We know that 'gravity' is due 'attraction' between two mass. We also know that 'our mind' gets attracted to certain physical things as per the 'nature of our mind'. So considering this common factor of 'attraction', we can say that: 'Our mind has a nature of gravity' or 'Gravity has a nature of our mind'. Thoughts...
Gravity is a law / formula pertaining to a force, when the preference is for what will happen and avoiding "why / how" things happen; or referring to gravity in a way that is more stable over time, not dependent upon the most popular theory of explanation of a particular era. As a law it can be construed as a kind of inherent and global regularity of the cosmos, and not something acquired accidentally and locally in the course of contingent, empirical events transpiring through the ages.
Whereas a person wanting / craving a checkered blouse, motorcycle, a pizza, or raggae music consists of conditioned attractions that a brain / body habitually obtains over the flux of life. There is no special force of attraction mediating between the desirer and the objects of desire, other than permutations of applicable ones recognized by physical sciences. Such conditioned inclinations and passions accordingly vary from individual to individual. Though there are basic innate needs that are necessary for an organism's survival, which can be universal in the species. Tom may habitually crave steak to say alive, but his friend prefers potatoes; both particulars can be subsumed under the general concept of "food", driven to be sought by the common feeling of hunger. While it's unclear that any attempts have been made to seriously formalize some of these universal, template needs of humankind as "laws", there is an emerging "physics of society" that does treat the grand overall behaviors of people as if we were interacting atoms amenable to rules and statistical predictions:
Philip Ball (physicsweb.org): From theories of pedestrian movement and traffic flow to voting processes, economic markets and war, researchers are striving towards a physics of society. "It may be", said US sociologist George Lundberg in 1939, "that the next great developments in the social sciences will come not from professed social scientists, but from people trained in other fields." Take a look at any issue of a physical-sciences journal in the past five years and you will see one such field staking its claim vigorously. Physics is muscling its way into social science. Not content with explaining the behaviour of atoms and electrons, semiconductors, sand and space-time, physicists are now setting out to understand the behaviour of people.
Lundberg would have approved. He was part of a tradition that sought to establish a scientific grounding for sociology that would make it every bit as quantitative and deterministic as the natural sciences. [...] But the impulse to identify natural laws of society is, in fact, much older. Plato may have been the first to hint at it, and the Roman writer Cicero in the second century BC believed in laws that transcended the customs and particularities of individual nations and which would apply to societies everywhere at all times.
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The basic idea is simple: we replace the atoms of conventional statistical mechanics by people. Of course, while atoms interact via well defined forces of attraction and repulsion, people are seldom so straightforward. But in some situations human interactions do not amount to very much more than this basic concept. For example, by avoiding collisions and not encroaching on one another's "personal space", we act just as though there was a repulsive force between us.
Add to this some directional motion towards a goal, rather than the random Brownian drift of atoms, and you have a model of pedestrian behaviour like that developed in the mid-1990s by German physicist Dirk Helbing and co-workers. Helbing, who is now at the Technical University of Dresden, has shown that this model can be used to predict how people move in busy corridors and intersections, and how they create spontaneous trails over open spaces (see Helbing, Keltsch and Molnar in further reading).
If we include a degree of neighbour-following - a cohesive, attractive force - you find the "flocking" behaviour explored by physicist Tamás Vicsek and colleagues at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest, which mimics the motion of animal swarms. In 1999 Vicsek, Helbing and co-worker Illés Farkas demonstrated how neighbour-following can lead to hazardous herding effects when a crowd becomes seized by panic in conditions of poor visibility, such as a smoke-filled room (see Helbing, Farkas and Vicsek in further reading).
The rules that govern the interaction between people (or "agents") can be as simple or as complex as the situation demands. Between economic traders, for example, the interactions consist of buying and selling, as well as responding to the perceived market sentiments of their neighbours. Voters, on the other hand, seek to persuade nearby agents to adopt their views - just like magnetic atoms tending to align their magnetic moments.
These physics-inspired "interacting agent" models - which are typically studied using computer simulations - have been used to explore everything from the growth of businesses to the dynamics of boat trips in the Grand Canyon. One of the most complex examples is the virtual world of "Sugarscape" devised by Robert Axtell and Joshua Epstein of the Brookings Institution - a political-science think-tank in Washington DC. In this model, agents are free to move, breed, trade, fight and exchange cultural values according to simple rules. Their key objective is to acquire food ("sugar"), which is distributed patchily across the gridded landscape. They can obtain sugar by force if necessary, although some versions of the model permit civilized trading by introducing a second commodity, spice.
Interacting-agent models enjoy an increasing respectability in social sciences, but their complexity can mean that the connection with real physics becomes tenuous. Even in models as complex as Sugarscape, however, some of the properties that emerge can be interpreted and rationalized by drawing on the experience that statistical physics has with simpler systems. For example, these models often show statistical behaviour such as non-Gaussian fluctuations and power-law probability distributions, which are familiar in physics. Both of these features are generally signatures of non-equilibrium systems that are governed by strong correlations between the individual components. Such correlations typically mean that the system's behaviour, while hard to predict in detail, is not simply random (that is, characterized by Gaussian fluctuations). Thus even in very complex systems there may be universal statistical features that remain aloof to the fine details.
Despite all of this, social scientists (and others) may feel uncomfortable with the notion that you can represent a human being by a particle - however complicated its interaction laws. Does it not imply that people are mere automata that jerk like puppets in response to the push and pull of external forces? In the face of such a mechanical view of society - which was pioneered by Comte along with French mathematician Pierre-Simon Laplace and others - the Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky asserted that men will strive to exert their free will, even to the extent of making themselves act irrationally or insanely.
Yet modern physical models of social phenomena are not really imposing some deterministic tyranny on human actions. Rather, they are simply acknowledging that in reality our choices are often extremely limited. However much we treasure a belief in free will, social norms and conventions exist partly to reduce the need to make choices in the first place.
People within a culture dress similarly, eat the same kinds of food and use the same words. We do not question whether drivers have free will simply because they predictably follow one another down the motorway at more or less the same speed. And in an election we do not exercise our free will by voting for our grandmother - we vote for one of the handful of names on the ballot sheet. Statistical physics does not prescribe which way our mental "compass needle" points. It merely asserts that the choice of orientations is limited, and that this choice is typically influenced by our neighbours.
The idea that mass decisions may have predictable yet counterintuitive consequences was pioneered by Harvard economist Thomas Schelling in his 1978 book Micromotives and Macrobehavior. Schelling was really writing about social physics, although he did not know it. ...
Instead she had to wait till Butterfly, in 1981.