[...] And finally, if people think a religion’s description or version of heaven is stupid [...] if people think a religion’s description or version of heaven is stupid but have one of their own then please share.
Bible-quoting ministers and clerics are the ones most willing to output conclusions from the scarce data concerning what the idea of heaven is concretely like. And individuals creatively providing their own preferences is akin to
The Good Place territory and would perhaps warrant moving the topic to the entertainment-oriented "Life" section for exhibiting personal concoctions about _X_.
Taking the subject more seriously (and as belonging in this category it was originally posted to) means delving into the interests and abstract explorations of theological scholars (example below). The "comparative" aspect of this subforum can still be accommodated by others adding non-Western conceptions of heaven or afterlife for contrast (indigenous, Islamic, East Asian, etc), as critically examined and augmented by academicians (initially).
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https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heaven-hell/#HeaThrCriIss
The issue of freedom in heaven
EXCERPTS: [...] Consider now three different accounts of what it means to act freely that appear in the relevant philosophical literature on the topic of freedom in heaven. According to the first account, one is free with respect to the issue of remaining obedient to God only if it is within one’s power to remain obedient to God and also within one’s power to disobey God. [...] the saints in heaven do not have the same kind of freedom that Lucifer had unless they retain a very real power to sin in heaven.
A second account carries no implication that having the relevant freedom in the present always requires an ability to do otherwise in the present, though it does require an ability to do otherwise at various times in one’s life history. [...] James F. Sennett defends the free will of the saints in heaven by in effect arguing that they have [already] freely chosen their own moral character....
[...] A third account of freedom ... is Susan Wolf’s Reason View, according to which “the freedom necessary for responsibility consists in the ability (or freedom) to do the right thing for the right reasons”. But unlike the autonomy view, as she calls it, such freedom does not require the ability to refrain from doing the right thing for the right reasons. Wolf thus commits herself to the following asymmetry: whereas committing a wrong (or immoral) act freely requires an ability to do otherwise and therefore to refrain from acting wrongly, doing the right thing for the right reasons freely does not require an ability to act otherwise.
The issue of the misery of loved ones in Hell
EXCERPT: Assuming that love ties people’s interests together in the way described in section 4.1 above, one might then wonder how God could preserve the happiness of those in heaven who know that some of their own loved ones are suffering forever in hell. For the question inevitably arises, “How could anyone remain happy knowing that a genuine loved one, however corrupted, is destined to be miserable forever”?
The issue of the supposed tedium of immortality
EXCERPTS: [...] Williams’s view concerning the inevitably tedious nature of an unending life is not that far removed from the religious view that in our present unperfected condition we are not yet fit for eternity and not yet capable of experiencing the most worthwhile forms of happiness; indeed, given our present condition, some would claim, we might even turn heaven itself into a hellish experience. And if that be true, then the task of rendering someone fit for eternal joy may be far more complicated, even for an omnipotent being, than one might have imagined. ... Williams would question whether a suitably transformed person would be the same individual as the unperfected person that existed previously...
MORE (missing details):
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heaven-hell/#HeaThrCriIss
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