Hitchens' moral challenge

[Sarkus]

"Immorality is the active opposition to morality" -http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morality​

You can't get much more obvious than that. Subverting a person's morality is an "active opposition" to that morality, so it is tautological that subverting a person's morality is immoral.

This would only be true within a consistent/shared moral framework.
If two people have different morals, and the same action is viewed by one as moral and the other as immoral, how is the action to be deemed immoral?

Further, you are not differentiating between one's morality and one's moral code... i.e. the system for one's morals: It is feasible to subvert the moral code while retaining the actual morals.
i.e. one could argue that it is wrong to kill (the moral) not because God says so (moral code A) but because it is depriving a person of their only chance of redemption by society (moral code B).

Here the subversion is not of the moral but the moral code.

In essence, subverting the moral basis of a believer is very much like removing all law without anything to immediately fill the authority vacuum.

So you honestly consider it to be immoral to disagree with a religious person regarding their moral code? :shrug: "This is your moral code... and if anyone tries to persuade you otherwise they are being immoral!!" Religious protectionism at its finest, methinks.

Second, your analogy is false: everyone has an authority to fill the immediate vacuum... it's called "ourself".

 

[Sarkus]

A person (in this case, you) cannot be meaningfully grateful to a non-person (in this case, the Universe).

Ever tried actually thanking your shoes for keeping your feet warm and safe?

You are projecting your own view on everyone and claiming it as fact.
I have thanked shoes for not leaking, yes.
I have thanked overhanging rocks for keeping the worst of the wind and rain off me.
I have thanked the universe for being so glorious and magnificent.
Who are you to say what is "meaningful".

With that kind of relativism, atheists are also not morally/ethically superior, given that they acknowledge that which only exists within their own moral code.

Indeed - but why should it be a case of either being superior?
Hitchen's point is that you can achieve the same without recourse to "God".

As far as I understood, mundane moral behavior was never the goal of religions.

Whatever the behaviour, Hitchen's point is that you can achieve the same without recourse to "God".

If you think otherwise, point to an ethical action or statement that can not be achieved by a non-believer.

 

[wynn]

Indeed - but why should it be a case of either being superior?

Because the challenge is set up as a competition between the religion and the non-religious.

Hitchen's point is that you can achieve the same without recourse to "God".

Whatever the behaviour, Hitchen's point is that you can achieve the same without recourse to "God".

From Hitchens' perspective, yes.

If you think otherwise, point to an ethical action or statement that can not be achieved by a non-believer.

Such ethical statements and actions have been pointed out, by several of us.

Hitchens' side doesn't accept them, because they believe their own perspective is superior and that this superiority is to be taken for granted and non-negotiable.

Hitchens' challenge is like saying "Prove me wrong, but you must do so on my terms, and I am free to change my terms at any time."

That makes it trivial.

 

[wynn]

So you honestly consider it to be immoral to disagree with a religious person regarding their moral code? "This is your moral code... and if anyone tries to persuade you otherwise they are being immoral!!" Religious protectionism at its finest, methinks.

Atheists make the same point, only in reverse - "Religious people are bullying us! Any act of preaching is an attack on us!!"

Second, your analogy is false: everyone has an authority to fill the immediate vacuum... it's called "ourself".

In your dreams, perhaps.

While individualism and self-sufficiency in every respect are highly regarded in Western society, that high regard does not automatically mean that they can produce the results that they are purported to be able to produce.

People don't live in a vacuum, and considering oneself an authority on one's own thinking and acting is only possible by blocking out the awareness of the sources one necessarily draws on.

 

[Sarkus]

Because the challenge is set up as a competition between the religion and the non-religious.

Only in terms of what it might require to reach a consistent position... one requires God, the other doesn't.

From Hitchens' perspective, yes.

Which is what this thread is about, right?

Such ethical statements and actions have been pointed out, by several of us.

And refuted.

Hitchens' side doesn't accept them, because they believe their own perspective is superior and that this superiority is to be taken for granted and non-negotiable.

Not at all - they have not been accepted because they either do not address the challenge asked, or insist upon a shared moral code, or other such aspect that makes the proposed examples invalid.

Hitchens' challenge is like saying "Prove me wrong, but you must do so on my terms, and I am free to change my terms at any time."

And what are his "terms" other than those provided in the challenge, and where are they being changed?

 

[Sarkus]

Atheists make the same point, only in reverse - "Religious people are bullying us! Any act of preaching is an attack on us!!"

Thus you agree that the example provided by Syne does not meet Hitchen's challenge - since it can be held by both believers and non-believers.
Thanks.

In your dreams, perhaps.

While individualism and self-sufficiency in every respect are highly regarded in Western society, that high regard does not automatically mean that they can produce the results that they are purported to be able to produce.

They produce results. Whether they are what are purported is a quite possibly a matter of accurately setting expectations up front, or just misunderstanding the process.

People don't live in a vacuum, and considering oneself an authority on one's own thinking and acting is only possible by blocking out the awareness of the sources one necessarily draws on.

Somewhat irrelevant.
Whether we have the awareness of the sources or not, we are the ones processing those sources, and thus we can do nothing other than come up with our own subjective position... and thus we are our own authority on what external "authority" we give credence to, and to what measure.
Even if that is to abdicate our responsibility for producing such a personal moral code... that is a judgement that we ourselves have come to.

We can not escape it.
We can do nothing else.

 

[wynn]

or insist upon a shared moral code

So does Hitchens - otherwise his challenge is trivial.

 

[wynn]

Thus you agree that the example provided by Syne does not meet Hitchen's challenge - since it can be held by both believers and non-believers.
Thanks.

I have commented on this earlier, do read it.
http://www.sciforums.com/showpost.php?p=2904188&postcount=26

Whether we have the awareness of the sources or not, we are the ones processing those sources,

To believe that we are "the ones processing those sources" still requires blocking out areas of awareness that make it clear that this is not necessarily so. Consider the ideas that personhood is merely an emergent property and that free will is an illusion, and whatnot.

and thus we can do nothing other than come up with our own subjective position...

This is a statement of faith, not of fact.

We can not escape it.
We can do nothing else.

Ditto.

 

[Sarkus]

I have commented on this earlier, do read it.
http://www.sciforums.com/showpost.php?p=2904188&postcount=26

There's no addressing the specific matter in hand, though, in that both the believer and non-believer can be in either position - thus negating Syne's claim that it is a position/action only a believer can perform.

To believe that we are "the ones processing those sources" still requires blocking out areas of awareness that make it clear that this is not necessarily so. Consider the ideas that personhood is merely an emergent property and that free will is an illusion, and whatnot.

Issues of what "we" might be are irrelevant in so far as it is still "we" that process those sources, even if the "we" is illusory with regard its actual nature.

This is a statement of faith, not of fact.

The only time it is untrue is if the conscious self has zero input into the action... i.e. when you are wholly manipulated and no longer under self control.
So how is it a statement of faith that we are our consciousness?

 

[Sarkus]

So does Hitchens - otherwise his challenge is trivial.

I see there being a difference between the moral and the code/philosophy that gives rise to the moral.

Perhaps my use of the phrase "moral code" is inaccurate, but this is how I understand it.

 

[wynn]

I see there being a difference between the moral and the code/philosophy that gives rise to the moral.

Perhaps my use of the phrase "moral code" is inaccurate, but this is how I understand it.

In order to compare and discuss something, anything, it must be assumed that there is a common ground, a shared ground, a common language.

But if this assumption is denied from the onset, then there cannot be a discussion, nor a debate, just a psychoplay, a struggle to win the upper hand, an attempt to destroy the other.

 

[wynn]

There's no addressing the specific matter in hand, though, in that both the believer and non-believer can be in either position - thus negating Syne's claim that it is a position/action only a believer can perform.

You're talking about something else entirely.

In the post I linked to, I commented on how criticizing another's morality is sometimes immoral, but not necessarily.

Issues of what "we" might be are irrelevant in so far as it is still "we" that process those sources, even if the "we" is illusory with regard its actual nature.

It depends on what one thinks this "we" could be.

One's sense of self could also be an accumulation of thoughts from others, thus annulling the notion of the self being one/united.

So how is it a statement of faith that we are our consciousness?

Can you test the claim that you are your consciousness?

 

[Yazata]

It does not matter if the statement is made in the "conceptual vocabulary" of the Buddhist or the Christian.

Hitchens was quoted as saying:

"Name me an ethical statement made or an action performed by a believer that could not have been made or performed by a non-believer."​

You're talking semantics, Hitchens is talking actions.

He's also talking about "ethical statements made".

I'm not sure what you mean by "semantics", but technically the word means the study of the relationship of signs to the things that they represent.

The words that people speak, the conceptual vocabulary that they use, are the building-blocks of the statements that they make.

The point is that people in different cultures, who belong to different religions or to no religion at all, will typically speak of different things (some of them probably real, some probably not) when they are speaking about ethics. Many of the things that religious people will say are things that it's highly unlikely that a non-believer would say.

What matters is that they could make the the same ethical statement as any theist. You're focusing on semantics; the framework of the statement is not the ethical part of the statement.

When a Christian says that Christians should behave as Jesus would have behaved, that's a profoundly ethical statement to them.

A truly good person isn't just somebody who performs some good actions. (Perhaps the individual desperately wants to do something terrible and is just waiting for the opportunity.) A truly good person is somebody who is sincerely motivated to do good things.

Religious ethics often address people's motivations, their inner states of mind, that result in visible external actions.

Again, you're focusing on the semantics, and you're way off base. Here's an example:

Theist: "I feed the homeless because Jesus tells me to."

Atheist: "I feed the homeless because it's the right thing to do."

They aren't the same statement and the atheist is unlikely to speak the first one. So you've just met Hitchens' challenge. (Ironically, while trying to argue that it can't be met.)

The qualifiers (in bold) are not the ethical part of the statements. By your assertion, these two comments would be making entirely different ethical claims, and that's simply not true.

The two individuals are saying that they perform the same physical action, but they are saying that they are doing it for different reasons. Those kind of differences in motivation are often ethically significant.

Judging by your comments, I sincerely doubt you have much of an idea what ethics are to Buddhists.

I'm not interested in getting into an ego-contest with you.

But if anyone's interested, there's a short account of prostrations and why some Buddhists traditionally perform them (here). There's a much more theoretical and Western-style philosophical description of Buddhist ethics in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (here).

None of this makes any sense, and you're still talking about actions that are not ethical or unethical.

I'm talking about what motivates people to behave in ways that they and other people would describe as ethical. To me that's an essential part of what ethics is, arguably the most important part.

All we're excluding are qualifiers. We're talking about ethical statements and actions--deeds that can be agreed upon and done. And you have failed to mention one that a non-believer cannot do.

Sincerely try to behave as Jesus would have done. Sincerely try recollect the Buddha's Dhamma in all of their speech, actions and livelihood.

You seemingly want to argue that these kind of things are ethically irrelevant. I'm arguing that they address a person's inner motivation, the sources and wellsprings of all of the rest of their actions, and are deeply and profoundly ethically relevant.

Don't feel the need to defend yourself, because the challenge cannot be met. As I said before, Hitchens used it as rhetoric.

I'm not tremendously familiar with Hitchens, who doesn't really interest me. But I think that it might be true that the challenge that leads off this thread is just rhetorical and is designed so that it can't be met.

He knew full well that there is no ethical statement or action that cannot be said or done by a non-believer.

Only if he covertly includes that conclusion among his initial premises, by defining his use of the word 'ethics' in such a restrictive way that any statement or behavior that isn't consistent with his desired conclusion is already excluded. In other words, his desired conclusion only follows as the result of circular reasoning.

 

[Syne]

This would only be true within a consistent/shared moral framework.
If two people have different morals, and the same action is viewed by one as moral and the other as immoral, how is the action to be deemed immoral?

Further, you are not differentiating between one's morality and one's moral code... i.e. the system for one's morals: It is feasible to subvert the moral code while retaining the actual morals.
i.e. one could argue that it is wrong to kill (the moral) not because God says so (moral code A) but because it is depriving a person of their only chance of redemption by society (moral code B).

Here the subversion is not of the moral but the moral code.

So you honestly consider it to be immoral to disagree with a religious person regarding their moral code? :shrug: "This is your moral code... and if anyone tries to persuade you otherwise they are being immoral!!" Religious protectionism at its finest, methinks.

Second, your analogy is false: everyone has an authority to fill the immediate vacuum... it's called "ourself".

No shared framework required. Like others in this thread you seem to conflate specific moral points with having some morality in general. Two people can indeed disagree on any given point in diverse moral codes. That is trivially so. I've already made it very clear that a disagreement on moral points is not necessarily immoral in any objective way.

What is not trivial is undermining an entire morality indiscriminately, regardless of any actual shared moral points. As humans, it is inevitable that there will be some shared points.

I have been the one differentiating morality from any specific moral code, as demonstrated many times in this thread, including the above. You seem to think that the basis for a morality is equivalent to the codification of a morality, but that's like saying reason (as a basis for secular morality) is equivalent to any given law or collection of laws. Reason is not itself an ethics, only a means for perhaps determining one. The basis of a morality is not, itself, necessarily nor explicitly codified in that morality. Moralities are generally codified to specify conduct, not to forward ideology.

Ethical value judgments are only made with respect to an alignment to a worldview. Remove the worldview, be it reason or faith, and you alter ethical values. Or do you consider there to be some sort of absolute morality?

 

[Yazata]

Person 1: "I feed the homeless because I want them to die, and I have laced their food with arsenic."

Person 2: "I feed the homeless because I want them to get themselves together and vote for me and my program of racial segregation."

Person 3: "I feed the homeless because I want to be perceived as a nice person, so that I can better conceal my criminal activities."


Yeah, intentions have nothing to do with ethics.

Precisely.

I can imagine:

Person 1 - Has compassion for the homeless, wants to help them, and prepares food to give to them. But an error occurs while cooking the food resulting in the food being poisonous and three homeless people who eat it subsequently die.

Person 2 - Has hatred for the homeless, wants to eliminate them, and prepares poisoned food to give to them. Three homeless people who eat it subsequently die.

The same physical events are happening in both cases, and both are seemingly ethically identical by the Hitchens-esque definition of 'ethics' that's being promoted here on Sciforums.

Nevertheless most of us would want to call #1 a tragic accident while we call #2 a reprehensible act.

I persist in thinking that motivation is as big a part of ethics as action. The two are probably inseparable, seeing as how philosophical action-theory defines 'action' as somebody doing something intentionally.

It's the difference between kicking somebody on purpose and suffering a reflex knee spasm that causes your foot to impact somebody else.

Ethics typically is far more concerned with actions than with accidents. (Unless the accident involved negligence perhaps, which returns things to the realm where intent is once again relevant.)

 

[Balerion]

Hitchens was quoted as saying:

"Name me an ethical statement made or an action performed by a believer that could not have been made or performed by a non-believer."​

He's also talking about "ethical statements made".

I understand that.

I'm not sure what you mean by "semantics", but technically the word means the study of the relationship of signs to the things that they represent.

Technically, you're talking about semiotics, not semantics. Semantics in this context refers to the meaning of words, and what I mean when I say that is you are hung up on the qualifiers instead of the actual ethical statement made.

The words that people speak, the conceptual vocabulary that they use, are the building-blocks of the statements that they make.

Piffle.

The point is that people in different cultures, who belong to different religions or to no religion at all, will typically speak of different things (some of them probably real, some probably not) when they are speaking about ethics. Many of the things that religious people will say are things that it's highly unlikely that a non-believer would say.

Yes, if someone in Bambooville says they want to help their neighbor because it would appease FooFoo the Pink Elephant, as an entire statement, that's not something you'd hear a non-believer (or someone of a different religion) say. But the important part--the ethical statement within that sentence--"I wish to help my neighbor," is something you can and will hear someone else say.

This is where you get off track. The ethical statement is not the entire sentence, it is the declaration of an ethical action. Otherwise, I could say "I am going to go without so my family may eat, and I'm also going to paint the garage and watch the Knicks game tonight." Is my ethical statement that whole sentence, or is it just the part about feeding my family?

When a Christian says that Christians should behave as Jesus would have behaved, that's a profoundly ethical statement to them.

But what are they really saying? What does it mean to "behave as Jesus behaved?" Given that no one who says that actually knows how Jesus behaved, and is basing that statement off of the caricature they've been taught rather than the man found in the texts, I would assume it means to behave selflessly, to be charitable. Well then there's nothing about that statement that could not be said by a non-believer. They might use different language--they would spell it out, so to speak--but it would be the exact same same ethical statement.

Unless, of course, the religious person actually means "behave like Jesus" in the sense of abandoning all duty to your family and giving no care for tomorrow, and all of the immoral things Jesus taught. In that case, no, a non-believer would not say that. But then, it isn't an ethical statement, because we can all agree that those things would be immoral.

A truly good person isn't just somebody who performs some good actions. (Perhaps the individual desperately wants to do something terrible and is just waiting for the opportunity.) A truly good person is somebody who is sincerely motivated to do good things.

I totally agree. My point was that the qualifiers of "Because Jesus said so," and "Because it's the right thing to do" mean the same thing.

Religious ethics often address people's motivations, their inner states of mind, that result in visible external actions.

Can one have an outer state of mind?

I don't doubt religion can motivate people. The only reason suicide bombers exist in the middle east today is because of religion. But if the motivation is nefarious, then the statement is not ethical. For example, wynn's ridiculous example of "I want to feed the homeless because I want them to die and I've laced their food with poison" is not an ethical statement, because the statement is not simply "I feed the homeless," but rather "I feed the homeless poison." See the difference?

We're talking about moral acts and ethical statements. Of course the challenge presumes a common ground in morality. That's the whole point of an atheist's argument that morality comes from within and not without.

They aren't the same statement and the atheist is unlikely to speak the first one. So you've just met Hitchens' challenge. (Ironically, while trying to argue that it can't be met.)

No, again, they are the same statement. They mean exactly the same thing, as I've demonstrated above.

The two individuals are saying that they perform the same physical action, but they are saying that they are doing it for different reasons. Those kind of differences in motivation are often ethically significant.

But they aren't for different reasons. "Because Jesus did it," means "because it's the right thing to do." The language may be different, but the meaning is exactly the same. Now, if a person said "I'm feeding the homeless because I'm afraid of going to hell," then yes, that would be a different statement.

But then, it wouldn't be ethical, would it?

I'm talking about what motivates people to behave in ways that they and other people would describe as ethical. To me that's an essential part of what ethics is, arguably the most important part.

I understand, but you're still only reading it at face value. You've already shown that just because someone cites Jesus while anther doesn't, they do not have the same motivation, when they actually do. Just because one says it is for Jesus while the other says for Zeus, and other cites statistics of how helping impoverished people increases their odds of getting on their feet, the ethical motivation is the same. It all boils down to doing it because it's the right thing to do. (again, this is assuming they aren't doing it out of fear, or out of hatred for their parents, or some other thing; but as we've already determined, then it would not be an ethical statement at all.)

I'm not tremendously familiar with Hitchens, who doesn't really interest me. But I think that it might be true that the challenge that leads off this thread is just rhetorical and is designed so that it can't be met.

I am. He was a wickedly intelligent man, and he didn't say it on a lark. He employed the challenge to prove a point, not create a discussion. And as I--and quad--have demonstrated, he was correct.

 

[wynn]

Hang on in there, Yazata!

 

[Yazata]

Hang on in there, Yazata!

I sense that this exchange between me and Dawg is getting kind of repetitive. I don't expect Dawg to suddenly start agreeing with me. That rarely happens in internet arguments. So all I can do is state my own views as clearly as I can. I think that I've already done that, so maybe it's time to let things rest before this turns into an ego-battle. (You know the suttas about grasping onto 'views'.)

My bottom line is that Hitchens' challenge is trivially easy to answer, unless we start redefining and restricting what 'ethical' means in such a way that the only admissible conclusion is Hitchens' own. In that case, the whole thing becomes circular.

I don't think that Hitchens' challenge is really designed to change anyone's mind who doesn't already agree with it. Rather, it appears designed to pump up the spirits of Hitchens' own atheist followers, helping them imagine that they are somehow intellectually invincible.

A great deal of Christian apologetics is seemingly designed to perform a similar flag-waving spirit-raising function over on the other side.

 

[Balerion]

I sense that this exchange between me and Dawg is getting kind of repetitive. I don't expect Dawg to suddenly start agreeing with me. That rarely happens in internet arguments. So all I can do is state my own views as clearly as I can. I think that I've already done that, so maybe it's time to let things rest before this turns into an ego-battle. (You know the suttas about grasping onto 'views'.)

My bottom line is that Hitchens' challenge is trivially easy to answer, unless we start redefining and restricting what 'ethical' means in such a way that the only admissible conclusion is Hitchens' own. In that case, the whole thing becomes circular.

I don't think that Hitchens' challenge is really designed to change anyone's mind who doesn't already agree with it. Rather, it appears designed to pump up the spirits of Hitchens' own atheist followers, helping them imagine that they are somehow intellectually invincible.

A great deal of Christian apologetics is seemingly designed to perform a similar flag-waving spirit-raising function over on the other side.

So after I successfully demonstrate how you are wrong about your definition of an ethical statement, you run away? No concession, no nothing?

So you weren't really here to learn anything. You posed your "answer" to Hitchens question only after you had decided you were absolutely right, and you have no interest in hearing otherwise.

Edit: Perhaps you aren't trolling by bailing on the discussion while refusing to budge on your position despite it having been refuted, but it certainly is ethically bankrupt. You are better than that, Yazata.

 

[birch]

morality is understanding ethics whereas religion may have dogmatic teachings that may be unethical. so for one to commit an action or non-action due to rules without considering why, then it has nothing to do with morality in essence. that is the problem with any religion that doesn't question that within any book or work of texts/teachings there are good and bad or worthy or unworthy within it as people are faulty. that's why one has to be discerning. it's the same type of stupidity as never questioning authority or assuming because there is some truth or sound morals in some religious texts all of them are or if some guru is wise or right about one thing or certain things, they must be about everything. that's definitely not the case in reality.