The Persistent Self

Simon Anders

Valued Senior Member
A fantasy?
Will it be viewed by future generations as a pernicious belief, much along the lines of how belief in God is viewed by a certain portion of the population?

The materialist's perspective, I can only assume, posits that the Self is made of matter. If this matter is replaced, over time, by other matter, does the self continue? Am I the same person as I was 10 years ago, 20, when I was 3?

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/#3
gives a little overview of the issue.
 
Egads!

You're killing me here SA.

:)

This very topic was the subject of my Undergrad Thesis.

Suffice it to say that from my materialist POV, while your matter is constantly changing (full body cell cycle in 7 yrs..) your self is always your self.

However, I would also maintain that your self is never the same self.

That's all I'll say for now.

I'd like to see some other responses...
 

lol

Trust me, I'm seriously biting my tongue here.
This has been a longstanding project for me. Something I've been working on over the past 15 years or so.

I based most of my position on the work of David M. Armstrong's A Materialist Theory of the Mind.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Malet_Armstrong

That, taken together with some Quine, Dawkins and Dennett pretty much get me to where I'm at.

So basically, it's a materialist POV, but not necessarily eliminitivist.
 
I don't see it as a pernicious belief, but I do see it as a bit of a fiction in the way we normally conceptualize it. First off, it is just an abstraction, and it has no concrete form, which makes it difficult to analyze. Even if, due to the replacement of atoms in the body, cognitive scientists were able to show that the "self" were to be completely replaced every three to five years, our concept of self would clearly encompass a string of "selves" from birth to death.

That is not how most people think of the self, but if one accepts multiple "selves" in a certain sense, one has to acknowledge that we tend to use the concept to mean "my 'selves' that exist from time to time."

I think most people do think of the self as something fixed and that, to many, has an existence apart from the physical body. That it is, in effect, a manifestation of the soul that is merely translated through a physical body.

I tend to think that the self only exists as a result of the body, and that as the body changes the self necessarily changes with it. The seeming permanence of it comes from the fact that we have no other point of view from which to observe ourselves than the position of the "self", and that makes it exceedingly hard to notice changes. The only time we tend to do do is when the change is relatively radical, which typically takes time.

Because replacements of the body tend to happen in ways that preserve structures, thankfully, we are not given to radical changes in behavior. Atoms may replace one another, but the overall structure remains relatively stable. Exceptions to this do crop up with people who have major brain trauma, and their "selves" can seem to change quite radically as a result.
 
I don't see it as a pernicious belief
Well, here's the downside: selfishness. If I know I will be the same who wakes up in the morning tomorrow, then stealing, for example, so that that future me has more stuff, is logical, setting aside the moral issue. The overidentification with one portion of life, over time, sets up all sorts of long term goals (and they only have to be longer than a few seconds for purists of transience) that set us at odds with each other. If however there is no permanent self, why should I set my needs above those of others. By the time the act is finished some self or another will benefit.

First off, it is just an abstraction, and it has no concrete form, which makes it difficult to analyze. Even if, due to the replacement of atoms in the body, cognitive scientists were able to show that the "self" were to be completely replaced every three to five years, our concept of self would clearly encompass a string of "selves" from birth to death.
Yes.

That is not how most people think of the self, but if one accepts multiple "selves" in a certain sense, one has to acknowledge that we tend to use the concept to mean "my 'selves' that exist from time to time."
These selves would not be discrete, I assume, since the change is gradual. Or?

I think most people do think of the self as something fixed and that, to many, has an existence apart from the physical body. That it is, in effect, a manifestation of the soul that is merely translated through a physical body.
Yes.

I tend to think that the self only exists as a result of the body, and that as the body changes the self necessarily changes with it. The seeming permanence of it comes from the fact that we have no other point of view from which to observe ourselves than the position of the "self", and that makes it exceedingly hard to notice changes. The only time we tend to do do is when the change is relatively radical, which typically takes time.
In a sense the proverbial frog placed in the slowly heated water does not notice the change to hot, the 'experiencing vantage point with no substance' does not notice that his or her identity is being 'boiled' away.

Because replacements of the body tend to happen in ways that preserve structures, thankfully, we are not given to radical changes in behavior. Atoms may replace one another, but the overall structure remains relatively stable. Exceptions to this do crop up with people who have major brain trauma, and their "selves" can seem to change quite radically as a result.
Ah see, now you are agreeing with my OP too much. I hope you will stay with the thread and help me with skeptics about my skepticism. Perhaps we can take on the formidable Glaucon together after some warm ups.
 
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Well, here's the downside: selfishness. If I know I will be the same who wakes up in the morning tomorrow, then stealing, for example, so that that future me has more stuff, is logical, setting aside the moral issue.
Stealing is not logical, even setting aside the moral issue.
The gaining of "more stuff" is logical, if one's (self-derived) purpose includes comforts etc, but the act of stealing is not logical due to the inclusion of the risk of penalties for being caught... so one would need to weigh the risk / reward factor before concluding whether it is rational... e.g. no point in stealing $1m if you get nicked and spend the next 10 years in jail.


Anyhoo - that's probably a red-herring, so apologies.



Regarding the persistent self, it is surely difficult to know whether it is persistent or not unless we can adequately define what "self" is?

Also, the claim (or merely understanding) of "persistence" might also only exist because we have memory of that previous self. If you remove that memory and wipe the slate clean, so to speak (as in the case of some amnesiacs), are we the same self that we were, given that we have no memory of that prior self?

For example, I "know" I am the same person (same consciousness at least) that did X on a certain date. I might be a slightly different personality (which I understand to be based on the accumlated experience and one's processing of) by dint of increased experience, but I am the same consciousness. I can not prove it... which is a different matter.

But... if I were to lose all my memories tomorrow (other than the ability to read / write / communicate etc)... would I be the same "self"?

Using someone else's analogy... I might be playing the same game, but I would have to start again, having lost all the previous saves.

So the question is... is your "self" the particular run through the game you're playing, or the consciousness playing the game?


Meh - probably a bit muddled in my thoughts.
 
Well, here's the downside: selfishness. If I know I will be the same who wakes up in the morning tomorrow, then stealing, for example, so that that future me has more stuff, is logical, setting aside the moral issue. The overidentification with one portion of life, over time, sets up all sorts of long term goals (and they only have to be longer than a few seconds for purists of transience) that set us at odds with each other. If however there is no permanent self, why should I set my needs above those of others. By the time the act is finished some self or another will benefit.

I tend to think, if the me who wakes up tomorrow is not the same me as exists right now, then fuck him, I am going to spend my money on more lapdances, as this is my last night on Earth. Similarly, if I steal and get caught who cares? It's not me that's going to prison, it's some other sap who looks like me. Carpe diem.
 
Simon Anders
The materialist's perspective, I can only assume, posits that the Self is made of matter.

No the self is made of patterns. The patterns are formed by matter and energy.
 
Suffice it to say that from my materialist POV, while your matter is constantly changing (full body cell cycle in 7 yrs..) your self is always your self.

How on earth (sic!) do you know that?


However, I would also maintain that your self is never the same self.

Then it is not the self.
 
the sense of self is not something that memory can change over time.

There's no mechanism to reference it inside our heads. But whenever I ask myself ' is this myself?' of course the answer is Yes. And I can't recall a time when this wasn't so.

Time doesn't progress like a ticking watch forward. Everything is right now, and now things are not changing, not slowly, nor quickly - everything is just stopped.

So the 'self' sits in this little unchanging bubble of 'now'ness. The rest of me doesn't do that - the rest is referenced and memorized, things are black and white, and the present and the future, start turning the wheels and make time seem like a progressing ticking forward clock.

But 'self' doesn't feel the same way, it just sits and gets recalled, over and over, never to be memorized - (for we can't reference it).

I don't think the sense of self 'changes' unless I put too much faith in scientific instruments.
 
Regarding the persistent self, it is surely difficult to know whether it is persistent or not unless we can adequately define what "self" is?

Also, the claim (or merely understanding) of "persistence" might also only exist because we have memory of that previous self. If you remove that memory and wipe the slate clean, so to speak (as in the case of some amnesiacs), are we the same self that we were, given that we have no memory of that prior self?
And there is also the problem of memory itself: a memory is a difference you have from the 'person' you are remembering. It is a record of a change in your brain. Or?

For example, I "know" I am the same person (same consciousness at least) that did X on a certain date. I might be a slightly different personality (which I understand to be based on the accumlated experience and one's processing of) by dint of increased experience, but I am the same consciousness. I can not prove it... which is a different matter.
Excellent. I had thought all the rationalists here thought that if you could not prove something it was not real. (I know that if presented this in the abstract many would balk, but somehow that seems to be the approach, for example with theists)

But... if I were to lose all my memories tomorrow (other than the ability to read / write / communicate etc)... would I be the same "self"?

Using someone else's analogy... I might be playing the same game, but I would have to start again, having lost all the previous saves.

So the question is... is your "self" the particular run through the game you're playing, or the consciousness playing the game?
And again, memories are records of changes and, to my mind, make a poor foundation for claims to sameness.

Also the computer revolution should make us cautious about confusing memory with identity. These things can be copied.


Meh - probably a bit muddled in my thoughts.
I cannot imagine not getting muddied on such an issue. Keep bringing on the mud.
 
I tend to think, if the me who wakes up tomorrow is not the same me as exists right now, then fuck him, I am going to spend my money on more lapdances, as this is my last night on Earth. Similarly, if I steal and get caught who cares? It's not me that's going to prison, it's some other sap who looks like me. Carpe diem.
Really? Even if it were not me, he would be a person I would very likely wish well. But certain kinds of long term sacrifices would be out of the question, so good point. I would not go to medical school, for example. Of course, I didn't anyway.
 
the sense of self is not something that memory can change over time.
I think 'sense' is a misleading word choice. I think it is more accurate to say 'idea'. If it is 'sense' what is this sense of? And could it not be, just like other senses, something that can be mislead by gradual changes?

There's no mechanism to reference it inside our heads. But whenever I ask myself ' is this myself?' of course the answer is Yes. And I can't recall a time when this wasn't so.
The persistence of the idea of the persistent self is not one I would ever challenge.

So the 'self' sits in this little unchanging bubble of 'now'ness. The rest of me doesn't do that - the rest is referenced and memorized, things are black and white, and the present and the future, start turning the wheels and make time seem like a progressing ticking forward clock.
So then your self is not your memories, body sensations, emotions, thoughts etc. You have a characterless self - A Man Without Qualities, to steal from Robert Musil. But then how can you have this sense it is the same characterless vantage point that was there 10 years ago. What about those blanks spaces where you are not conscious? Do you ever notice coming back from one of those?

I don't think the sense of self 'changes' unless I put too much faith in scientific instruments.
You would have no way of knowing if each NOW thinks it is the same as those other NOWS in memory.

(I enjoyed your post by the way)
 
Well, here's the downside: selfishness.

Not necessarily. It depends on your understanding of

1. where this self comes from
and
2. in what relation it is to other selves.

There are several possibilities, but from where I am, not an infinite number of possibilities:

The self can come from:
1. coincidence
2. God
3. is self-created
("comes from other selves" is not a valid option, as it is simply a regression begging the question)

A self can be in relation to others:
1. equal
2. superior
3. inferior

What say you?


Perhaps we can take on the formidable Glaucon together after some warm ups.

Yes, let's.
:cool:
 
Fascinating

There can't be a scene-stopping "self" anymore than
there can be a "now."
Time is measured as the motion of matter through space.
It never stops.
{A good virtual example: a new year's eve
digital clock with an infinite number of digits
to the right of the second....
Yes, that last digit never stops.
It's never exactly 12:00. It's always
11:999999999999......}
But unlike Zeno, the chicken always manages
to cross the road.
"Self" is a memory of those successful journeys.
But the paradox remains: how'd he get there?
Suffice it to say, for me, some things are still
unknown,
and some things are just
Unknowable
And that's the toughest thing I ever had to accept.
I cannot explain infinity, nor embrace an infinite
intelligence. My heart cries out for explanation,
yet would certainly rebel against a doctrine of
determinism.
Your question is one of the grandest ever asked.
Thank you for sharing this time.
With optimism, I predict, this forum, and its instant
exchange of intelligence, represents the evolution
of "ourselves".
 
And there is also the problem of memory itself: a memory is a difference you have from the 'person' you are remembering. It is a record of a change in your brain. Or?
You can get bogged down in what remains the same and what is changing. If you take the approach that the self is X and unchanging, then memory is merely a record of changes in the clothes that X wears.

Unfortunately to argue further on whether self is persistent, one needs an agreed upon definition of "self". Are we talking merely "consciousness"? Or are we talking personality?
And even then, with an agreed-upon definition / understanding, we can only answer the question (hopefully) for that particular understanding.


Excellent. I had thought all the rationalists here thought that if you could not prove something it was not real. (I know that if presented this in the abstract many would balk, but somehow that seems to be the approach, for example with theists)
Very few rationalists on this board would make the claim that lack of proof (or even lack of evidence) = not real. Without proof or evidence, at best one can say "I don't know" - which is what I understand the majority of rationalists on this board would say.

And again, memories are records of changes and, to my mind, make a poor foundation for claims to sameness.

Also the computer revolution should make us cautious about confusing memory with identity. These things can be copied.
An exact copy (and I do mean exact in every way) of a person would be a different person, by dint of having a different consciousness. They would have the same memories (identity) up to the point of copying, and one could say they were the same up to that point... precisely because they had the same consciousness up to that point. After the copy was made, a new consciousness was created, and hence a new "self". From that point on they are different people - different "self"s


So - let me ask... would you define "self" as "consciousness"?
Or even broader - how do you think the two are related or interact?
 
Holy busyness.

Ok, I'll make some comments here on various points.

If anyone thinks I've missed some salient points do let me know.





Well, here's the downside: selfishness.
...


Howso?
What's wrong with selfishness?
I'd say it's a fairly effective survival strategy.



I don't see it as a pernicious belief, but I do see it as a bit of a fiction in the way we normally conceptualize it. First off, it is just an abstraction, and it has no concrete form, which makes it difficult to analyze. Even if, due to the replacement of atoms in the body, cognitive scientists were able to show that the "self" were to be completely replaced every three to five years, our concept of self would clearly encompass a string of "selves" from birth to death.


I wholeheartedly agree on all points. Nicely said.
Even if we set aside the issue as to whether or not the 'string of selves' is developed through a graduated change or discrete instantiations, it's clear that our self is different through time.
However, you're most significant point here is your description of the self as a fictive entity. Not only is the self a piece of fiction, it is a very useful fiction.
As an aside, in my PI theory, the fictive nature of the self is exactly the explanatory mechanism that is responsible for both the maintenance and creation (evolution..) of the self.


...
That is not how most people think of the self, but if one accepts multiple "selves" in a certain sense, one has to acknowledge that we tend to use the concept to mean "my 'selves' that exist from time to time."


Or, more accurately, "my selves that I recall".


...
I tend to think that the self only exists as a result of the body, and that as the body changes the self necessarily changes with it. The seeming permanence of it comes from the fact that we have no other point of view from which to observe ourselves than the position of the "self", and that makes it exceedingly hard to notice changes. The only time we tend to do do is when the change is relatively radical, which typically takes time.
...

100% correct.
I can add nothing here.



Regarding the persistent self, it is surely difficult to know whether it is persistent or not unless we can adequately define what "self" is?

Thank you.
I was really hoping that the first post after my initial post would point this out.
Procedures people. We cannot hope to even discuss if we do not first define our terms.


Also, the claim (or merely understanding) of "persistence" might also only exist because we have memory of that previous self. If you remove that memory and wipe the slate clean, so to speak (as in the case of some amnesiacs), are we the same self that we were, given that we have no memory of that prior self?

Exactly.
As it stands, the only evidence (sic) we have at all of a 'self' is through recollection. Memory, it goes without saying, is hardly reliable.


So the question is... is your "self" the particular run through the game you're playing, or the consciousness playing the game?


Or, is your 'self' the totality of all played games?

The problem with the game analogy is that through all played games, there is that entity that has the controller in its hands, and can opt to end or start a game at any time. Which is to say, in ordinary life, there is no such continuous 'behind the scene' player.


Meh - probably a bit muddled in my thoughts.

But good thoughts nonetheless.



How on earth (sic!) do you know that?


Hey gb. Nice to see you back.


That my self is always myself??

If that's what you're asking, then I refer you to the Thread Title.
Or, Buckaroo Banzai: Wherever you go, there you are".

But, to be clear: you do not wake up one day not being you.


Then it is not the self.

Really?

And yet I can clearly point out Lake Ontario to you on a map despite the fact that no one can tell me where the lake begins and the Atlantic Ocean ends....


Note also that your objection here begs some sort of definition of 'self' that you're making use of.



There's no mechanism to reference it inside our heads. But whenever I ask myself ' is this myself?' of course the answer is Yes. And I can't recall a time when this wasn't so.


my emphasis

This is correct.
And alludes to the evasive nature of the 'self'.



...

Unfortunately to argue further on whether self is persistent, one needs an agreed upon definition of "self". Are we talking merely "consciousness"? Or are we talking personality?
And even then, with an agreed-upon definition / understanding, we can only answer the question (hopefully) for that particular understanding.

Indeed.
However, the problem is even more restrictive than that: assuming an agreed upon definition, we face the solipsistic hurdle ( and the Other Minds Problem, and Infinite Regress, for a few).

So - let me ask... would you define "self" as "consciousness"?
Or even broader - how do you think the two are related or interact?


We can only begin once we do this. Even if we can agree upon an operational definition.


Although, for my part, I'd say we discard the mentioning (with respect to making a definition..) of consciousness (unless we wish to get bogged down in a neurochemistry discussion).



Whew.
 
Simon Anders
well, the patterns change. And if we make a copy, which will no doubt be possible at some point, will that be you? In which one will you be.

Change is in the nature of patterns.

Nature already can make an exact copy. But neither has improved status over the other. Twins are copies of each other and each is a full individual, the original.
 
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