Yazata,
JamesR's point about models is a good one and I'd guess that physics' beloved mathematical formulae start out as models.
All physical theories start off as conceptual ideas. The mathematics comes in because we want to be able to test those ideas. We want to quantify things. We want to statistically analyse our level of uncertainty, etc.
Each formula is meant to summarize some particular relationship that is observed in whole classes of empirical observations that seem to the physicists to be similar in some way.
But somewhere along that twisty path the summary formulae are hypostasized, and they start to be imagined as if they were distinct substances or realities.
That does happen in some cases. I think this sort of confusion between models and the things being modelled tends to be more common among the later generations of students of science who are taught about the models as if they are somehow an infallible reflection of reality. The originators of the ideas are usually well aware that they are proposing tentative hypotheses in an effort to describe aspects of the observed reality.
They transform from being models that summarize a set of observations, into being the underlying laws of nature to which all physical phenomena must somehow conform.
It is poor pedagogy to teach that science is prescriptive (which it isn't) rather than descriptive (which it is).
"Ye canna break the laws of physics, Jim!" is a true statement, but the problem is that we don't know the actual laws of physics. All we know, at any given time, is what our best current approximation to those laws is. The laws of physics written down by human beings are always a work in progress and they often turn out to be some kind of approximation to a more complicated and comprehensive set of laws. In rare cases, they turn out to be actual mistakes, which forces us to go back to the drawing board and start from scratch.
We saw that illustrated in the 'Something From Nothing' arguments, in which today's physicists' understanding of quantum mechanics somehow become the fundamental principles of reality itself, with deeper ontological reality even than space-time-matter physical reality and somehow able to explain the origin of the latter.
Personally, I think that pop-science presentations of quantum physics often tend to misrepresent or overextend the actual science. Quantum physics doesn't say that something can come from nothing, for example. It does, on the other hand, describe quantum fields that can randomly fluctuate and thereby create particles that usually last for very short periods of time before disappearing back into the quantum vacuum. While they exist, though, they can have measurable effects.
As far as quantum physics is concerned, space and time are backdrops against which quantum processes play out. There are attempts to combine our best understanding of space and time (the general theory of relativity) with our best understanding of quantum physics, to find a unified theory. The main problem with those attempts is that, to date, they don't seem to be testable.
The trouble might be that they don't know what's actually there. All they know are their observations. Pronouncing what's actually there requires a leap.
Rather than trying to pronounce on what is or isn't actually there, careful physicists more commonly make statements such as "The results of these experiments/observations are consistent with the predictions of Theory X and Theory Y, while they tend to refute Theory Z." They recognise that, even if
these observations support Theory X, that doesn't mean that Theory X must be correct, or that Theory X must be the Final Theory of the phenomenon being studied.
Pop-science accounts of scientific work, on the other hand, tend to be more definitive. The headlines say "Scientists have discovered that ..." or "New experiments have shown that ...". Scientists themselves often tend to me more circumspect about their work. "Our results suggest that X might be case." "Our latest experiments show that it is more likely that X than Y." "Our latest results suggest that fruitful avenues for further research might include W and Z."
Of course, not all scientists. There are certainly some scientists who like to blow their own horns and who make unwarranted claims about what they have achieved. Those scientists tend to be the exception rather than the rule, and they usually come in for warranted criticism - often from their colleagues in the same field - sooner or later (often sooner).
Most scientists learn early on to be skeptical when other scientists claim to have made a "leap". Leaps are the exception rather than the rule in science. A lot of science is just gradually chipping away at a problem and making gradual incremental improvements to our collective knowledge. There are few true Eureka! moments.
Business-as-usual science doesn't make for exciting headlines, though, so there is always a tension between scientists and reporters/popularisers who want to tell an exciting story.
We see that illustrated in quantum mechanics, which possesses a great apparatus for predicting observations, albeit probabilistically, but limited ability to tell us what is actually there on the micro-scale, such that the observations come out as they do.
It's worth considering the question of whether we should care about what is "actually there", especially if what is actually there is something we can never truly access. Pragmatically, if A is what is actually there and our best theories posit some other foundational objects or entities, B, then if the predictions of theories built around the modelling of B produce all of the same real-world outcomes as theories built around the modelling of A, then there's no practical benefit to be had in knowing that A is what is "actually there" rather than B.