Speakpigeon
Valued Senior Member
Here is an interesting example for you to try your wits...
This is one philosopher, Vann McGee, who in 1985 proposed a counterexample to the Modus Ponens, no less!
Here is the thing:
Anyone understands what's going on here?
EB
This is one philosopher, Vann McGee, who in 1985 proposed a counterexample to the Modus Ponens, no less!
Here is the thing:
McGee's counterexample
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00355293
Almost 10 years ago, Vann McGee pushed philosophical doubt beyond another frontier. His attempt to show that modus ponens is not a valid form of inference- and to show this by help of a counterexample and not by envisaging an evil demon confusing us - is proof of the ingenuity of a philosopher's ability to doubt. Other philosophers might be less impressed. They criticize McGee's counterexample, thinking it either rests on confusions or can, in some other way, easily be circumvented. I argue in this paper that such a reaction is unjustified. McGee's counterexample withstands the criticisms raised against it. Should we thus abolish modus ponens? It depends, I think, on what the right theory of conditionals is, and though I will provide some material for deciding this question, in the end, this material will be indecisive.
It is sufficient to focus our discussion on one of McGee's counterexamples - others follow the same recipe.
Opinion polls taken just before the 1980 election showed the Republican Ronald Reagan decisively ahead of the democrat Jimmy Carter, with the other Republican in the race, John Anderson, a distant third. Those apprised of the poll results believed, with good reason:
Yet they did not have reason to believe
This example shows that modus ponens is not an entirely reliable rule of inference. Sometimes the conclusion of an application of modus ponens is something we do not believe and should not believe, even though the premises are propositions we believe very properly. (McGee 1985, pp. 462f.)
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00355293
Almost 10 years ago, Vann McGee pushed philosophical doubt beyond another frontier. His attempt to show that modus ponens is not a valid form of inference- and to show this by help of a counterexample and not by envisaging an evil demon confusing us - is proof of the ingenuity of a philosopher's ability to doubt. Other philosophers might be less impressed. They criticize McGee's counterexample, thinking it either rests on confusions or can, in some other way, easily be circumvented. I argue in this paper that such a reaction is unjustified. McGee's counterexample withstands the criticisms raised against it. Should we thus abolish modus ponens? It depends, I think, on what the right theory of conditionals is, and though I will provide some material for deciding this question, in the end, this material will be indecisive.
McGEE'S CLAIM ABOUT MODUS PONENS
It is sufficient to focus our discussion on one of McGee's counterexamples - others follow the same recipe.
Opinion polls taken just before the 1980 election showed the Republican Ronald Reagan decisively ahead of the democrat Jimmy Carter, with the other Republican in the race, John Anderson, a distant third. Those apprised of the poll results believed, with good reason:
If a Republican wins the election, then if it's not Reagan who wins it will be Anderson.
A Republican will win the election.
A Republican will win the election.
Yet they did not have reason to believe
If it's not Reagan who wins, it will be Anderson.
This example shows that modus ponens is not an entirely reliable rule of inference. Sometimes the conclusion of an application of modus ponens is something we do not believe and should not believe, even though the premises are propositions we believe very properly. (McGee 1985, pp. 462f.)
Anyone understands what's going on here?
EB