geoff' said:
OK, no reason to put the boots in. How about everyone play nice and no one inject personal issues?
It's Ok, I'm the guy with the boots on here.
And "personal issues", meaning whatever Joe has made up this time or yet another analogy the Marquis has got backwards, is all they have.
geoff said:
I think Bells' links demonstrate they were warned, although obviously not specifically of what.
I rest my case, about the psychological issues visible in this bizarre denial of what happened in broad daylight.
How in hell does "not specifically of what" translate into "they were warned"?
If you haven't warned somebody that you have an atomic bomb and you intend to use it, they haven't been warned about your atomic bomb. Warning them about your violent mood, ambitions of destruction, intentions to commit violence upon them, etc, does not warn them about your atomic bomb. Those flyers wouldn't even be "warnings" now, when we know about the Bombs and we know they exist and we know what they can do.
The entire issue, the central point, the big kahuna, the end of the War, pivoted on the US having atomic bombs in its arsenal. That's the piece of information that was intended to end the war, and did end the war just as expected. That's the only thing the Japanese needed warning about - we'd been bombing their cities, dropping threatening flyers, invading their territories and destroying their stuff, etc, for months. They already knew about that. They'd been warned for years about the US military. They had seen it coming months ago.
repo man said:
I don't understand why Iceaura thinks a warning would have been effective when, after having two of their cities destroyed by these new devices, they still dragged things out so long that we fell back on conventional weapons and massive numbers of aircraft
1) In the first place, none of my posting is based on "thinking a warning would have been effective". I think the US would have been much better off, then and now, with even an ineffective warning delivered sometime between January and March of 1945 - as many in the US thought was the best thing to do. The chance of a big win, from a regular US citizen's point of view - Japanese capitulation months before Hiroshima, before the Tokyo firebombings, before the battle of Okinawa - was of course an attractive feature, from that point of view anyway, but the actual event of a big win is not a necessary feature of my argument. Maybe an actual warning, the honest use of the Bomb as negotiation leverage, the discovery by the Japanese that their ace in the hole, the pain of their last ditch resistance to invasion, was not something the US needed to worry about any more, would have had no effect. So?
2) It doesn't matter to my posting how long the Japanese negotiated after Hiroshima - starting negotiations as early as possible, months before dropping the thing, is the option I am insisting existed and was known to exist at the time, thus providing the moral and ethical context for the decision to a) keep the Bomb a secret until the implosion design could be readied for use, and b) announce its existence by coordinated surprise attacks on two cities full of civilians. If such negotiations had gone nowhere for months, so what? There were still going to be cities full of schoolchildren to burn alive, whenever the US thought the timing would be the best.
3) Individuals in the Japanese high command got their first solid information about the fact and nature of the Bomb on August 8th - two days after Hiroshima. The decision to surrender immediately on some terms had been made by the 9th, and the first formal offer had been made and rejected by the 12th. The amended offer was made by the Japanese and accepted by the Americans by the 14th, and was announced officially on the 15th.
The Japanese went from full preparation for an invasion of the home island, an invasion they fully expected to do to them what they had done in China and worth whatever it took to resist, an invasion they had already accepted massive civilian bombing casualties to resist and were preparing to accept just as many in the future,
to complete capitulation and occupation by the American military, based on learning from scratch and comprehending a weapon completely new to humanity or warfare and completely unexpected by them.
within 72 hours of Nagasaki (144 hours of Hiroshima). Those 72 hours, or even less if one counts discovery time after communication with Nagasaki was disrupted, is what I read described as "they dragged things out so long".
And that "dragging" after the event is offered as an argument for not having informed the Japanese in good time about this weapon, given them more time to get a grip on their new situation, and instead surprising them with an unimaginable blow.
That is denial, folks. That's what it looks like.
Bells said:
There was no element of surprise that these bombs destroyed those cities.
That is complete proof of my contention that the psychological need to deny what the US did at Hiroshima and Nagasaki has done and is doing psychological harm.
bells said:
Usually in war, you don't warn the enemy of what you are planning on doing.
Usually, in attempting to end a war, you do exactly that. "Surrender, or we will do such and so" is kind of standard operating procedure.
So one would have looked for "Surrender, or be utterly destroyed by this utterly terrible and unstoppable new weapon". Looked for it in January, February, or March of 1945. If the US had been attempting to end the war as soon as possible, that is.
bells said:
The US went above and beyond by dropping millions of flyers and giving warnings on radio every 15 minutes for weeks prior to dropping the bombs, not just to try to make sure as few civilians were killed as possible, but also in the hope that the Japanese leadership would surrender before the bombs were dropped.
Nobody in the US command expected the Japanese to capitulate until the Bomb was revealed, because they had already withstood massive aerial bombardment and severe privation without abandoning their attempts to negotiate surrender rather than capitulate. None of the regular stuff had worked yet, and there was no reason to think it would work now.
The Bomb, however, was expected to work. Several members of the US command expected surrender after Bomb revelation to be coming so quickly that the Nagasaki bomb was rushed, dropped in suboptimal conditions on a secondary target - and that was a good decision, as it turned out, because an offer of surrender came only 4 days after, and complete capitulation came only six days after, the Emperor learned about what had happened to Hiroshima. So if they hadn't rushed the Nagasaki bomb, got it in within 72 hours, they might not have been able to drop it at all.
From a PR standpoint.