A simple question. We humans (some few of us, at least, mainly in Western nations) tend to put a lot of effort into trying to preserve various species. Our politicians and many others pride themselves on such efforts. We spend quite a lot of money on it. Many of us read about such efforts frequently. Many of us consider such efforts to be good. But what about when we wipe out a form of life? Consider smallpox (and yes, I know a virus doesn't qualify as life in some definitions of life). The world rejoiced when the WHO declared it had been eradicated (apart from a few samples). We considered it good. We considered it good because smallpox was a danger to humans. Is that what lies at the heart of good and evil? Self-interest? Is it good or bad to wipe out a form of life purely because it may or may not be a danger to us? What if it's just useful to us, or not useful?
But smallpox hasn't been eradicated... "this was found on http://www.mass.gov/dph/cdc/factsheets/fssmallpox.htm this is what it read: Currently, there are only 2 known stocks of Variola (smallpox virus), which are held in Atlanta and in Russia. There is a concern that the smallpox virus might exist elsewhere and be used in a harmful way. There is no documented evidence of this existence outside the secure laboratories. "
well....its good or bad depending on how it effects me. Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image! pandas vanish, eh cows vanish...HOLY CRAP! Noooooooooooo
My view is that there are two ways we might accord protection to a life form (such that completely annihilating it should be avoided): 1) If the members of that life-form are persons (including, of course, non-human persons). I don't know of, in fact, any known non-human species are persons, but it is still worth noting that IF there are some, they ought not be annihilated. By person I just mean something that meets the requisite level of cognitive awareness to deserve moral consideration as an individual, in the same way that we give moral consideration to other humans. 2) If the annihilation of that life-form is instrumentally bad for some persons. So, for instance, if annihilation of species x would cause a billion people to die, then it is bad to annihilate species x. Of course, it gets more tricky: -We can ask how many persons does an annihilation event have to be instrumentally bad for in order to make it wrong to annihilate that life form. -We can ask how instrumentally bad an annihilation event must be in order for us to bother going through the hassle of protecting it. -We can ask what sorts of instrumental bads are operative in our decision whether to protect from annihilation. It seems obvious that if an annihilation event would (say) kill a billion people then it ought to be avoided, but what if an annihilation event would merely cause people to be deprived of the aesthetic pleasure of seeing some beautiful species? Should that species be protected, or should we only protect in cases of more tangible, physical harm? -We can ask how we ought to handle cases in which we have imperfect knowledge of the effects of annihilation (maybe it will help people, maybe it will harm people). All those complications make this a tricky issue in practice, but I think the basis conceptual distinction made in points 1) and 2) is sound. The only major complication I can think of to the conceptual distinction in 1) and 2) is what to do in cases (if there are any) in which the members of a life-form are not persons, but do feel pain (or pleasure, etc.). I'm not sure yet what to say about such cases.
