And you’re the only one in this conversation who thinks it is, even though you have yet to explain how, and everything you do say (other than words to the effect of “it is relevant”) suggests you don’t actually know how it is relevant, and thus can’t explain why it is, or how it is. What you fail to grasp, even in this latest comment of yours, is that the theories of time that you have raised have nothing to say on what time actually is, only on whether time can be said to exist pre- and/or post- the present. You also agree that all of them allow a deterministic universe. And my contention is that it is that deterministic nature alone that negates the possibility of free will. One doesn’t need to know anything else about time, or reality, or anything else. One merely needs to understand what determinism means, what it allows and doesn’t, and from that one can answer the question posed. And for that reason, the theories around whether the past and/or future exist as well as the present are simply not relevant to the issue. If you wish to claim them relevant, the onus is on you, and to do more than just simply bleat that they are relevant. This is a strawman, in that I have never said that time is not an important ingredient, only that understanding its nature is not relevant to the discussion at hand, since it does not alter the nature of determinism. The only important thing is the relationship between cause and effect, and that is defined by determinism. Adherence to a specific ontological theory of time, or any other, is at best going to allow determinism or not, but since we have stipulated a deterministic universe... and you have agreed that each such theory allows a deterministic universe... where’s the actual relevance of which theory one adopts to the deterministic relationship between cause and effect? Just because one might see flour as a vital part of a cake, it is somewhat irrelevant when discussing the flavour of the icing. So you can bleat on about the importance of time in the whole recipe, but it is simply not relevant to the discussion at hand. Thanks for continuing the strawman. I have not said that time itself is not important to causation, only that the theories of time that you are wanting me to choose between are irrelevant to the discussion at hand, on the possibility of free will in a deterministic universe. The existence of the past and/or future along with the present does not change the relationship between cause and effect in a deterministic universe. You have agreed to this, else you would not have agreed that all the theories allow for a deterministic universe, where the determinism defines that relationship between cause and effect. If you are now changing your mind, explain why you think the theory of time one adopts alters what it means for a relationship to be deterministic. Assuming you haven’t changed your mind, with no impact upon the nature of determinism, how is the ontological nature of time relevant to issues involving the nature of that determinism? Only those unwilling or unable to comprehend the explanations I have given, or those simply obstinate enough to ignore them, could think that. To repeat what I have said, lest you digress to only engaging with your strawman: I have never said time is not important to causation, only that the theories of time you have put forward as being relevant, that are theories on the existence of a past and/or future along with the present, are indeed irrelevant to the actual discussion at hand. And the onus is on you, still, to show why it is relevant. And I’m putting the onus on you to cease engaging your strawman and engage with what I have been saying. You can run with them all you like, but if they do not alter what it means to be deterministic then they remain irrelevant to issues that can be addressed solely by examining the nature of determinism. That simple fact doesn’t seem to penetrate with you. So, rather than continue to bleat that it is relevant, rather than continue to argue against your strawman, are you ever going to show why the ontological theory of time one adopts impacts the question of whether freewill is possible in a deterministic universe? Physicists may have a preferred theory of time, but physics is reasonably agnostic on the idea, especially with regard the ontological nature of time. There are philosophical arguments for all such ontological theories, none of which can be falsified, all of which thus appear to be outside the remit of science. So, are you ever going to actually explain how the ontological theory of time one adheres to impacts the nature of determinism, and thus (or otherwise) the possibility of free will in a deterministic universe? Because thus far... zip. Time for you to engage rather than merely type words. Time for you to participate rather than continue your obfuscation and strawman.