One more time real slow . And for the turninig point Seems plain to me Easren Europe as a German dominated economic and currency zone which became Nazi policy . Are you saying Russia isnt a part of Eastern Europe . Picking flyshit out of pepper are we ? Before Germany could invade Russia , Germany first had to get close ie: Czechoslovakia then Poland and deal with Britain and France and when they were accomplished Hitler authored directive 21 . Its as simple as that .
You have already made this claim in a thread devoted to the subject of the bombing of Dresden. I have already pointed out that the bombing was requested by the Russians. It is rather beneficial to have a city you wish to capture pulverised by allies rather than fight for it street by street. Files CAB.120/176 and /179 (which may be examined at the Public Record Office, Kew, Surrey, England) indicate that Lord Portal, attending the Yalta Conference, reported that the Russians had "again" requested air attacks on a line of targets from Stettin to Berlin to Dresden to Zagreb. Portal was not in favour, and memo'd DCAS: "To enable me to argue against this please send Most Immediate a few good objectives against which we desire to maintain our attacks until they become involved in tactical situation on land." It was Churchill's (political) decision to give the Russians the support they asked for, though the fate of Dresden was ultimately sealed by weather conditions ideal for the creation of a firestorm on the night it was chosen as a target. (On this at least there is broad agreement among historians.) If the Russians were particularly impressed by the result, it was as a result of meteorological mischance. Why do you persist in ignoring clear evidence? Do you suppose the files to be faked?
So now your ignoring Halder’s assessment, and the conclusions reached by the German army itself? You are aware that Halder commanded the German army in Russia during Barbarossa? I take it you only like cited references when they support your beliefs? “Eastern and Southern Europe" appear to refer to the former territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Balkans, and Rumania. If Russia were to be involved, then Schacht would require a directive from Hitler stating the intention to use force to make Stalin comply. So where’s the directive, dude? And that also corresponds to the “winging it” theory, 100%. As I’ve been telling you all along. So, in summary – you cannot point to any document from the 1930’s found in the German archives where Hitler told his military to focus upon an invasion of the Soviet Union? Even though numerous directives found in the archives dealt with LONG TERM German military contingency planning?
Whats new about it ? Dont you read what you quote? In Halder's opinion the appropriate German strategy for the summer of 1942 would have been to stabilize the front, eliminate the numerous Russian salient and dents in the German lines, and shorten the front line to save personnel.... And when did Halder enter this into his diary ? Late 1941 when at the time this was a logical deduction. In summarizing the transportation picture, the Army estimated that the spearhead divisions in the south would have 85 percent of their...allowance. And here is where the Germans begin to concentrate their forces to the Southern sector whilst leaving the Northern sector with only enough men to hold and stabilize that front . By the beginning of the offensive the infantry divisions in the south were to be at full strength Viola ! The main German thrust was going to be in the South , that is the way the German OKH decided to conduct their battle plan of 1942 . Attacking armies always get the most men and equipment and resources . Halder's report revealed that the German ground forces that were to launch the summer offensive of 1942 could not compare with the troops that had invaded Russia a year earlier....No wonder the Army High Command felt apprehensive about executing Hitler's overambitious plans... A summary not offered by the author of the Diary , but the publisher himself offers this deduction . You are aware Halder was sacked by Hitler in 1942 ? Are you aware that in these very diaries , which I have also read , Halder doubted that Germany could successfully invade France ? Read some of the reveiws of this man : I cannot count out this mans addition to my knowledge , but he was not the fountainhead . Absolutely not ! I have read all your sources thouroughly and have given a point by point critique , thats the manners I have , I have given you that courtesy . None , not one source , you provided has stated the Battle of Moscow was a turning point . I have agreed the Battle was costly , and a Russian victory , but I have provided several reputable source's which clearly state that Stalingrad was a turning point but is was Kursk that was the coup de grace . And those sources were a Russian source , a German source and I believe either an American of English source . If you read the entire link which is a page long it gives the history of German economic policy from 1934 to 2005 . The source clearly states that the Gernman East policy was carried on by the nazis under Schact . Mein Kampf ! Hitler's World View: Mein Kampf For pete's sake its all about invading russia and colonizing it . First up was re-arming Germany , second aquiring the German volk of Austria and Czechoslovakia and finally aquiring the springboard for the invasion Poland . When that was all completed then came Directive 21 . How the hell is an 8 year process 'winging it' ? Late 1939 is good enough , as I have already discussed when , and only when Hitler had completed his tasks I set doen then he began to move toward the direction of Directive 21 .
Could you re-link that for me mate , I am having problem finding where you wrote that in the thread . Its a large thread .
For those interested in Molotov's visit to Berlin, and whether or not it constituted a "sham" put on by Hitler and Stalin as Brian suggests, or a diplomatic showdown where both sides placed their cards on the table, and then wouldn't budge an inch, here's an outline of the incident. The first question to ask would be, "Who first suggested such a conference take place?" The answer is that the Germans were the ones that extended the invitation to Molotov in the fall of 1941 to come to Berlin, as outlined in Stalin's reply of October 22nd, "...Herr Molotov admits that he is under obligation to pay you a return visit in Berlin. He hereby accepts your invitation." The motive for this German move was to address the distrust and hostility apparent in German-Soviet relations. The shock of the sudden fall of France, Stalin's reactive moves into a number of territories in the Baltic States and Bessarabia, German troop movements into Rumania and Finland, and Hitler's unconsulting mediation between Rumania and Hungary, had caused opened a chasm between Moscow and Berlin. It is difficult to understand why Hitler would invite Molotov to Berlin, save for a desire to ascertain what it was the Russians wanted. This in turn implies that Hitler was not yet of a decided opinion on his next move - for why else would Russian intentions interest Hitler save for the possibility of working with them? As for Molotov's meeting in Berlin, suffice to say that Hitler and he didn't get along at all. Hitler, as a born again demagogic egotist, rarely, if ever had to endure such a tepid, hostile, cross-examination. He was so discomfitured by the dual that he did not attend a dinner at the Soviet embassy after their two talks. If one is to wonder how it would be possible that a "sham" meeting could turn so serious, one needs look no further than what was on the agenda. Contrary to Brian's assertion, when Molotov and Hitler talked, they didn't evade issues, and they didn't seek to conceal their real concerns. That is, their meeting was deadly serious, and not some fluffy pate put on for obscure purposes. Molotov, for his part, told Hitler flat out that Germany had to withdraw all troops from Finland, and left no doubt but that the USSR intended to subdue Helsinki in a second war. He also made it clear that Bulgaria was within the Soviet sphere, and that military bases would be established in Turkey. Hitler, apparently shocked by the Russian demands, told Molotov that under no circumstances would Germany tolerate Finland being subjected to a war. Indeed, he warned Molotov explicitly on a number of occasions that this would be completely unacceptable to Germany. He was evasive to the point of rejecting the notion of a Soviet-Bulgarian connection, and would only offer revisions to the Montreux Straits Convention (which regulated military traffic into and out of the Black Sea). To me, this looks like two players with their cards on the table. This was straight up talk on critical political issues, and it was tense. Would Molotov, if perpetuating a "sham", have signalled to Berlin so transparently that Finland was about to be annexed? That Turkey was also a target? Hardly. The facts of the case seems to show that, had Stalin been in a more submissive mood that year, there would have been no war. After Molotov departed from Berlin, Hitler did not allow matters to rest as they stood. Rather, Ribbentrop dispatched a copy of the draft treaty to Moscow, where it was presented for acceptance to the Russians in conversation between the German ambassador and Molotov on November 25th. And so it was in late November 1940 that Hitler, and not Stalin, committed himself formally to an offer of benevolent neutrality. The treaty Hitler desired contained four articles (one unimportant) and two secret annexes, Article I: The four powers (Germany, the USSR, Italy and Japan) declared themselves united in opposing the "extension" of the war. This referred indirectly to cooperating against the United States. Article II: This dealt with respecting one another's "natural spheres of influence". The current possessions of the Soviet Union were to be recognized by the other three. Article III: Called for extensive economic cooperation in "every" way, and a pledge to support any aggression against any of the four powers (through diplomatic and economic means). Secret Annex I: Was a declaration of spheres of influence. Germany's was to be within Europe and Africa. Italy, also Europe and Africa. Japan - territories to the south of the Home Islands. Russia - to the south, towards the Indian Ocean. Secret Annex II: This detailed the procedure by which Hitler was willing to overturn the Montreux Straits Convention and open up the Black Sea to the movements of Russian warships in and out. Now, if this were to be a trick on Hitler's part, it would have been a most curious one indeed, for all Stalin had to do was agree, and delegates from Italy, Japan, and Germany would have flown to Moscow to sign it and announce it to the world. Stalin, for his part, seemed to be under the impression that this wasn't a "take it or leave it" offer from our furious little nazi genocidal maniac. His reply is summarized as follows: 1 - German troops were to leave Finland immediately. Finland's fate was as per the non-aggression pact of 1939. 2 - Within the next few months Turkey was to accept Soviet military bases within her territory. Should Turkey refuse, the four powers were to, "work out and carry through the required military (emphasis mine) and diplomatic measures..." Bulgaria was to accept a "mutual assistance pact". 3 - The Russian direction of "aspiration" was to be the Persian Gulf. 4 - Japan was to renounce her rights to concessions for resources in Northern Sakhalin. Stalin wanted three more secret protocols: a - Dealing with Finland b - Outling what compensation Russia would provide Japan for the concessions Stalin wished in Sakhalin. c - Dealing with Bulgaria. Hitler appears never to have replied, though if there was further communication, the Russians may have purged the records from Berlin after the war. The delay between Stalin's answer (November 26th) and Hitler penning the Barbarossa directive (December 18th).
Halder's report, from which my quotes are taken, was submitted on May 12th, 1942. Just before Blue commenced. Now you begin to understand the German problem? They had lost so much of their transportation during the winter, and had recieved so little motorized replacements, that Hitler's objectives outlined in Blue, Huron and Edelweiss were impossible. He couldn't reach Russia's oil on the Caspian, let alone establish supply lines to them! "Viola?" I think you're continuing to miss the point. The Germans were, by scraping the bottom of the barrel, barely able to regain their strength on one front. In contrast, do you realise that Stalin had amassed by spring 1942 11 armies in the Stavka reserve? (Germany had no reserves to speak of) A further 5 tank armies (3,500 tanks in total) and 15 air armies (with between 200 and 1000 aircraft each) were formed during the summer. That's 16 field armies and 15 air armies in reserve, to Germany's none. Do recall that this is drawn from the German military's own series of studies. You wanted citations, you got citations. So what? Manstien, Hoth, Guderian - they were all dismissed by Hitler. Hitler was constantly blaming others for his own failings. Let's go over it again: Quote 1: According to the postwar conclusions of the Generals Halder, Heinrici, etc., the German summer offensive should never have been launched. Question: Do you understand the meaning of, "...the German summer offensive should never have been launched?" Quote 2: "It was now a question of how long the Third Riech...would be able to withstand the superior resources of the Allied Powers." Question: Do you understand that the above quote means Germany had lost the war? Quote 3: "...never again after Kiev and the commencement of Operation Typhoon would <Germany> regain the strategic advantage." Question: Do you understand the meaning of "never again" when Fugate discusses the "strategic advantage" Germany lost? Yes, wonderful. And for the record - you are unable to divulge a single reference, in all of the millions of documents captured in Germany after World War Two, to planning directed by Hitler against the Soviet Union by name during the 1930's? Actually, very little of Mein Kampf was devoted to that. About 5 or 6 crappy pages in a 700 page sewagefest, if I recall correctly. But these do indeed outline in wonderful and gory detail that particular proposal. One slight problem though: Hitler was a pathological liar, and much that came out of his yapper about his objectives were baldfaced lies designed to obtain some goal or another. The book that is relevent to foriegn policy is Hitler's second book, otherwise known as the Secret Book. You're on far better ground to quote directly from that source.
Before this lunacy goes any further , this is an actual indepth study into the Nazi-Soviet Pact . below is where the Soviets knew they were going to be attacked in the 1930s . Below Stalin trys to form a deal with the West against Hitler only to be rebuffed . Note the highliht where my thery about the Anglo/Franco plan to set Germany against Russia . And here Stalin uses it as an instrument to buy time . And a comment by Khrushev . And here is the German reason .
And for the umpteeth time here is where the turning point came ! These are from official German documents . And Add these two documented instances with what i posted ablove in relation with the Nazi-Soviet pact and you (insert drul roll) A conspiracy to attack Russia (insert loud cymbal crash) I can confidentialy state that you have not read Mein Kampf .
Its your source , not mine ! and nowhere in that source did the Russians call for airstrikes on Dresden as you so boldly claimed .
Care to explain why Hitler had the treaty sent to Stalin in Moscow, November 1940, other than the rather silly idea of a "sham"? "Confidentialy?" Nice. "Confidentially" Anyways, it is a known fact that Hitler did lie about many aspects of his foreign program in the Secret Book. He did so to trick his enemies into where and how he intended to aggrandize Germany. Given that he was a chronic liar, nothing that he said about anything can be taken as gospel. Hitler spent more time in Mien Kampf talking about syphilis than he does wars against Russia, by the way. I take it from the lack of an answer that you've got nothing to rebut the fact that Stalin had 16 armies and 15 air armies in reserve or forming in the spring and summer of 1942 to Hitler's none? That your "genius", through the unbelievably stupid tandem errors of going to war against Russia and forgetting to mobilize his economy? And then declaring war on the United States? He managed to take a winning position in Europe and toss it in the trash bin in record time. First place to total loser in 6 months. That's quite the achievement! For the "umpteenth" time: Germany was too weak to finish Russia after the 1941-1942 battles. Coupled with America's entry into the war, Hitler was done like dinner. Kursk? A mere formality along the road to hell. You do understand that there is a difference between when Russia was able to take the offensive for the duration (1943), and when Germany became unable to defeat Russia (1941-1942)? Because, for the number of times we've discussed the point, I'm not certain you're understanding the nuances of it
Have you not read the source I gave you ? What has this to do with anything ? I have provided ample economic/military/political source material to answer all your questions yet you still persist . You must stick with Moscow as this gives basis to you Barbarossa on the fly theory . Explain this .
Quite simple: They are discussing the point in time where German reverted permanently to the defensive. We on the other hand, are discussing the turning point where Germany became unable to defeat Russia. These are not the same thing. In World War One terms, the battle before Moscow might have been analogous to (but more severe than) the turning point suffered by Moltke in the Battle of the Marne in September 1914. The genesis of German planning for the invasion of the Soviet Union was in 1940, and it was so poorly conducted that Germany managed to throw away any reasonable chance of winning the war within 6 months of the invasion. Obviously, since this occurred only because of German errors in planning and execution, we can conclude that their preparations were seriously flawed - which in turn suggests no one was thinking about invading Russia during the 1930's. Hitler bears primary responsibility for this stupidity, but in all fairness the arrogance within the German High Command was extensive. Certainly. Thier patchwork of guesses don't make any explanation for Hitler's eagerness to come to an agreement with Stalin in November 1940. No one knows for certain what Hitler was thinking, or why he did things. But saying Hitler's offer to allow Russia into his alliance with Japan and Italy was a sham? C'mon. Let's review this. Your thread here is in support of a standard interpretation of Hitler's war aims prior and during World War Two. In this version, Mien Kampf outlined how Hitler intended to resolved Germany's various dilemmas by re-imposing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and thereby achieving both domination in Europe, living space for Germany, as well as the disintegration of a powerful rival. Sweet and simple, and to the point. But as has been continuously pointed out, this isn't the only theory of his behavior that fits the facts, and that the victors write history. Rather, I suspect it enjoys such a standing in no small part because it absolves us of having to search for the full truth as to why Europe committed suicide for the second time in 1939. We all agree that Hitler was a deranged lunatic bent on exerting his will through a sea of blood for no better reason than his lust for violence, but it seems that this guilt isn't enough; no contributory negligence in the process by the other powers is permitted. In particular, the notion that Stalin's expansionist agenda may have been a huge factor, or perhaps the decisive factor, in causing the Nazi-Soviet War, is to be downplayed as much as possible. But it's still there. The Secret Book, Hitler's second work, goes into far greater detail about what he thought of Germany's situation and objectives in Europe. His primary concern in the 1920's was not that Germany's population was too large in comparison to Germany's ability to sustain it. Rather, it was that Germany was weak and disarmed, and was in no position to rectify the problem herself. Hitler believed Germany physically too small, with a birth rate too high, to allow Germans to sustain a comfortable standard of living in the future. Contrary to the impression gained on this thread, Hitler identified not one, but four basic methods by which this problem could be resolved. But before anything could be done about that, Germany needed to rearm. And to do that she needed allies. And allies had to be reassured as to why Germany needed to rearm. Whatever turgid mess held balance in Hitler's twisted cranium isn't of interest to me. Rather, that he recognized a number of competing methods by which to solve Germany's problems implies that he wasn't hell-bent on carrying forward with any one plan to the exclusion of the others. Just so long as he was conquering others and killing people, I think he was happy to putter along. Hitler recognized the value of a commercial empire as a replacement or supplement for territorial conquest, but supposed that England would fight such a venture with all her strength. In contrast, England and Italy were thought to be favorably impressed by a march east, "Moreover, with Italy as with England, it is a positive fact that a continental expansion for Germany in northern Europe is no threat and thereby can give no cause for an estrangement by Italy against Germany." Did Hitler's public endorsement a march against Russia come as a startlingly honest statement of intent, or was he trying to sway British and Italian foreign policy to drive a wedge between them and France? Who knows? Who cares? He was nuts. But what is interesting is that Hitler lied through his teeth about his intentions against the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, "...<Germany's> task should not have been the preservation of the Hapsburg State but exclusively the salvation of the German nation, including the nine million Germans in Austria. Otherwise nothing else at all, indeed absolutely nothing else." Hitler had a defective compass. Russia was east of Germany, and Hitler had lied up and down in his writings that his goals lay to the east; but when he took power, the purpose of German policy from 1937 through 1939 as defined in his secret directives and in his actions, was to expand south down the Danube Basin and into the Balkans. Notice that Moscow wasn't built upon the Danube River. Hitler's writings bear the hallmark of a pathological liar trying to deceive his enemies as to his intentions. He falsely emphasized conflict with Russia as a method to divert attention from his other objectives, which may have been to re-establish the primacy of the Triple Alliance between Germany, Italy, and the former territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Having done so he intended to smash France and thereby secure German hegemony in Europe. Any power (including Russia) which went along with this agenda would be spared. Any power (including England) that resisted would be annihilated as a world power. Hitler bears responsibility for invading Russia in 1941, but the fact remains that all Stalin had to do to avoid the most destructive war in history was to sign the treaty Hitler placed on his desk on November 25th 1940.
Um, no. Hitler was elected because he promised to take care of problems that others would not, and still do not, address. He predicted the cold war. He predicted the environmental calamity. He saw how important oil supplies would be. WWII was an ideological war. Hard for Americans and Brits to imagine, but it did happen. And as American the Superpower collapses, we're going to re-assess that war hardcore.
I recall earlier in the thread where you used the battle of Moscow as a calamity of such that the material losses and manpower losses were so enormous due to stupidity that this was what was the irreversible turning point . I pointed out from several sources , especially note the Russian source , which said Germany made good its losses and went on to Stalingrad and it was not until Kursk that the German military was beaten to a point where its losses were irretreivable . It cannot be any more plainer than that glenn . Military planning began in 1940 , preparations for positioning germany's military in place began in 1939 with the invasion of Poland as Hitler clearly stated . And before that was the arms build up to actually pursue such an invasion . And as the Russians feared as early as 1936 and wanted to deal with germany then . We have been over this pact before on several occasions . And here Stalin uses the pact as an instrument to buy time . And here is the German reason for the pact. And as for Adolf Hitlers secret book "Zweites Buch ", which is authentic , read the whole of chapter11, GERMANY AND RUSSIA and then tell me Hitler had no designs on invading Russia .
CHAPTER SEVEN Who Financed Adolf Hitler? This gives a comprehensive list of what corporations donated to the Nazi Party and how much . As the war unfolded such predictions became clearly evident as obvious not prophecy . It was a war of conquering economic markets for exploitation . I hope so , but no I dont think such a thing will happen , just look at the reaction to my plausible theory .
