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Actually, he's technically correct about that part. The HEU gun design incorporated into Little Boy was all but guaranteed to work, and didn't need to be tested first. Trinity was a functional test of an implosion weapon. While it's a more elegant design and a far more efficient use of fuels, it relied upon a number of new/unproven components to work. (Namely the pulse power switching network that timed the HE lenses.) These unproven complex subsystems, combined with the fact that HEU was in even scarcer supply at the time than plutonium, were the reasons that an implosion weapon was tested but a gun weapon was not. So: Hiroshima - Little Boy - HEU gun type - testing unnecessary Nagasaki - Fat Man - Pu implosion type - testing necessary Trinity did provide initial data for some other things relating to thermal/blast and radiological effects, but these were largely academic concerns at the time. The larger problem with Ice's argument lies in ts failure to consider the scarcity of fuels at the time. Essentially, Oak Ridge had produced enough plutonium for four Fat Man-sized weapon cores. The first was used at Trinity. The second at Nagasaki. The final two of the original cores were used in the Able and Baker shots of Operation Crossroads in 1946. It wasn't until several years later that the US had enough fuels on hand to assemble additional weapons, and its fuels production infrastructure didn't really ramp up until after the Soviets tested their first device in 1949. Could the US have done a demo for the Japanese? Yeah, maybe, but it would've been a huge risk given the limited number of weapons on hand and the likelihood of a demo changing minds on Japan's end is far from certain. Edit: This derail seems to pop up a couple times a month on this forum and this forum alone. It's pretty uncanny how it happens, and it's basically the death knell for the thread's original topic. At least the I/P conflict derails pertain to an ongoing set of events, and can change over time. This one is a broken record.
So, it is your opinion that revelations about porn consumption should not do any damage to Bin Laden's image amongst his target audience (jihadist militants, and the conservative Muslim diapora more generally)?
Hold on a second there - if the Twin Towers are a legitimate target due to their financial involvement in US foreign policy, then how are the people in them exempted? It isn't the physical edifices that finance anything - it's the people working in them. I mean, sure, you could exempt the janitors or whatever, but not the actual financial workers (at least at those firms with said international involvement). If you leave those guys alone (they happen to be at a different place at the time, say) and just destroy the Twin Towers, you don't do any particular damage to those financial dealings. Likewise, if you go and kill all those people without bothering to blow up the Twin Towers, then you'd cripple said financial operations. So there seems to be a piece missing in that reasoning - the Twin Towers were not an aircraft carrier or military base whose mere physical existence creates a strategic reality which must be addressed. And what about all of the other businesses in those buildings, which didn't have anything in particular to do with US foreign policy? Is there no consideration of discrimination or proportionality in the calculus of determining the legitimacy of military targets? All of which begs the question of whether you're analyzing this as a total war. On the one hand it does not seem like you are - there seems to be some suggestion that not just any piece of US population or infrastructure is a valid target. But on the other hand it's difficult for me to see where you're respecting the standard considerations for legitimacy of military targetting in a regular, non-total war. Well, now, that one actually was a total war. ? Did you perhaps mean to phrase that differently? Between the equation of these cases with those killed in the Twin Towers, and the previous assertion that the latter was an obviously legitimate target, it adds up to a clear assertion that those were all instances of obviously legitimate targetting, not requiring "excuse." Which isn't a position I'd imagine you endorsing. So is this all just some attempt to turn the tables on whoever, to suggest that they're hypocrits? Not playing it well, if that's the plan. I'm relatively certain that the normal procedure is for both sides to attempt to do that. Ability to control media would seem to matter mostly in how successful said attempts end up being. Moreover, there is no requirement that only one side can be the one controlling the media - typically each side has its own media, directed at its own audience, with its own means of controlling such.
A demo is what was done - only on living cities. And it changed Japan's mind in about ten days - as soon after Hiroshima as the info could be processed, and the existence of the bomb comprehended (Nagasaki was superfluous). Film of the Trinity test, or even just the relevant info about the bomb, could have been given to the several competent Japanese physicists available. No demo necessary, and no info about fuel availability required. Since the existence of the bomb proved the key factor (aerial bombardment for mass slaughter of civilians had failed already) - we know in hindsight that it might have proven persuasive, and they knew at the time that it was a reasonable option or available tactic - one that cost nothing, and might have ended the war much sooner. It's existence, all that was proven by Hiroshima much less Nagasaki, could have been shown without a demo. The use of Hiroshima taken for granted as necessary or justified, is common. The only aspect that might be unique to here would then be my swatting of the presumption. It bothers me, actually, to see that amoral, cynical, so obviously evil and badly motivated atrocity passed off as some kind of justified act of war. It has crippled the mind and soul of my country, to establish its patriotism and ethical base in such lame and transparent excuse-mongering. And the effects of such callow replacement of integrity by marketing and image resonate to this day, even to relevance in this thread. One of the contributing physicists on the scene said what needs saying in one brief response, years ago: "We just didn't think, OK?" (Richard Feynman). Not all of them are. But as the towers were clearly targeted for their symbolic value, rather than as an assassination attempt on the guilty parties inside them, the innocents killed are the more important. You make a good point, about my setup. Let's back up: those targets are equivalently legitimate. Reject the Towers as legitimate targets, and a very long list of mass killings of civilians by the US gets rejected with them. And that is respecting the "standard considerations" for targeting as much as the standard targeters do. The moral or ethical argument begins, not ends, here. Because any moral virtue of the US agents and people shows not in their choice of targets, which is apparently equivalent, but in their reaction to what they've done. They hide, dissemble, recognize guilt, and deceive themselves to avoid shame. Timothy McVeigh lost a great deal of support for his cause because his bomb killed children in day care - that he didn't "target" them was not enough. So there's an entry, a starting point, for the discussions of the bombing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because the perps of 9/11 are not less evil, but more evil, for killing people merely because they were in the way - not even targets. Likewise a military that kills people the way one would run over an anthill with a lawn mower, merely for being in the way of some operation, "wasting" them, is not thereby less evil than one that actually targets those people - one could argue that it is more evil. And the attempts to deflect this kind of afterthought, reaction, by making odious or inferior the killed is a sign of moral achievement, standards. If OBL were reported to be an admirable person altogether, questions about the entire situation surrounding his killing would be raised - even by the people chanting "USA" at the drop of a body.
No, the strikes showed a lot more than mere existence. They showed an obstinate Supreme War Council that the US was in possession of multiple such weapons, that the US could deliver these weapons against urban centers in the Japanese mainland with relative impunity, and the results of such weapons were more horrific than anyone could have believed. Something tells me those same hardheaded generals would have found photos and technical documents relating to a test in their enemy's remote uninhabited desert less than compelling. Well, it's not like this thread was going places to begin with. It does strike me as strange that people can render judgement on something that occurred in a world that was so different than the one we now live in, whether it's unquestionably for or against. The level of certitude displayed involves religious levels of faith. In truth, we don't know what the Japanese would've done had we sent them an envelope containing our most heavily guarded national secrets. We don't know how long Russia would've taken to open a northern front, had Japan not surrendered. We don't know if Japan would've then ended up divided like North Korea. We don't know if the casualty projections for Operation Downfall were accurate, too low, or too high - American military or Japanese military/civilian. We don't know a lot of things and there's no way we can. And there's even less that US leaders at the time knew than we know now.
The delivery impunity they already knew. The possession would have been part of the information delivered. Even after explanation from their physicists? But such speculation does not explain the failure to attempt - the worst they could say is no, and then Hiroshima proceeds as planned, only with much more solid ethical foundation - no guilt, no hiding behind claims of lives saved in an invasion that everyone privy to the bomb knew was never going to happen now, no weakness at the core. Better was possible - and much time and war, along with the lives of hundreds of thousands of non-combatants, would have been saved. This isn't hindsight, btw: there were people at the time pointing this out: That uniquely among weapons this one was better not kept secret. We are entitled to consider what motives were involved in rejecting the negotiation option.
It's not hard to believe that bin laden was into porn given the brand of misogyny inherent in the kind of religious extremism he and his friends in the taliban want to impose on the world.
Sorry if I caught you offguard with a late edit to my last post. I see no reason to believe the council would've taken the US at their word. Why do you think it would have mattered? I mean, the council attempted a coup against their Emperor. They weren't terribly openminded to anything outside their narrow view of loyalty to their empire. Well again, the US would've been showing its hand and divulging what were literally its most valuable national security secrets. Given the length of the war by that point and the ferocity of Japanese resistance, the chances of this working the way you describe would have been slim to say the least.
The account would have been very plausible, and photos etc easy to supply. The equations, etc, they could have worked out by themselves and checked in a couple of days, week or two. It would have provided a good reason for the surrender many wanted already - they were facing mass starvation, invasion or non invasion. Which they were going to reveal, inevitably, to the world's physics community, as soon as they set off the bomb. Besides: So what? There was nothing the Japanese could do about it anyway. Slim was worth taking, as people noted at the time. A slim chance of ending the war weeks early and without burning schoolchildren. In hindsight we know the odds were better than that, the Japanese in desperate straits, but even at the time: why not? And that's not a rhetorical question.
Plausible to the physicists, maybe. To the generals, not so much. The empire had many good reasons to surrender long before the nuclear strikes. The mainland had been subjected to conventional strategic bombing for six months by the time Hiroshima was bombed. Over 60 Japanese cities were almost entirely ruined and over a half million people had been killed. (The destruction of Tokyo was enough to convince Hirohito to get involved in the peace process, but not Tojo or the council.) Likewise, Japan's supply lines of food and fuel had been steadily choked off by allied naval interdiction. As for starvation in particular, it was expected and planned for by the Supreme War Council as part of Operation Ketsugo. The goal of the council was to brace for an allied invasion of the homeland and then drag the war out as long as possible, maximizing loss of life and forcing an armistice on their terms. Enduring a siege of some length was a necessary part of Ketsugo, and they were willing to throw their people under the bus to make it happen. Details of how the weapons were engineered were not and have never been publicly revealed in sufficient detail to constitute incontrovertible levels of scientific proof they would work. Because it would've been a crazy thing to do at the time, and the privilege of hindsight shows us it would've had zero chance of working anyway.
The physicists in the US were capable of persuading the warlords to divert huge sums of money and badly needed resources, in the middle of war, on the mere promise of maybe. The Japanese generals were well acquainted with the contributions of modern physics to weaponry, and the competence of their own physicists. Even the generals in Japan knew who Einstein was. Put him at the table. But speculation regarding the universal rigidity and closemindedness and suicidal fanaticism of every single Japanese general is beside the point: the possibility of persuasion was there, and rejected without even the attempt. Why? So the destruction of the bomb was not the persuasive factor - the mass killing of civilians was not critical, not the essential thing. That had already failed to persuade. That is more or less false, in the situation as it stood. "Incontrovertible", from a scientific nitpicking pov, is far too strong and unnecessary. The details of the design were just that - details. As you noted, the gun design was so straightforward it didn't even need testing, and several other designs were plausible given the basic physics - all the Japanese needed to know, and soon to be easily deduced from the fact of aerial drop and detonation anyway. But if necessary, include film of the mushroom cloud - or even an eyewitness, what the hell. There was no benefit in secrecy - at least, none relevant to ending the war with Japan. Hindsight shows the opposite - people often use that as denigration of my take here ("yeah, sure, in 20 20 hindsight we know better, but at the time yadda yadda yadda"). Even at the time, the option of negotiation with the bomb as persuader, as trump card, was known, recognized, on the table, from responsible and informed people, not crazy at all. It was decided against, for some reason - not dismissed out of hand as babbling. The grounds now advanced for that decision were after the fact justifications, we know that much. They don't square with events - there are dozens of incongruencies, such as the very quick drop on Nagasaki.
No it doesn't. The people who said dropping the bombs would end the war were proven right. One can't presume to know what would have happened if any other course of action was taken. Arthur
Another leap of faith. How much effect the mass killing of its people was having on the imperial leadership's resolve is debateable, but it did have some effect. (Hirohito's personal response to the firebombing of Tokyo, for example.) Then why did you specify delivering the information to enemy scientists? Ambiguous information lacking critical details would be even less convincing to a scientist than a layperson. Are you sure this isn't a rhetorical question? I mean, it's starting to feel like you're going to keep asking the same thing no matter what answers you get on specific points. Let's assume the US had taken the actions you describe WRT demonstrating its nuclear strike capability, and it had no effect on Japan's resolve. What then?
It was your leap of faith, to imagine the generals unaffected by all that had gone before, unwilling to even consider surrender, willing to sacrifice civilians wholesale. My point was that the existence of the bomb was the critical factor - not the existence of the ability to slaughter civilians somehow. On the contrary - the scientists could fill in the gaps for themselves, and easily comprehend what they and Japan were faced with, and be heard by the generals. It was not the physicists that needed convincing of the possibility of the bomb, back before anyone knew for sure it was possible. Scientists are not the ones who need "incontrovertible" scientific proof of existence to recognize possibility. Then the worst case fallback: Hiroshima, if indicated by the manner of rejection: it becomes something less evil than it was, and the justifications of it become something other than the hollow excuses they are.
No one in the Military would ever agree to that. Letting Japan know about the bomb would let them anticipate the delivery mechanism and possibly prevent the delivery. One can never presume to know what the enemy can and cannot do, but giving away this much info was simply not something that we would do back in 1945. Iceaura can sit in his easy chair today and pontificate about how wrong we were, but the fact of the matter is the decision was justifed by the outcome as being a good one. We ended the war. The actual outcome of any other decision is uncertain. Arthur
Okay. This is a different thing, though: targetting for symbolic value. Those other examples of US actions you cite, all have some specific military target on one side of the ledger. Except the total war ones, of course. Anyway it's unclear to me how "symbolic value" would figure into the usual just war theory calculus of keeping expected military utility in proportion to expected civilian casualties. What could the perpetrators have realistically expected to achieve by such? We've been told, alternatingly, that they expected America to shit itself in terror and pull all forces out of the Middle East, or that they expected America to respond in fury and wage massive, widespread wars for a long time. The first of those expectations does not seem reasonable to me. The second hardly adds up to an act of defensive necessity - it looks rather like aggression, in fact. Which isn't much of a stretch: this group openly declared total war on the USA - explicitly including all American civilians anywhere in the world - and clearly wanted such to be reciprocated (their prominence and apparent influence being strongly dependent on such a belligerent state of relations).
So everyone agrees, in wacking off to porn, bin laden sewed (or spilt) the seeds of al qaeda's destruction.
