[...] Plus, how inconsistently insane would it be (in the context of natural science) to propose that certain procedures (either mechanical, electrical, or chemical) can conjure a
hidden or subjective _X_ novelty via their performance?
[...] Most items claimed to be instances of emergence are public -- they are new activities slash structures or patterns that can be observed or detected by observation or instruments. Still composed of atoms, particles, fields (i.e., they don't float on their own).
[...] A routine(?) assertion that physical operations are emergently producing something immaterial that can't be directly detected (akin to
epiphenomenalism), might be fine if one doesn't mind going over the cliff of inconsistency with respect to everything else one usually believes. Otherwise, it's probably a good idea for the physicalist to slap one's self back into the world of consequences with respect to what one proposes. Not directly stating an apparent consequence of a proposal or trying to remain ignorant of it does not really offer exoneration.
[...] So that's arguably the second issue: the presentations of consciousness cannot even be determined to be the case in terms of residing in public space, directly available to the "many" of scientific investigation. An emergent novelty that is private might as well be a report about divine revelation. Multiple believers can share a consensus about each individual privately intuiting God, but that's still suspect BS.