Hey Straw- I wrote you a rather long reply, but Sci seems to have made some sort of error and dropped it when I tried to submit. I'll try to put together some sort of re-cap when I get some free time - in the meantime, don't think I'm ignoring you, or anything.
When he suits him, he calls spades spades. Other times he calls them hearts, or refuses to aknowledge that they exist at all. He's a politician, and not even a "straight-shooter" for that crowd. But I don't want to get side-tracked on his personality - he's entertaining at times, but it doesn't really matter either way. It's not a reason to prefer any course over another. You deal with the countries you have, not the ones you wish you had, and they're always going to be led by politicians of some sort. Are you referring to the period around WWI, or the 1950's? Because there'd been a Shah of Iran throughout that entire time, and for a long time before. The differences being in what his actual and nominal influence was, but there was at least a titular Shah the entire time. As are the dictators since. Classic pitfall of revolutions, right? The US-Iran alliance preceded the relationship with Pahlavi by decades, but okay. Well, there's a step between the popular revolution, and the break in relations with the US. Relations didn't go fundamentally south until the hostage crisis, several months after the fall of the Shah and creation of an interim government. The Carter administration had declined to support Shah Pahlavi in a counter-revolutionary crack-down, possibly insuring his downfall. Whether this was done out of distaste for Pahlavi (who had recently become unpopular in the US due to his human rights record), or just a misreading of how dire his situation was, or what, is a matter of debate. At any rate, Carter seemed happy enough to drop him once he was out, given that the interim Prime Minister was Mehdi Bazargan, a democrat and reformer who was very much the political heir of Moussedeq (and open to engagement with the West). The constitution on the table at that point involved a much more circumscribed role for the Islamic Judiciary, and a much more empowered democracy, than what Iran ended up with. So for a little while, everything looked peachy: Carter thought he'd duck Persian backlash for America's support of the Shah, Bazargan thought he'd avoid American backlash for the revolution (including a few plum oil-sector nationalizations, no doubt), and we'd all just be buddies and continue with the development of Iran like civilized adults. Up to this point, it looks like a best-case scenario that disproves all of the warnings about the danger of revolution. But Khomeini didn't like this state of affairs. So, he convened his buddies and wrote a new theocratic constitution, with himself as Supreme Leader. Of course, the democrats like Bazargan opposed this naked power-grab, so Khomeini used the Revolution to destroy them. And the key to doing that was to sabotage relations with America. If Bazargan manages to normalize relations with America, the revolutionary moment is over, the good times will roll, and the theocracy won't get another chance at total control for who-knows-how-long. And meanwhile, the source of Khomeini's power (popular rage at the Shah) is waning, what with him off in exile somewhere. He needs a new Bad Guy to mobilize Revolutionary forces against the democrats and enact his theocratic constitution. So when Carter caves and allows Pahlavi to come to the US for end-of-life treatment, the theocrats' brownshirts seize the US Embassy. Khomeini then endorses this action, paralyzing the interim government (which is legally bound to protect and defend foreign embassies), poisoning relations with America, and re-empowering him as Supreme Leader of the Revolution (against America, now, rather than the already-defeated Shah). Next thing you know there's a theocratic constitution enacted with suspiciously-high reported turn-out and support, and it's all been down hill for democracy in Iran since then. You're conflating the questions of democracy and human rights in general. And I'm not sure I'm seeing where the source of your comments (Hillary Clinton) is advertizing Israel as a paragon of human rights to be emulated. Nor do I see where anyone observing whatever about Israel is exclusive of observing things about Iran. Sure, there's resources, and nearby trade routes, and the whole resource politics side of stuff. Not all of which represents fundamental divergences of US and Iranian interests, even for the current governments. Neither country is crazy about Russia consolidating control of the Caspian energy trade, monopolizing transport to eastern Europe, etc. I think the issue is less hegemony per say, than that the US, Israel and most of the Arab States are pretty heavily invested in the regional status-quo, and that Iran wants to revise this situation. ? I'm not sure what you mean - what does "non-alignment" refer to, after the end of the Cold War? First off, threats needn't be existential to be worth worrying about. Or even directly military - an upending of the regional status quo is a scary thing for many of the polities there, regardless of whether any tanks roll into their towns. I actually don't see all that much paranoia on either side. There's a huge amount of plain old distrust, though. Ah, but friendship between whom? The kicker is that rapprochement between Iran and the US will do at least as much to upend the regional status quo as continued poor relations (poor Iran-US relations being a major feature of said status quo). A US that is friends with Iran has that much less reason to be friends with the Arab States, or Israel. And an Iran that is friends with the US stands to quickly develop a lot more influence. It's pretty much going to mean a downgrade in status and influence for every state in the region except Iran. So we should expect the Arab States and Israel to oppose and sabotage any such rapprochement. So we know which forces inside Iran oppose friendship, and which actors in the region. Which political faction in America has the incentive to keep relations with Iran poor, in your opinion, and why?
Suffice to say he has room for improvement. He is perhaps a populist at the expense of nation building fundamentals. Yes of course. Briefly, from Mohammed Shah to Mosaddeq to Reza Shah Pahlavi to the revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini. Yes of course. The Mosaddeq/CIA/Reza Shah Pahlavi putsch. But democratically elected Mosaddeq was not, installed Pahlavi was, thus the revolution and the issue. Which of course was a classic symptom of interference. And enmity prevailed. Yes. Would you say at this point any US initiative at improving the relationship would have failed? Yes, that is a succinct take on affairs. Also a candid view on how fear and "manufactured threats" can shape public opinion. :m: At this point, at least the US stood by an old friend, for what its worth. I always did see the compassionate side of Carter. Yes, sadly this heady mix of righteousness, religious fervor and nationalism was the outcome of the interlacing. Turn back the clock to Moussedeq, do things differently, and the political landscape would most likely have been unrecognizable today. Yes, you have a point. Perhaps I am somewhat confused. But in simplistic terms, how does one equate ONE parties tacit support (or turning a blind eye) on human rights abuses on one page, to severe criticism of human rights (and arguably lesser) on another? If the criticism was equal and universal, I would have a different view. I cannot see it any other way but as a double standard. Yes, that makes sense. Yes, logical, but how do you reach that conclusion? IMO, the military posturing is directly related to perceived threats form Israel and the US. Pardon. I mean the US does not like any party to dance to a different tune, particularly some choice members of the Non-Aligned Nations. Yes, granted. However, I believe the fear, real or imagined, is fundamental to regional tensions. Fair enough. Without sounding mercenary Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image!eekPlease Register or Log in to view the hidden image! should one not instinctively make friends with the major players? How did the relationship circa Pahlavi effect the regional status quo? This is a very good point. But I believe if Iran (and the US) could lose its militant stance, why could there not be some economic/security collaborative initiatives along the lines of the EU? The schisms in Islam are surely not insurmountable? A logical view yes, but is a more level playing field achievable? Which we do see, to a certain extent at least. Yes. Sadly, it would be the Israeli lobby. The why is simply as you said, a US/Iran alliance would disempower Israel to a large extent and utterly change the available political and national outcomes for Israel, and thus Palestine. With ripples running out to stir up some old foes. :m:
Some OT articles and comments. Whether valid or not, if a "military dictatorship" is a criticism, how does one reconcile the US/Pakistan relationship under Musharraf? UN Gen Assembly Speech. From Press TV. Reasonable points (IMO), but with omissions, as per this BBC report. Interesting, but what does this mean? A rather troubling statement? (unless there were translation errors?) The consequences indeed changed the world, but his allusions to conspiracies will do him no good, is offensive and insensitive, and of course undermines everything else he said. :m: I fully concur, and IMO this was a missed opportunity for reaching out and creating goodwill. This is interesting, perhaps Ja`far can comment?
Not necessarily. Again, the expectation at the time (mid-1979) was that relations would be normalized relatively quickly. Which doesn't mean there wouldn't be residual tensions or other problems, but both Carter and the interim government seemed to strongly prefer good relations to recrimination, and be working together to cement that preference. It's always possible that things would still have soured one way or another, sure. But I doubt that they would have gotten to the point they did (total break in diplomatic relations, lasting decades now) without active sabotage by the clerical faction. I do not buy the idea that the result is driven purely by popular national enmity - indeed, the US has never been as unpopular amongst regular Iranians as the Islamic Republic would have it. For example, I seem to recall some regional public opinion surveys a few years back showing that the US was vastly more popular in Iran than in almost any other Muslim state... I wouldn't attribute that to compassion on Carter's part. The story is that he had no use for the Shah after he went into exile, and was strongly against admitting him into the US for fear of souring relations with the new Iranian government (the US Embassy in Tehran, for example, was urging him in no uncertain terms not to admit Pahlavi). But apparently he was prevailed upon by Kissinger and the like, who felt that it was a necessary step to rebuilding American credibility as a supporter of dictators in the wake of the Shah's fall. Stupid move, if you ask me. Probably things would have gone a lot better for Iran-US relations if he hadn't done that. If you like. It's sort of a fact of politics that one goes about criticizing one's friends in a very different way than one goes about criticizing one's enemies. Which makes sense - the US is much more likely to influence Israel's behavior by keeping them on-side and criticizing behind closed doors, than by launching public broadsides. Probably all that the latter will accomplish is to lessen American influence over Israel, without changing their behavior. Which isn't to say that broadsides against enemies tend to be terribly productive either, but there's little disincentive to doing so, and it's not like you have the "quiet, friendly" path to criticism available as an alternative anyway. Point is that one can't accurately infer the underlying US beliefs about each situation without also taking this stuff into account. It's quite possible that the Obama administration views Israel's human rights abuses as worse than Iran's, as such. But the public comments on the question won't work out to the same proportions, due to the above reasons. There's also the plain old fact that politics is about helping one's friends and harming one's enemies. So, while speaking from the implicit premise that the US should not behave in a politicized manner may make for searing rhetoric, at bottom it's sort of irrelevant. And even perverse: if progress is held to require states abjuring politics, then all we have is a demand that no progress at all be made, ever. It goes without saying that all militarism everywhere is directly related to fear. One can't extract the tax money for the military absent the fear. So the interesting stuff lies at higher levels - why does Iran fear that Israel and/or the US would attack them? Presumably, because Iran thinks that those parties see Iran as a threat. But, again: that's just conflict for you. Both sides see the other as threats, and respond by living up to those perceptions. So we need to go up at least another level: what is the actual underlying issue here? I contend that it has to do with the regional order suiting the Arab States, Israel and the US, but not Iran. Iran thinks that they should enjoy more power and influence than they do, at the expense of the US, Israel and the Arab States (influence being a zero-sum game after all). Those two positions are incompatible, and so unless one or both sides change course, the result is conflict. Additionally, there's the internal factor of Iran's theocrats exploiting anti-Americanism as a means of boosting their legitimacy and squashing reform, so they also have that incentive to pursue hostile relations. Well, right, that's the same as what I've been saying. The US is heavily invested in the status quo (indeed, is basically its guarantor) and so anybody that wants to revise it is a problem. It should not be a surprise that such states tend to be in organizations like the Non-Aligned Movement or SCO or whatever - but I don't think it's enmity towards those organizations as such that motivates US positions. Oh yeah, sure, in "mercenary" terms. In the period shortly after WWII, the alliance with Iran was the foundation of America's influence in the region. It's strategically located, was much more developed and powerful than the Arab states, and didn't have any of Israel's problematic baggage (courting the Arab states away from Soviet influence being a major regional concern at the time). After Egypt snubbed the US in favor of the Soviets in the wake of the Suez Crisis, the US reoriented somewhat to a two-legged approach consisting of alliance with Iran and Israel - thus putting the Arab states in a "pincher." Relations between Israel and Iran were very good in that period, including all kinds of technical exchange, arms sales, etc. By 1973 this had paid off, and Egypt and Jordan were willing to sign peace deals with Israel and come back to the US fold, which put to rest most fears of a regional Soviet take-over. So things looked pretty good to the US at that point. The region was pretty well locked up. But then the Iranian Revolution occurs, and the US loses one of the two legs of its regional position. The response was to double down on relations with the Arab States (including getting into bed with Saddam) to compensate. Since then, we've had 30 years of systematically holding Iran back while working to advance the position of the Arabs. The Arabs (or their leadership, anyway) are quite happy about this, since it represents the end of their being weak players caught inside a powerful US-Israel-Iran dynamic. I'd say that the schism between Arabs and Persians is the relevant one here, but, no, it needn't necessarily result in a horrible conflagration. Possibly there's a way to accomodate everyone, provided the power parties are on the same page to start with. But the point is that it's a big unknown, and there are potentially nasty outcomes, and at this point none of the players invested in the status quo has much reason to think that the outcome would be better for themselves than the current scenario (even the rosier outcomes, since they all involve Iran becoming more powerful than any other state in the region fairly quickly). And so they resist, and even prefer to scuttle any such possibilities in favor of military action. At risk of a near-Godwin, part of what makes people nervous are the parallels to Germany in the interwar period. I.e., you have a state that, in terms of geography, demographics, resources, etc. should naturally be the most powerful in the region. But the state in question has been previously defeated, and a punitive regional order put in place to prevent them from realizing that potential (again). This creates a lot of pressure inside the repressed state to oppose and overturn this order, and so not simply re-assert their potential but do so in a potentially belligerent way (in much the same way that the punitive Versailles Treaty is held to have contributed to the rise of Naziism in Germany). Point is that they are both, at bottom, pressure-cooker scenarios and not sustainable orders that reflect the inherent geopolitics of the regions. And of course it doesn't help that the current leadership of Iran is so eager to run with Holocaust deniers and the like. Well, that's the kicker. My contention is that the natural order of the region would have Iran on top. So "levelling the playing field" necessarily means holding Iran back and propping the Arab states and Israel up. This being exactly the unsustainable status quo. It's not clear to me how you go about doing that in a way that doesn't piss Iran off - and by this point, they don't show many signs of accepting dimunition at all. Again, decades of resisting such on hostile terms would be expected to result in increased nationalism, militarism, etc. Right, makes sense. Likewise, what about the Arab lobby? They're similarly invested in the status quo (and have no shortage of lobbying power). But what about internal factions of the US polity? I have a hard time believing that America's Iran policy is dictated to it by Israel (indeed, there've been some pretty public differences, including open discussion of how the US should go about thwarting certain of Israel's policy preferences). There's got to be American factions that are invested in bad relations and conflict. The military-industrial complex perhaps? Messianic evangelists that want to bring about the end of the world (or at least strike down revolutionary Islamic states)? Any other ideas?
Great post Quadra, your input is appreciated and just some minor comments. Was this sentiment reflected in the mainstream Media? Yes, of course. Yes. Paradoxically, Iran is a surprisingly, sophisticated society, and I think there would be many things American that would be appreciated, enjoyed and gasp, aspired to. Arts, literature, popular music, Hollywood and I would imagine, even US Pop culture. You have spoilt that romantic notion for me, I always liked him. Nevertheless, I see the man doing compassionate things today that are pleasing. Very interesting. Of course this makes logical sense. One would imagine though that if this was occurring, certain Israeli behaviours would change? I am not convinced that we are seeing a swing to acceptable behaviour. I get the distinct feeling, Obama is Netanyahu`s stooge. No problem with your logic. Fair enough, and of course undeniably, only a very select few are privy to the actual discourse and attitudes. Articulate. I would still hope to see a better balance in light of integrity. Yes. Bottom line? Nobody`s really talking. Mutual understanding levels are practically non existent. Is the Iranian rhetoric an application for membership, or an attempt to purchase the Club? This is a very good point, and I think it deserves more consideration. Hm. This makes perfect sense. Right. Fair comment, thank you. Again, perhaps this aspect needs more scrutiny, in order to make more sense of the underlying fundamentals. A fair appraisal. Yes. Surely a host of economic initiatives would be a start. Presently we have punitive initiatives, perhaps some tangible and mutually attractive economic collaborations and incentives would be feasible? I would not put them on a similar level to the Jewish Lobby, particularly given the amount of pro Israel staffers and advocates in the White House. Somehow, for as yet not fully understood reasons, I do believe Israel holds some real influence over the US government. Undoubtedly. Apart from supply and demand - war requires arms and ammunition, where is that $9 Billion that went missing in Iraq? Perhaps localized to Florida? Let me give it some thought. :m:
Which rests on the ability to tell them apart, and create or attract them if necessary, and being able to distinguish "helping" from "hurting". We might find Iran has been a better friend than Pakistan these past few years, for example, in hindsight. Greed plays a larger role than advertised, I suspect. Or perhaps Iran has seen the pattern of recent decades of US and Israeli aggression, not forgotten the attacks on itself and its neighbors, and realizes that it - like Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan - has something the US or Israel wants. Having something the US wants (using the nation designation for the controlling interests of a given situation) is a vulnerable position, no? The US oil companies are invested in getting rid of the current Iranian regime - any means would suit them. And Colorado. And spread through the Old Confederacy.
Wait, there is a standoff? I think the whole concept of a "standoff" is just fluster by news industry both inside of and outside of Iran. For Iran is feeds nationalist sentiment and for Americans it feeds nationalist sentiment, its profit for the news industry to over-blow the scale of this issue: make it look like israel is attack any day or that Iran will have the nuke tommorow.
A new phase of anti Iranian aggression? Interestingly, this attack seems to be working. Some comments. 1.) Is an attack of this nature traceable? 2.) If identified as originating from a foreign Government Agency, can this be classified as an act of war?
Could I ask for a link to where said article comes from? Offhand I think that looking at offers to negotiate (and refusals thereof) as such is something of a red herring. There's a similar laundry list of American outreaches that Iran has spurned over the years (not to mention, European attempts to mediate). Absent some kind of detailed, compelling analysis of which of these offers (if any) were really good-faith efforts (and not just political posturing), we can't conclude much of anything that we didn't already know (i.e., the two sides are hostile and haven't been talking). So that portion looks a lot like a cheap blame-game, and not much like a thoughtful analysis. Moreover, given that the current Administration is not rejecting Iranian offers of engagement (it's the converse, actually), an analysis of why previous administrations did so probably will not tell us much of real pertinence anyway. The last paragraph there is overheated polemic, and not even entertaining overheated polemic at that. It starts out citing special interests driving the situation, eschews substantiating this premise in favor of calling said interests names, and then turns around and insists that said interests are logically incomprehensible. Cathartic venting, I suppose, but what's anyone who isn't already a true believer to take away from that?
Very doubtful. Probably. You'd also need to demonstrate that it was intentionally directed against Iran (or some other state) to make that charge really stick, and there's only (to my knowledge) circumstantial evidence for that. Frankly it's unlikely that we'll ever know much more than we do now (that being one of the appeals of these sorts of activities). But then there are all manner of such acts of espionage and sabotage conducted systematically against many countries in the world all the time, and they rarely result in out-and-out warfare.
Fair point. I have noticed that offers for dialogue (both ways) tend to voiced at arbitrary platforms and media events generating back and forth responses. Perhaps, if sincerity and integrity is intended, they need to be voiced respectfully, and via diplomatic channels? I think what started out as a hopeful era for talks (Obama) has degenerated into a standoff due to many factors, including sanctions, dishonesty and a perhaps valid Iranian perceptions around reasonable respect levels. Yes, but it offers a perspective on the special interests, read "military industrial complex" that you mentioned. IYO are they valid perspectives? Personally I think such language sullies the integrity of intent and raises questions around validity.
Some OT articles gleaned from various sources. Seeming upping the ante around confrontation. Its total madness to even think along these lines. Clearly lessons have not been learned. This piece hits a negative gut feel I have around the role of Mr. Asssange. We keep getting incriminating leaks, and nothing happens. :m:
Removing Iran's strike capability is a smarter solution that full-scale regime change, but it does nothing to address the more worrying component of a nuclear Iran. Namely, if Iran has a nuclear shield how much more unwieldy do the non-state actors it supports become?
Why does Iran want nuclear power? They got the worlds largest reserves of natural gas from which they could power their power plants, heat their cities and homes and run their cars for decades if not centuries. So I just can't buy there peaceful nuclear power excuse. if they really want that they could just buy reactors pre-fueled from Russia for far cheaper then making uranium processing and nuclear reactors from scratch. As for attacking Iran that would such a bad idea on so many levels.
Your reasoning is valid in the broad ME sense, although it omits the critical factor that Israeli and US foreign policy is perhaps the greatest obstacle to peace and stability in the region. And again, the criteria for overt aggression are flimsy, there is absolutely no evidence of a nuke program, we have had this discussion many times. There has been no diversion of nuclear fuel. Its all accounted for.
Obvious things like the pursuit of science and technology, research, medical isotopes, etc. Lets not forget the fundamental right to peaceful nuclear energy, as signatories of the NPT. Correct.
