Once upon a time, I asked this forum the question:
* "When we say that God is something, are we also saying there is something It is not?" ( [http://www.sciforums.com/showthread.php?t=2123 )
I came across a longer statement of the central issue, in the same book by Jeffrey Russell Burton I've been torturing y'all with. But, I wasn't happy with the outcome of the last go-round on this idea, mainly because of how many ideas I compressed into the topic question. This, I hope, might serve as grounds to revitalize part of the philosophical paradox of many/most/all religions (circle one; I'm given to the notion it's a matter of perception at that point.)
The following excerpt is taken from a chapter covering Early Medieval Diabology. The philosopher receiving primary focus is John Scottus Eriugena, born in Ireland around 825 CE. (Boldface accents by Tiassa)
"John's epistemology is basic: God is absolutely incomprehensible both to us and to himself. To know something is to define it, but God cannot be defined. Further, God is not anything at all. It is absurd to say that God is something, for that puts him into the same category as created things. Moreover, nothing can be affirmed about God, for whatever is affirmed about God denies its contrary. If we say that God is great, that denies that he is small; if we say he is light, it denies that he is darkness; and so on. But in fact God is beyond all categories, transcends all categories, and reconciles all contraries. Any affirmation about God can be only a metaphor, but a denial may be literal. For example, one may truly deny that God is limited by space or that he is light, but any statement about God that excludes any other statement about him is invalid. God cannot even be said to be an essence, for essence is the contrary of nothing, and God is nothing as much as he is something. It is true that one can say that God is superessential (superessentialis, hyperousious), but this is really a negation, for it tells us not what God is, but what he is not: he is not any essence, substance, or being. Thus God does not exist. It is absurd to maintain that God exists, as if God occupies the space-time continuum with other things that exist. A dog, a table, a star, or a woman may exist, but God does not. Yet this negative does not destroy the affirmative. Like Dionysius, John prefers negative, or apophatic, theology to positive, or cataphatic, theology, but he affirms that the truest statements are paradoxes, the coincidence of opposites. Any given statement about God resolves itself into two opposite contraries, neither of which is true and both of which are true. This is not nonsense, though it passes human reason, for God is beyond the grasp of human reason. It is true to say: God exists; God does not exist; God exists and does not exist: God neither exists nor does not exist: we cannot devise any category that can contain God.
Can any sense be made out of saying that God exists and does not exist? The first distinction that Eriugena makes is between different meanings of existence or being. 1--Being may mean that which is perceivable by sense or intellect, nonbeing that which is not; 2--being may mean what is actualized, nonbeing what is only in potential; 3--being may mean that which is known to the intellect, nonbeing that which is known only to the senses. Whether God exists or not depends on the mode that is used. God does not exist if by existence one means something that is present to the senses. If a shirt exists, then God does not. On the other hand, if one shifts the meaning of the term existence and says that God exists, then the shirt does not. Being cannot be used univocally for God and for any created thing. Whatever "being" may be for God, it is totally different from what "being" is for a shirt." (pp. 115-117)
Burton, Jeffrey Russell. Lucifer: The Devil in the Middle Ages. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984.
* * * * *
I apologize for the length of the excerpt, both to the author and to the readers.
If we accept Burton's summary ... can we make any assertions to the nature of faith? For instance, might we say that faith, in this case, becomes the acceptance not of God itself, but of the notion that one cannot discover and know God while confined within the mortal coil?
If we accept the summary ... does this seeming paradox apply to the ideas of Divine Will or Divine Knowledge? How does that application regard the immutability of God (if at all)?
Forgive me if I reserve my own further commentary, especially for reasons of the length of this topic post. Thank you all for your patience.
thanx,
Tiassa
------------------
Take a side you say, it's black and gray. And all the hunters take the hunted merrily out to play. We are one, you say, but who are you? You're all too busy reaping in the things you never sown. And this feast must go on and on and on .... Nobody gives a damn. (Floater; "Beast")
[This message has been edited by tiassa (edited February 08, 2000).]
* "When we say that God is something, are we also saying there is something It is not?" ( [http://www.sciforums.com/showthread.php?t=2123 )
I came across a longer statement of the central issue, in the same book by Jeffrey Russell Burton I've been torturing y'all with. But, I wasn't happy with the outcome of the last go-round on this idea, mainly because of how many ideas I compressed into the topic question. This, I hope, might serve as grounds to revitalize part of the philosophical paradox of many/most/all religions (circle one; I'm given to the notion it's a matter of perception at that point.)
The following excerpt is taken from a chapter covering Early Medieval Diabology. The philosopher receiving primary focus is John Scottus Eriugena, born in Ireland around 825 CE. (Boldface accents by Tiassa)
"John's epistemology is basic: God is absolutely incomprehensible both to us and to himself. To know something is to define it, but God cannot be defined. Further, God is not anything at all. It is absurd to say that God is something, for that puts him into the same category as created things. Moreover, nothing can be affirmed about God, for whatever is affirmed about God denies its contrary. If we say that God is great, that denies that he is small; if we say he is light, it denies that he is darkness; and so on. But in fact God is beyond all categories, transcends all categories, and reconciles all contraries. Any affirmation about God can be only a metaphor, but a denial may be literal. For example, one may truly deny that God is limited by space or that he is light, but any statement about God that excludes any other statement about him is invalid. God cannot even be said to be an essence, for essence is the contrary of nothing, and God is nothing as much as he is something. It is true that one can say that God is superessential (superessentialis, hyperousious), but this is really a negation, for it tells us not what God is, but what he is not: he is not any essence, substance, or being. Thus God does not exist. It is absurd to maintain that God exists, as if God occupies the space-time continuum with other things that exist. A dog, a table, a star, or a woman may exist, but God does not. Yet this negative does not destroy the affirmative. Like Dionysius, John prefers negative, or apophatic, theology to positive, or cataphatic, theology, but he affirms that the truest statements are paradoxes, the coincidence of opposites. Any given statement about God resolves itself into two opposite contraries, neither of which is true and both of which are true. This is not nonsense, though it passes human reason, for God is beyond the grasp of human reason. It is true to say: God exists; God does not exist; God exists and does not exist: God neither exists nor does not exist: we cannot devise any category that can contain God.
Can any sense be made out of saying that God exists and does not exist? The first distinction that Eriugena makes is between different meanings of existence or being. 1--Being may mean that which is perceivable by sense or intellect, nonbeing that which is not; 2--being may mean what is actualized, nonbeing what is only in potential; 3--being may mean that which is known to the intellect, nonbeing that which is known only to the senses. Whether God exists or not depends on the mode that is used. God does not exist if by existence one means something that is present to the senses. If a shirt exists, then God does not. On the other hand, if one shifts the meaning of the term existence and says that God exists, then the shirt does not. Being cannot be used univocally for God and for any created thing. Whatever "being" may be for God, it is totally different from what "being" is for a shirt." (pp. 115-117)
Burton, Jeffrey Russell. Lucifer: The Devil in the Middle Ages. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984.
* * * * *
I apologize for the length of the excerpt, both to the author and to the readers.
If we accept Burton's summary ... can we make any assertions to the nature of faith? For instance, might we say that faith, in this case, becomes the acceptance not of God itself, but of the notion that one cannot discover and know God while confined within the mortal coil?
If we accept the summary ... does this seeming paradox apply to the ideas of Divine Will or Divine Knowledge? How does that application regard the immutability of God (if at all)?
Forgive me if I reserve my own further commentary, especially for reasons of the length of this topic post. Thank you all for your patience.
thanx,
Tiassa
------------------
Take a side you say, it's black and gray. And all the hunters take the hunted merrily out to play. We are one, you say, but who are you? You're all too busy reaping in the things you never sown. And this feast must go on and on and on .... Nobody gives a damn. (Floater; "Beast")
[This message has been edited by tiassa (edited February 08, 2000).]
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