Yazata:
I agree with most of what you wrote above. So, a lot of this post will just be agreement. Nevertheless...
"Religion" is a very broad term. Clearly, science won't ever demolish the idea that there are "higher powers" or supernatural forces/beings/phenomena.
However, science certainly can demolish specific empirical claims that religions make. For example, if a religious "scripture" claims that the Earth sits on the back of a giant tortoise, or that the Earth is only 6000 years old, then those claims are empirically falsifiable, and therefore squarely in the scope of science.
When it comes down to it, even the way we divide up the world into discrete "things" is a kind of arbitrary-seeming process that can seem more pragmatic than actually embedded in "reality".
For example, we can argue over whether a mathematical concept such as "triangle" is something that exists out there in a separate Platonic "second reality", or whether it is just a useful abstraction that we invented to help make sense of the world, or to describe it.
I agree with most of what you wrote above. So, a lot of this post will just be agreement. Nevertheless...
I'm arguing against the idea that science somehow demolishes religion
"Religion" is a very broad term. Clearly, science won't ever demolish the idea that there are "higher powers" or supernatural forces/beings/phenomena.
However, science certainly can demolish specific empirical claims that religions make. For example, if a religious "scripture" claims that the Earth sits on the back of a giant tortoise, or that the Earth is only 6000 years old, then those claims are empirically falsifiable, and therefore squarely in the scope of science.
I agree.Right. Empiricism is a theory that knowledge comes only or primarily from sensory experience.
So by implication, an empirical pursuit like science can only produce knowledge of whatever realities are accessible to sensory experience (and its instrumental extensions).
I wrote:
"Your "scientist" is going to seek a natural explanation for whatever it is, because that's what science does. The "scientist" will attempt to explain the new phenomenon in terms of known physical principles and what is empirically observable. That heuristic (discovery strategy) is called methodological naturalism.
But (and this is my point) methodological naturalism doesn't justify the move to metaphysical naturalism, the claim that nothing can exist that doesn't belong to the natural world. (Where 'natural world' is defined as the order of things accessible through sensory observation and the methods of the empirical sciences.) There's seemingly no way that your "scientist" could know the truth of metaphysical naturalism, certainly not without abandoning methodological naturalism and venturing into the realm of metaphysics."
Yes.Of course science is all about nature, that's methodological naturalism. Which implies that science would be violating its own principles if it tries to argue for the existence or non-existence of hypothetical realities that transcend the realm of nature.
As long as those hypothetical supernatural realities don't try to muscle in on "nature", then I don't think science is concerned with them. If they aren't muscling in on the natural world, then the hypothetical supernatural realities don't have a lot to do with their time, though, as far as I can tell.So you're agreeing with me that natural science isn't concerned with hypothetical supernatural realities that lie outside its scope?
It's very difficult (probably impossible, in fact) to verify the existence of another "reality" based purely on states of mind. The hurdle of proving that there's anything there other than the state of mind itself is a high one to jump.Of course we still haven't really established that religion has no supporting evidence. The suggestion so far is merely that it lacks empirical evidence. (Evidence obtained by sensory observation, broadly conceived.)
Meditation, yoga and the Western contemplative traditions all (arguably) provide experiential evidence of purported realities inaccessible to the senses. (Their epistemic status remains very controversial.)
Yes. These are interesting philosophical issues.My point was that abstractions like logical relationships, numbers and mathematical structures can't be observed with the senses. They aren't empirical. They are intuited with the mind's eye, so to speak. The ontological status of logic and mathematics (mathematics is seemingly objective and appears to be discovered rather than invented) is still controversial and their epistemic status (how we come to know about logical relationships and mathematical objects) is controversial too.
When it comes down to it, even the way we divide up the world into discrete "things" is a kind of arbitrary-seeming process that can seem more pragmatic than actually embedded in "reality".
Well, there's some argument there, and most scientists don't actually worry about these kinds of questions on a day-to-day basis.My point being that scientists (and atheists along with them) already accept the reality of non-physical realities known by intuitive means other than the senses. Realities that lie outside the realm of natural science per se, that aren't part of physics' inventory of physical reality, but which natural science in its modern (post-scientific-revolution) form seems to be heavily dependent on.
For example, we can argue over whether a mathematical concept such as "triangle" is something that exists out there in a separate Platonic "second reality", or whether it is just a useful abstraction that we invented to help make sense of the world, or to describe it.