[...] Why do you regard Materialism as your Religion without any doubt?
I'm a "materialist" only with respect to explanatory approach. (See
methodological naturalism). IOW, it's not a metaphysical conviction or ontological dogma.
We don't have direct access to a non-represented external world, but only the one that our brains or minds output for us, which will always feature natural causes (when it's possible for us to obtain a firm, non-debatable explanation for _X_ at all).
Erwin Schrödinger:
The world is a construct of our sensations, perceptions, memories. It is convenient to regard it as existing objectively on its own. But it certainly does not become manifest by its mere existence. Its becoming manifest is conditional on very special goings-on in very special parts of this very world, namely on certain events that happen in a brain. That is an inordinately peculiar kind of implication, which prompts the question: What particular properties distinguish these brain processes and enable them to produce the manifestation? Can we guess which material processes have this power, which not? Or simple: What kind of material process is directly associated with consciousness? --What is Life? Mind and Matter
That represented (empirical or phenomenal) environment is inter-subjective -- objective or "public" in that manner (we can have consensus about it) because non-damaged brains (figuratively) run the same operating system. In contrast, those suffering from clinical conditions or drug influences (hallucinations) can experience all manner of bizarre circumstances and entities inhabiting their version of outer experience.
We explain the represented world with its own contents, not those of a hypothetical domain that could only be speculated about.
While you might be a metaphysical realist and choose the "supernatural" as one of the options for a so-called ultimate reality, it is pointless to seek explanations in the context of a prior in rank level to which there is no access. Any more than [figuratively] the characters of a video game would have ingress to the technological substrate generating their limited environment.
Even a scientific realist view of particles (matter) as really being excitations in 24 quantum fields -- despite that being something wholly different, abstract, and weirder than the phenomenal world that your neural processes present to you via every moment of everyday life -- is itself still a product derived from human intellect and experiment directed at and interrogating the regularities of the empirical or phenomenal world. It's both something that can be revised and even dispensed with over time (in favor of a better theoretical construct). Thus, it thereby also belongs to the phenomenal world (that manifested world of Schrödinger's and Kant's) -- not a noumenal realm uncontaminated with the evolution-derived filtering preferences and qualitative properties of consciousness. (Granting that a particular individual believes in a mind-independent realm to begin with that lacks the latter's useful cognitive deceptions, or is not agnostic about it. See quotes below.)
EDWARD S. REED:
Thomas H. Huxley, like all the other scientists in the group -- and like almost all scientists in Europe or America at the that time -- was not a materialist [though popularly construed as such], despite his belief in the progress of mechanistic physiology. He argued in two directions: one from the external phenomena of science (say, the data of physiology) and the other from introspective phenomena (for example, our belief in free will). He was inclined to believe that most (or all) introspectively revealed phenomena would prove to be caused by externally revealed ones.
But in any event he was a phenomenalist, arguing that what is real is phenomena. If the soul (or the unconscious) is not real, it is because it is not part of the phenomenal world.
This panphenomenalism was widely labeled positivism when it was propounded by scientists. In the loosely defined meandering of the term, positivism dominated the European intellectual scene from approximately 1870 to 1890. Yet that type of positivism is inherently unstable when applied to psychology. The externalist (physiological) analysis of behavior and mind attributes all psychological states to antecedent causes. Introspective analysis reveals both intuitions of freedom and the appearance of autonomous psychological states. The two seem irreconcilable. --From Soul to Mind: The Emergence of Psychology, from Erasmus Darwin to William James ... p.121 to 122 (1997)
Positivism was not only agnostic with respect to religion, it was also antimaterialist. This antimaterialism was expressed in a very novel way -- with reference to the new Erkenntnislehre -- mental states or behavior. Matter for Huxley was just what is was for Mach or Hertz: a set of phenomenal observations made by scientists. It is thus remarkable but true that the most reviled "materialists" of the 1880s--Huxley, Tyndall, and Clifford--were all phenomenalists of sort or another and not materialists at all.
The positivist impulse gave new life to a variety of panphenomenalism, one whose adherents were surprisingly uncritical about the analysis of those allegedly basic mental phenomena, sensations. Thus, thinkers as different in outlook and interests as Huxley and Mach, Taine and Spencer, Wundt and Lewes all agreed that the basic "data" on which all science was to built were sensations. --From Soul to Mind: The Emergence of Psychology, from Erasmus Darwin to William James ... p.159 to p.161 (1997)
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