You apparently need to review the aftermath of TMI as well. They lost control of the reactor, they didn't know what to do in response to the radiation releases and various threats of disaster that kept popping up in the subsequent days and weeks, and they solved most of their difficulties by 1) lying to the public about what they knew and didn't know, and what was happening 2) not monitoring the stuff they couldn't control or respond to (they did not track actual exposure regimes in the surrounding area, for example, and used landscape averages of estimated releases instead), and 3) being lucky - that core they had lost track of ? it didn't, as it turned out, burn through the containment shell after all. So their failure to set up a response for that event (they did not set up emergency mass evacuation procedures in potentially affected areas, for example) in that tense aftermath when it could have happened at any minute, didn't have the consequences it might have,Me: Iceaura, your statement that they haven't been able to handle the aftermath is NOT true about TMI. Billvon is correct, you are incorrect.
and nuke proponents can now, years later, pretend that was not dumb luck, but instead an indication of competence and expertise - that the aftermath of TMI was "handled" well, and we can depend on the people who "handled" it to display competence and integrity in the future.
Sure. You just don't have time right now.kiteman said:A reasonable argument can be made that it is not true about TEPCO in Fukushima either.
Make it to the Japanese. Be careful, though: They're a little angry, especially about being lied to by people pretending to expertise they don't have, in order to obscure the fact that their former pretensions to nonexistent expertise have made kind of a large mess. Again.
The "many" you are talking about, that loudly and repeatedly foresaw this kind of event, were anti-nuke analysts warning against building such things. The entire nuke industry was in public denial - still is.kiteman said:they didn't foresee the events, they lost control of every reactor that was running (despite the event hitting at the best possible time by sheer luck)
Actually, many did foresee, but until after the event, Japan had no analog to the NRC and still has no law making the companies mutually liable for such events like the US has in the Price Anderson Act. So in truth, there was little impetus to act on the vision.
The US had, at the time of Fukushima, a dozen or more large reactors and nuclear complexes in the same situation and with the same vulnerabilities as Fukushima Daichi. It happened to Japan instead of, say, California, by chance. All of your NRC and Price Anderson Act invocations need to be compared to the simple physical reality - the only reason Fukushima did not happen at, say, Diablo Canyon, is that Fukushima was closer to the epicenter of the quake. That is luck.
The Price Anderson Act limits the liabilities of the nuke industry, exempts them from lawsuit if they meet certain easily met requirements regardless of culpability, and puts the US and local governments on the hook for all consequences of nuke mishap beyond certain limits both financial and physical. Without it nuke operators would be unable to get insurance, and without insurance no competent investor would take that large a risk - if US nuke operators had to carry the kind of insurance every other corporation has to carry, against the damages they could reasonably cause through easily possible mishap and screwup, they would all be out of business.
But your point is odd, anyway: are we supposed to conclude, by accepting your bogus reassurances re US nukes, that such dependence on political whim is an argument in favor of nuke power?
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