

axocanth:

It sounds like you're asking me for a general method that all creative people (scientists, especially) use to come up with new ideas. I don't really have much more to say about that than what I already put in my previous post. Having productive new ideas in creative fields usually involves a lot of prior learning, lots of careful thought and individual sparks of inspiration that a well-prepared mind is able to come up with.

No one I know of ever said it was. I certainly didn't. Obviously scientists in different disciplines and different times have used all kinds of specific methods.

I'm glad we agree on that much, at least.

That's not the question we're addressing, which is: Is there a universal method unique to science and used by all (good) scientists in all times and all places?

I spent some words on that in my previous post, which outlined a typical description of the hypothetico-deductive method that is typically used by science. And yes, this has certain features that, while not necessarily unique, are particularly characteristic of the scientific method. You dismissed all of that as somehow irrelevant.

Is the sticking point that you want a unique method that is restricted to scientists or science only? If so, then I don't think there is one.

Maybe we need to drill down on what really gets your goat about all this. If I understand you correctly, you get a bit upset when people refer to The Scientific Method, because you don't think there is one. Or rather, based on what you've just written, you think there are many different methods and it's wrong to speak as if there is just one or as if the various methods share any common features.

Our main point of disagreement appears to be that I think that it is possible to identify certain common patterns in how scientists typically approach their work, no matter what kind of science they are do, whereas I suppose you would say that there aren't any such things.

Is that it, in a nutshell? Or am I missing something?

Ignoring all the peripherals that were not requested, your answer to my question about the method by which scientists formulate a hypothesis/theory is "formulate a testable hypothesis", which obviously sheds no light whatsoever on how this is done methodically. You've simply repeated the question.

Well, to be fair, I did tell you that if you really wanted something like a blow-by-blow description about how one could arrive at, say, the Theory of General Relativity from scratch (so to speak), I could probably come up with a rather boring list of recipe-like steps. That would shed some light on the sorts of activities that were necessary for Einstein to achieve what he did, I assume.

Science is a very broad topic, as you know. The specific steps about how one goes from nothing to, say, the theory of plate tectonics will be rather different from the specific steps that take one from nothing to, say, theory of foetal development in placental mammals.

The best advice I can give you, really, is that if you want to learn how science is done in practice, the best way is take some science courses and at least help in some research activity.

Meanwhile, notice that "formulating a hypothesis" is just one step in my description of what I would call the Scientific Method. I'm not sure why you regard the other steps I described as "peripheral", if you're actually looking for the Scientific Method, as opposed to just a Method for Formulating a Hypothesis.

Do you consider the instructions "formulate a testable hypothesis" to be a methodical prescription for formulating a hypothesis?

Is that the message you took away from my previous post? Perhaps I overestimated you.

I'm not trying to be impolite, but is this not as vacuous as offering the advice "write a good book" as a methodological prescription for writing a book?

I'm glad to hear that you're not trying to be impolite. Yes, you're right. That would be vacuous. It's also not like anything I wrote.

No doubt there are certain preconditions that must be satisfied for a book to be written; the budding Dostoevsky would have to be literate for one thing. Likewise, you've effectively told us that to formulate a hypothesis about something, you'd have to acquire some background knowledge. Such preconditions, however, hardly constitute a method for writing a book or forming a hypothesis. Don't you agree?

It seems to me you are trivializing the whole idea of a method.

You didn't tell me you only wanted to drill down in to one step in the Scientific Method. I thought you were interested in the thing as a whole. That's why I talked about the whole. You're not mistaking the part for the whole, are you?

Since symphonies were mentioned, do you feel, James, that all the great composers were following the very same The Symphonic Method? Once again, you're not going to write a symphony without some training in music -- it's a necessary precondition -- but presumably a grounding in basic music theory won't methodically lead you to Beethoven's 5th.

Do you feel all great (and not so great) authors follow The Novelist Method? - exactly the same method in every case?

Are these not creative processes -- as you've already hinted at yourself -- that defy any kind of formal codification?

If creative processes were entirely unique to every creator, then it would be pointless to try to teach the principles of music composition or the principles of how to write a good novel, because there wouldn't be anything to teach.

Composers don't refer to The Symphonic Method, of course. But they have other names for various musical styles and forms that do the same kind of job of summarising certain commonalities that the term Scientific Method does for science. When one writes a sonata, one tends to use Sonata Form, for instance. Is there a "Sonata method"? Why, yes, there is. A lot of scholarly words have been written about sonatas and how they are written.

You ask whether all novelists follow the same method in every case to write their novels. I'm sure you are aware that they do not. Nevertheless, it's not too hard to identify some common practices among novelists. Rules are made to be broken, they say, so we do see the occasional innovation in music form or in the structure of the novel, just as we see the occasional scientific revolution. But the existence of such things doesn't mean there are no methods to speak of.

We certainly never hear composers or novelists speak of such a thing, just as Einstein tells us there is no method for the construction of scientific theories/hypotheses.

Einstein didn't quite say that, though, did he? At least, not in the quote you provided earlier.

If you don't feel there is such a thing as The Symphonic Method or The Novelist Method, why do you think it is appropriate to apply the word "method" to the construction (note that word!) of scientific theories/hypotheses?

I hope it is clear to you that I do think there is such a thing as the Symphonic Method, though people don't really call it that.

Notice, you are largely addressing issues that were not asked.

I'm anticipating. It will save time later. Also, bear in mind that you're not the only person who will read what I wrote. I sometimes like to provide helpful context and stuff, even if it might not be strictly necessary. I'm also wary about simply making assumptions that we're on the same page regarding what I might regard as uncontroversial points, because my experience here is that what is uncontroversial to me can be quite triggering for certain other people.

For your reference, if you're not already aware, philosophers and scientists too sometimes draw a distinction between the so-called "context of discovery" of scientific hypotheses/theories, and the so-called "context of justification" (subsequent testing, etc.). Right now we're (supposed to be!) addressing the former.

Okay. It might have been easier if you'd told me from the start that you are only interested in one part of the scientific method, rather than how the whole process typically works.

And your answer essentially (ignoring the irrelevancies again): "He had some ideas".

More accurately, his prior deep immersion in the relevant subject matter enabled him to make some novel connections among certain concepts and ideas. It's mostly a myth that great science (or great art, for that matter) comes out of mystical flashes of inspiration that come out of nowhere. It's more a case of an appropriately primed brain doing what brains do.

Sounds about right to me, and doesn't anything like a method to me. What about you?

I agree that having some ideas or imagining something is not, in itself, a method. That's why I listed all those other steps that you dismissed as irrelevant to the Scientific Method.

By the way, by far the most valuable source on all this, that I'm aware of anyway, is the magnificent 4-volume "The Genesis of General Relativity".

I might look it up.

 

[parmalee]

It's mostly a myth that great science (or great art, for that matter) comes out of mystical flashes of inspiration that come out of nowhere. It's more a case of an appropriately primed brain doing what brains do.

It's entirely dependent upon how one conceives what is "mystical", and what constitutes, say, a "mystical" approach or methodology, but I would argue that in the better instances of such these are very much the same thing. As a 'fer instance, I'll offer apophatic traditions within Buddhism and Catholicism. However, at the moment it's more like I would argue such, but I am presently otherwise occupied.

 

[exchemist]

I think it may be worth stressing the point about collective endeavour. It’s a waste of time picking Einstein, as an individual, and demanding to know what “method” he followed.

At Oxford there is whole Department of Theoretical Chemistry, with not a lab coat, vacuum line or spectrometer in sight. The experimentalists do their thing in the lab and the theoreticians draw on their results to develop mathematical models. Both take part in different aspects of the process of theory development. Einstein did no experimental work at all, so far as I know. He was engaged in model development, like my former tutor in QM who worked in that department and worked with a pen and paper.

The so-called Scientific Method is sometimes overstated. All it means is the back and forth between observations of nature and model development, which intrinsic to science. Any one person may do only a bit of the whole thing. This whole thread seems to be making a huge meal out of this very simple concept.

 

[C C]

"[...] Yet, because the deviation between classical and relativistic reality is manifest only under extreme conditions (such as extremes of speed and gravity), Newtonian physics still provides an approximation that proves extremely accurate and useful in many circumstances [cf. it works - axo]. But utility and reality are very different standards.[...]" - "The Fabric of the Cosmos", Brian Greene, p10

And of the "two standards", the option of instrumentalism doesn't require an ontological or "metaphysical realism" stance about theories. And thereby also dodges any dependence on or appeal to a completed or ideal physics of the future, that might otherwise require various intellectual acrobatics to thwart. Although Hempel's dilemma revolves around physicalism, it derives a meaning or justification for "physical" from physics -- and ergo the recognition that "current physics" probably isn't going to be physics of the distant future.

Niels Bohr: "It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature [ultimately] is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature [in a useful context]. --Spoken at the Como conference, 1927" ..... (Even theories change)

In what sense, then, do you see this episode as cumulative (assuming you see it that way at all)?

Obviously, Thomas Kuhn's concept of paradigm shift probably impinges on the dialogue eventually.

• https://iep.utm.edu/kuhn-ts/
  
  Kuhn began by assuring his audience that he, as a once practicing scientist, believed that science produces useful and cumulative knowledge of the world, but that traditional analysis of science distorts the process by which scientific knowledge develops.
  
  [...] Kuhn then took on the nature of scientific progress. For normal science, progress is cumulative in that the solutions to puzzles form a repository of information and knowledge about the world. This progress is the result of the direction a paradigm provides a community of practitioners. Importantly, the progress achieved through normal science, in terms of the information and knowledge, is used to educate the next generation of scientists and to manipulate the world for human welfare. Scientific revolutions change all that. For Kuhn, revolutionary progress is not cumulative but non-cumulative.
  
  [...] The transition from extraordinary science to a new normal science represents a scientific revolution. According to Kuhn, a scientific revolution is non-cumulative in which a newer paradigm replaces an older one—either partially or completely. It can come in two sizes: a major revolution such as the shift from geocentric universe to heliocentric universe or a minor revolution such as the discovery of X-rays or oxygen. But whether big or small, all revolutions have the same structure: generation of a crisis through irresolvable anomalies and establishment of a new paradigm that resolves the crisis-producing anomalies.

But...

• https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thomas-kuhn/#ScieChan
  
  This picture has been questioned for its accuracy. Stephen Toulmin (1970) argues that a more realistic picture shows that revisionary changes in science are far more common and correspondingly less dramatic than Kuhn supposes, and that perfectly ‘normal’ science experiences these changes also. Kuhn could reply that such revisions are not revisions to the paradigm but to the non-paradigm puzzle-solutions provided by normal science. But that in turn requires a clear distinction between paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic components of science, a distinction that, arguably, Kuhn has not supplied in any detail.
  
  At the same time, by making revisionary change a necessary condition of revolutionary science, Kuhn ignores important discoveries and developments that are widely regarded as revolutionary, such as the discovery of the structure of DNA and the revolution in molecular biology. Kuhn’s view is that discoveries and revolutions come about only as a consequence of the appearance of anomalies. Yet it is also clear that a discovery might come about in the course of normal science and initiate a ‘revolution’ (in a non-Kuhnian sense) in a field because of the unexpected insight it provides and the way it opens up opportunities for new avenues of research.

So-called "auxiliary hypotheses" enter the complicated picture, too, as add-ons to a core theory. Nowadays, those can supposedly be adjusted by their supporters to arguably continue to keep a theory viable, or in the running of some "sweepstakes", even if majority opinion leans against the initial formulation. Tweaks or reiterations of MOND might still be haunting the fringes of cosmology 20 years from now.

• https://open.lnu.se/index.php/metapsychology/article/view/2756 (PDF is downloadable)
  
  Auxiliary hypotheses (AHs) are indispensable in hypothesis-testing, because without them specification of testable predictions and consequently falsification is impossible. However, as AHs enter the test along with the main hypothesis, non-corroborative findings are ambiguous. Due to this ambiguity, AHs may also be employed to deflect falsification by providing “alternative explanations” of findings
  
  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lakatos/#ImprPoppScie
  
  For example, Newtonian mechanics by itself—the three laws of mechanics and the law of gravitation—won’t tell you what you will see in the night sky. To derive empirical predictions from Newtonian mechanics you need a whole host of auxiliary hypotheses about the positions, masses and relative velocities of the heavenly bodies, including the earth. (This is related to Duhem’s thesis that, generally speaking, theoretical propositions—and indeed sets of theoretical propositions—cannot be conclusively falsified by experimental observations, since they only entail observation-statements in conjunction with auxiliary hypotheses. So when something goes wrong, and the observation statements that they entail turn out to be false, we have two intellectual options: modify the theoretical propositions or modify the auxiliary hypotheses. See Ariew 2014.) For Lakatos an individual theory within a research programme typically consists of two components: the (more or less) irrefutable hard core plus a set of auxiliary hypotheses. Together with the hard core these auxiliary hypotheses entail empirical predictions, thus making the theory as a whole—hard core plus auxiliary hypotheses—a falsifiable affair.
  
  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/#UndeTheoData
  
  Duhem noted that a hypothesis cannot be used to derive testable predictions in isolation. To derive predictions one also requires “auxiliary” assumptions, such as background theories, hypotheses about instruments and measurements, etc. If subsequent observation and experiment produces data that conflict with those predicted, one might think that this reflects badly on the hypothesis under test, but Duhem pointed out that given all of the assumptions required to derive predictions, it is no simple matter to identify where the error lies.
  
  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10465209/
  
  Additionally, other types of hypotheses can exist. As discussed in more detail below, scientific theories generate not only scientific hypotheses but also contain auxiliary hypotheses. The latter refers to additional assumptions considered to be true and not explicitly evaluated.

 

[James R]

Just one more thing, somewhat tangential to our current discussion . . .

No problem. What you have raised is interesting to me.

One caveat that I think might be worth bearing in mind is that when scientists write popular articles for general audience or give public talks to non-expert audiences, there are understandable incentives to 'jazz things up' a bit. This is not, by the way, restricted to scientists. It is often observed when experts of any type speak to general audiences of non-experts. Moreover, the pithy sound bite tends to make one's speech more memorable than the careful nuances of the expert's detailed explanation of the minutiae of a topic. Finally, contested opinions, if not the focus of the talk or writing, often go unremarked upon by the speaker. What we tend to get, then, is the speaker's personal opinions, possibly slightly exaggerated for effect.

This is not always a problem, but in modern times, pithy quotes can get picked up and shipped around the internet, on the assumption that they are a fair representation of the speaker/author's full nuanced opinion on the topic. It turns out that when speakers/authors are quizzed about such quotes in a more long-form format, especially when under less perceived performance pressure, the opinions they express are often more thoughtful and nuanced.

Some scientists occasionally achieve some degree of public celebrity or infamy. When that happens, their voices tend to get amplified in the public media. Since we don't tend to see a lot of scientists in our general viewing, a perception can develop among some members of the public that the celebrity scientists are representative of all scientists and that their views are typical views of the mythical "scientific establishment". The fact is, the people who do science are quite a diverse crowd, with diverse opinions about all kinds of things, and there's no "party line" that all scientists are compelled to toe. It's more of a herding cats kind of situation, which we might expect from a bunch of people who tend to be trained to think independently.

With that in mind...

Copied from post #1554 (page 78) of the "Intelligent Design Redux" thread . . .

"The two theories of relativity are among humankind's most precious achievements, and with them Einstein toppled Newton's conception of reality. Even though Newtonian physics seemed to capture mathematically much of what we experience physically, the reality it describes turns out not to be the reality of our world. Ours is a relativistic reality. Yet, because the deviation between classical and relativistic reality is manifest only under extreme conditions (such as extremes of speed and gravity), Newtonian physics still provides an approximation that proves extremely accurate and useful in many circumstances [cf. it works - axo]. But utility and reality are very different standards. As we will see, features of space and time that for many of us are second nature have turned out to be figments of a false Newtonian perspective."

- "The Fabric of the Cosmos", Brian Greene, p10

"It was this task to which Einstein boldly dedicated himself, and with the dazzling framework he developed after close to a decade of searching in the dark, Einstein overthrew Newton's revered theory of gravity."

- "The Fabric of the Cosmos", Brian Greene, p64

Brian Greene is a scientific realist, judging by the first quote here that mentions "reality" a few times. From that point of view, science's job is to find out what the natural world is "really" like. I think our ability to do that is limited, so I personally prefer to think of science's job as doing its best at any time to build models that describe and predict observations of the natural world with a high degree of agreement between theory and observation. I'm not that concerned about whether the unobserved elements that a theory describes are "real", as opposed to merely being useful for promoting agreement between theory and observation. In other words, while Greene says that "utility and reality are very different standards", I think that "reality" is largely inaccessible to us and we should be wary about assuming that we have a good handle on exactly what it is.

When Greene talks about a "false Newtonian perspective" and such, I don't really take issue with it. For me, the perspective is "false" in the sense that the Newtonian model does not describe the universe we observe as accurately as the Einsteinian model. Greene also talks about Einstein 'overthrowing' Newton's theory. The point of that is partly for dramatic emphasis - one that is not at all uncommon when it comes to discussions of this particular topic among physicists who are trying to give the public a sense of how significant the Einsteinian 'revolution' was to modern physics. The Newton to General Relativity shift is also a rare example of a bunch of 'core' theoretical constructs or precepts being effectively replaced (or, more accurately, radically altered) from how they were understood in the previous theoretical framework.

For some extra emphasis, Greene refers to the 'revered' nature of Newton's theory, which brings to my mind notions of religion-like worship or awe. It's hard to communicate in a brief amount of time to a general audience why Newton's theory - or Einstein's - are considered by physicists to be especially important or significant. But most audiences are familiar with the idea of religious awe. The danger in making that kind of reference is that it risks importing the idea that science is essentially a collection of dogmas, similar to articles of faith, which has the potential to be highly misleading.

Kuhn said some interesting things about scientific revolutions. But that's for another discussion, possibly.

"To present such new ideas without relating them properly to previously held ideas gives the wrong impression that the theory of relativity is merely at a culminating point of earlier developments and does not properly bring out the fact that this theory is on a radically new line that contradicts Newtonian concepts in the very same step in which it extends physical law in new directions, and into hitherto unexpected new domains"

- David Bohm, "The Special Theory of Relativity", preface, page xvi

Bohm isn't wrong. On the other hand, Einstein's E=mc^2 and all that did build on earlier (Newtonian) developments. Einstein did not throw out the baby with the bathwater. For instance, when he examined momentum and energy in the context of special relativity, he started with the first-principles definition of those terms that were established by Newton. Moreover, those concepts become indistinguishable, for the most part, from their counterparts in Newtonian physics, when suitable limits are applied to the relativistic theory. In that sense, relativity can be considered an extension of Newtonian physics rather than a complete back-to-the-drawing-board replacement. Alternatively, we can look at things the other way around and say that Newtonian physics is, in many respects, a "special case" of the theory of relativity after certain limits are applied to it.

"It is now nearly a full century since Einstein destroyed Newton's concept of space and time as absolute, and began laying the foundations for his own legacy."

- Kip S. Thorne, "Black Holes and Time Warps: Einstein's Outrageous Legacy", p523

Note that Thorne doesn't say that Einstein destroyed Newton's concepts of space and time. What was destroyed was the implicit notion that space and time are 'absolute', in a certain technical sense. Physicists today think about time in much the same way that Newton thought about time, most of the time! The difference is that today's physicists have dropped Newton's implicit assumption that time is 'absolute' (i.e. the same everywhere for all observers).

"We can indeed see from Newton's formulation of it that the concept of absolute space, which comprised that of absolute rest, made him feel uncomfortable; he realized that there seemed to be nothing in experience corresponding to this last concept. He was also not quite comfortable about the introduction of forces operating at a distance. But the tremendous practical success of his doctrines may well have prevented him and the physicists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from recognizing the fictitious character of the foundations of his system."

- Albert Einstein, essay, "On the Methods of Theoretical Physics"

I wonder if you can find anything from Einstein commenting on his own "fictitious" construct of curved spacetime? It would be ironic if Einstein was not aware that his own theory relies on unobservable base elements, just different ones to the ones Newton had.

 

[James R]

(continued...)

Now, assuming these writers can be trusted (can they?), it does not sound at all like the switch -- or the revolution, if you will-- from Newtonian physics to relativistic physics was cumulative. We are told not, for example, that Einstein "built on" Newton's work but, quite to the contrary, that he toppled it, he overthrew it, and destroyed it. We are told not that Einstein's theory complements or adds to Newton's theory, but it contradicts Newton's theory. We are told that Newton's theory was shown to be false; it turned out to be a "figment of a false Newtonian perspective".

It all sounds nicely dramatic, doesn't it? Do you get any sense from what I've written above that these things might not be quite as dramatic as people like to make out?

Put it this way: without Newton's physics, Einstein could not have done what he did with his theory. Einstein had to climb onto the metaphorical shoulders of the giant before he could topple it. And the result of that toppling wasn't a complete "out with the old; in with the new". It's more like the statue was taken down, its foundations renovated and then it was put back with a fresh coat of paint. Of course, that work on the foundations, though often invisible to those viewing the restored statue, was rather significant.

You have to admit surely that, at least to the uninitiated, cumulative hardly seems consistent with what we've just been told? It sounds a lot more like a process of destruction followed by a complete restructuring, rather than additional construction upon a foundation that itself remains unchanged. Indeed, if you'll forgive me, it sounds more like Einstein took a wrecking ball to the Newtonian edifice!

That's how the story is often told, certainly. Kuhn made quite of point of telling it that way. And yes, this is probably now the most common public perception of what Einstein did for physics, at least to those who take more than a passing interest in such matters.

It's a compelling story. David beats up Goliath and goes on to become King. It has all the elements. But I think that some things get a little lost in the retelling.

In what sense, then, do you see this episode as cumulative (assuming you see it that way at all)?

Einstein built on Newton's ideas. Without Newton, no Einstein. Without Galileo, no Newton. Without the ancient Greeks, no Galileo. And so on and so forth. On the other hand, it didn't have to be Einstein. Like many great discovers or inventors, Einstein was in the right place at the right time. Relativity was an idea whose time had come. If it hadn't been Einstein, it would have been another scientist. In fact, in the case of special relativity, there were other scientists who got to parts of the theory years before Einstein did. There's a reason why the central equations of special relativity are called the Lorentz transformations rather than the Einstein transformations.

The idea of the solitary genius noodling away in isolation is even less accurate today than it was back in 1905.

As I said in the other thread, I've no objection to the claim that Einstein's theory represents an improvement of Newton's in terms of its instrumental efficacy -- it works better! I know of no one else who objects to this claim either.

But it's hard to see how this transition represents cumulation of knowledge of how our universe really is.

As I said, I'm not convinced that we can access how our universe "really is". We have some access to how parts of our universe appear to us under certain viewing conditions; that's really about the best we can do.

In addition, our theories often postulate the existences of entities who existence we can only infer from experiments. We can never directly observe them. Worse still, we can only really infer things about them in the context of some theory or other. If the theory specifies that such-and-such should be seen under such-and-such conditions that the theory also specifies and we find that after performing the relevant experiment the predictions of the theory match the observations, we can't conclude that therefore what we measured or 'saw' in the experiment was actually caused by the actual existence of the postulated theoretical entities.

I should say that this view is not a popular one among scientists. Most scientists hold a realist view that says, for instance, that electrons are "real" particles that we actually detect, rather than the idea that electrons are a convenient shorthand way for summarising whatever it is that we actually 'detect' under certain well-specified and theory-dependent conditions.

Do you see this transition -- typical of scientific revolutions -- as an accumulation of knowledge, James? Pure accumulation? Is nothing "lost" in such transitions?

No, I don't see it that way. Sure, things are lost or deliberately discarded from time to time. Referencing Kuhn again, a lot of the time science is "business as usual" - the 'boring' work of trying to test expected results and of making small improvements and elaborations of theories. Occasionally, a new theory or a new experimental observation comes along that fundamentally shifts our understanding of a particular phenomenon or set of phenomena. What tends to happen in so-called scientific revolutions is not so much a wholesale replacement of an old theory by a new one. Instead, we find that certain key concepts of the old are replaced by the new, while many 'subsidiary' ideas are retained.

Science is very pragmatic in how it operates. It tends to keep what works and throw away what is shown not to work, but only when there is a viable replacement part ready for installation.

Do we understand the unobservable processes (supposedly) at work better than we did before?

The proof is in the pudding, I would say. If our ability to make accurate predictions of experimental outcomes improves over time, then I think it's fair to conclude that our understanding of the subject matter of the experiments is also improving. But I don't think it necessarily means that we are getting at whatever the ultimate "reality" of things might be any better than we did before.

What possible understanding or knowledge of unobservable reality can a fictitious theory (see Einstein above) give us?

Of unobservable reality? I would say: none. We don't have any access to unobservable reality, whatever it might be.

Here's a question: if a "fictitious" theory that we have invented can tell us what the weather will be like in three days' time with a reliable degree of accuracy, would you agree that the theory demonstrates that we understand something about how the weather works?

Admittedly, one isolated fictitious theory might have a happy accident and manage to give the right answer for completely the wrong reasons. But what two fictitious theories? Three? 27? One hundred? After you've seen enough successes, it's very hard to put it all down to coincidence and good luck. Something else must be going on.

 

[parmalee]

At Oxford there is whole Department of Theoretical Chemistry, with not a lab coat, vacuum line or spectrometer in sight. The experimentalists do their thing in the lab and the theoreticians draw on their results to develop mathematical models. Both take part in different aspects of the process of theory development. Einstein did no experimental work at all, so far as I know. He was engaged in model development, like my former tutor in QM who worked in that department and worked with a pen and paper.

For some reason, this bit reminded me of this running joke in David Cross's series, The Increasingly Poor Decisions of Todd Margaret, in which the idea of molecular gastronomy (basically, just a scientific approach towards food preparation) is taken to it's most logical, preposterous extreme.

 

[exchemist]

For some reason, this bit reminded me of this running joke in David Cross's series, The Increasingly Poor Decisions of Todd Margaret, in which the idea of molecular gastronomy (basically, just a scientific approach towards food preparation) is taken to it's most logical, preposterous extreme.

Haha. But in fact a lot of chemistry is underpinned by QM mathematics, esp. the theories of chemical bonding. Here's one of my former tutor's papers: https://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/jp1096103

 

[axocanth]

First, for reference, on page 12 (post #226) I quoted science educator Stuart Firestein's thoughts on The Scientific Method. Like myself, he feels there is no such thing. In particular, with regards the "critical step" -- the construction of a hypothesis/theory -- he says this:

"On the other hand, the most critical step in the whole cycle, the one that requires a magic brew of creativity, thought, inspiration, intuition, rationality, past knowledge, and new thinking--this the Scientific "Method" has nothing to say about. "Form a hypothesis." Very good. How, precisely, does one do that? [ . . . ] This is like giving an art student a brush and the direction "do painting". [ . . . ] "

Since James re-entered the thread yesterday, all my questions to him have pertained to this "critical step" -- how is is a theory/hypothesis constructed or formulated or "set up" (Einstein). I have tried to be as clear as is humanly possible, even emphasizing these critical words in bold type or italics, to show that I am not asking about any other parts of the so-called Scientific Method (e.g. testing of theories), but only asking about the so-called "context of discovery" -- how are theories discovered. See my three questions in post #256.

Evidently my attempts at clarity were in vain . . .

Meanwhile, notice that "formulating a hypothesis" is just one step in my description of what I would call the Scientific Method. I'm not sure why you regard the other steps I described as "peripheral", if you're actually looking for the Scientific Method, as opposed to just a Method for Formulating a Hypothesis.

They're "peripheral" because you were not asked about them. You were specifically asked to state the "method" (if there is one) that scientists use to discover or formulate a theory/hypothesis.

You didn't tell me you only wanted to drill down in to one step in the Scientific Method. I thought you were interested in the thing as a whole. That's why I talked about the whole. You're not mistaking the part for the whole, are you?

I didn't tell you? I could not possibly have been more clear! I was asking you about the "method" (if there is one) that scientists use to discover or formulate a theory/hypothesis. See my three questions in post #256 again.

I'm glad to hear that you're not trying to be impolite. Yes, you're right. That would be vacuous. It's also not like anything I wrote.

It's exactly like what you wrote, and it is vacuous, just as Stuart Firestein says it is (see top of this post). What you wrote amounts essentially to "get yourself in the right place" kind of thing (get born, grow up, short pants, romance, learn to read, educate yourself on some area of science, etc.) and then when we come to to critical step, the one I've been virtually begging you to address, namely "how does one form a hypothesis methodically?", you answer thus:

"5. Using your acquired scientific skills, formulate a testable hypothesis - preferably quantitative - that can be used to check whether your answer in step 4 is wrong or right." (post #257)

In short, your methodological advice for formulating a hypothesis is "formulate a testable hypothesis", which tells us precisely nothing.

Is that the message you took away from my previous post? Perhaps I overestimated you.

And perhaps I overestimated you. You have moved the goalposts time and time again, padding your answers with unrequested "periphery". I refrained from saying so (until now) on grounds of politeness.



Moving on . . .

Well, to be fair, I did tell you that if you really wanted something like a blow-by-blow description about how one could arrive at, say, the Theory of General Relativity from scratch (so to speak), I could probably come up with a rather boring list of recipe-like steps. That would shed some light on the sorts of activities that were necessary for Einstein to achieve what he did, I assume.

Science is a very broad topic, as you know. The specific steps about how one goes from nothing to, say, the theory of plate tectonics will be rather different from the specific steps that take one from nothing to, say, theory of foetal development in placental mammals.

This, once again, is to miss the point. Of course we can -- and historians have -- retrace(d) the steps that Einstein took on his tortuous course to the discovery of the general theory of relativity. Of course we can retrace the steps taken that led to the formulation of the theory of plate tectonics.

Of course we can also retrace the steps that Jones, and every lottery winner, took to scoop ten million bucks.

From the fact that the steps taken can be retraced or reconstructed, it does not follow that the discovery of a scientific theory (or the discovery that one now has a 10-figure bank balance) is a methodical process, let alone that all scientists are following the same method.

You're once again trivializing the notion of a "method". If all it takes for something to count as methodical is to do one thing, then do another thing, then do something else, according to no common formula then everything we do is methodical! Do you consider, for example, falling in love to be a methodical process? Sure, there are certain preconditions for that magic to take place (cf. your preconditions for formulating a theory); you're unlikely to fall in love while marooned on a desert island, for example, Tom Hanks and Wilson notwithstanding.

And your prescription for the magic of discovering a scientific hypothesis amounts to "discover a scientific hypothesis" (see your Step 5 above).


It's a free country, I suppose. There's no law prohibiting you from calling all this methodical. Of course, there's a price to be paid though. If the "method" of constructing a scientific hypothesis amounts to nothing more than "have an idea" then the distinction between a creative and a methodical process breaks down and there are only methodical processes. There are no eureka moments; there are only methodical moments!

It was a stroke of method that led Archimedes to go running through the streets of Syracuse naked and shouting, "I have it!"

I hope it is clear to you that I do think there is such a thing as the Symphonic Method, though people don't really call it that.

Conclusion: Not only is The Scientific Method a reality, so is The Symphony Method, The Novelist Method, The Fall in Love Method, The Win the Lottery Method, The Win Bingo Method, and the Lose Your Marbles Method (we can, after all, reconstruct the steps that led to Nietzsche losing his). It's just that, for some strange reason, other people don't really call these things a "method". Only scientists do.




In a similar vein . . .

The so-called Scientific Method is sometimes overstated. All it means is the back and forth between observations of nature and model development, which intrinsic to science. Any one person may do only a bit of the whole thing. This whole thread seems to be making a huge meal out of this very simple concept.

Fine! The Intelligent Design mob also . . . um . . . observed stuff and came up with a model. We must then conclude, based on your own criteria, that they are following The Scientific Method.

Unless of course you want to make a meal out of it.

 

[axocanth]

And of the "two standards", the option of instrumentalism doesn't require an ontological or "metaphysical realism" stance about theories. And thereby also dodges any dependence on or appeal to a completed or ideal physics of the future, that might otherwise require various intellectual acrobatics to thwart.

Quite so.

Instrumentalism has an undeniable appeal: scientific theories are merely tools or instruments -- "inference tickets" as they are sometimes described -- thus it's far easier to defend progress and continuity in science. Einstein was undeniably an instrumental improvement over Newton.

At the same time, though, if you nail your colors to the instrumentalist mast, you must be very cautious not to lapse into incoherency. In my short time here I've noticed one or two members express sympathy for the position, perhaps without fully grasping the consequences thereof. On pain of incoherency, what they are now precluded from doing includes the following:

* Asserting that science is taking us closer to an accurate picture of how our universe really is.

* Asserting that science helps us to understand the (unobservable) universe. We can describe mathematically how apples fall, say, but on the question of why, science is completely silent. What do we understand about gravity? Ans: nothing.

* Asserting that science generates knowledge of unobservable entities, processes, mechanisms (electrons, forces, fields, gravity, spacetime, dark matter, quarks, etc.). All unobservable theoretical postulates are nothing more than "useful fictions".

* Asserting that scientific theories explain - tools or instruments do not explain anything.

* Asserting that scientific theories (distinguishing them from pseudoscience, metaphysics, ID, etc.) are falsifiable. Tools or instruments are neither true nor false, and needless to say, that which has no truth value (T/F) cannot be shown to be either true or false.

 

[axocanth]

One or two odds and ends . . .

I wonder if you can find anything from Einstein commenting on his own "fictitious" construct of curved spacetime? It would be ironic if Einstein was not aware that his own theory relies on unobservable base elements, just different ones to the ones Newton had.

See my post at the bottom of page 12 on Einstein's fascinating philosophy of science (as best I understand it anyway) . . .

Note Einstein's use of the word "fictitious" (cf. Rindler above). Newton quite literally -- in AE's view at least -- made up the concepts in his theory, despite what Sir Isaac evidently thought himself. Albert makes no exception for himself, mind you; in other places he applies the same word "fictitious" to his own array of theoretical posits.

I don't have any quotes at hand, but Einstein is quite clear: all concepts in physical theories -- including his own -- are "free inventions" or "free creations". The scientist quite literally makes them up.

Why would he say such a thing? Ans: to contrast his view with the so-called inductivists (Newton et al), mainly of a previous age, who held that theories could be somehow methodically derived from experience. This inductivist view is precisely what you allude to you yourself when you tell us that theories/hypotheses are arrived at (= constructed = formulated = discovered) methodically. And it's precisely what Einstein denies can be done.

After affirming your commitment to inductivist methodology, however, you proceed to tell us (post #255) that The Scientific Method just is the hypothetico-deductive method - which stands in direct opposition to inductivist methodology.

On the inductivist account, unlike the H-D account, theories are somehow already in the data, just waiting to be discovered as it were, and all the scientist has to do is methodically extract or distil (Einstein's word) the theory from the data. Again, you hint at this when you suggest that if Einstein hadn't discovered relativity, someone else would have. (How about phlogiston theory?)

By contrast, the H-D account says (contra yourself) that there is no methodical or logical path from the data to a theory; the theory is not somehow already contained in the data. What the scientist does instead is bring a theory/hypothesis -- of his own creation -- to the data. The H-D account, as standardly formulated, pertains to what happens after we have a theory or hypothesis, how we test it. On how the theory or hypothesis comes into being the H-D method is quite silent.

Like other members who (inconsistently!) have one foot in a Newtonian universe and the other in an Einsteinian universe, you have one foot in inductivist methodology and the other in H-D deductivist methodology -- two camps that are normally regarded as being mutually exclusive.

Can they be reconciled? Don't look at me!

Of unobservable reality? I would say: none. We don't have any access to unobservable reality, whatever it might be.

Here's a question: if a "fictitious" theory that we have invented can tell us what the weather will be like in three days' time with a reliable degree of accuracy, would you agree that the theory demonstrates that we understand something about how the weather works?

Admittedly, one isolated fictitious theory might have a happy accident and manage to give the right answer for completely the wrong reasons. But what two fictitious theories? Three? 27? One hundred? After you've seen enough successes, it's very hard to put it all down to coincidence and good luck. Something else must be going on.

What's happening here is that you first explicitly reject scientific realism (first paragraph), after which you implicitly endorse scientific realism (last paragraph).

What you're rehearsing at the end is the so-called "No Miracles" argument in favor of scientific realism. Scientific realists argue as follows: It would be something of a miracle if science produced theories which were so instrumentally efficacious and were not latching onto unobservable reality. The best explanation for the instrumental success of science is that scientific theories are true, or approximately so. It can't just be a coincidence or a "happy accident" (see you above)! Scientific theories -- or at least our best ones -- are revealing hidden reality to us.

It's a powerful argument, at least prima facie, and indeed we see members here rehearse it day-in day-out ("If you don't believe science throw away your cellphone and your GPS and your laptop, you hypocrite!").

Needless to say, things are never quite so straightforward. The antirealists have responses.


From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . . .

2.1 The Miracle Argument​

The most powerful intuition motivating realism is an old idea, commonly referred to in recent discussions as the “miracle argument” or “no miracles argument”, after Putnam’s (1975a: 73) claim that realism “is the only philosophy that doesn’t make the success of science a miracle”. The argument begins with the widely accepted premise that our best theories are extraordinarily successful: they facilitate empirical predictions, retrodictions, and explanations of the subject matters of scientific investigation, often marked by astounding accuracy and intricate causal manipulations of the relevant phenomena. What explains this success? One explanation, favored by realists, is that our best theories are true (or approximately true, or correctly describe a mind-independent world of entities, laws, etc.). Indeed, if these theories were far from the truth, so the argument goes, the fact that they are so successful would be miraculous. And given the choice between a straightforward explanation of success and a miraculous explanation, clearly one should prefer the non-miraculous explanation, viz. that our best theories are approximately true (etc.). (For elaborations of the miracle argument, see J. Brown 1982; Boyd 1989; Lipton 1994; Psillos 1999: ch. 4; Barnes 2002; Lyons 2003; Busch 2008; Frost-Arnold 2010; and Dellsén 2016.)

Scientific Realism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Finally, as you noted yourself, James, a few weeks ago, I'm focusing mainly on points of contention between us, skipping over areas of agreement. Overall, I found your posts 255-256 to be very sensible and interesting reading. Thanks for sharing your thoughts.

 

[axocanth]

For readers' reference. And before proceeding, recall that James has been arguing that scientific theories/hypotheses can be derived or "distilled" (see Einstein below) methodically from experience through some kind of inductive process: there is a method for discovering scientific theories.

"Philosophical accounts of the nature of science, or of the 'scientific method', are, in part, accounts of the relation, or relations, of theory and experiment in science. A simplistic view of the history of philosophy of science since the eighteenth century would show one philosophy, inductivism, holding sway for a century and a half before being replaced by hypothetico-deductivism. Francis Bacon is usually blamed for inductivism, a position that we all now plainly see as silly. Indeed, over a hundred years ago, Charles Darwin, who publicly gave lip-service to the 'Baconian method', privately ridiculed inductivism, saying that "one might as well go into a gravel pit and count the pebbles and describe the colours". "

- Robert N. Brandon, "Concepts and Methods in Evolutionary Biology", p147

(Psst. This is the same fella I mentioned in another place who also argues -- while defending natural selection -- that the principle of natural selection itself is empirically empty.)

"We now realize, with special clarity, how much in error are those theorists who believe that theory comes inductively from experience. Even the great Newton could not free himself from this error ("Hypotheses non fingo"). [ . . . ]

"There is no inductive method which could lead to the fundamental concepts of physics. Failure to understand this fact constituted the basic philosophical error of so many investigators of the nineteenth century. [ . . . ]

"Physics constitutes a logical system of thought which is in a state of evolution., and whose basis cannot be obtained through distillation by any inductive method from the experiences lived through, but which can only be attained by free invention."

- Albert Einstein, essay "Physics and Reality"

 

[exchemist]

First, for reference, on page 12 (post #226) I quoted science educator Stuart Firestein's thoughts on The Scientific Method. Like myself, he feels there is no such thing. In particular, with regards the "critical step" -- the construction of a hypothesis/theory -- he says this:




Since James re-entered the thread yesterday, all my questions to him have pertained to this "critical step" -- how is is a theory/hypothesis constructed or formulated or "set up" (Einstein). I have tried to be as clear as is humanly possible, even emphasizing these critical words in bold type or italics, to show that I am not asking about any other parts of the so-called Scientific Method (e.g. testing of theories), but only asking about the so-called "context of discovery" -- how are theories discovered. See my three questions in post #256.

Evidently my attempts at clarity were in vain . . .




They're "peripheral" because you were not asked about them. You were specifically asked to state the "method" (if there is one) that scientists use to discover or formulate a theory/hypothesis.



I didn't tell you? I could not possibly have been more clear! I was asking you about the "method" (if there is one) that scientists use to discover or formulate a theory/hypothesis. See my three questions in post #256 again.



It's exactly like what you wrote, and it is vacuous, just as Stuart Firestein says it is (see top of this post). What you wrote amounts essentially to "get yourself in the right place" kind of thing (get born, grow up, short pants, romance, learn to read, educate yourself on some area of science, etc.) and then when we come to to critical step, the one I've been virtually begging you to address, namely "how does one form a hypothesis methodically?", you answer thus:

"5. Using your acquired scientific skills, formulate a testable hypothesis - preferably quantitative - that can be used to check whether your answer in step 4 is wrong or right." (post #257)

In short, your methodological advice for formulating a hypothesis is "formulate a testable hypothesis", which tells us precisely nothing.



And perhaps I overestimated you. You have moved the goalposts time and time again, padding your answers with unrequested "periphery". I refrained from saying so (until now) on grounds of politeness.



Moving on . . .



This, once again, is to miss the point. Of course we can -- and historians have -- retrace(d) the steps that Einstein took on his tortuous course to the discovery of the general theory of relativity. Of course we can retrace the steps taken that led to the formulation of the theory of plate tectonics.

Of course we can also retrace the steps that Jones, and every lottery winner, took to scoop ten million bucks.

From the fact that the steps taken can be retraced or reconstructed, it does not follow that the discovery of a scientific theory (or the discovery that one now has a 10-figure bank balance) is a methodical process, let alone that all scientists are following the same method.

You're once again trivializing the notion of a "method". If all it takes for something to count as methodical is to do one thing, then do another thing, then do something else, according to no common formula then everything we do is methodical! Do you consider, for example, falling in love to be a methodical process? Sure, there are certain preconditions for that magic to take place (cf. your preconditions for formulating a theory); you're unlikely to fall in love while marooned on a desert island, for example, Tom Hanks and Wilson notwithstanding.

And your prescription for the magic of discovering a scientific hypothesis amounts to "discover a scientific hypothesis" (see your Step 5 above).


It's a free country, I suppose. There's no law prohibiting you from calling all this methodical. Of course, there's a price to be paid though. If the "method" of constructing a scientific hypothesis amounts to nothing more than "have an idea" then the distinction between a creative and a methodical process breaks down and there are only methodical processes. There are no eureka moments; there are only methodical moments!

It was a stroke of method that led Archimedes to go running through the streets of Syracuse naked and shouting, "I have it!"





Conclusion: Not only is The Scientific Method a reality, so is The Symphony Method, The Novelist Method, The Fall in Love Method, The Win the Lottery Method, The Win Bingo Method, and the Lose Your Marbles Method (we can, after all, reconstruct the steps that led to Nietzsche losing his). It's just that, for some strange reason, other people don't really call these things a "method". Only scientists do.




In a similar vein . . .




Fine! The Intelligent Design mob also . . . um . . . observed stuff and came up with a model. We must then conclude, based on your own criteria, that they are following The Scientific Method.

Unless of course you want to make a meal out of it.

No observations to support the theory can be made in the case of ID.

 

[axocanth]

No observations to support the theory can be made in the case of ID.

One can't help feel sorry for these poor ID folks. It's inevitably the case that they have not a shred, not a jot, not a whiff of evidence to support their theory while you guys have mountains higher than the Himalayas. At least if you guys can be believed.

Just to show that this is not just some ex cathedra dogmatic bald assertion on your part, how about you explain to our more suspicious readers what exactly it takes for a given observation O to support a given theory T, and how no observation whatsoever satisfies these criteria in the case of ID theory. Ok?

Note also, that what you've said above is quite irrelevant to what was said before. The goalposts have once again been moved. A reminder of what you told us in post #263 . . .

The so-called Scientific Method is sometimes overstated. All it means is the back and forth between observations of nature and model development, which intrinsic to science. Any one person may do only a bit of the whole thing. This whole thread seems to be making a huge meal out of this very simple concept.

The Scientific Method, on your account, consists merely of observing and developing models. Nothing was said about observations supporting a theory. Intelligent Design seems to satisfy your pre-goalpost shuffling criteria quite nicely. Have they not observed and developed a model?

 

[axocanth]

P.S.

To help you get started, James told us earlier that The Scientific Method, just is hypothetico-deductivism. On this view, at least in skeletal form, any observation that is entailed by a theory, which is subsequently confirmed, constitutes evidence for that theory.

I haven't looked into Intelligent Design in any detail, but if for example the theory asserts that some Intelligence created the birds and the bees, the heavens and the earth, the oceans and the rivers, then the theory entails that such things should be observed.

Now unless you're going to suggest that no one has ever seen a hummingbird or a hill, the H-D account of scientific method already yields lots of supporting evidence for ID theory -- mountains of it.


Do you accept this conclusion? If not, you'd better come up with another formulation of The Scientific Method.

 

[exchemist]

One can't help feel sorry for these poor ID folks. It's inevitably the case that they have not a shred, not a jot, not a whiff of evidence to support their theory while you guys have mountains higher than the Himalayas. At least if you guys can be believed.

Just to show that this is not just some ex cathedra dogmatic bald assertion on your part, how about you explain to our more suspicious readers what exactly it takes for a given observation O to support a given theory T, and how no observation whatsoever satisfies these criteria in the case of ID theory. Ok?

Note also, that what you've said above is quite irrelevant to what was said before. The goalposts have once again been moved. A reminder of what you told us in post #263 . . .



The Scientific Method, on your account, consists merely of observing and developing models. Nothing was said about observations supporting a theory. Intelligent Design seems to satisfy your pre-goalpost shuffling criteria quite nicely. Have they not observed and developed a model?

Nah, too much kuntlichkeit.

 

[axocanth]

Nah, too much kuntlichkeit.

Ok then. Until some justification is forthcoming, exchemist's musings on the wonders of science and the failures of ID shall be regarded as mere bald assertion on a par with, say, "Jesus loves you", unworthy of our attention.

 

[TheVat]

Fine! The Intelligent Design mob also . . . um . . . observed stuff and came up with a model. We must then conclude, based on your own criteria, that they are following The Scientific Method.

Why this tenacious fastening onto "following"? It is possible to use a method poorly. To make poor models which presume facts not in evidence and paper over gaps in understanding with baseless metaphysical conjecture. Just as a composer can write a symphony that sounds like a bunch of cats caught in a windchime because she didn't follow fundamental principles of pitch, voicing, rhythm and harmony too well. Most method is really a collection of guidelines, not rules.

Points given for that Bob Dylan snippet (get born get warm short pants romance), however.

 

[TheVat]

haven't looked into Intelligent Design in any detail, but if for example the theory asserts that some Intelligence created the birds and the bees, the heavens and the earth, the oceans and the rivers, then the theory entails that such things should be observed.

You seem to be overlooking that ID also posits that such things cannot develop by natural processes alone. It essentially departed from science by inserting a baseless evidence-free metaphysical assertion. It then interpreted all observations presuming that which was yet to be shown. Not all scientific quests may employ the same methods and practices, but none of them fare well with presuming hidden supernatural processes. Like Wittgenstein and his family resemblance concept, we are able to say what science is NOT. Defining borders involves being able to stand outside them and definitively state we're not in Kansas anymore, Toto!

 

[axocanth]

You seem to be overlooking that ID also posits that such things cannot develop by natural processes alone. It essentially departed from science by inserting a baseless evidence-free metaphysical assertion. It then interpreted all observations presuming that which was yet to be shown. Not all scientific quests may employ the same methods and practices, but none of them fare well with presuming hidden supernatural processes. Like Wittgenstein and his family resemblance concept, we are able to say what science is NOT. Defining borders involves being able to stand outside them and definitively state we're not in Kansas anymore, Toto!

Look out ID, it's something you did. Don't know when, but you're doing it again
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

First, to repeat from above, my understanding of Intelligent Design is minimal, it's not something I've looked into in any depth. Corrections and criticisms welcome. With that duly noted, let us proceed . . .

It is commonplace that science posits unobservable entities, processes, etc. that no one has ever observed (quarks et al), and quite possibly, no one ever will observe. This is generally regarded as legitimate scientific practice, however, insofar as theories postulating such unobservables have consequences (= predictions, in an atemporal sense) that can be observed. Having observable consequences allows a theory to be tested.

I trust nothing in the above "received wisdom" is controversial. Shout otherwise.

Intelligent Design likewise posits an unobservable in its theory (or theories - I know little about it). That unobservable posit is an intelligence responsible for certain (perhaps all, I dunno) phenomena on our planet, and perhaps other places too. Whether the proponents themselves stipulate that this intelligence is supernatural I have no idea. Their adversaries of course do, as if this, by itself, is sufficient to throw the entire case out of court -- sometimes literally.



The main premise of ID, as far as I understand at least, is this: Intelligent Design, just like typical scientific theories, has consequences that are observable, thus the theory can be tested just like other respectable scientific theories. One consequence is that certain observable phenomena in nature cannot be explained -- or perhaps cannot be plausibly explained -- by natural processes. If this is the case, then the best explanation for such cases is intelligent design.

In my brief time here, I have already seen members dismiss ID on the grounds that all that "irreducible complexity" crap has long ago been debunked. I assume you've seen such dismissals too, Mr Vat? We are told that natural non-intelligent processes are perfectly capable of accounting for the flagellum on such-and-such a beastie.

Now, you knowing me as you do will be aware that I take such declarations of "thorough debunking" with a healthy pinch of skeptical salt - as any sane person should. Scientists rarely, if ever, take the same "Popperian" attitude to their own theories. If, for example, distant galaxies do not behave in a manner consistent with general relativity, we do not hear declarations of a "thorough debunking" having transpired. The theory will typically be patched. They conjure up (cf. Einstein's "free creations") dark matter, dark energy, and whatever else, instead to mend the puncture.

Note further, if what our members here (and elsewhere) tell us about ID having been debunked (= falsified) is true -- indeed debunked by good science itself -- and if the criterion for scientific status is falsifiability, then the obvious conclusion to draw is that ID is scientific but false: It has been falsified in the same way that phlogiston theory, and a hundred others, were. It's business as usual in the scientific factory. Whether its unobservable posits are supernatural or not, science is perfectly capable of making an appraisal thereof, and indeed concluding that the theory is false.

If it were the case, as we are often told, that science simply cannot deal with any claims that make appeal to the supernatural, then the correct response from the scientific community to ID is complete silence. Clearly, the last thing they have been is silent.

What say you, so far?



Next up . . . is it, or is it not the case, that the SETI (Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence) project works on exactly the same premise as Intelligent Design? That is, it is possible to distinguish signals that are produced by intelligence from signals that are mere unintelligent cosmic "noise". It hasn't happened yet, but in a case where quasars, say, and everything else known to us has been ruled out, the best explanation for an otherwise inexplicable signal is intelligence.

Am I characterizing the SETI project correctly? If so, it doesn't strike me intuitively as unscientific. How about you? And if SETI can be granted scientific status, on what grounds is ID denied it?



Finally, lip service to methodological naturalism notwithstanding, I submit for consideration that it is obviously not true that science is silent on supernatural matters. Darwin, for example, spends considerable time in Origin contrasting his own theory against that of Special Creation, Richard Dawkins has a bestselling book devoted to scientifically falsifying the "God hypothesis", and as we've seen, scientists routinely appraise the claims made by Intelligent Design and Creationism (e.g. age of the earth).

Note also, since we've been discussing The Scientific Method (TSM), Darwin's reasoning does not sit comfortably at all with James' assertion that TSM just is the Hypothetico-Deductive method. The kind of reasoning Darwin appeals to time and time again is explanatory inference; his theory explains the data better than any rival.



In summary, it seems everyone wants eleven dollars bills, and ID only got ten. We are told that it is not only unfalsifiable, thus unscientific, but that it is false. We are told that science cannot speak on matters pertaining to the supernatural, and then science proceeds to do exactly that.

Pleased to hear your thoughts on all this.