And this is a philosophical thread. The nature and function of evidence is a fundamental question in epistemology, along with related issues regarding the justification of belief. The issues here are all about philosophy and have very little to do with science. (Except indirectly, in the sense that like most of human cognition, science is applied epistemology.)
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evidence/
Is evidence even applicable to the question of what evidence is and how it functions? There would seem to be some circularity creeping in there. Instead of asking for evidence, wouldn't it make more sense to apply any proposed formulations of how people should conceive of evidence to
problem cases? And isn't that what's happening here?
The first post in this thread was an interesting and stimulating contribution by Ophtiolite. He was the one who first referred to evidence regarding ghosts, gods and ufos, along with other things. So the topic of the applicability of evidence to those kinds of problem cases was there from the very beginning. The second post was a piece of foolishness about religion and tortillas
posted by a moderator. The third post was a short reference to big-foot by Daecon. Then the first page of the thread went off the rails completely with "humor" and "banter" and images of scorched tortillas. I think that it was Exchemist that endeavored to pull it back on-track. MR didn't have any role in any of that (but your moderator corps did).
Why aren't MR's cases evidence? If taken collectively and at face value, they would certainly seem to be evidence for the conclusion that ufos are something pretty extraordinary.
Wouldn't it be better to say that MR's examples aren't
good evidence? That obviously opens up the question of what makes evidence good or not-good. I'm inclined to think that your line of criticism is a promising one, that mundane explanations haven't been conclusively excluded. (That's the same argument that I would use.) But isn't that a sliding scale that can be set very low or very high? What determines that? Wouldn't setting the standard for good evidence so high that nothing can possibly satisfy it be equivalent to closed-mindedness?
As for me, I suspect that we really have here is evidence that we don't personally find plausible. (I generally agree with you about your judgements of MR's examples' plausibility.) But when we don't find MR's evidence plausible, aren't we making a subjective decision, based in some large part on our own world-views and judgements about what is and isn't likely in the world as we conceive of it?