Can a moral relativist be trusted?

[Techne]

Trust is a pretty important factor that plays a positive role in a functioning society. To trust someone basically entails that you can rely on the actions of another person to conform to certain virtues or expectations while basically abandoning your own control over the situation.

Let’s look at two examples of where trust plays an important role. Firstly, if you leave a person with your child and you trust him or her to look after your child in such a manner that your child will be safe and won’t be exposed to certain things e.g. violence, then you are basically abandoning your own control over the situation (looking after you kid) and transferring control to another. The outcome is unknown, but you trust that it will end in a certain manner i.e. your child will be safe.

Secondly, in a democratic society the voters vote for politicians whom they trust will do the job they want them to do. For example, if voters want a certain service and a political party makes a certain promises and the voters like the promises and they vote for the party, then the voters are essentially abandoning their own control and transferring control to the party. Again, the outcome is unknown but the voters trust that the party leaders will stick to their word.

Now there are at least two ways to be a moral relativist. You can agree that different cultures have different moral values and that there is not a single universal moral that is shared by all cultures. Call it “descriptive moral relativism”. You can also assert that there are no objectively and intrinsically good or evil actions. Call it “meta-ethical moral relativism”. Empirical data seems to suggest that descriptive moral relativism is true. It is however a logical fallacy to claim that this demonstrates that meta-ethical moral relativism is true. A person can be a descriptive moral relativist and not be a meta-ethical moral relativist.

There are also at least two ways to be a moral absolutist. The first way is to argue that if action X is absolutely and intrinsically wrong absolutely and intrinsically wrong then action X is ALWAYS absolutely and intrinsically wrong. Call it “universal moral absolutism”. The second way is argue that if it is wrong for one person to commit act X in situation Z, then it is wrong for any person to commit act X in the same situation Z. The second view thus allows for a situation where action X in situation Z is wrong but is not absolutely and intrinsically wrong at different moments. Call it “situational moral absolutism”.

In what way can a person be trusted you may ask? Here again there are at least two ways to trust a person. One can trust a person based on reason and logic and one can trust a person in a manner that is not based on reason and logic. For example a person can trust another for emotional reasons, whatever they may be. You can basically trust anything or any person in manner that is not based on reason and logic. You can trust a wild lion that is chasing after you to not eat you because you may perhaps be emotionally attached to cats, or you can trust you’re a hijacker not to kill you because you think deep down he is a good person. To trust someone or something in a way that is not based on reason and logic is basically trusting a person or something on faith that is not grounded in any reason and logic. People of course do this all the time, it’s called blind faith.

Now the kind of moral relativism I wish to focus on in this entry is the one that denies both kinds of moral absolutism discussed and I want to know how any person can trust a meta-ethical moral relativist in a manner that is based on reason and logic?

Let’s get back to the two examples. Is there any way a person can logically leave their child with another person and logically trust that person if he states that there are no objectively and intrinsically good or evil actions? Is there any way a voter can logically trust the promises of a person that states that there are no objectively and intrinsically good or evil actions?

In both of the above cases I would argue no and in general I don’t think there is a logical and rational way to trust a meta-ethical moral relativist. The moral beliefs of a meta-ethical moral relativist might be just what the voters are looking for or what the mom of the child is looking for. He or she might believe individual rights are good, but he can’t believe they are objectively good, and does think it is only relatively bad and good. He might later on change his mind on any issue he supported, or lie about anything and still think his choices are relatively good and relatively bad. A meta-ethical moral relativist can basically lie, be corrupt and fake a very good personality and policies and still feel morally superior to those who disapprove of his choices, even if he contradicts himself.

Of course, I don't think many people (if any) are moral relativists. If there are, how do you think people can trust you based on reason and logic? And to everyone else, how can you trust a meta-ethical moral relativist in such manner that does not collapse into blind faith? The kind of faith that some people view as irrational.

 

[wynn]

On principle, trusting a (meta-ethical) moral relativist is like trusting the lottery - not reliable at all.

However, as trust is a matter of human beliefs and actions and how people affect eachother via their beliefs and actions, by an act of trust, force can be exerted on the other person, including the (meta-ethical) moral relativist, to the extent that the person complies with the expectations.
That act of trust can be either in good will, or in ill will.

A (meta-ethical) moral relativist can be trusted by being overpowered.

Of course, overpowering someone like this is very demanding, and not many people are capable of it.

 

[wynn]

*bump*

 

[Mathers2013]

Techne I agree with your post one-hundred percent. Trust is when you DO NOT KNOW THE RESULT of something. For example if I am trying to solve an equation and someone simply TELLS me the answer, I will be trusting them if I DO NOT CHECK THE RESULT. That's trust. If I check the result then I have not trusted. x

 

[Yazata]

Now there are at least two ways to be a moral relativist. You can agree that different cultures have different moral values and that there is not a single universal moral that is shared by all cultures. Call it “descriptive moral relativism”.

I don't think that I'd call that one 'moral relativism'. It's more of a recognition that moral disagreements exist out there. It's possible for people to recognize that moral disagreements exist while continuing to believe that their own position is objectively and factually correct and other people's positions are objectively and factually wrong.

You can also assert that there are no objectively and intrinsically good or evil actions. Call it “meta-ethical moral relativism”.

Moral relativism is basically the view that moral appraisals are dependent on standards, practices and norms that are accepted by particular social groups at particular times. Since there is a multiplicity of these social groups, each with its own unique mores, there isn't any 'absolute' non-culturally specific criterion that everyone can use to objectively determine which cultures' standards of moral appraisal are fact correct and which aren't.

Empirical data seems to suggest that descriptive moral relativism is true. It is however a logical fallacy to claim that this demonstrates that meta-ethical moral relativism is true. A person can be a descriptive moral relativist and not be a meta-ethical moral relativist.

There's an issue there about what the empirical data really shows. Certainly it shows us that moral differences exist. That's basically trivial since I don't think that anyone would deny it.

More significantly, the data also seems to suggest that the practices, norms and standards that people use to decide what is and isn't moral are culture-specific. Specifying some standard of moral appraisal that isn't culture-specific may (arguably) be an impossible task.

I want to know how any person can trust a meta-ethical moral relativist in a manner that is based on reason and logic?

Skepticism about whether or not a culture-independent criterion of moral correctness exists doesn't imply that the moral-relativist doesn't scrupulously adhere to the morality of his or her own culture. The moral relativist may (and often does) believe that the morality of his or her culture is superior to and much preferrable to different mores in different cultures.

It's just that the moral relativist doesn't know of any objective, culture-independent and universally authoritative way of adjudicating these differences on the occasions when the moralities of the different cultures come into collision.

In both of the above cases I would argue no and in general I don’t think there is a logical and rational way to trust a meta-ethical moral relativist.

I agree that it would be hard to trust somebody who has no morality at all. But conflating moral relativism with the absence of morality would typically be an error. 'Moral relativism' isn't synonymous with 'anything goes'.

 

[wynn]

Moral relativism is basically the view that moral appraisals are dependent on standards, practices and norms that are accepted by particular social groups at particular times. Since there is a multiplicity of these social groups, each with its own unique mores, there isn't any 'absolute' non-culturally specific criterion that everyone can use to objectively determine which cultures' standards of moral appraisal are fact correct and which aren't.

Skepticism about whether or not a culture-independent criterion of moral correctness exists doesn't imply that the moral-relativist doesn't scrupulously adhere to the morality of his or her own culture. The moral relativist may (and often does) believe that the morality of his or her culture is superior to and much preferrable to different mores in different cultures.

But this is just one kind of moral relativism, as the OP says - "descriptive moral relativism."

I think the OP was interested in consequent moral relativists, people who are true meta-ethical moral relativists - people who "assert that there are no objectively and intrinsically good or evil actions."

Conflating moral relativism with the absence of morality would be an error in most cases indeed, but only because most people who declare themselves to be moral relativists are merely descriptive moral relativists at most, and even those who do declare themselves to be meta-ethical moral relativists aren't consequent about it.


Would you trust, say, Hamlet? Said he, "There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so." Would you let him babysit your children?

 

[Yazata]

I think the OP was interested in consequent moral relativists, people who are true meta-ethical moral relativists - people who "assert that there are no objectively and intrinsically good or evil actions."

The term 'meta-ethics' is a piece of philosophical jargon that refers to the philosophical study of the nature of moral judgement.

Ethics per-se is about morally judging particular actions. Meta-ethics is about explaining how moral judgments are made and what they mean.

Moral relativism is based the observation that moral judgements seem dependent on the standards, norms and principles accepted by particular social groups at particular times. Since there is obviously a multiplicity of these, the conclusion is drawn that there isn't any 'absolute' non-culturally-specific criterion that everybody can use to objectively determine which cultures' moral judgements are in fact correct and which aren't.

Conflating moral relativism with the absence of morality would be an error in most cases indeed, but only because most people who declare themselves to be moral relativists are merely descriptive moral relativists at most

Moral relativists aren't just acknowleging the fact that moral disagreement exists. Recognizing that is trivial in my opinion.

A moral relativist is expressing skepticism about whether objective and culture-independent principles of moral judgement exist.

My point was that individuals believing that the principles of moral judgement are culture-specific doesn't imply that these individuals must belong to no culture and that they make no moral judgments from within their own cultural perspective. It certainly doesn't suggest that the moral relativist believes that 'anything goes'.

 

[wynn]

It certainly doesn't suggest that the moral relativist believes that 'anything goes'.

The popular image of moral relativism indeed tends to be that moral relativism is "anything goes."

How would you name those then who in fact believe that "anything goes"? Because there are people who do believe that.

 

[Sarkus]

Let’s get back to the two examples. Is there any way a person can logically leave their child with another person and logically trust that person if he states that there are no objectively and intrinsically good or evil actions? Is there any way a voter can logically trust the promises of a person that states that there are no objectively and intrinsically good or evil actions?

In both of the above cases I would argue no and in general I don’t think there is a logical and rational way to trust a meta-ethical moral relativist.

I disagree for two very key points:
First, we don't judge people by their moral philosophy but by our own: if I hold that morals are objective, etc, then this must surely hold for all people, whether they think them subjective or not.
Second, we don't judge people by their moral philosophy but by their actions.

So we judge peoples' actions by our own moral compass, and from such experience we form decisions.
If you are asking about the case where we have no previous actions at all on which to judge the person, why on earth would you leave your child with a complete stranger of whom you know nothing about?
But as soon as we know anything about their actions: how they have acted in the past in given situations, we can judge their character and thus form opinions.

As an aside - is it moral to pre-judge people by their philosophy?

The moral beliefs of a meta-ethical moral relativist might be just what the voters are looking for or what the mom of the child is looking for. He or she might believe individual rights are good, but he can’t believe they are objectively good, and does think it is only relatively bad and good. He might later on change his mind on any issue he supported, or lie about anything and still think his choices are relatively good and relatively bad. A meta-ethical moral relativist can basically lie, be corrupt and fake a very good personality and policies and still feel morally superior to those who disapprove of his choices, even if he contradicts himself.

I disagree with your view of such a person.
They still have a moral compass, but they merely consider each to be subjective and that no act is inherently right or wrong.
There is nothing that suggests they can change their morals any easier than someone else.
What you are talking about is someone who is amoral, or who adheres to moral nihilism.
A moral relativist of either variety still has to justify their actions to themselves and against their own compass, however that compass is formed.

Of course, I don't think many people (if any) are moral relativists. If there are, how do you think people can trust you based on reason and logic? And to everyone else, how can you trust a meta-ethical moral relativist in such manner that does not collapse into blind faith? The kind of faith that some people view as irrational.

I think you'll find there to be far more than you realise, and rather that you are arguing from the consequence you perceive of being one, consequences which I don't agree with for the reasons stated.

Further, I would suggest that the "relative" part depends on what group you are looking at. If you are only looking at humans, this might lead to a different conclusion than if looking universally. If you look at one set of humans only then this might lead to a different conclusion.

I, for one, do not consider morals to be objective.

 

[Sarkus]

The popular image of moral relativism indeed tends to be that moral relativism is "anything goes."

How would you name those then who in fact believe that "anything goes"? Because there are people who do believe that.

Either "amoral" or "moral nihilist".

 

[wynn]

First, we don't judge people by their moral philosophy but by our own: if I hold that morals are objective, etc, then this must surely hold for all people, whether they think them subjective or not.

I tend to agree. However -

Second, we don't judge people by their moral philosophy but by their actions.

What moral philosophy they profess is also an action of theirs.

If, for example, someone tells you that they are a Nazi supremacist, then you don't have to witness any actions of theirs to judge them already. Or do you?

If you are asking about the case where we have no previous actions at all on which to judge the person, why on earth would you leave your child with a complete stranger of whom you know nothing about?

Hence the job interview. In which people reveal, usually indirectly, but sometimes also directly, what their moral philosophy is.

But as soon as we know anything about their actions: how they have acted in the past in given situations, we can judge their character and thus form opinions.

Which is one form of inducing criminal recidivism and why it is so hard for former prisoners to ever become ordinary citizens again.

As an aside - is it moral to pre-judge people by their philosophy?

I guess a Jew would be moral then to stick around a self-declared Nazi supremacist, as long as the Nazi-supremacist doesn't actually gas the Jew ...

They still have a moral compass, but they merely consider each to be subjective and that no act is inherently right or wrong.

Would you be willing to trust someone who clearly states they believe that "no act is inherently right or wrong"? Would such a statement not cause alarm for you?

A moral relativist of either variety still has to justify their actions to themselves and against their own compass, however that compass is formed.

Moral relativism has a bad reputation. Why do you think this is so?

I think you'll find there to be far more than you realise, and rather that you are arguing from the consequence you perceive of being one, consequences which I don't agree with for the reasons stated.

I think the two of you are operating out of different understanings of "moral relativism."

There is nothing that suggests they can change their morals any easier than someone else.
/.../
I, for one, do not consider morals to be objective.

This appears to fit your idea of judging people by their actions - if someone doesn't have a history of, say, shop-lifting, it is reasonable to assume they won't steal in the future either. And conversely, if someone does have a criminal history, it is reasonable to assume that they will continue to make one.
However, such assumptions can function as self-fulfilling prophecies, as projective identifications, helping to bring about the expected effect.

 

[Sarkus]

What moral philosophy they profess is also an action of theirs.

If, for example, someone tells you that they are a Nazi supremacist, then you don't have to witness any actions of theirs to judge them already. Or do you?

You don't have to, no. Whether you do or not is your choice. And the actions performed by others adhering to ones philosophy can certainly act as a guide.
So what actions are known to have been performed in the name of moral relativism?

Hence the job interview. In which people reveal, usually indirectly, but sometimes also directly, what their moral philosophy is.

And here I would draw the distinction between a moral philosophy that is the foundation of one's moral compass, and a "moral philosophy" that is the philosophy of moral structure itself... E.g. that discusses whether it is subjective or objective.

Which is one form of inducing criminal recidivism and why it is so hard for former prisoners to ever become ordinary citizens again.

Sure, but that is only because people work on incomplete knowledge and focus on certain things rather than others: they see the criminal and not the person trying to reform etc.

I guess a Jew would be moral then to stick around a self-declared Nazi supremacist, as long as the Nazi-supremacist doesn't actually gas the Jew ...

Would it be immoral for them to stick around such a person?
Admittedly we do judge on association of one's philosophies with past actions by others.

Would you be willing to trust someone who clearly states they believe that "no act is inherently right or wrong"? Would such a statement not cause alarm for you?

Normally knowing someone's philosophy does give us a hook on to which to hang something. But with such a person as you describe there is nothing that can be garnered about the person's compass other than the view he states. It doesn't say what his morals are.
So rather than alarm it just means I need to pry deeper to understand the person's morals.
Would I trust them? Simple answer is that I do trust those I know who hold such a view. And I do know one or two who would claim to hold such views. But I have a wealth of experience with them to understand which way their moral compass points.
But it possibly depends on what one considers right and wrong to actually mean.

Moral relativism has a bad reputation. Why do you think this is so?

It does? I can imagine it would within a western theistic society, given that religion generally teaches an objective morality from a deity. And given the dominance religion had over the past 2,000+ years, they would be keen to knock the opposition, so to speak.

I think the two of you are operating out of different understanings of "moral relativism."

I don't. I just think he is reading into it a nihilism that isn't necessarily there, and as such confusing it with amorality.

This appears to fit your idea of judging people by their actions - if someone doesn't have a history of, say, shop-lifting, it is reasonable to assume they won't steal in the future either. And conversely, if someone does have a criminal history, it is reasonable to assume that they will continue to make one.
However, such assumptions can function as self-fulfilling prophecies, as projective identifications, helping to bring about the expected effect.

They can, and don't get me wrong - I'm not saying its right or wrong to judge by a philosophy or action or both etc. My point is that moral relativism is a philosophy on the nature of morals, not on what those morals might be, nor on how one might change one's moral position.
To me it seems to be like saying that an atheist is also someone who dislikes religion: while some may, the term does not include the conclusion... it says nothing about it.

 

[Syne]

While it is true that people judge the actions of others (after the fact) according the their own morality, they also anticipate the future actions of others (the crux of trust) based, in part, on what they may know of the others' morality. If you know someone professes to be a nihilist, it is likely to factor into your trust of the person (especially for letting them watch your kids).

For anyone who is not a moral relativist, moral relativism is suspect. Since it views all morals as being highly subject to circumstances and/or culture and is nowhere codified for others to reference, at least on that information alone, it could include just about anything.

People trust based on known information or experience. Without either, only a known, codified moral system will instill any degree of trust. Yes, even this is no guarantee, but something is better then nothing.

Not only the fact that the relativists' morals are not readily known, but neither is their reasoning for whatever morals they may espouse. They may espouse a morality similar, or even identical, to a non-relativist, but there is no knowing if their conviction is strongly held, or merely a convention reinforced by social pressure alone.

Just too many unanswered questions, and when a snap judgement is necessary, the only reliable touchstone ends up being "there is no objective right or wrong". That inspires no trust, nor is there any objective reason why it should.

 

[Sarkus]

While it is true that people judge the actions of others (after the fact) according the their own morality, they also anticipate the future actions of others (the crux of trust) based, in part, on what they may know of the others' morality. If you know someone professes to be a nihilist, it is likely to factor into your trust of the person (especially for letting them watch your kids).

Of course it will influence, but then of course the person could also be lying about whatever moral philosophy they adhere to.
Personally I wouldn't trust anyone (especially in such matters) on what they claimed, and would go on what else I knew of them (actions, reputations from people I trust etc).
I.e. How do we even trust what a person says about their moral philosophy if we don't have anything else with which to trust their honesty?

For anyone who is not a moral relativist, moral relativism is suspect. Since it views all morals as being highly subject to circumstances and/or culture and is nowhere codified for others to reference, at least on that information alone, it could include just about anything.

It could, but that is to discount the strength of tendencies toward certain moral views based on the culture and society one is in.

People trust based on known information or experience. Without either, only a known, codified moral system will instill any degree of trust. Yes, even this is no guarantee, but something is better then nothing.

No, I say it isn't, as you are trusting someone's word without justification. Once you assume they are telling the truth then, yes, it is better than nothing, but how do you know it is correct / trustworthy without any experience.
Would you leave your child with a random stranger solely on the basis they claimed to be a Christian?

Not only the fact that the relativists' morals are not readily known, but neither is their reasoning for whatever morals they may espouse. They may espouse a morality similar, or even identical, to a non-relativist, but there is no knowing if their conviction is strongly held, or merely a convention reinforced by social pressure alone.

And by the same measure there is no knowing if the person claiming to be a non-relativist is telling the truth - unless we have some way of trusting them, perhaps?
Which would put us back at square one.

Just too many unanswered questions, and when a snap judgement is necessary, the only reliable touchstone ends up being "there is no objective right or wrong". That inspires no trust, nor is there any objective reason why it should.

And I would argue that you can not trust a person's claim of a moral philosophy without Eire some experience or, in the absence of that, an a priori assumption of trustworthiness: which defeats the purpose.

 

[wynn]

So what actions are known to have been performed in the name of moral relativism?

Whenever you hear someone refusing to take responsiblity for their actions, when they blame others instead, when they try to exculpate themselves by pointing out how "different people see things differently" or with the kind of "It's not that I hit him too hard, it's that his bones are too soft" - that points to moral relativism. And this is often.

Normally knowing someone's philosophy does give us a hook on to which to hang something. But with such a person as you describe there is nothing that can be garnered about the person's compass other than the view he states. It doesn't say what his morals are.
So rather than alarm it just means I need to pry deeper to understand the person's morals.

Indeed, it's necessary to pry deeper. But some clues are such that they themselves suffice. "There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so" is such a clue.

Would I trust them? Simple answer is that I do trust those I know who hold such a view. And I do know one or two who would claim to hold such views. But I have a wealth of experience with them to understand which way their moral compass points.

There is of course also the issue of a person's stated morality and how they may incorporate efforts to maintain a particular self-image in stating it in a particular way.
Plenty of people claim to be liberal, for example, but they dogmatize like popes!

And here I would draw the distinction between a moral philosophy that is the foundation of one's moral compass, and a "moral philosophy" that is the philosophy of moral structure itself...

How could the two possibly be separate??

I don't. I just think he is reading into it a nihilism that isn't necessarily there, and as such confusing it with amorality.
They can, and don't get me wrong - I'm not saying its right or wrong to judge by a philosophy or action or both etc. My point is that moral relativism is a philosophy on the nature of morals, not on what those morals might be, nor on how one might change one's moral position.

A person's meta-ethical position is necessarily related to the content of said person's morality.

A person's meta-ethical position is like the choice of a store in which to go shopping. There are things you can get in some stores, but not in others. Shopping for kiwis in a shoe store is generally a bad idea. Sure, there may be some overlap, there may be things one can buy in many stores - like one can buy chewing gum at the post office as well as in a hardware store. But generally, the choice of store determines what is available for one to buy.

A person's meta-ethical position determines what particular moral norms and with what priorities one will hold on to.

 

[wynn]

Of course it will influence, but then of course the person could also be lying about whatever moral philosophy they adhere to.
Personally I wouldn't trust anyone (especially in such matters) on what they claimed, and would go on what else I knew of them (actions, reputations from people I trust etc).
I.e. How do we even trust what a person says about their moral philosophy if we don't have anything else with which to trust their honesty?
/.../

And by the same measure there is no knowing if the person claiming to be a non-relativist is telling the truth - unless we have some way of trusting them, perhaps?
Which would put us back at square one.

Which is why developing philosophical interrogative skills is so important. - Scrutinizing another person's mind.

Hence critical literacy, for example.

 

[Magical Realist]

I think it is fallicious to equate moral relativism to an "anything goes" amoralism. The moral relativist is afterall still positing certain actions as right and others as wrong. He is just saying the source of this right and wrong comes from being a rational agent inside a specific situation. He believes the validation of moral action is an act of judgement made by the person themselves against the context of a specific set of circumstances.

Certainly he may acknowledge a few rules of thumb to help guide him, like the golden rule or the maximum benefit principle, but he follows these only provisionally as they apply to the situation. It's like logic. There are no objective rules for prescribing all logical actions. The logic is inherent to being in the situation, relative to who the person is and the circumstances of their life. Same with morality. We have an innate sense for deciding what is right relative to our personal situation, but that hardly means people can just do whatever they want.

 

[Sarkus]

Whenever you hear someone refusing to take responsiblity for their actions, when they blame others instead, when they try to exculpate themselves by pointing out how "different people see things differently" or with the kind of "It's not that I hit him too hard, it's that his bones are too soft" - that points to moral relativism. And this is often.

The latter is not moral relativism at all, and I'm honestly not sure why you would think it is.

Indeed, it's necessary to pry deeper. But some clues are such that they themselves suffice. "There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so" is such a clue.

Yes, 'cos this is what moral relativists all say, all believe, all hold to be true.

There is of course also the issue of a person's stated morality and how they may incorporate efforts to maintain a particular self-image in stating it in a particular way.
Plenty of people claim to be liberal, for example, but they dogmatize like popes!

Sure - psycopaths might often claim to hold to an objective morality. As such the mere statement of such is no guide to who they actually are.

How could the two possibly be separate??

One is a matter of what the picture is of, the other is how the picture is painted.

A person's meta-ethical position is necessarily related to the content of said person's morality.

No it's not.
I might consider myself to have a Christian moraltiy - but merely because I was brought up in said society.
Others might have a Christian morality because they hold to an objective morality that is Christian in nature.

A person's meta-ethical position is like the choice of a store in which to go shopping. There are things you can get in some stores, but not in others. Shopping for kiwis in a shoe store is generally a bad idea. Sure, there may be some overlap, there may be things one can buy in many stores - like one can buy chewing gum at the post office as well as in a hardware store. But generally, the choice of store determines what is available for one to buy.

"Generally" does not make it necessarily so in all cases, so I think you have answered my point for me with your choice of words.

A person's meta-ethical position determines what particular moral norms and with what priorities one will hold on to.

No it doesn't.
It might do, and it might generally be the case that there is an apparent correlation, but that does not make it necessarily true.
I am a moral relativist. My morals are very much based on my upbringing, my Christian upbringing, my parents, the society in which I live etc.
My brother holds to an objective morality. He is Christian, and adheres fairly much to the very same Christian morality as I do - but has a rather different meta-ethical view.

Why do you have an apparent desire to discredit moral relativists, because this does seem to be visibly biasing your arguments?

 

[Sarkus]

Which is why developing philosophical interrogative skills is so important. - Scrutinizing another person's mind.

Hence critical literacy, for example.

Sure. And such is also better face to face, as when you start questioning / interrogating people, you pick up on their physical responses as well as merely the words they utter.

 

[Yazata]

Would you be willing to trust someone who clearly states they believe that "no act is inherently right or wrong"? Would such a statement not cause alarm for you?

It depends on the context. If it was said during a philosophical discussion about the foundations of ethics, I might or might not agree, but I certainly wouldn't be alarmed.

But if somebody who works with children said it in the context of a discussion of child molesting, I might suspect that the person is trying to signal that he/she sees nothing wrong with child molesting. That might alarm me.

Moral relativism doesn't require that people believe that nothing is inherently right or wrong. It doesn't even require that people believe in moral relativism.

Moral relativism is a meta-ethical theory that hypothesizes that people acquire their moral values from their cultures. That applies to everyone, even to people who stoutly believe in religious moral absolutism. The Muslim believer in Shariah might insist that killing apostates is a law that comes straight from God himself. But the meta-ethical moral relativist would locate the origin of that absolutist belief in Islamic culture and tradition.

In places like Australia, Europe and North America, even the philosophical moral relativists among us are probably going to judge that killing apostates who try to convert away from Islam is flat-out evil. They are likely to be as unequivocal about that view as the Islamist fundamentalist is with theirs. The Westerner will speak about murder being wrong, about human rights and about freedom of religious choice. The Muslim will answer right back with the necessity of man's unquesitioning obedience to God's will.

What meta-ethical moral relativism does is take a step back and observe that both the Westerner and the Muslim are forming their moral judgements in the context of their own cultures. That doesn't mean that the moral relativist isn't doing it too, or that the moral relativist and the Westerner who champions human rights can't simultaneously be one and the same person.

Nothing says that the relativists can't believe that their own culture's view of things is preferable to a different culture's. Moral relativism predicts that they will most likely believe exactly that.

The relativist is just expressing the view that it's impossible for human beings to leave all moral culture behind so as to be able to make their moral judgements from some pristine and absolutely objective point of view.