It looks like you two are having a hard time connecting, and i think i know why. Bagman it seems like you are taking this free will issue on a lighter note then captain wants. It seems as you are assuming that actual "free will" exists(ability to choose something, or another way to look at it, no out side influences is causing your actions now) And it seems that captain canada is trying to argue the topic of actual "free will". hope that helps of course correct me if i am wrong
Is there such a thing as chance?
- Thread starter hockeywings
- Start date
Hockeywings,
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It looks like you two are having a hard time connecting, and i think i know why. Bagman it seems like you are taking this free will issue on a lighter note then captain wants. It seems as you are assuming that actual "free will" exists(ability to choose something, or another way to look at it, no out side influences is causing your actions now) And it seems that captain canada is trying to argue the topic of actual "free will". hope that helps of course correct me if i am wrong
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I'm aware of what Captain Canada wants, and I didn't write with the idea that I was ending the argument, but I do think that what I wrote is highly relevant to Captain's concerns. What you mean by "actual free will" is the free will that might seem to be excluded if the universe is "deterministic." I'm sure that's what Captain has in mind, too. You merely assume that it is categorically different from the kind of free will that I talked about. If your assumption is true, then I'm not talking about "actual free will," but how do you know that it is true? How do you so easily accept that there are two kinds of free will? The fact that I am more free typing this letter than if I were being forced to type it at gunpoint should be giving you a problem: Either there are two kinds of free will, or facts like these are evidence of the only thing that "free will" could refer to.
There's no third way, no saying that I am merely deceived about the difference between my present situation and the situation of being forced to type at gunpoint. Here, I'll prove it. Consider a gunman who doesn't want me to stop typing until I'm finished, else he'll shoot me. Since that gunman is not here, I just got up and stretched before I began typing this sentence.
So there are two ways, and either way, you've got a problem. You can say that I didn't talk about determinism and so forth, but you've still got a problem. I'm not evading. I've just chosen to begin with this problem.
Unfortunately, I don't have time tonight to continue or to reply to Captain Canada.
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It looks like you two are having a hard time connecting, and i think i know why. Bagman it seems like you are taking this free will issue on a lighter note then captain wants. It seems as you are assuming that actual "free will" exists(ability to choose something, or another way to look at it, no out side influences is causing your actions now) And it seems that captain canada is trying to argue the topic of actual "free will". hope that helps of course correct me if i am wrong
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I'm aware of what Captain Canada wants, and I didn't write with the idea that I was ending the argument, but I do think that what I wrote is highly relevant to Captain's concerns. What you mean by "actual free will" is the free will that might seem to be excluded if the universe is "deterministic." I'm sure that's what Captain has in mind, too. You merely assume that it is categorically different from the kind of free will that I talked about. If your assumption is true, then I'm not talking about "actual free will," but how do you know that it is true? How do you so easily accept that there are two kinds of free will? The fact that I am more free typing this letter than if I were being forced to type it at gunpoint should be giving you a problem: Either there are two kinds of free will, or facts like these are evidence of the only thing that "free will" could refer to.
There's no third way, no saying that I am merely deceived about the difference between my present situation and the situation of being forced to type at gunpoint. Here, I'll prove it. Consider a gunman who doesn't want me to stop typing until I'm finished, else he'll shoot me. Since that gunman is not here, I just got up and stretched before I began typing this sentence.
So there are two ways, and either way, you've got a problem. You can say that I didn't talk about determinism and so forth, but you've still got a problem. I'm not evading. I've just chosen to begin with this problem.
Unfortunately, I don't have time tonight to continue or to reply to Captain Canada.
I hope i am correct in assuming that the freewill issue captain was mentioning was the deterministic v. free will issue and not the one you were providing, else this is a big waste of time lol.
Well i guess what i will say is that if he is arguing the deterministic v. free will issue your concept of free will would be irrevelent. if it is adeterministic world then you only have the concept of having your "free will" and if it is that we have as i put it "actual free will" then you have it. See how in both cases you can seem to have your "free will"?
Well free will as in free will v. deterministic refers to whether or not you ACTUALLY have free will in your decisions and they are not influenced by previous causes and the free will you refer to is whether or not a present cause is affecting you or not, it isnt attending the issue of whether or not past causes are the reason for present situations and will be forever, you gunman may be gone tomarrow but if you were talking about the deterministic v. free will issue there would be millions of previous causes, and i am COMPLETELY UNDERESTIMATING lol. Hope that answers that.
I dont understand what you mean, maybe i inadvertantly answered it up top, but if i didnt then please restate it more clearly.
But with starting with this you are assuming that you have free will in the free will v. deterministic sence, which I beleive is what captain is arguing.
Hockeywings,
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Well i guess what i will say is that if he is arguing the deterministic v. free will issue your concept of free will would be irrevelent. if it is adeterministic world then you only have the concept of having your "free will" and if it is that we have as i put it "actual free will" then you have it. See how in both cases you can seem to have your "free will"?
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If you can't describe or characterize "actual free will," your statements are meaningless; you might as well substitute "zubnix" or any other meaningless word for it. The same goes for "non-deterministic world." No, of course I don't see how one can seem to have free will in "both cases," because I don't necessarily see that there are two cases, and even if I did see it, this would not necessarily show me that in the non-deterministic case I would have free will or even seem to have it. I suppose, a non-deterministic world is something like this: A world in which at least some events are uncaused or only partially caused. I think I might __not__ have free will in such a world, since perhaps I would not be the cause of my actions. On the other hand, if all events are caused, then I probably am the cause of my actions, even if I myself am caused. So free will seems to be compatible with causation, not incompatible.
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Well free will as in free will v. deterministic refers to whether or not you ACTUALLY have free will in your decisions and they are not influenced by previous causes and the free will you refer to is whether or not a present cause is affecting you or not, it isnt attending the issue of whether or not past causes are the reason for present situations and will be forever, you gunman may be gone tomarrow but if you were talking about the deterministic v. free will issue there would be millions of previous causes, and i am COMPLETELY UNDERESTIMATING lol. Hope that answers that.
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It is absolute nonsense to suggest that if my actions were not influenced by previous causes, this would correspond to my having free will. For example, suppose that the gunman is here, but this has no effect on my decision to get up and stretch. I would not be deciding whether to be shot. Since it does have an effect, I am deciding. If you don't think that example is fair, make one up that is. Show me how I would be more free if my actions were not influenced by previous causes.
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I dont understand what you mean, maybe i inadvertantly answered it up top, but if i didnt then please restate it more clearly.
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I had said that either (1) there are two kinds of free will, the kind I was talking about, and your "actual free will," or (2) the things I was talking about, such as in the example of the gunman, constitute evidence for free will. Then I said, "There is no third way..." The third way would be (3); I am not more free when the gunman is absent; I only think I am. Obviously that's not true; it's much easier for me to get up and stretch if no one is threatening to kill me if I do. If you say I'm not, since my getting up and stretching would have "previous causes," I reply that that's already covered by (1). In other words, (3) is just (1) in disguise, so there's "no third way." Of course, you can say that the free will in (2) is not free will, but then you'll be saying that "free will" has no meaning whatever, not even my meaning; which would mean you were talking about absolutely nothing; you might as well be talking about "zubnix."
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But with starting with this you are assuming that you have free will in the free will v. deterministic sence, which I beleive is what captain is arguing.
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Nope. I'm offering evidence that I have free will. You're the one making an assumption; you're assuming that "actual free will" means something. I don't think you can characterize it. I don't think you can show that if the world were non-deterministic, this would give you something that sensibly deserves the name "actual free will." The free will that I'm talking about is the only one on the table. If it's the only conceivable free will, it deserves the name "actual free will."
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Well i guess what i will say is that if he is arguing the deterministic v. free will issue your concept of free will would be irrevelent. if it is adeterministic world then you only have the concept of having your "free will" and if it is that we have as i put it "actual free will" then you have it. See how in both cases you can seem to have your "free will"?
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If you can't describe or characterize "actual free will," your statements are meaningless; you might as well substitute "zubnix" or any other meaningless word for it. The same goes for "non-deterministic world." No, of course I don't see how one can seem to have free will in "both cases," because I don't necessarily see that there are two cases, and even if I did see it, this would not necessarily show me that in the non-deterministic case I would have free will or even seem to have it. I suppose, a non-deterministic world is something like this: A world in which at least some events are uncaused or only partially caused. I think I might __not__ have free will in such a world, since perhaps I would not be the cause of my actions. On the other hand, if all events are caused, then I probably am the cause of my actions, even if I myself am caused. So free will seems to be compatible with causation, not incompatible.
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Well free will as in free will v. deterministic refers to whether or not you ACTUALLY have free will in your decisions and they are not influenced by previous causes and the free will you refer to is whether or not a present cause is affecting you or not, it isnt attending the issue of whether or not past causes are the reason for present situations and will be forever, you gunman may be gone tomarrow but if you were talking about the deterministic v. free will issue there would be millions of previous causes, and i am COMPLETELY UNDERESTIMATING lol. Hope that answers that.
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It is absolute nonsense to suggest that if my actions were not influenced by previous causes, this would correspond to my having free will. For example, suppose that the gunman is here, but this has no effect on my decision to get up and stretch. I would not be deciding whether to be shot. Since it does have an effect, I am deciding. If you don't think that example is fair, make one up that is. Show me how I would be more free if my actions were not influenced by previous causes.
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I dont understand what you mean, maybe i inadvertantly answered it up top, but if i didnt then please restate it more clearly.
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I had said that either (1) there are two kinds of free will, the kind I was talking about, and your "actual free will," or (2) the things I was talking about, such as in the example of the gunman, constitute evidence for free will. Then I said, "There is no third way..." The third way would be (3); I am not more free when the gunman is absent; I only think I am. Obviously that's not true; it's much easier for me to get up and stretch if no one is threatening to kill me if I do. If you say I'm not, since my getting up and stretching would have "previous causes," I reply that that's already covered by (1). In other words, (3) is just (1) in disguise, so there's "no third way." Of course, you can say that the free will in (2) is not free will, but then you'll be saying that "free will" has no meaning whatever, not even my meaning; which would mean you were talking about absolutely nothing; you might as well be talking about "zubnix."
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But with starting with this you are assuming that you have free will in the free will v. deterministic sence, which I beleive is what captain is arguing.
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Nope. I'm offering evidence that I have free will. You're the one making an assumption; you're assuming that "actual free will" means something. I don't think you can characterize it. I don't think you can show that if the world were non-deterministic, this would give you something that sensibly deserves the name "actual free will." The free will that I'm talking about is the only one on the table. If it's the only conceivable free will, it deserves the name "actual free will."
Imahamster
Registered Senior Member
Suppose that “free will” contributes to a person’s actions. Now videotape the person. As you play back the video you might think, “This person has no free will. No matter what he thinks he can’t change the outcome on that videotape.” Yet the videotape has captured that person’s “free will” in action. Each taped event represents the choice that person made. Viewing the universe as a videotape that may be played and replayed doesn’t change that the events portrayed represent a person’s free will in action.
In a deterministic world one might predict a planet’s orbit or might predict the “free choice” a person will make. That prediction doesn’t change that the choice itself was free. With more and more information predictions might become better and better. In the limit one might feel that one could predict with total certainty a person’s actions. (That is, more information leads to better predictions that seem to reduce that person’s choices until in the extreme limit there is no choice.) All one has accomplished is understanding a person so well that they are predicting where that person’s “free will” takes them. It does not mean the person isn’t exercising free will.
People’s choices are constrained. At times very constrained. And different people have different constraints. A great runner may choose to run a four-minute mile. This hamster can’t choose to run that fast. (Law recognizes that different circumstances and mental states affect one’s freedom to choose.) But having little choice is not the same as having no choice.
Understanding leads to awareness of many actions one might take. Free will is the selection of one path from many.
In this hamster’s opinion “Free will” responds to and interacts with its external and internal environment. It is not independent of environment and is not determined by environment. “Free will” is the surfer riding the wave.
The mechanical model that gives rise to a deterministic universe does not seem to match with modern physics. Non-linear “butterfly” effects mean even small initial differences may lead to vastly different outcomes. More information may not significantly aid one’s ability to predict. The “limit case” of predicting everything may not exist.
At the quantum level determinism disappears. Chance rules. The emission of an individual photon is a random event. Only in the aggregation of many such events does “determinism” appear. Yet such macroscopic “determinism” is only highly probable, not certain. Add the “butterfly” effect on top of this quantum uncertainty and the universe is far from predictable. Replaying the universe could lead to very different outcomes.
Scientists may someday map out a process of “free will”. Perhaps observe it in action, measure it as varying brain waves, or even simulate it on a computer. Understanding how or why a choice is made does not mean a choice wasn’t made. “Free will” still typed this sentence.
(In case this hamster's meanderings aren't clear, to the extent that this hamster understands Bagman’s explanations, this hamster agrees with his presentation of “free will”.)
In a deterministic world one might predict a planet’s orbit or might predict the “free choice” a person will make. That prediction doesn’t change that the choice itself was free. With more and more information predictions might become better and better. In the limit one might feel that one could predict with total certainty a person’s actions. (That is, more information leads to better predictions that seem to reduce that person’s choices until in the extreme limit there is no choice.) All one has accomplished is understanding a person so well that they are predicting where that person’s “free will” takes them. It does not mean the person isn’t exercising free will.
People’s choices are constrained. At times very constrained. And different people have different constraints. A great runner may choose to run a four-minute mile. This hamster can’t choose to run that fast. (Law recognizes that different circumstances and mental states affect one’s freedom to choose.) But having little choice is not the same as having no choice.
Understanding leads to awareness of many actions one might take. Free will is the selection of one path from many.
In this hamster’s opinion “Free will” responds to and interacts with its external and internal environment. It is not independent of environment and is not determined by environment. “Free will” is the surfer riding the wave.
The mechanical model that gives rise to a deterministic universe does not seem to match with modern physics. Non-linear “butterfly” effects mean even small initial differences may lead to vastly different outcomes. More information may not significantly aid one’s ability to predict. The “limit case” of predicting everything may not exist.
At the quantum level determinism disappears. Chance rules. The emission of an individual photon is a random event. Only in the aggregation of many such events does “determinism” appear. Yet such macroscopic “determinism” is only highly probable, not certain. Add the “butterfly” effect on top of this quantum uncertainty and the universe is far from predictable. Replaying the universe could lead to very different outcomes.
Scientists may someday map out a process of “free will”. Perhaps observe it in action, measure it as varying brain waves, or even simulate it on a computer. Understanding how or why a choice is made does not mean a choice wasn’t made. “Free will” still typed this sentence.
(In case this hamster's meanderings aren't clear, to the extent that this hamster understands Bagman’s explanations, this hamster agrees with his presentation of “free will”.)
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Imahamster,
Your videotape analogy is pretty good, but you need to make some argument about the nature of causation, since predicting and forcing are two different things. Those who say that causation precludes free will probably unwittingly assume that causation is a phenomenon of some kind, like gravity, electromagnetism, or even far less well measured phenomena, such as the behavior of Mr. Gomez who lives down the street. We can have theories of all these things. We can't have theories of causation, so far as I know; i.e., we can't have theories of it as a phenomenon.
Your videotape analogy is pretty good, but you need to make some argument about the nature of causation, since predicting and forcing are two different things. Those who say that causation precludes free will probably unwittingly assume that causation is a phenomenon of some kind, like gravity, electromagnetism, or even far less well measured phenomena, such as the behavior of Mr. Gomez who lives down the street. We can have theories of all these things. We can't have theories of causation, so far as I know; i.e., we can't have theories of it as a phenomenon.
Captain Canada,
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My first suggestion was that 'free will' and 'responsibility' are necessary concepts for society to function. I suggest that without 'free will' 'responsibility' has little meaning, and that consequently society is no longer able to function.
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That's true, but it's only important if "free will" is a fiction. However, if you think they are fictions, you shouldn't take it as obvious that they are necessary for society to function. Don't you find it surprising that a fiction would be __necessary__?
The question of moral responsibility is far too narrow. If I can't hold you simply responsible for your acts (including your speech acts), we can't make any kind of sense at all. E.g., if you say you think it will rain tonight, I can't say, "Captain C. thinks it will rain tonight," because this would be holding you responsible for the statement. I'm not, just yet, speaking to the question of whether distant causes forced you to make the statement; I'm merely pointing out that you are responsible for it in the simple sense that you made considerations that led you to it; this is true regardless of whether you were forced to make the considerations. Similarly, if you steal or refrain from stealing it, you made moral considerations, and this is what we mean when we say that you are morally responsible.
I wondered if you were singling out moral responsibility because it involves punishment. If so, I say that makes no sense, because there is no relevant difference between punishment and any treatment I might give you, e.g., grading your ability to predict rain. Any treatment I give you would affect you, and that's what's crucial; if I can't punish you, I can't do anything else to you, either; I can't even __say__ that you predicted rain, not because I would be "blaming" you for predicting it, but because I would be holding you responsible in any sense at all.
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If I understand correctly you first argue that 'free will' is not necessary for society to function. This is because we can have a sensible understanding of freedom that does not depend upon the assumption of 'complete freedom', but rather in degrees of freedom. The very fact that we can speak of degrees of freedom proves that freedom must exist.
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No, I don't argue that your version of free will is not necessary for society to function, because I don't even accept that your version is free will. Similarly, I would not argue that "zubnix" is or is not necessary for society to function, unless I knew what zubnix was. You can't assume that we do or do not have "complete freedom," or "actual free will," unless you know what those phrases mean, but I don't think you do, if you say that your being caused precludes free will. If you were not caused, how would this make you free? Your actions would be senseless, and you yourself would not understand them or will them; they would be absolutely unpredictable, because there could be no theory to account for them, not even a vague, weak theory. If you were to say, "I'm going to buy some milk," I would have no reason to believe you, no reason to think that buying milk was even slightly more likely than any other action.
You might say, "You're only showing that there's no free will, which is what I suggested in the first place." But that would be wrong, unless by "free will" you meant something that would exist in the senseless world I just described; it would be a technical term having nothing to do with anything that anyone understands by "free will." The fact that you connect free will with moral responsibility shows that you don't mean that, because that world would be incompatible with all responsibility, not just the moral kind.
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My problem is with the concept of 'free will' which I still don't understand. You did your best to explain it to me, but I'm still confused.
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It means that you are free to make considerations determining your actions in the same sense as a computer is free to compute, a wheel is free to roll, and so forth. A computer may or may not be free to compute; I can unplug it, I can foul it up in various ways. A wheel may or may not be free to roll; I can place a block in front of it. Similarly, I can give you drugs, I can hold you at gunpoint, and so forth.
This is the only thing that "free will" could mean. It is not in any way inferior to that other, senseless "free will," because that other does not make sense. Unless you can make it make sense, you have no basis on which to say that it's the "actual free will" which, alas, we do not have.
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I would say to this:
(1) Your action is caused by the threat of being shot.
(2) Your action is caused by a dream.
Of course we have further, perhaps infinte causal chains which go further back, but for the moment we'll stick to the basic cause.
But why is (1) less of a free choice than (2)? This is what I want to know. They were both caused by something you had no control over. Let's even assume that (2) occurred whil I was awake. What is the difference? Regardless of why I struck her there would be a cause and ultimately one which had nothing to do with me. Now if we accept that everything is cause and effect, why should we draw a line under cause 1 rather than 2, 3, 4, and so on?
Of course I understand that most people will view (1) as less free than (2), but why? Essentially, what is this freedom you speak of?
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I didn't say that (1) is less a free choice than (2). I said that striking your wife (2) while you are asleep is not a free choice, since it is not made in consideration of striking your wife; you were not free to decide whether to strike her. Actually, (1) is freer than (2), since the choice in (1) is made in consideration of being shot, which is freer than not having a choice at all. In (2), you don't choose whether to strike your wife; you know nothing about the problem.
The reason we should "draw a line under cause 1" is that has more to do with you in particular than the more distant 2,3,4. A nearby cause forces you more than a distant cause does. Distant causes are responsible for lots of things, but there are nearby causes that are more specifically responsible for you. That's the only difference I know of. A cause is no less a cause for being near.
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I suspect that you must mean choice. But what does this mean? To do otherwise? Thus far, no one has. So if we look at the empirical evidence, we have absolutley no basis for believing in choice as the ability to do otherwise. If we cannot do otherwise, ever, then what does freedom possibly mean?
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Do I understand this correctly? You seem to be saying that a person only has free will if he does other than what he does. That's a contradiction, so you're saying that free will does not exist unless a contradiction is true. I think you're trying to say that free will implies a contradiction.
All right, then. (1) How does free will imply that a person is doing other than what he is doing? (2) How does the fact that a person is doing whatever he is doing constitute "empirical evidence" for lack of free will? The fact that a person does whatever he does can not be empirical evidence for anything, and there's no such thing as empirical evidence for a logical implication, anyway.
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To recap:
(1) Your action is caused by the threat of being shot.
(2) Your action is caused by a dream.
So
if we accept that everything is cause and effect, why should we draw a line under cause 1 rather than 2, 3, 4, and so on (why should we say the closer the proximate cause, the more freedom you had)?
But if we could not do otherwise in either case, why should we say we were more free in one example than the other?
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Ah, when you say 1,2,3,4, are you talking about (1) shot, (2) dream? If so, I didn't realize this. But you misunderstood me as saying that (2) involved more free choice than (1), and now you're understanding the reverse, in the same message. So maybe your 1,2,3,4 do not refer to (1), (2).
It is not true that "we could not do otherwise." When we say, e.g., that we could have either spaghetti or steak for dinner, we only mean that it makes sense to speak of these possibilities, e.g., because both are on hand, and that we can deliberate on the question, because we have minds, and we know that we deliberate. These are facts. "Could" does not refer to any real eating of steak in the case where spaghetti is eaten. You seem to be confused about this when you say that a person does not have free will unless he does other than what he does, i.e., unless a contradiction is true.
The fact that you misunderstand "could" does not mean that you're wrong about free will, but it does impact your argument, because it leaves you without a way to say "we could not do otherwise." When we say that something could not happen, we mean that we know of reasons why it could not happen. We do not know of reasons why we could not choose (say) spaghetti for dinner - it happens every day that people choose spaghetti, and besides, we have some.
Of course, you say that there is no choice; one or the other has been ordained from the beginning of the world. That may be true, but it does not mean that you have no choice, because clearly the alternatives of steak and spaghetti are on hand, and clearly you perform some calculation that results in one or the other. Suppose you say, "I think I'll have spaghetti," and you proceed to cook and eat it. Now someone comes along and says, "Captain C. did not choose spaghetti." What would that mean, except a falsehood?
Certainly your parents didn't choose it so many years ago. Certainly the inventor of spaghetti didn't choose it. As for inanimate causes, they don't choose; "choose" means what a person does, and you did it.
I agree that spaghetti may have been inevitable from the beginning of the world, but I do not agree that this means you don't have free will, because "free will" does not mean something that is uncaused. As I argued earlier, if your actions were not caused, they would make no sense at all, so you can't set up "free will" as something that you would have in that case, unless you're using it as a technical term for something bearing no resemblance to the normal understanding. You yourself have made moral responsibility contingent on free will, so you've shown that you assume the normal understanding. If your actions were not caused, moral responsibility would make no sense at all.
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I don't want to confuse the issue further so I will limit myself to this for now, but if there's any specific argument of yours you'd like me to respond to let me know.
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I think I've given you a lot to work on in this message.
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My first suggestion was that 'free will' and 'responsibility' are necessary concepts for society to function. I suggest that without 'free will' 'responsibility' has little meaning, and that consequently society is no longer able to function.
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That's true, but it's only important if "free will" is a fiction. However, if you think they are fictions, you shouldn't take it as obvious that they are necessary for society to function. Don't you find it surprising that a fiction would be __necessary__?
The question of moral responsibility is far too narrow. If I can't hold you simply responsible for your acts (including your speech acts), we can't make any kind of sense at all. E.g., if you say you think it will rain tonight, I can't say, "Captain C. thinks it will rain tonight," because this would be holding you responsible for the statement. I'm not, just yet, speaking to the question of whether distant causes forced you to make the statement; I'm merely pointing out that you are responsible for it in the simple sense that you made considerations that led you to it; this is true regardless of whether you were forced to make the considerations. Similarly, if you steal or refrain from stealing it, you made moral considerations, and this is what we mean when we say that you are morally responsible.
I wondered if you were singling out moral responsibility because it involves punishment. If so, I say that makes no sense, because there is no relevant difference between punishment and any treatment I might give you, e.g., grading your ability to predict rain. Any treatment I give you would affect you, and that's what's crucial; if I can't punish you, I can't do anything else to you, either; I can't even __say__ that you predicted rain, not because I would be "blaming" you for predicting it, but because I would be holding you responsible in any sense at all.
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If I understand correctly you first argue that 'free will' is not necessary for society to function. This is because we can have a sensible understanding of freedom that does not depend upon the assumption of 'complete freedom', but rather in degrees of freedom. The very fact that we can speak of degrees of freedom proves that freedom must exist.
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No, I don't argue that your version of free will is not necessary for society to function, because I don't even accept that your version is free will. Similarly, I would not argue that "zubnix" is or is not necessary for society to function, unless I knew what zubnix was. You can't assume that we do or do not have "complete freedom," or "actual free will," unless you know what those phrases mean, but I don't think you do, if you say that your being caused precludes free will. If you were not caused, how would this make you free? Your actions would be senseless, and you yourself would not understand them or will them; they would be absolutely unpredictable, because there could be no theory to account for them, not even a vague, weak theory. If you were to say, "I'm going to buy some milk," I would have no reason to believe you, no reason to think that buying milk was even slightly more likely than any other action.
You might say, "You're only showing that there's no free will, which is what I suggested in the first place." But that would be wrong, unless by "free will" you meant something that would exist in the senseless world I just described; it would be a technical term having nothing to do with anything that anyone understands by "free will." The fact that you connect free will with moral responsibility shows that you don't mean that, because that world would be incompatible with all responsibility, not just the moral kind.
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My problem is with the concept of 'free will' which I still don't understand. You did your best to explain it to me, but I'm still confused.
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It means that you are free to make considerations determining your actions in the same sense as a computer is free to compute, a wheel is free to roll, and so forth. A computer may or may not be free to compute; I can unplug it, I can foul it up in various ways. A wheel may or may not be free to roll; I can place a block in front of it. Similarly, I can give you drugs, I can hold you at gunpoint, and so forth.
This is the only thing that "free will" could mean. It is not in any way inferior to that other, senseless "free will," because that other does not make sense. Unless you can make it make sense, you have no basis on which to say that it's the "actual free will" which, alas, we do not have.
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I would say to this:
(1) Your action is caused by the threat of being shot.
(2) Your action is caused by a dream.
Of course we have further, perhaps infinte causal chains which go further back, but for the moment we'll stick to the basic cause.
But why is (1) less of a free choice than (2)? This is what I want to know. They were both caused by something you had no control over. Let's even assume that (2) occurred whil I was awake. What is the difference? Regardless of why I struck her there would be a cause and ultimately one which had nothing to do with me. Now if we accept that everything is cause and effect, why should we draw a line under cause 1 rather than 2, 3, 4, and so on?
Of course I understand that most people will view (1) as less free than (2), but why? Essentially, what is this freedom you speak of?
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I didn't say that (1) is less a free choice than (2). I said that striking your wife (2) while you are asleep is not a free choice, since it is not made in consideration of striking your wife; you were not free to decide whether to strike her. Actually, (1) is freer than (2), since the choice in (1) is made in consideration of being shot, which is freer than not having a choice at all. In (2), you don't choose whether to strike your wife; you know nothing about the problem.
The reason we should "draw a line under cause 1" is that has more to do with you in particular than the more distant 2,3,4. A nearby cause forces you more than a distant cause does. Distant causes are responsible for lots of things, but there are nearby causes that are more specifically responsible for you. That's the only difference I know of. A cause is no less a cause for being near.
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I suspect that you must mean choice. But what does this mean? To do otherwise? Thus far, no one has. So if we look at the empirical evidence, we have absolutley no basis for believing in choice as the ability to do otherwise. If we cannot do otherwise, ever, then what does freedom possibly mean?
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Do I understand this correctly? You seem to be saying that a person only has free will if he does other than what he does. That's a contradiction, so you're saying that free will does not exist unless a contradiction is true. I think you're trying to say that free will implies a contradiction.
All right, then. (1) How does free will imply that a person is doing other than what he is doing? (2) How does the fact that a person is doing whatever he is doing constitute "empirical evidence" for lack of free will? The fact that a person does whatever he does can not be empirical evidence for anything, and there's no such thing as empirical evidence for a logical implication, anyway.
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To recap:
(1) Your action is caused by the threat of being shot.
(2) Your action is caused by a dream.
So
if we accept that everything is cause and effect, why should we draw a line under cause 1 rather than 2, 3, 4, and so on (why should we say the closer the proximate cause, the more freedom you had)?
But if we could not do otherwise in either case, why should we say we were more free in one example than the other?
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Ah, when you say 1,2,3,4, are you talking about (1) shot, (2) dream? If so, I didn't realize this. But you misunderstood me as saying that (2) involved more free choice than (1), and now you're understanding the reverse, in the same message. So maybe your 1,2,3,4 do not refer to (1), (2).
It is not true that "we could not do otherwise." When we say, e.g., that we could have either spaghetti or steak for dinner, we only mean that it makes sense to speak of these possibilities, e.g., because both are on hand, and that we can deliberate on the question, because we have minds, and we know that we deliberate. These are facts. "Could" does not refer to any real eating of steak in the case where spaghetti is eaten. You seem to be confused about this when you say that a person does not have free will unless he does other than what he does, i.e., unless a contradiction is true.
The fact that you misunderstand "could" does not mean that you're wrong about free will, but it does impact your argument, because it leaves you without a way to say "we could not do otherwise." When we say that something could not happen, we mean that we know of reasons why it could not happen. We do not know of reasons why we could not choose (say) spaghetti for dinner - it happens every day that people choose spaghetti, and besides, we have some.
Of course, you say that there is no choice; one or the other has been ordained from the beginning of the world. That may be true, but it does not mean that you have no choice, because clearly the alternatives of steak and spaghetti are on hand, and clearly you perform some calculation that results in one or the other. Suppose you say, "I think I'll have spaghetti," and you proceed to cook and eat it. Now someone comes along and says, "Captain C. did not choose spaghetti." What would that mean, except a falsehood?
Certainly your parents didn't choose it so many years ago. Certainly the inventor of spaghetti didn't choose it. As for inanimate causes, they don't choose; "choose" means what a person does, and you did it.
I agree that spaghetti may have been inevitable from the beginning of the world, but I do not agree that this means you don't have free will, because "free will" does not mean something that is uncaused. As I argued earlier, if your actions were not caused, they would make no sense at all, so you can't set up "free will" as something that you would have in that case, unless you're using it as a technical term for something bearing no resemblance to the normal understanding. You yourself have made moral responsibility contingent on free will, so you've shown that you assume the normal understanding. If your actions were not caused, moral responsibility would make no sense at all.
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I don't want to confuse the issue further so I will limit myself to this for now, but if there's any specific argument of yours you'd like me to respond to let me know.
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I think I've given you a lot to work on in this message.