Like many, Schrödinger in the quote below seemed to favor the "brute emergence" route of appearances (phenomena) popping into exhibition due to procedures performing the correct magical conjuring spell (that's what such literally amounts to, no matter what disciplinary nomenclature is recruited to obscure the appalling fact). I believe primitive precursor capacities already have to be the case, just as the emergence of life-forms was dependent on molecules and atoms beforehand, or the electrical power supplied to homes is dependent upon electromagnetism. Manipulation requires an available _X_ to manipulate.
Erwin Schrödinger: "The world is a construct of our sensations, perceptions, memories. It is convenient to regard it as existing objectively on its own. But it certainly does not become manifest by its mere existence. Its becoming manifest is conditional on very special goings-on in very special parts of this very world, namely on certain events that happen in a brain. That is an inordinately peculiar kind of implication, which prompts the question: What particular properties distinguish these brain processes and enable them to produce the manifestation? Can we guess which material processes have this power, which not? Or simple: What kind of material process is directly associated with consciousness?" --What is Life? Mind and Matter ... (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), p. 1
I sort of agree. As Schrödinger remarked above, the physical "world" in terms of every day environmental appearances is just that -- a mental representation, not the thing itself. And the other (intellectual) version of it outputted by science (primarily physics) and taken up by physicalist philosophers, is a complex abstraction of symbols, technical language, etc. As Lockwood referred to it figuratively: a map of causal structure. Form alone. Relationships and magnitudes extracted from the phenomenal version via reasoning and experiment.
So in essence, both types of "physical world" are dependent upon the experiences and concepts of minds and their inter-communicative discourses. That doesn't mean that there is not a non-represented manner of existence independent of brain-related affairs. But how it exists is certainly not artificial, abstract description nor is it views and sensations of objects outside themselves from contingent distances. (Though that basic ability of "manifestation" may be required of it, to avoid the magical-like conjuring of brute emergence.)