My impression is that 'Russell's teapot' is kind of a reductio-ad-absurdem of the idea that there's no problem in believing in something provided that there isn't any evidence against it. It doesn't depend on the teapot being a physical object, it revolves instead around the teapot being ridiculous. It's saying that if it's ok to believe in anything you want to believe, provided there isn't any evidence against it, that opens the door to believing in no end of ridiculous things.
The concept of "evidence" used in the teapot analogy is one that can adequately be employed only for things that do not contextualize the (prospective) knower.
To give another example, besides God, of something we hold that contextualizes us: If we posit that electrons play a role in how we know things, then electrons are things that contextualize us as (prospective) knowers. Which is why we cannot approach seeking evidence of or about electrons in the same way we seek it of things like tables and chairs (things we are sure do not contextualize us). Which is how on the microlevel, physics turns into philosophy.
I'm not convinced that you are an atheist.
Have you noticed that the theists on this forum generally agree that I am not a theist?
I get the impression that you have a very exalted idea of theism.
Of course I do. Because exalted ideas are the only ones worth having!
(You still seem to believe that theists are superior people, compared to non-theists.)
On principle, yes.
Unfortunately, something happened to you that estranged you, something that drove you away. (That's just a speculation, but you hint at it often.) I sense that you still believe in God
I've never believed in God.
and still long for him, passionately with all of your heart. You just feel so distant...
Sure. Who doesn't long for the exalted?
Perhaps you are one of the theists for whom the problem of the 'hiddenness of God' is a deep and existential problem.
No, and no.
Frankly, I don't want to become one of them [atheists], for a number of reasons.
I have no objection to that. I'm curious what those reasons are, but it's up to you whether you want to discuss them.
Because of their "Timmy started it!" mentality.
If I find something to be important, then I will research it myself, make effort to figure it out myself. I'm not going to wait for someone else to do it for me.
So when someone claims they want to see evidence of "God," as atheists typically do, and then they just sit on their assess, pouting - then such people simply aren't serious about their inquiry or about what they state is important to them or what they want to know about.
I'm not like that and I don't want to become like that.
When I was a youth, I never felt any anger or hostility towards or from the other kids whose families belonged to various Christian churches (and occasionally Jewish congregations). It fascinated me.
/.../
But having said all that, from my earliest recollection, I was always aware that I didn't literally believe any of it. I never have. There was never any fear, never any defense mechanisms. Never any of the anger that so many other atheists wear on their sleeves. No bad experiences with theism or with religion ever, really. My atheism, such as it is, is entirely philosophical.
Envy, feeling threatned can take on very sophisticated forms. The more sophisticated a person, the more sophisticated their envy and feeling threatened can be. They can reach a level of sophistication where they don't seem anything like what is usually understood by "envy" and "feeling threatened."
Mature ego defense mechanisms don't seem like ego defense mechanisms at all - the list reads like a list of virtues, of positive qualities to aspire to, nothing at all like those ugly things listed in the previous levels.
I don't understand that. How do you propose to distinguish true religious ideas from heathen supersitition?
By exploring how come I wish to make such a distinction.
Since I am not in any formal or socially relevant position where it would be part of my job description to distinguish true religious ideas from heathen supersitition, it's none of my business to attempt to do so in speculation.
"Monks, these two are fools. Which two? The one who takes up a burden that hasn't fallen to him, and the one who doesn't take up a burden that has. These two are fools."
AN 2.98
You seem opposed to the whole idea of making religious decisions based on reasons for making them.
Not at all. I am vehemently focusing on those reasons, and I include into them as a factor the personal qualities of the (prospective) knower / decision-maker.
Knowing takes place within a person's mind, based on the person's faculties, qualities; it doesn't take place in some abstract impersonal space. Hence epistemology is necessarily personal.
You've mentioned virtue epistemology several times. I don't understand that either. How does consideration of the knower's virtues dissolve all the questions about how it is that he or she knows particular things?
Apply virtue epistemology to yourself: You are the knower, or at least the prospective knower. For what reason are you interested in knowing this or that? Do you assess that to be a good reason?
"All those who ask questions of another do so from any one of five motivations. Which five?
"One asks a question of another through stupidity & bewilderment. One asks a question of another through evil desires & overwhelmed with greed. One asks a question of another through contempt. One asks a question of another when desiring knowledge. Or one asks a question with this thought,[1] 'If, when asked, he answers correctly, well & good. If not, then I will answer correctly [for him].'
AN 5.165
I get the impression from all these threads the last week or two that there's an implicit argument hidden under the surface of these discussions, often hinted at but never clearly stated by anybody. There are repeated suggestions that theists possess virtues that non-theists don't. Perhaps they are faithful to God or something. And in religion, these religious virtues arguably are simultaneously epistemological virtues.
Yes.
So the theist is justified claiming to know that God exists, and that belief is not only true, it's the ultimate and highest truth. Provided only that the theist has suitable faith.
No, these two sentences do not follow from the above.
You didn't like that paraphrase the last time I mentioned it. But even if it's wrong, that's the impression I've gotten. I'm sensing that the traditional Christian idea of knowing by faith is floating around. So if that isn't what you are talking about, and it very likely isn't, feel free to fill out the details and explain what your own idea really is.
I think virtue epistemology deals with really basic things, things that children are expected to master. I'm just bewildered why it seems like such a problem to some people.
Why not? I'm not sure what the phrase "the same manner that one seeks evidence of chairs and tables" means. Nor am I sure what you are objecting to. Are you objecting to the whole idea of basing one's belief in A rather than B on there being reasons to believe A rather than B?
I talked about it in the sentences following the one quoted.
What does "work with" mean?
Hold as true for the sake of the argument for the time being.
Obvously if we choose to believe a-priori that God really is Supreme Being, Creator and Controller, then the whole problem of God's existence would evaporate because we would already believe that God is Supreme Being, Creator and Controller. But why should somebody believe that the definition states a truth? That whole line of argument looks circular to me.
All arguments, about anything, are circular, self-referential like that.
From Quine's "Two Dogmas:"
The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to change the figure, total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. Truth values have to be redistributed over some of our statements. Re-evaluation of some statements entails re-evaluation of others, because of their logical interconnections -- the logical laws being in turn simply certain further statements of the system, certain further elements of the field. Having re-evaluated one statement we must re-evaluate some others, whether they be statements logically connected with the first or whether they be the statements of logical connections themselves. But the total field is so undetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to re-evaluate in the light of any single contrary experience. No particular experiences are linked with any particular statements in the interior of the field, except indirectly through considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole.
If this view is right, it is misleading to speak of the empirical content of an individual statement -- especially if it be a statement at all remote from the experiential periphery of the field. Furthermore it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold contingently on experience, and analytic statements which hold come what may. Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system. Even a statement very close to the periphery can be held true in the face of recalcitrant experience by pleading hallucination or by amending certain statements of the kind called logical laws. Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revision. Revision even of the logical law of the excluded middle has been proposed as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics; and what difference is there in principle between such a shift and the shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin Aristotle?
Perhaps the thing to remember here is that arguments for or against aren't meant to convince people, but only to stimulate thought on a topic.
Perhaps the argument instead is that if somebody really understands a 'Supreme Being, Creator and Controller' definition of God, even if one isn't actually asserting its truth, then on that assumption no particular fact could stand out as evidence for God's existence, since everything without exception could equally be termed evidence of God's existence. That seems to land us right back where we started, with Russell's teapot again.
I think you need to clarify what your null hypothesis is in all this.
I think that one can (and arguably must) continue to inquire into how people supposedly know, and hence what reasons exist for believing, the propositions that people assert are truths. If it appears that no reasons exist, or even possibly can exist for what they say, then that seems to tell us something important about the plausibility of the things being asserted.
Why inquire into how other people know, but ignore matters of how one knows?
Continually directing one's attention outwards is a recipe for confusion and suffering.