The one theology book all atheists really should read

[Jeeves]

Then I guess you can look at the issue of how they are preserved ...simply in sterilized museums as artifacts from the past ... or within social conventions relevant to contemporary thought.

Libraries, caves, colleges, administrative offices, temples, private collections, municipal archives. So?

I mean there is a huge difference between cuneiform stocktakes or King Arthur and Plato's dialogues.

No there isn't. The most ancient texts also include bylaws, personal correspondence and poetry. Culture just keeps on truckin'.

 

[Jeeves]

That's the wonder of the printing press. It could print all sorts of books, from illegitimate fields of study like alchemy and astrology, works of fiction, and fairy tales, to scientific treatises and greek classics. The fact that it published theological works in no way implicates that invention as some how part of the field of theology. It's a physical machine. It has nothing to do with theology.

Some of its first commissions were commercial flyers, broadsheets [fake news] and indulgences.
τόσο περισσότερα πράγματα αλλάζουν όσο περισσότερο μένουν τα ίδια

 

[spidergoat]

Theology is stacked to the hilt with philosophy, both in terms of history and culture and development.

IOW you cannot even talk about the development and existence of philosophy in any meaningful way if you bypass religion.

That might be an effect of a particular subjective dualism arising when an argues against particular iteration of God, implicitly restricting the question of yes or no to that iteration, and extending it to all or simply failing to acknowledge other iterations do exist in the world. The article describes a theological range where monotheism starts to become panentheistic, which is different from what most theist/atheist disputes usually countenance.

I think the impact of theology to the present argument is overstated. Theology isn't knowledge. The whole field is the study of nonsense and fiction. Theologians might as well have attended clown college. It doesn't matter if religious tradition was where philosophy was founded, or if attempts at philosophical justification are ripe within churches, when it comes to theism, they all failed.

 

[StrangerInAStrangeLand]

 

[Jeeves]

Gargantuan sentences!
Plus hyperbole, profligate use of emotionally manipulative adjectives, personification of abstract concepts, facile pop psychology based firmly on air and absolute rejection of the passage of time. Other than that, it sounds like a philosophical work or no merit whatsoever.
Forgive me if I don't come back for more.

 

[Yazata]

In an earlier post I wrote (more or less, I've adjusted it slightly to read better):

But it is typically an existence claim. That puts it in the metaphysical arena. It's also typically a knowledge claim. People claim to know that God exists. And that puts it in the epistemological arena.

If we (as I generally do) understand 'knowledge' to mean something like 'justified true belief', then most weight would seem to fall on the word 'justified'.

How is purported 'knowledge' of God justified?

We must not only have a proposition in mind that we believe is true. Nor is it sufficient that it in fact be true. (That correspondence might just be luck or happenstance.) We need some satisfactory reason to believe that it's true.

That's what motivates all the incessant talk about 'evidence'. If the word 'evidence' suggests 'science' to you and yours, a stance ignorant of philosophy, then you probably need to propose a specifically philosophical form of extra-evidential justification that you think is more appropriate to theistic propositions. That's your task, not the atheist's.

And that, of course is a massive philosophical topic, which is the primary focus of scriptural commentary, practice, presentation etc.

Actually, the theological literature pays surprisingly little attention to trying to justify its own revealed doctrines. The Bible has almost nothing to say about it, hence scriptural commentary doesn't either. The mere claim that they are 'revealed' seems to be enough. That's the point of the natural theology/revealed theology distinction (Aquinas refers to these as 'general revelation' and 'special revelation'). 'Natural theology' refers to what supposedly can be known by everyone about God from examination of this world we live in. While 'revealed theology' consists of what can only be known by recipients of the revelation.

In the high medieval period there were some interesting attempts at providing justifications, which contradicts Jan's idea that only atheists would be concerned with them. There was Anselm's 'ontological argument' and Aquinas' attempt to use various arguments taken from Aristotle to create natural theology. My (repeatedly stated) point is that natural theology reduces God to a set of metaphysical issues like unmoved mover, first cause, or the necessary/contingent distinction. (The Big Bang might serve as unmoved mover and first cause, but we don't typically worship the Big Bang. The Laws of Physics supply reality with its order, but physicists don't kneel before their blackboards full of equations.)

Natural theology makes use of precisely the kind of concepts you and your journalist seem to be insisting that atheists not use (and ridiculing them for using): concepts based on our human observations of this supposedly 'created' realm that we inhabit. Natural theology is empirical by its nature.

But apart from natural theology, what do we have?

Its not even a topic that provides an immediate and obvious answer

I agree. Natural theology raises several metaphysical questions that remain unanswered in my estimation. The proper response to that is probably agnosticism (with regards to those particular questions). The proper response is not to equate the unknown answers to the questions with the 'God' of scripture, as Aquinas tries to do (that would require a lot more argument) Nor is the answer to follow some of the 'new atheists' by shrieking that it's all 'philosophers and theologians' so bullshit by definition. It's error either way in my opinion. The only thing that we are truly justified in saying is that we don't know what the answers to the metaphysical questions are at the moment (and that their relevance to religion remains unclear).

For the purposes of brevity however, I would suggest that if God is defined as something unique to reality

Apparently an assertion of divine immanence.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanence

What kind of something? Is 'God' synonymous with 'reality'? If so, what's up with worship, religious ethics, God's will and commands, with God's supposed love? In other words, if God is made synonymous with reality, where does that leave the average religious believer and the content of the religious traditions?

Or should God be distinguished from reality somehow? If so, how?

(The pantheism/panentheism distinction arises there.)

not only in the special object sense (ie demiurge), but the ontological sense (unconditioned cause of all causes)

That sounds like traditional theism's personal creator is being replaced by a metaphysical concept. Wouldn't most of religiosity be cast adrift by making that move?

Doesn't the theological tradition oftentimes make a big deal about the distinction between creator and creation? (That's the whole point with divine transcendence.) In some Christian theologies that's supposedly a tremendous chasm, bridgeable only by Christ.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transcendence_(religion)

And don't the theistic theologies of creation generally want to imagine creation as intentional, purposive, willful, rational and so on? That kind of language sneaks what you dismiss as a "demiurge" back in without acknowledging him.

then all conventional wisdoms, justifications and reasonings based on unpacking conditioned caused things are either moot or subject to a severe sort of scrutiny to determine their validity as epistemological tools. If one is not prepared to apply that scrutiny, they do not pass Go and collect $200.

Somebody (your author, your journalist or you) is trying to promote a particular kind of theology. Atheists are under attack because atheists supposedly are unaware or unresponsive to it. Perhaps the critics of atheism need to better explain what their preferred theology is and explain why it's superior to the supposedly crude concepts that the atheists are said to be using. Admittedly I haven't read the author's book and perhaps that's the task that he's set himself. From looking at the table of contents, it looks like he's getting his inspiration from theistic Hindu theology. (Which is ok with me.) That's seemingly where Jan Ardena is coming from too, or was a few years ago when he/she was a very outspoken proponent of Krishna bhakti.

How does the problem of justifying one's beliefs in the reality of God go away or become misguided when one makes these moves?

 

[Jeeves]

What a clear, succinct analysis! What a woeful waste of effort!

 

[Musika]

This is getting way too long. It took Musika two posts to respond to my last post, so I'm in danger of going four pages. To prevent that, I'll break it up into bite-sized pieces.

Atheists are a large and diverse group. They range from trained philosophers to laymen on the street. So right off, it's probably foolish to say that they all participate in a single philosophical 'game'.

You could say the same about theists - One type of variety begets another. The journalist even went as far to determine the atheist MO for discussions that don't enter the philosophical realm (beyond science). He also went on talk about the futility of bringing the said MO to such a "game". It was less an attempt to narrow it down to a specific or singular philosophical approach, but rather a pointing out of an entire philosophical field which is untouched by such atheistic critiques.

Wouldn't that mean accepting the journalist's assertions as already established? Which would seemingly pre-stack the deck in favor of your own rhetorical points. Why should any of us agree to that?

I'm ot sure what you are identifying as the rhetorical points here .... namely whether atheists have been known to bring an inappropriate MO to critique a metaphysical argument, or that theists have been known to have recourse to a type of argument that is beyond such an MO?
IMHO both these points appear to be clearly illustrated and not rhetorical.

You can argue about the demographics of a/theism in order to determine the prevalence of ideas as they appear on a spectrum, but that does not diminish the spectrum. Inasmuch as atheism has a reactive (as opposed to proactive) element at its core, it doesn't have the capacity to determine the "playing field" of theism. IOW theistic arguments that occupy a metaphysical space in philosophy have to be met on their own ground.

The idea that knowledge claims require satisfactory justification (especially when the knowledge claim is disputed) isn't "frog-marching all philosophical problems into the colosseum of science".

If one determines that such a Colosseum has the monopoly on such "justification", then that is exactly what it means.

It's a perfectly philosophical epistemological position. If we reject the idea that knowledge claims need justification, then how should we adjudicate between contradictory knowledge claims?

Its more to the point thst justification (or critique) takes a form in accordance to the claim at hand.... or at least it takes such a form if it wants to be relevant. Of course one can argue to suggest a lack of diversity within epistemology, but that appears to be part of the "philosophical shortcomings of atheists" the journalist is alluding to.

The journalist (and maybe the author of the book) was talking about how we should properly conceive of God. That's a theological issue.

Sure.
But they were focusing on the philosohical (as opposed to cultural, political, etc) ramifications of it, as it pertains to atheistic critique (atheists also have plenty to say about culture and politics stemming from religion). Hence, philosphy.

I'm certain that if we examine the Christian, Hindu and Islamic traditions throughout their histories, we will encounter a whole variety of ways of conceiving of their deities. Ranging from unknowability (negative theology or 'neti neti') to theological personalism. All of these can come in highly philosophical forms or in more popular versions.

Regardless of your views that such a dichotomy being present (trying to engineer the existence of God in the framework of material science seems to also have quite a strong historical academic presence), you are still left with the issue of a theistic category of argument that doesn't come down to the MO of science. Categories, by their very nature, contain variety.

You seem to me to be trying to collapse concerns with epistemological issues together with what you call "science". So any talk about justification for one's knowledge-claims turns into an example of trying to cram a round philosophical peg into a square scientific hole. If that's what you are up to, then I think that you are mistaken. The need to justify one's claims, especially if they are contested, is just common sense. (I'm sure later stone age people reasoned like that.) Philosophy absorbed it in its earliest days. Aristotle formalized it in his Organon. Then science absorbed it. That latter adoption by science isn't any reason to dismiss it now.

I'm not talking of dismissing science. Round pegs in square holes make just as much racket as square pegs in round holes.

Advocating that square holes have the monopoly on all issues of justification is the precise sort of "collapsing of epistemologies" that the journalist and the author are agreeing on.
You may not agree to it, but it just leaves you outside the scope of critiquing certain religious ideas on their own philosophical grounds.

What other sources of justification of religious existence-claims do we have?

Its a philosophical issue. If it had no application beyond religion, it would be an identity trope of its culture, politics, etc .... which of course is one manner to try and cut a philosophical claim off at the pass.

If atheists emphasize empirical sources of information, that's because our senses seem to be our gateway to the objective world, to reality that doesn't just exist for you or me individually (I like the taste of chocolate, or I believe in the existence of invisible pink unicorns), but for everyone.

Needless to say, that is a topic unto itself. In short, the five senses are subject to mistakes on account of their limited nature. So to whatever means they are utilized as a "gateway to the objective world", they bring a substantial par to the course. That doesn't mean they don't find use as a square peg in a square hole, but they certainly don't have the capacity to engineer all problems to the proportions of squares either.

But I will say that if theists want to attack atheists for excessive empiricism, then the theists probably need to present a plausible case that an alternative path to knowledge of God actually exists. Witnessing to their own faith doesn't suffice.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pramana

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology

That is a question that requires getting down to specific approaches. I mentioned at the onset that there is no one singular apparent answer (and you agreed as much in your reference to islam, hinduism, christianity, buddhism , etc being fields).

If would probably be easier to talk about how empiricism doesn't work in particular scenarios rather than talk the immense subject of what works outside of it.

 

[iceaura]

Nor is the answer to follow some of the 'new atheists' by shrieking that it's all 'philosophers and theologians' so bullshit by definition.

Unfamiliar crowd.
They are "shrieking" (something theists never seem to do in these debates, for whatever reason), and they reject philosophy - the category, all of it - as bullshit. Both. That excludes everyone I'm familiar with.
I haven't been keeping up, apparently.

 

[iceaura]

You could say the same about theists - One type of variety begets another.

Not the same. They have a specific feature in common, and it's significant - fundamental. They occupy a defined and delimited category, and those without that feature are everyone else.
And they don't "beget" each other, in general. That's a specific relationship found in certain circumstances.

- - namely whether atheists have been known to bring an inappropriate MO to critique a metaphysical argument, or that theists have bedn known to have recourse to a type of argument that is beyond such an MO?
IMHO both these points appear to be clearly illustrated and not rhetorical.

Nobody has illustrated either of those points here,
and what atheists have been known to do (some self-described atheist or two, somewhere) is hardly relevant.

Inasmuch as atheism has a reactive (as opposed to proactive) element at its core, it doesn't havd the capacity to determine the "playing field" of theism

Any core of "atheism", to the extent that concept even makes sense, would be neither reactive or proactive.
The playing field of theism is certainly not whatever some theist tries to hide in after bullshitting the universe.

" - - if theists want to attack atheists for excessive empiricism, then the theists probably need to present a plausible case that an alternative path to knowledge of God actually exists."
That is a question that requires getting down to specific approaches. I mentioned at the onset that their is no one singular apparent answer -

You appear to be demonstrating that there is not even one apparent answer.

 

[Musika]

To paraphrase: You said that religion is filled with philosophy - "in other words" you can't discuss philosophy without referring to religion.

I was meaning philosophy. It was a response to MR s proposition that theology is an illegitimate field of study (with his emphasis that whatever theology brings forth in the name of philosophy, has no merit). Put quite simply, the only way to study philosophy in that manner is to dismantle culture and history (what to speak of philosophy)

Fair enough if one's target is religion, but if you have to dismantle philosophy, history and culture to do it, I would offer that one is going about it all wrong. To be fair, MR is probably laboring under the idea that philosophy, like the sciences, is simply a linear process. IOW one simply studies the most up to date version of it, and dallying with historical elements is of no real consequence. The study of philosophy does not function like that.

If one's goal is to launch an effective and relevant argument for atheism, it requires effective and relevent study of theism.

 

[Musika]

Musika, you do know that "phenomena" is the plural?

Thanks for pointing that out

 

[StrangerInAStrangeLand]

I was meaning philosophy. It was a response to MR s proposition that theology is an illegitimate field of study (with his emphasis that whatever theology brings forth in the name of philosophy, has no merit). Put quite simply, the only way to study philosophy in that manner is to dismantle culture and history (what to speak of philosophy)

Fair enough if one's target is religion, but if you have to dismantle philosophy, history and culture to do it, I would offer that one is going about it all wrong. To be fair, MR is probably laboring under the idea that philosophy, like the sciences, is simply a linear process. IOW one simply studies the most up to date version of it, and dallying with historical elements is of no real consequence. The study of philosophy does not function like that.

If one's goal is to launch an effective and relevant argument for atheism, it requires effective and relevent study of theism.

///
No study of theism is required to not be a theist. No argument is needed to not be a theist.
Tho sometimes, studying religion results in ceasing to be a theist.

<>

 

[Musika]

In 1959, classicist Norman O. Brown released an important book applying Freudianism to historical study, called Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytic Meaning of History (Middletown: Wesleyan Univ. Press):

It is a Freudian theorem that each individual neurosis is not static but dynamic. It is a historical process with its own internal logic. Because of the basically unsatisfactory nature of the neurotic compromise, tension between the repressed and repressing factors persists and produces a constant series of new symptom-formations. And the series of symptom-formations is not a shapeless series of mere changes; it exhibits a regressive pattern, which Freud calls the slow return of the repressed, "It is a law of neurotic diseases that these obsessive acts serve the impulse more and more and come nearer and nearer the original and forbidden act." The doctrine of the universal neurosis of mankind, if we take it seriously, therefore compels us to entertain the hypothesis that the pattern of history exhibits a dialectic not hitherto recognized by historians, the dialectic of neurosis.​

It is, admittedly, at least somewhat obscure; I've mentioned it before, but none of the forty-some posts over the last nine years demonstrated any significant impact. Nor is it especially popular in these disputes; if people paid closer attention, the main risk of introducing Brown to this sort of discussion would be offending religionists by mitigating God while simultaneously angering atheists for undermining their political indictments against any given religion.

Obscure as it may seem, however, the psychoanalyic meaning of history is something people engage on a regular basis. If I recall religionists distrusting "psychology", is that another wasted historical reference? People don't know Vanila Ice, would they know Woody Woodpecker? Or Bugs Bunny? I'm pretty sure they both did the hollow-book, violence as child psychology joke. I actually know a Christian who, if the patchwork story is accurate, never finished is master's degree because he's short the psych credits, which is funny because he's a cruel gaslight. And he becomes a pretty straightforward example: He doesn't trust "psychology", but the cornerstone of his gaslighting really is "reverse psychology" as if he's talking to a child. So, yes, if I recall religionists distrusting psychology, yet practicing "reverse psychology" and other basic manipulation, does that mean anything other than a chuckle of superficial satisfaction because religious people are hypocrites?

Anyone attempting interpretation of political history is engaging the psychoanalytic meaning of history.

There is a saying about learning from history or else repeating it; the psychoanalytic meaning of history is part of how we learn from history.

• • •​

Box yourself in with the tautalogy, "God is". A seeming paraxox emerges at some point, as you can "free yourself" by doing so. As I suggested↗ in discussion with Toad, yesterday: Monotheism has certain logical results; Hart clearly isn't ready to decouple God from that specialness people feel within their religious contexts, but the viable tautalogy runs, "God is", and the most part of religion that gives societies trouble has to do with screwing that part up in order to feel special.

In this case, freeing oneself means simply slipping the surly bonds of discourse designed intending failure and futility.

Hart is countenancing, however he arrived at the vista, something near to panentheistic immanence, but trying to present a more constricted pantheistic version. The problem with pantheistic immanence in Christianity is human frailty; if God simply is, then we simply are, thus much of immanence emerged as an effect of trying to justify religion.

There is another aspect, too: Are you familiar with a math game played with a six-sided die and a triangle? The point of the game is to demonstrate that chaos constrained reflects its constraints. For our purposes, the resulting myriad triangles remind that humanity is, evolutionarily, what it is because it cannot be anything else. There is an old question about do-overs, and why did God make the Universe as He did; this becomes part of the answer. The math describing the physics of the Universe is what it is, whether we ever know it all or not, one metaphorical symptom is that it becomes possible to say we are, indeed, made in God's image. Why two eyes and ten fingers and toes? If the ultimate reality had gone differently, such that there was advantageous utility in having six fingers on a hand, we would.

And there you see the double-edge of the psychoanalytic meaning of history in these religious discussions and disputes: Redemptive religionists don't want that emotional reward of feeling special to go away; atheists don't want to deal with literary and philosophical notions that are harder to denigrate religion.

It seems you are taking the question to another level, namely drawing some conclusion on the precise pantheistic/personalistic nature of God. (So if that's where you're going .... well, brace yourself). You are right, that Hart doesn't deal with that q (at least from what I read from the article). And you are right, according to how God is defined (pantheistic, personal, or something in between) bears high significance on the nature of this world, our selves, and even what constitutes the best of all worlds.

From a "simple maths" perspective, there appears to be an elegance in kicking God upstairs with Pantheism (the unknowable, the un-nameable., etc). This serves many purposes, namely relegating the "anthro" exclusively to the fallible (namely, "us") so we don't have to take desire, free will and individual expression outside the sand box ... the sandbox being the trappings of personhood within the profane, namely its predictability in jubilation (name, fame, adoration and distinction arising from money, fame/followers, strength, intelligence, renunciation, beauty, etc ) and despair (the absence or loss of the before mentioned things). So the simple maths dictates a simple dichotomy ... namely (so called ) material life arising from the acquisition of such things and (so called) spiritual life arising from the renunciation of such things (which gives the necessary trauma for psychoanalysis.... and if you do it long enough in a consistent manner, a history).

But there is a bigger q of whether personhood has a necessary requirement for the profane. IOW even though we may be susceptible to crimes of passion regarding ownership in this world, we are also quite capable of a "life free of crime". Ok, someone owns that big bank downtown, yet it would appear (at least in my saner moments) that I can be quite satisfied without getting my grubby little hands all over it, and I can also be quite satisfied without coming before its marble columns and proclaiming I have nothing to do with it. So if I have recourse to a sense of self that isn't deeply dyed by material acquisition (I can't own anything material in any ultimate sense) or material renunciation (I can't renounce everything material in any ultimate sense), of what would God bestow if he wishes to reciprocate with the "specialness" of knowing Him? Is favours at the prison shop dispensary (aka, "the sandbox") the extent of His magnanimity? Is reciprocation only meaningful if given in the medium of mental distress (inasmuch as material acquisition/renunciation = psychoanysis narrative)?

 

[Capracus]

Tho sometimes, studying religion results in ceasing to be a theist.

If done honestly it's almost guaranteed.

 

[Musika]

///
No study of theism is required to not be a theist. No argument is needed to not be a theist.
Tho sometimes, studying religion results in ceasing to be a theist.

<>

I guess as long as one is satisfied with a few keywords and google search, you have a point.

 

[StrangerInAStrangeLand]

I guess as long as one is satisfied with a few keywords and google search, you have a point.

///
You have no point. As usual.
Evidently, my points are beyond your understanding.

<>

 

[Jeeves]

If one's goal is to launch an effective and relevant argument for atheism, it requires effective and relevent study of theism.

Why would anyone make that their goal?
Why would anyone think that anyone else wants to launch (launch??) an argument for atheism?

I certainly found comparative religion an interesting aspect of anthropology and history, and it does provide a framework for current cultural trends. But a single reading of the English Standard Bible was quite sufficient to cure me of religion.

 

[Musika]

Why would anyone make that their goal?
Why would anyone think that anyone else wants to launch (launch??) an argument for atheism?

At a guess, probably because one is under the impression there is some value in taking what it has to say (or what one has to say on its behalf) seriously.

 

[Jeeves]

At a guess, probably because one is under the impression there is some value in taking what it has to say seriously.

If one had a reference for the the word "it", this sentence might have a meaning.
Even if so, this sentence would not answer the question "Why would anyone make [launching an argument for atheism] their goal?"
If one removed the qualifiers, thus:

because there is value in taking what it has to say seriously.

the sentence might make more sense, but still wouldn't answer the question
"Why would anyone think that [ anyone else wants an argument for atheism]?"
You see, atheism is a state of mind. It has nothing to say.
Theism is a belief-system; a psychological condition; it doesn't talk, either.
People may have quite a lot to say about either of those mental conditions. A study of their opinions and observations may be of some value in constructing an argument for or against those conditions, but would not render such an argument effective and relevant, since effectiveness and relevance are determined by the reader. For example, Freud's brilliant monograph, The Future of an Illusion was not well received by critics of his time.