Agian, on the face of it, this comes back to being arbitrary.No its science. The general consensus being that you generally require a brain (and even then sufficient brain mass) to have what wed typically think of conscious experience.
It doesn't have to have a central nervous system, but presence of a central nervous system would usually indicate that you're dealing with something that can experience pain.
This is argument by ridicule.Probably not for 10 years or so, and no files have managed to either maim or kill me since then you'll be glad to hear!
Have you ever ridden a spaceship at an amusement park?
I disagree, They can not experience what we recognize as being pain, based upon the scientific knowledge we have amassed.Because they cannot experience pain based upon the scientific knowledge we have currently amassed. Hence - reasoning about the world on the basis of empiricism, e.g. - the exact opposite of arbitrariness.
My point was, how do you gauge what has and hasn't the capacity to suffer? Since your moral framework heavily depends on sorting that one out, i assumed you must have some kind of system in place to establish its presence or absence.
It's arbitrary because 'Because it looks like ours' it represents no greater justification then 'because she's a girl'.How could it be arbitrary if its based upon an understanding of something? I really dont think you know what arbitrary means.
Noone is claiming that recognition of phenomenal experience (particularly pain) is %100 accurate. But we know enough about physiology to hazard a pretty decent guess.
I think what youre really arguing is that we cant be entirely sure what can and cant have consciousness, and of course in that respect i fully agree. But you have to understand that the process we use to determine what has consciousness isnt arbitrary, is fundamentally scientific.
The capacity for empathy existed long before we formed what we'd now recognise as 'civilisation'. In other words we argue and disagree about the extent of moral rules and theories, but the process of moral intuition is ultimately inherent.
My morality is more 'correct' than a african moral system btw, because my moral system is logically consist nt and is based upon a governing rule 'do not harm something that has the capacity to be harmed'.
Most moral systems only take certain types of persons/entities into moral account, while leaving others outside of the moral argument without providing good explanations for why this should be so. I.e. - why should a woman be mutalated without consent whereas for a man this would be deemed immoral? Typical answer: 'Because she's just a woman' (not a good argument, or even an argument atall).
I assumed we were talking about vegetarianism on moral grounds.
Can you please provide a reason for moral action other than recognition of a conscious, experiential being that might have the capacity to suffer.
Yes. Again i dont know what other basis of moral action youre working from but im ready to hear it whatever it is.Agian, on the face of it, this comes back to being arbitrary.
Neurological responses are, at the most basic level, a chemical phenomenon. What you're saying is that one type of chemical phenomenom should be given precedence of priority over another type of chemical phenomenom when it has a certain form, or occurs with a certain organisation?
The tree doesnt have a cognitive centre with which to realise that its limb has been removed. I kind of feel ive already been over this several times, and im not sure how much clearer i can make it.Why is the Biochemical response of a Tree having a limb severed, and different to the Biochemical response of me having a limb severed?
Why is the Biochemical response of a firm wilting as a result of an impact less important then my biochemical responses after being punched in the face?
Now we're getting to the main point here. This is the tricky thing with consciousness - it isnt just the chemical response you observe at the molecular level. Its the subjective experience about the response as well (mind/matter).Pain, when all is said and done, is simply a biochemical response to certain stimuli that has evolved as a survival instinct. Why should one survival instinct take precedence over others?
This is the point that I find arbitrary.
Again, I find this point arbitrary, for the reasons outlined above. What is so special about 'pain' - it is simply the name that we give to a particular biochemical response to a certain stimulus. Why should one biochemical response be regarded as being special above all others.
Psychophysics and comparative psychology unfortunately disagrees with you.I disagree, They can not experience what we recognize as being pain, based upon the scientific knowledge we have amassed.
Again, the distinction between one biochemical response, and others is an arbitrary decision based on an emotive response, a response that is emoted by the familiarity of the response.
It's arbitrary because 'Because it looks like ours' it represents no greater justification then 'because she's a girl'.
Nothing if they can prove its self consistent.And yet others might argue that theirs is self consistent, and what further justification do they need?
It is the point youre making though - youre arguing against the recognition of pain responses in other animals as a valid means of assigning moral rights. My only question is (and i think its a fair one) what other method is there? And why should i believe its better than the one i already have?Not the point I was making.
Why is the Biochemical response of a Tree having a limb severed, and different to the Biochemical response of me having a limb severed?
Why is the Biochemical response of a firm wilting as a result of an impact less important then my biochemical responses after being punched in the face?
Pain, when all is said and done, is simply a biochemical response to certain stimuli that has evolved as a survival instinct. Why should one survival instinct take precedence over others?
This is the point that I find arbitrary.
I don't. I don't make that assumption. I treat that which I prey upon, the same way that I would wish to be preyed upon.
The capacity for empathy existed long before we formed what we'd now recognise as 'civilisation'. In other words we argue and disagree about the extent of moral rules and theories, but the process of moral intuition is ultimately inherent.
Irrelevant, Morality still has a strong societal influence.
Most moral systems only take certain types of persons/entities into moral account, while leaving others outside of the moral argument without providing good explanations for why this should be so. I.e. - why should a woman be mutalated without consent whereas for a man this would be deemed immoral? Typical answer: 'Because she's just a woman' (not a good argument, or even an argument atall).
And yet others might argue that theirs is self consistent, and what further justification do they need?
James, if you had the ability, would you forbid anyone from killing animals? Like outlaw/punish, etc. those who killed animals.
"Killing" is a very general term.
What kind of killing do you have in mind, exactly?
Exactly my point.Different biochemistry, I guess. But that's not what is morally significant here.
This isn't exactly what I said.I don't think that you seriously can't recognise suffering when you see it, as something more than just a biochemical response.
In your opinion, perhaps.In claiming that pain, when caused deliberately, is not of any moral significance, but a mere biochemical effect of no special consequence, you are being deliberately obtuse.
This is a pure strawman. At no point has any of this been implied.You're seriously expecting us to believe that you feel nothing when you see a person or an animal in pain? That you just look at the situation clinically and marvel at the biology of the nervous system and the inticacies of the chemical processes in the nerves?
Just as well then, because what you think i'm selling bares little resemblance to what i'm actually saying.I'm not buying it.
I disagree, Once again, I mention Tigers.That's all very convenient when you know that nothing will ever seriously prey on you unless you are very stupid.
Again, this is a strawman, this query bares little resemblance to the point that I was making, and the context it was being made in.Are you seriously trying to claim that empathy is irrelevant to morality?
Do you actually believe that?
How would you argue that a system which allows, say, female genital mutilation, while it does not allow the same thing for men, is "self-consistent" and moral?
Like every other individual on this planet, my morality is based on emotive responses 'right' and 'wrong' which in turn are based upon a combination of personal circumstance, societal pressures, peer pressures, religous background, and other stuff.Yes. Again i dont know what other basis of moral action youre working from but im ready to hear it whatever it is.
Again, this is part of my point.The tree doesnt have a cognitive centre with which to realise that its limb has been removed. I kind of feel ive already been over this several times, and im not sure how much clearer i can make it.
I'm making the point that I consider it an arbitrary one based on an emotive response, rather then one based on anything logical.If youre seriously objecting to the idea of moral treatment towards things that have 'mind' only, then i think youre going to have a hard time justifying it.
If you dont feel there is a moral distinction to be made between conscious and non-conscious matter, then i wish youd just give some sort of justification for it.
And this is the point that I consider arbitrary.Now we're getting to the main point here. This is the tricky thing with consciousness - it isnt just the chemical response you observe at the molecular level. Its the subjective experience about the response as well (mind/matter).
Where we recognise mind, we assume consciousness, where we assume consciousness we assume the right to be treated morally.
Oh, as i've already stated, I understand the point you're making, however I draw a distinction between a biochemical response (pain) in an individual, and the sympathetic emotive responses that biochemical response evokes in another individual.Intuitively i think you already understand all this. Its the exact same reason why you wouldnt feel bad if you got annoyed and kicked a tree, but probably would feel bad if you got annoyed and kicked a cat.
Because like every other individual on the face of this planet, I am, when all is said and done, a hedonist.Why do you spend so much time in pursuit of pleasure when you could just as easily experience pain? Again, alot of these answers are staring you in the face.
Then so be it.Psychophysics and comparative psychology unfortunately disagrees with you.
And i've been saying, more or less, that I consider the governing principle, and the method to be arbitrary.Please look up what the word 'arbitrary' means. A method that's based upon a governing principle cannot by definition be arbitrary. You can argue against the principles of course, say theyre flawed, or contractive (etc), but what you cant say is that theyre arbitrary.
Measurement is still an observation.Noones claiming that we have similar responses based on observation alone, we're talking about measurable similarities. Stuff you can verify and quantify.
I consider my stance to be more general, and to be consistent (namely that killing is killing, and killing members of one phyllum is no different to killing members of another phyllum - having said that I also aknowledge that I routinely fail to live up to my own standard).It is the point youre making though - youre arguing against the recognition of pain responses in other animals as a valid means of assigning moral rights. My only question is (and i think its a fair one) what other method is there? And why should i believe its better than the one i already have?
Your as bad as buffalo roam when its comes to projecting your faults on to others. God learn how to debate like an adult.They set the condition that no unnecessary pain should be inflicted then argue that all pain and suffering is unnecessary when the pain and suffering serves a human need. If you let yourself be jerked around you'll be arguing against several different definitions of necessity.
Then they want to argue for a morality that's got no clothes on. Why do they argue for a morality based on strawman arguments, inverted definitions of terms, technophobia, a fashionable hatred of humanity, and on whatever the activist feels like saying at the time? Why do they say "I'm not an animal rights activist" when you know very well that they are? Because that way they make the rules, which may be no rule at all except "the pissy animal rights activist is always right no matter what you say." That's a six year old's way of arguing. When you started arguing with the child you were already in trouble.
For food, for sport, for material, because it's convenient.
Raising cattle for consumption.
Deer hunting.
Trapping.
"Putting down" animals that you no longer wish to care for.
Fishing (does killing fish count as immoral?).
Animal testing for drugs, research, cosmetics.
For instance, I could most likely live totally comfortably on a diet without animal parts. However, I choose to hunt small game because I enjoy it, I hunt deer & moose because it's cheaper than buying beef, and I eat at McDonald's because a hamburger is cheap, easy calories.. Would I go to a re-education camp, if you were in charge?
I just went to their homepage and couldn't find these campaigns. Could you give me a link to an article.
I would disagree with RSPCA, probably, on both issues, but they hardly seem radical or violent.
I do hate the fact that people breed dogs when we have so many strays that have to be put down. I could see legislation limiting the breeding and sale of dogs and cats, somehow related to the population of strays. This may not be as big an issue in England as in the US, however.
I also assume that the RSPCA does not have the power to punish someone for mistreatment of animals and that they must go through the courts.
Most dog breeds have specific traits that people want. We breed Lhasa Apsos, which are small, inactive, solitude-tolerant, and astoundingly good at evaluating character. They're ideal dogs for people who live in small quarters, spend a lot of time away from home, can only have one pet, and are wary of letting strangers in when the doorbell rings. They also have no undercoat or dander so people are rarely allergic to them. They're also aloof and headstrong, so they appeal to a certain type of owner. If a Lhasa Apso is right for you, a poodle, Westie, Doberman, Labrador, or any of a hundred other breeds would be a disaster for you.Simon Anders said:I do hate the fact that people breed dogs when we have so many strays that have to be put down. I could see legislation limiting the breeding and sale of dogs and cats, somehow related to the population of strays.
Putting down healthy animals? Certainly.