My point was that his criticism
should be of specific religions, because not everything in the category of 'religion' possesses the qualities that he criticizes.
In Chapter 8, entitled 'What's wrong with religion? Why be so hostile?' he lets go with full force. His subtitles include: 'Fundamentalism and the subversion of science', 'The dark side of absolutism', 'Faith and homosexuality', 'Faith and the sanctity of human life' and 'How 'moderation' in faith fosters fanaticism'. He's seemingly associating the broad concept 'religion' with the narrower concepts 'fundamentalism', 'absolutism' and 'faith'. He's seemingly oblivious to the fact that while these ideas may or may not apply to the kind of creationists he debates, they don't apply to many forms of religiosity. So he's not even addressing the question he himself asked 'What's wrong with religion?' At best he's explaining what he finds wrong about the particular species of religion he doesn't like. He doesn't like the fundies that he's associated himself with in his career as atheist controversialist, so all of 'religion' gets caught up in the resulting stupidity.
Dawkins certainly sets up religion and science as opposites, as somehow antithetical to each other.
Dawkins seems to be asserting that all existence claims are scientific claims, which looks to me like an assertion of metaphysical physicalism. It seems to suggest that to be real means to be physically real and that scientific methods are the only methods, since they apply to anything that exists. That's all metaphysical belief that will be difficult to justify.
But if we accept for the sake of argument the hypothetical existence of non-physical or supernatural being, it's hard to see how natural science could be brought to bear on it.
Maybe. But that would seem to contradict the idea up above that all existence claims are scientific claims.
We can? We probably can't
right now. That sentence sounds like an expression of faith in the completeness of methodological physicalism, the idea that natural science's research program will leave no unexplained loose ends if extended indefinitely to its conclusion.
And just because something is deemed an "unnecessary hypothesis" isn't really a convincing argument that the something in question doesn't exist. What we seem to have instead is an argument for the irrelevance of science to the question. If the observed universe is consistent both with the existence and the non-existence of the questioned something, then no scientific observation will have any bearing on the question of its existence.
I imagine that this is where 'Ockham's razor' will make its appearance. But that's just a slogan, a maxim, that still needs to be justified itself. It's often true that simpler theories are more beautiful to our eyes, but why should that make them more accurate depictions of reality?
Parenthetical diversion: (I recently bought a hugely interesting book on that last question over at University Press Books in Berkeley, entitled '
Ockham's Razors: A User's Manual' by Eliot Sober. (Cambridge University Press, 2015)
https://www.amazon.com/Ockhams-Razo.../ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=
I'm not convinced that science could recognize a supernatural violation of the natural order, even if science's nose was rubbed in it. If what is being observed is a seeming violation of the natural order, then natural science would just observe that some anomalous event is inexplicable at the moment. It would have no way of knowing whether a natural explanation for it will be discovered in the future. The research program of methodological naturalism suggests that if science wants to proceed scientifically, it needs to seek a hypothetical natural explanation (even if conceivably none exists in some cases).
And what if as I suggested earlier, everything that happens is the product of God's will, but God's will operates through natural law? The young couple thinks their beautiful new baby is an answer to their prayers. That doesn't mean that they think that their baby's birth was a violation of the laws of nature.
How could science possibly prove them wrong?