Once upon a time, I asked this forum the question: * "When we say that God is something, are we also saying there is something It is not?" ( [http://www.sciforums.com/showthread.php?t=2123 ) I came across a longer statement of the central issue, in the same book by Jeffrey Russell Burton I've been torturing y'all with. But, I wasn't happy with the outcome of the last go-round on this idea, mainly because of how many ideas I compressed into the topic question. This, I hope, might serve as grounds to revitalize part of the philosophical paradox of many/most/all religions (circle one; I'm given to the notion it's a matter of perception at that point.) The following excerpt is taken from a chapter covering Early Medieval Diabology. The philosopher receiving primary focus is John Scottus Eriugena, born in Ireland around 825 CE. (Boldface accents by Tiassa) "John's epistemology is basic: God is absolutely incomprehensible both to us and to himself. To know something is to define it, but God cannot be defined. Further, God is not anything at all. It is absurd to say that God is something, for that puts him into the same category as created things. Moreover, nothing can be affirmed about God, for whatever is affirmed about God denies its contrary. If we say that God is great, that denies that he is small; if we say he is light, it denies that he is darkness; and so on. But in fact God is beyond all categories, transcends all categories, and reconciles all contraries. Any affirmation about God can be only a metaphor, but a denial may be literal. For example, one may truly deny that God is limited by space or that he is light, but any statement about God that excludes any other statement about him is invalid. God cannot even be said to be an essence, for essence is the contrary of nothing, and God is nothing as much as he is something. It is true that one can say that God is superessential (superessentialis, hyperousious), but this is really a negation, for it tells us not what God is, but what he is not: he is not any essence, substance, or being. Thus God does not exist. It is absurd to maintain that God exists, as if God occupies the space-time continuum with other things that exist. A dog, a table, a star, or a woman may exist, but God does not. Yet this negative does not destroy the affirmative. Like Dionysius, John prefers negative, or apophatic, theology to positive, or cataphatic, theology, but he affirms that the truest statements are paradoxes, the coincidence of opposites. Any given statement about God resolves itself into two opposite contraries, neither of which is true and both of which are true. This is not nonsense, though it passes human reason, for God is beyond the grasp of human reason. It is true to say: God exists; God does not exist; God exists and does not exist: God neither exists nor does not exist: we cannot devise any category that can contain God. Can any sense be made out of saying that God exists and does not exist? The first distinction that Eriugena makes is between different meanings of existence or being. 1--Being may mean that which is perceivable by sense or intellect, nonbeing that which is not; 2--being may mean what is actualized, nonbeing what is only in potential; 3--being may mean that which is known to the intellect, nonbeing that which is known only to the senses. Whether God exists or not depends on the mode that is used. God does not exist if by existence one means something that is present to the senses. If a shirt exists, then God does not. On the other hand, if one shifts the meaning of the term existence and says that God exists, then the shirt does not. Being cannot be used univocally for God and for any created thing. Whatever "being" may be for God, it is totally different from what "being" is for a shirt." (pp. 115-117) Burton, Jeffrey Russell. Lucifer: The Devil in the Middle Ages. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984. * * * * * I apologize for the length of the excerpt, both to the author and to the readers. If we accept Burton's summary ... can we make any assertions to the nature of faith? For instance, might we say that faith, in this case, becomes the acceptance not of God itself, but of the notion that one cannot discover and know God while confined within the mortal coil? If we accept the summary ... does this seeming paradox apply to the ideas of Divine Will or Divine Knowledge? How does that application regard the immutability of God (if at all)? Forgive me if I reserve my own further commentary, especially for reasons of the length of this topic post. Thank you all for your patience. Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image! thanx, Tiassa ------------------ Take a side you say, it's black and gray. And all the hunters take the hunted merrily out to play. We are one, you say, but who are you? You're all too busy reaping in the things you never sown. And this feast must go on and on and on .... Nobody gives a damn. (Floater; "Beast") [This message has been edited by tiassa (edited February 08, 2000).]
Tiassa, I'll be pretty brief, primarily because I'm running short on time... It does not make sense to me for somebody to claim that God does and does not exist (that God's existence is undefinable.) If we are to discuss God, then the very <u>concept</u> of God must <u>exist</u> inside our language and our brain. We cannot say that our concept "God" does and does not exist simultaneously -- since in our case (us being "created" and all), the concept is not above the 'mortal coil'. Similarly, our lexicon and semantic frameworks include a very real concept of "shirt". Inasmuch as we can verbally represent things and reason about things, God and shirts exist equally and in the same way for us (and in fact, the concept of their existence couldn't be any more distinct than purely identical -- at least as far as our minds and knowledge are concerned). Because existence of any concept is intrinsically tied to our own existence, then indeed in even so much as mentioning God, we imply strictly that God exists -- at the very least, as a token of discourse. And tokens always, inescapably, represent 'something'. Incidentally, under the author's assumption (at least within the quoted snippet) -- if God does not exist, then neither does divine knowledge, or divine will -- and even the act of Creation had never occurred. ------------------ I am; therefore I think. [This message has been edited by Boris (edited February 08, 2000).]
Boris .... Forgive me if I'm speaking with my mouth full ... you've given food for thought. Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image! If God is good, then what is evil? One notion I've carried around for a while, and am finding at least some echoes of among religious and philosophical academia is that if evil exists independently of God, then God is not omniscient, omnipresent, or omni-anything, which negates one of the foundations of God's immutable Will and Knowledge. As to the concept of God ... I would point to the three views of existence Burton offered, as a place to start (I would agree with anyone who claimed said enumeration to be limiting and lacking, though I've no words yet for the fourth, fifth, sixth, &c. perspectives). Consider God as a scientific objective, if you would. Can you contain God in a jar? Can we see, touch, smell, or taste God directly? I assert that the answer to this is no, though we can view the effects of God's presence in the universe. The universe itself is the effect of God's presence and Will much like the eddies left in the water where an oar has dipped and pressed. In this sense, I think that to say that the shirt and God exist equally would be to conclude the shirt is real because you are warmer with the shirt than without--this as opposed to a silly alligator logo scraping your nipple. Respectfully, I would assert, regarding tokens of discourse that the intrinsic worth of any token is subjective, dependent upon presuppositions (consider--why is gold expensive? Surely its industrial demands cannot inflate the price to its present status. We consider gold expensive because of its objectifiable demand; the reason for that demand, however, is subjective.) I agree that merely discussing God is an acknowledgement that God exists, but that God exists within the framework allowed us by our human perception. For this to work, I must reduce God's place in the universe as exclusive to humanity, which I cannot (this, I admit, is as subjective as anything else). I might suggest that I have difficulty defining what is nonexistant. To declare something nonexistant, I must ask, "As opposed to what?" Surely, there must be some extant counterpoint in order to recognize that something does not exist. Thus, I would say that to say God exists does not appropriately regard what, then, does not exist, and what role that part of the universe plays in God's scheme. After all, can our limited senses, with all of our technological aids, truly say that something doesn't exist? After all, we can't perceive it, which is the motivation of our saying it doesn't exist (in many cases). Maybe I don't see a field with dancing faeries and a parade of nymphs; but I only see three dimensions, and perceive four (I'm aware this is a limiting theory given the potential of advanced dimensions, but I'm speaking of everyday perception). It might be that within a single footstep I have passed a room a thousand years wide, but I cannot perceive that place, or how to access it. If I cannot perceive its effects as such, I am prone to say it does not exist. Therefore, as relates the difficulty of saying God does and does not exist ... that paradox is easier for me to work with (in terms of eventual resolution ... well, as if it'll ever resolve) than the one I encounter when I say, "God exists". Because there may be many wonders I wouldn't know of because our human bodies are frail and short-lived; I cannot declare those unseen wonders to not exist, else I steal away part of the potential of God's Will. Let me say, overall, that I cannot object--except in theoretic considerations--to the idea of real concepts within our semantic framework. As a logical model, the resulting principles that I can see do not invoke discord with other bases of existence until we reach such subjective mysteries as God. At that level, I can say that I can only disagree inasmuch as I am sure such principles will never prove truer than my own; and should I stake that claim of validity, I would also like a side order of foot served with a silver spoon. That said, I also thank you. By no means does this contain the whole of my reaction to your post, but it touches on the essence, and I can only hope I'm making enough sense to warrant some further exploration. Oh ... one last thing I just noticed while trying to wrap up. You wrote "...existence of any concept is intrinsically tied to our own existence..." Okay, I'm aware I'm cutting from a larger sentence, but how to regard that part of the phrase will actually cost me some sleep tonight (be proud ... you've revealed a fork in the logical yellow-brick road). After all, if existence of any concept is so intrinsically tied to our own existence, does that (at the very least) imply that the assumption of God's existence might be false because it would not be without our existence? Of course, I have no idea what the broader ramifications of that idea are, yet, so it could prove to be fun for Pandora. Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image! thanx, Tiassa ------------------ Take a side you say, it's black and gray. And all the hunters take the hunted merrily out to play. We are one, you say, but who are you? You're all too busy reaping in the things you never sown. And this feast must go on and on and on .... Nobody gives a damn. (Floater; "Beast") [This message has been edited by tiassa (edited February 08, 2000).]
tiassa, i think you are analyzing this from the wrong perspective. for the most part, i see this as the fallability of our own language. let me give you an example. one person once asked me if god is all powerful, why can't he make a married bachelor? my response was that this entire concept is merely a flaw in our language, that being that you can modify the word "bachelor" with the word "married." what is this "married bachelor" that they claim god cannot create it? nothing, it is a flaw in our language used to describe somthing that does not exist. it's not that god cannot create a married bachelor, only that the words are meaningless. to give another example, i'm sure that you've heard the question "can god make a boulder that he can't lift?" well, god can make whatever he wants, and he can lift any boulder he chooses, so is this something that god cannot do? of course not. what is it about this boulder that god cannot create? or, what is it about this boulder that god cannot lift it? there is no actual quality that you can attribute to the boulder, only the meaningless negations of our own language. if god is the light, what does it mean to say that god cannot be the dark? if dark is the absence of light, then there is no thing that god cannot be. it is merely the fallability of our language to apply a label to that which does not exist. i think also you have to consider that not everything in our language is exclusive to the opposite. if i were to say that i own a chair, this does not mean that i cannot own a couch. or rather, if i say that god is in the room with me now (as he is omnipresent), this does not imply that he cannot also be other places. i hope this helps. samus
Samus-- I cannot disagree with a word of what you have posted. However ... how does this limitation affect our expressions of God? Or, rather, how does it affect our expressions of faith in God? The answer to that question, it seems, might have profound implications regarding the most basic of our human social behaviors. For me, to be honest, that's where it gets really interesting. thanx, Tiassa ------------------ Take a side you say, it's black and gray. And all the hunters take the hunted merrily out to play. We are one, you say, but who are you? You're all too busy reaping in the things you never sown. And this feast must go on and on and on .... Nobody gives a damn. (Floater; "Beast")
tiassa, actually, i just finished a huge discussion with someone else about the meaning of the term faith. my point was that it implies following or trust, not necessarily belief in existence. their point was that the bible defines it a action based on established facts. i would be lying if i told you that we came to any worthwhile conclusions. but i think the discussion here demonstrates that our definition has no effect on the concept. faith was something first, and then we applied a label to it. twisting the meaning of our label does not in any way change the concept. another string in that discussion that relates is our discussion of what we label a fact. labeling something a fact does not make it a truth in the universe. i used the example that when i was younger, the force of gravity was something that i knew was a fact. but then, i read about einstein's general relativity and how it is a natural fourth dimensional path, and discovered that my established fact was wrong. this discussion was directed at how i didn't require "proof" of god's existence to acknowledge that as a rational way of thinking. just because we are limited being does not mean we can't know things in our limited little way. just because we have a limited little language does not mean we can't have faith. samus
Samus-- * "faith was something first, and then we applied a label to it." Once again I find myself in agreement. Paradoxically, the only objections I could field would occur if I started shifting definitions of words, which seems only to prove the point. Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image! And while I may be opening Pandora's can of worms--in general, but perhaps with you personally, as well, though I hope without offense--part of what I'm looking for in how people express their faith is how it relates to daily conduct. To that end I feel I owe a clarification. You wrote: "just because we are limited being does not mean we can't know things in our limited little way. just because we have a limited little language does not mean we can't have faith." Now, I can't possibly object to this. But it does beg other questions, in my opinion. Part of what I hope to learn something about by asking how such limitations affect our expressions of faith is the relationship between the expressed faith and the demonstrative conduct. It is hardly an insistance that one live sin-free; to use that idea, what I would instead be looking for would be to evaluate how we determine something to be sinful--rhetoric is just dandy, as such, but we still find ourselves saying, "What about if you ... [fill in the sin]?" I would hope not to undermine anyone's expression of faith; if I had to express an ideal goal, it would be to reduce the number of philosophical conflicts that muddle its expression. I cannot speak to what is in a faithful person's heart, but I can definitely draw some conclusions regarding how they demonstrate that. Part of the problem I've encountered is the individuality of faith. One cannot say something about a common philosophical grouping without deeply offending another's sensibilities. (You might ask about a church idea, and receive as feedback only disclaimers that "I am not a church Christian." True, but how does that help the paradox within the church idea?) I could constrain it to my direct experience, noticing the frequency with which most Americans, regardless of faith, abandon that idea of faith. We could start with "Christians" who abuse their children, but that's too blatant, obvious, and extreme to start. But it could also be in the form of a faithful person speaking harshly of the homeless beggar when explaining poverty to their children. How many of us learned racism or other -isms in the guise of religious instruction? Those are the aspects of faith I would directly challenge, were I of a particular church (doesn't matter if I was Christian, Jew, Muslim, or otherwise ... those hidden hitches damage the power of faith.) More direct approaches have failed, utterly, due to the nature of modern faith (perhaps also due to my approach, but the jury's still out on that.) It is well and fine for one to have faith; I have my own complex arrangement of faith, to be sure. But I would ask why one holds that faith. To answer that question for my own faith, I have to regard a vast range of factors. Among those is the idea that my faith is imperfect to the point of possibly being exactly wrong. Another part of that is how I define the unknowable mysteries of the universe; to some degree, these are the stuff of God, for me. But ... of any individual's faith .... * Did God create the universe of nothing, or of himself? (rhetorical) Does the answer not have a profound impact on the details of one's faith? And thus from those details to the manifestation of that faith, being one's living conduct? If I say God's church is imperfect, is it God's fault, or could it be that the people of the church have some thinking left to do? Thus we could disregard some of moral outrage we might feel toward, say, the Inquisitions, if we were to agree that the people who supported, endorsed, or allowed such hideous events overlooked a detail or two about God's will. And, in recognizing the imperfections of faiths past, how might we assimilate that process into our own? I would not assert that we cannot have faith. Nor would I assert that any specific faith is directly wrong, once I've accounted for the factors. However, I would assert that either some of the factors have been incorrectly accounted in the formula, or else there's a whole bunch of factors we've failed to include. As to that, I think we arrive at the crux of the topic post: that the motivating factors of our individual faiths might be skewed. To reduce it just a touch: How can I have faith in God when I have not learned enough/all/other? (circle an answer, as such) If I am bigoted against a black man because I don't know enough about people in general, and specifically those with skin darker than mine, how much different is that from being bigoted in favor of someone because their hair/skin/eye color matches my moral comfort? In that sense, how much do we really know about God, and is it enough to raise our faith above favorable prejudice? We hear tons about faith at this board; however, I feel it has almost matched the word God in its vagaries. I would hope that this topic serves toward securing people's faith, as opposed to driving them farther into a shell of insecurity. (In the tradition of the Apostolic Fathers, let me say: "Not that I have observed this among any of you ....") But a related question is: "What is faith for?" I'll throw out an accusation for debate in general, if I may, but with the understanding that I do not assert this as part of my philosophy. Quite simply, of the X number of religious people I know, and despite the "make the world a better place" ideas inherent to each of those religions, many people seem to make their religious experience exclusive to the point of being unable to directly apply their faith within their personal lives. But it's all a muddled mess. Samus, please bear in mind, I offer this as inspired by, not in opposition to your ideas. thanx kindly, Tiassa Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image! ------------------ Take a side you say, it's black and gray. And all the hunters take the hunted merrily out to play. We are one, you say, but who are you? You're all too busy reaping in the things you never sown. And this feast must go on and on and on .... Nobody gives a damn. (Floater; "Beast")
