Entities and attributes in science

[Tiassa]

Look, you wrote a lot of words in your reply. There are more than a few comprehension errors in evidence on your end, which suggests that you didn't really understand the post you replied to.

Such an easy line. But it's also true that sometimes a lot of words are necessary in order to address your sleights and fallacies. The flip side is no words at all, James, insofar as it's futile. For instance:

Your two examples here: gravity and lightning, are two quite different types of things.

Yes, but that's a different discussion.

… so don't try to put words in my mouth.

That's an example of the futility. Get off your high horse. See, from one post to the next, it's like you're trying to have some sort of orderly discussion in its own context, but not necessarily the same discussion you have been having.

It's like when you say, "You can put electrons in a bottle (create lightning in a bottle)". That one "can't put gravity in a bottle" is a distraction; something else I said was that it depends on what you mean by "produce a bottle full of energy", because inasmuch as it can be done, I would expect you will say that doesn't count, but only because you're already aware that one can produce energy inside a bottle, so to speak. Just like putting the red petal or the anthocyanin in the bottle wouldn't count. So that's not what you mean. What remains mysterious is what you mean.

Anyway, the point is that it reads like a word game when you say↑ "it is mistake to think of charge as a 'real physical thing' that is in the electron". As I said, part of a thing's existential realness is that it does something.

Which brings us to:

I don't think you're in any position to accurately describe my understanding of a "real physical thing". You shouldn't pretend to know what I think. You should, instead, pay some attention to what I write, and take a little time to try to understand it before shooting your mouth off.

What the hell does that even mean? "You shouldn't pretend to know what I think"? I get that it feels good to say stuff like that, but your little tantrum is irrelevant. Remember, part of what we're talking about has to do with whether you are being fallacious.

It's like saying you were "quite careful in talking about 'real physical things' in my previous post", and I told you what I think is amiss about it, and your response is that I am not "in any position to accurately describe [your] understanding of a 'real physical thing'", and that, James, is a fallacious objection. I shouldn't pretend to know what you think? Again, fallacious. When I say I think you're insisting on artifice when hewing to your understanding of a real physical thing, I mean you seem to be applying it in a fallacious manner. And all you can manage is to stake indignance on fallacy.

This is something I explicitly accepted in my previous post. There is no value in your retreading common ground. The fact that you thought it necessary shows that you didn't understand what I told you.

And this, too. The word game you're playing—

You just contradicted yourself in those two sentences. Think about it. If "red" is "something we do", then "red" cannot be "a fundamental part of the rose". Before you start up again, consider that this is not a mutually-exclusive thing. Even if "red" is partly something the rose does and partly something we do, it is still wrong to claim that "red" is "fundamentally" (solely) part of the rose.

—is ridiculous. When you turn your back and walk away, because you have errands to run, the sunlight still falls on the rose that reflects the wavelengths we describe as red.

That's another way in which this is kind of like discussing religion; you're trying to have a political argument: "You just contradicted yourself in those two sentences," you complain, but the way that works is beyond stupid. "Red" is as much something we do as "rojo" or "rouge", but the word we use to describe it doesn't change what it is.

Meanwhile, saying, "There is no value in your retreading common ground", is just you ducking and dodging. You went one place with it, I went another, and when you put on your haughty airs—"There is no value in your retreading common ground. The fact that you thought it necessary shows that you didn't understand what I told you."—in order to simply skip over the difference. And what you came up with is fallacious:

Yes. We - the describers of "red" - are real things in the Universe.

Good for us. I hadn't realized that part was in question. Still, that was kind of anticlimactic, even for solipsism. Of course, that wasn't really the point, was it:

There is no way, without an observer specified, to extract a "velocity" from a rose. Ergo, the "velocity" cannot be something that is "fundamentally a part of the rose". Getting the picture yet?

Wow, James, it's almost like you skipped over the three paragraphs↑ that started with, "Notice how relativistic these measurements are?" just so you could wag and huff.

Kind of like:

As for the second point, you're just wrong. "Mass" and "rose" are not synonyms. This ought to be an obvious point. But maybe that was just a silly rhetorical flourish on your part.

This is just grotesque, James. That "mass" and "rose" are not synonyms is an obvious point, but also your own fallacy. The simple fact is that the rose is made up of cells, and then molecules, and then atoms, so, yes, the mass of the rose is the rose insofar as it is not that tree over there, or the lake a mile yonder. Nothing about this straightforward, existential fact requires that mass and rose be synonymous.

Seriously:

The context was entities vs attributes. Beauty is an attribute. Rose is an entity. There is nothing fallacious about it, in the context in which I raised beauty as an example

What is the scientific definition of beauty?

There is a scientific definition of red.

You are raising a straw man, again. I have not claims that mass and colour don't do different things. On the other hand, I do claim that both mass and colour are attributes of a rose (an entity). You're lost in the weeds. This isn't difficult.

Those attributes have fundamentally different relationships with the entity.

You can put molecules and atoms in a bottle. It's a simple but useful rule-of-thumb thought experiment you could use to distinguish entities from attributes. arfa could, too, in principle. But, for some reason, neither of you seems to get it. What's your problem? Where's the blockage on understanding such a simple distinction? Is it just that you feel you need to oppose this distinction, because it's me who's making it? Or what? Can't you at least admit that you understand the distinction - or is even that a step too far for both of you? Or is it really the case that neither of you can grasp this?

All of that wag and huff was for your own sake. Remember what we're actually discussing, here. I've already said: In what sense is the charge a physical thing? In the sense that it is. In this case, in the sense that it does something.

Remember, the injury of a lightning strike is not caused by the kinetic impact of all those electrons. We come up to a question of what you mean↑ by not seeing any charge. What we see of the lightning is an effect of the underlying expression of charge, akin to what said charge did when interacting with that person over there.

Ask arfa. He's the one who introduced that term. I think he'd say if it has units, then it's a real physical thing, regardless of how stable it is.

I think you're right, about this. arfa's usage of the term is almost arbitrary. You'd better ask him to clarify.

But part of the question, here, is your definition. Meanwhile, if you think it's almost arbitrary, then we ought not wonder that your own definition is styled to be so preclusive.

It's irrelevant to the point I put to you. Why is it important to you? What's your argument (if you have one that isn't just to pointlessly nay-say anything I might write)?

Oh, it's just a question of which subatomic particles are real physical things.

Yes. I agree 100%.

If somebody seemingly can't understand the basics, there's no point complicating things unnecessarily, in the first instance. Here, we have two people who can't seem to get to first base on this. So, I'm leaving out all nuance and qualification for now, to try to get the basic idea across. You can't possibly run before you have demonstrated the ability to walk.

What I said is that you're being difficult and fallacious. Your narrow definition seems just a little too easy.

And it's kind of a thin pretext for your holy-rolling wag. Remember, James, one specialty you have long demonstrated is talking down to people. And that's the thing about being fallacious; it kind of wrecks your self-righteous moral pretense.

[1/2]​

 

[Tiassa]

Rule of thumb test: ask yourself - can I put it in a bottle (isolated, on its own)? If the answer is "yes", then it's probably a "physical thing", in some relevant sense. If the answer is "no", then it just might be a concept in your head. So, think: red, rose, molecule, mass, beauty. Ask the question. What are your answers?

‡​

Blackbody radiation is photons. Photons are things, insofar as they can be put in bottles.

‡​

Here's the crux - the part of my argument that you completely failed to grasp: energy is not a "thing", in the relevant sense, because you can't isolate it in that bottle, in the absence of the watch spring.

Again, what is the scientific definition of beauty?

Also, if you're going to wag like that, then do not misrepresent what other people say; it's almost impossible that you missed the next sentence↑ of what I said, but, sure, I'll remind you:

You want energy in a bottle, fine, I'll wind a watch spring and leave it locked. And while we all know that's not what you mean, to what degree is any form of energy contained in such a manner as you ask? To what degree can that energy exist under the circumstances you suggest?

(boldface accent added)​

See what you missed, there? See what you skipped out on? And what else did I say:

Well, that depends on what you mean. Inasmuch as it can be done, I would expect you will say that doesn't count, but only because you're already aware that one can produce energy inside a bottle, so to speak. Just like putting the red petal or the anthocyanin in the bottle wouldn't count. So that's not what you mean.​

But, we can put red in a bottle. Unlike beauty, there is a scientific definition of red, and it happens to work very well for putting red in a bottle.

The definition of red is blackbody radiation occurring at or about seven hundred nanometers.

"Blackbody radiation is photons. Photons are things, insofar as they can be put in bottles."

Photons making up blackbody radiation at seven hundred nanometers can be contained in a bottle.

And always could.

And you've known this.

So, like I said, inasmuch as it can be done, I would expect you will say that doesn't count.

Do you understand the distinction I have been making, yet? Surely, you must, if you've read this far.

Anyway, yeah, that sort of condescension probably works better if you aren't relying on wilful misrepresentation in order to justify it. But at least it felt good to say, right?

My point is very simple - childishly so. When you said I was being "difficult", I assumed you meant something along the lines of "obstinate". Now, it seems that the concept of entity vs attribute itself is actually difficult for you, for some reason - possibly in a similar way that it is so difficult for arfa.

And wagging like that seems to be your purpose. When I said "difficult", I was being polite.

I can't read minds, Tiassa. As far as understanding you or arfa goes, all I have to work with is the words you write here.

That you can't read minds is non sequitur. That all you have to work with is what someone writes probably works better if you aren't fresh off misrepresenting them.

It seems to me that you haven't offered much in the way of models of projections for me to argue against - other than the one I've specifically addressed in this post and previously.

See #80↑. Arf is trying to look at the data in a certain way, and you're flatly refusing to even try, and that's why it's important to recall that you don't even know what he's on about. I have no idea where he's actually going with it, but that is it's own question.

I have never set up a false dichotomy of my having to be right if I show that you're wrong, or that arfa's wrong, so I take it that your "reminder" is just more pointless rhetoric.

Look, James, if you're going to wag and condescend so self-righteously, you shouldn't need fallacy.

Like this:

How much time have you spent previously, discussing this kind of thing with people who are highly educated in science? If this is your first time, maybe it is a bit of a shock to find yourself out on a limb you didn't previously know was a limb.

That's just vapid puffery that makes you feel good to say.

There's a failure of perspective, right there. Too much time on the internet, maybe?

Yeah, the scientific definition of beauty is getting more important by the huff.

There is no inherent redness in a (red) rose!

Screech some more. It's in the physical makeup of the thing; without the redness, it is a different thing.

Meanwhile—

Well, sort of. That definition says that when photons with a certain range of wavelengths hit the human retina, thus producing a particular sensation in the mind of some human being, then by convention that sensation is generally described as "red". What this means is that there is some consistency when different individuals report seeing "red".

There are certainly objective ways to measure the wavelengths emitted by a light source, but none of those produce "red"; they just give us some numbers. We say that the number 600 nanometres corresponds to human beings' generally agreeing that the light produces in them, under appropriate conditions, the sensation we label "red".

So, "red" is a repeatable, testable, semi-objective concept, which can be assigned as an attribute to certain things.

—that's something of a reach, but—

But none of that is of much consequence for my dispute with arfa brane, or with you. On that note, the simple truth is that "red" is not an entity, as I have carefully defined that term (using a simple empirical test).

—it's easy to understand why you need it that way. What you're down to, James, is that red cannot be bottled, as such, because you don't want it to be, and have carefully defined terms in order to assert as such. Like your argument about having never set up a false dichotomy of having to be right in order to show another is wrong; you're just making excuses for yourself. Never setting up some false dichotomy for yourself has nothing to do with why you would misrepresent people in order to wag and huff like that.

I don't understand your difficult with what I wrote there. Please explain. There is no typo. As for cleverness, maybe it's too clever for you. Who knows?

Okay, you had said—

If we chose a unit of charge such that the electron had a charge of +1 charge unit instead of -1.6 x 10^-19 Coulomb, nothing in any theory of physics would be affected. In fact, physicists typically use many different systems of units for convenience. It can be very useful to think of the speed of light as 1 light year per year rather than as 299792458 metres per second. The number 1 is a lot easier to deal with, for starters.

—and the juxtaposition of "a charge of +1 charge unit instead of -1.6 x 10^-19 Coulomb" stands out, because it would have been easier to compare "+1" and "-1". Either way, the only change is that we would have to go back and rewrite everything. But it's a weird paragraph, anyway, so the extraneous complication stands out.

It's not about whether you "never set up a false dichotomy", but, rather, photons in a bottle, or the bit about +1, and alongside the misrepresentation and your particular focus on condescension and self-righteous puffery, sure, it's one thing if that person over there is wrong, but there is also something of a question what the hell you think you're doing, because for being as right as you are, you're serving up a lot of fallacy.

And it's also true this fallacious behavior is not inconsistent with your apparent regard for other subjects. It's in your critique against religion, and address of history. It's part of your dysfunctional assertion of free speech, a cacophony in which two items of speech are equal according to the measure that someone said it. As a matter of familiarity, it would be foolish to presume this will be the occasion in which this behavior breaks form and makes sense.

And we can review, if we want, what I told Arf↑, and in green ink, no less, about bringing new ideas intending to transform paradigm, that scientists are reluctant to inflict that much mystery just because, and that a fragment must be part of a functioning vessel lest it be merely a potsherd. But there is also the part about people being more interested in the sport of dispute than its utility, though it is easy enough to wonder if you are more about vice than sport. Because, really, for being as right as you are, it makes no sense to put on this kind of shitshow. You probably shouldn't be saying much about how many words people write when you're willing to waste people's time with that much self-righteous disingenuousness.

But it's why I asked about a typo. It's like when you bawl about opposition because it's you, and, sure, I know the feeling, but, really, it's just as easy to ask if you're playing some sick game, because there's always something amiss, and no, it doesn't really read like an accident. It's one thing if Arf is wrong, but you're bullshitting. All that huff and wag, and you're bullshitting. But at least you got to feel good about saying it.

[2/2]​

 

[arfa brane]

As I explained previously, "just a number" is a bit of a simplification. If you prefer "just a number with some units", I have no problem with that. Units, like numbers, are concepts in your head. As I have previously pointed out, many physical units are arbitrary inventions of human beings. There is nothing magical about a metre, for example. The length of a metre is a completely arbitrary choice made by human beings.

This idea or philosophy you have about physical units being concepts, isn't one I can agree with.
The choice of a unit of distance is, as you state, an arbitrary one. But in order to make this choice, don't you need real physical distances to actually exist? Distance itself--the thing being measured--cannot be a concept in your head. It doesn't fly, sorry.
Aliens might need to have a metre of distance explained to them, but surely not measuring a distance or that distances exist a priori.

But what is a distance? Where did it come from? Does anyone "really" know? Why do we question the existence of time, but not distance or area or volume? What can any philosophy tell us? Not very much it seems. Your particular philosophy seems to fail the reality test. Sure we have concepts of what distance really is, or time or gravity. But that doesn't at all lead to a conclusion that physicality is a bunch of concepts. It just doesn't.

p.s. Physics attempts to simplify things, not make them seem (theoretically) more complex.
As to where I'm trying to go with this, I'm not trying to go anywhere. I'm trying to stay where I am.

 

[arfa brane]

It's the units that make things physical, then, is it?

Is an electron something physical? Is an apple something physical? Is the Moon something physical? None of those things have units. (What are the units of the Moon?) Is none of them physical, then?

How confused is this?
I just noticed this part of James's earlier post. Ye gods.

Anything physical is described by physical units, James. The moon, an electron, an apple are physical objects, with mass. But that's only one of the physical "attributes", ok? Now if you want to claim the mass of any of those physical objects, is not the object itself you just open up another question--what is an object if it isn't the sum of its properties?

Sure, claim if you like, that an electron isn't its mass, it isn't its charge or its spin either. I prefer to think of an electron as a sum, a superposition of mass charge and spin. I don't see how you or anyone can prove this is wrong. Likewise if a rose isn't its red color, or its shape or its smell, then what is it? Why isn't a rose the sum of its attributes--why are attributes separate, what separates them?

I bet you have no idea

 

[James R]

arfa brane:

This idea or philosophy you have about physical units being concepts, isn't one I can agree with.

I'm well aware of that.

The choice of a unit of distance is, as you state, an arbitrary one. But in order to make this choice, don't you need real physical distances to actually exist? Distance itself--the thing being measured--cannot be a concept in your head. It doesn't fly, sorry.
Aliens might need to have a metre of distance explained to them, but surely not measuring a distance or that distances exist a priori.

The idea you seem to be grasping for here is the idea of "space" as a "thing". From experience, we know that different things can be in different places. To quantify that notion, we invent a concept called "distance", and an operational set of instructions for determining, in any instance, the specific number to be associated with the concept "the distance between objects A and B".

Is "distance" something you can put in a bottle? No. Distance is a concept.

What about "space", then? Space is usually defined, approproximately, as an absence of "stuff" or "things". Can we put "nothing" in a bottle? Well, at a stretch, maybe we can. But I'm not sure you want to go down the path of trying to define "nothing" as a "physical thing".

But what is a distance? Where did it come from? Does anyone "really" know?

See the bit about operational definitions and the like, above.

If you want to equivocate "distance" with "space" - and I think you most likely do want to do that - then your question boils down to "what did space come from?" That one has some science attached; investigate the big bang theory, for instance, but bear in ind that the definition of "space" in that theory is a little more complicated than just "the absence of 'things'".

Why do we question the existence of time, but not distance or area or volume?

It's a good question. I think they are all on a similar footing. I don't question the existence of time; it seems to be a part of my everyday experience. Nor do I question the existence of distance or area or volume, of course.

In case this is not clear to you: you and I are not arguing about what things exist. We are arguing about the difference between physical objects and concepts. You appear to have no test to tell the difference between them. I have suggested a simple test.

What can any philosophy tell us? Not very much it seems. Your particular philosophy seems to fail the reality test. Sure we have concepts of what distance really is, or time or gravity. But that doesn't at all lead to a conclusion that physicality is a bunch of concepts. It just doesn't.

I have not argued that "physicality is (just) a bunch of concepts". Quite the opposite, in fact. I have given you a test which you can use to easily distinguish between "a bunch of concepts" and a "physical thing" (like an apple or an electron or a tree).

p.s. Physics attempts to simplify things, not make them seem (theoretically) more complex.

It seeks simplification by building conceptual models of the physical systems that are being studied.

How confused is this?
I just noticed this part of James's earlier post. Ye gods.

That was a description of that illustrates your confusion between entities and attributes. So yes, you're right, your ideas are very confused indeed.

Anything physical is described by physical units, James.

Note the wording: described by.

Think about what that means. Please.

The moon, an electron, an apple are physical objects, with mass.

They are physical objects and we describe them using the concept of mass. Mass is an attribute they have.

But that's only one of the physical "attributes", ok?

Yes. There are many other attributes we can describe and use to build conceptual models.

Now if you want to claim the mass of any of those physical objects, is not the object itself you just open up another question--what is an object if it isn't the sum of its properties?

And, as usual, we land right back at the point we're you're so stuck.

The description of an object is not the object.

The map is not the territory.

A collection of attributes is not an object; it is a description of an object.

I really don't think this is hard to grasp. What happened to you, man?

Sure, claim if you like, that an electron isn't its mass, it isn't its charge or its spin either.

Thank you. I will. Because, of course, the electron isn't either of those things.

I prefer to think of an electron as a sum, a superposition of mass charge and spin.

When you eat an apple, do you taste the mass, charge and spin?

I don't see how you or anyone can prove this is wrong.

How you prefer to think about things is your business. You're very confused, but if you're unwilling to even try to understand the alternative that has been carefully explained to you, you're welcome to stay confused.

Likewise if a rose isn't its red color, or its shape or its smell, then what is it?

It is what it is: a collection of particles assembled in a particular way.

Why isn't a rose the sum of its attributes--why are attributes separate, what separates them?

Attributes are concepts. A rose is an entity.

Get it, yet?

I bet you have no idea

I have offered you a very clear operational way to distinguish attributes from entities. Your response has been to more or less fail to engage with this at all. Instead, you have variously tried to laugh it off, to substitute personal insults for argument, to rely on argument from incredulity (or ignorance), and finally to say that you don't even understand what was put to you.

Ironic for you to claim, after all that, that I have no idea, I'd say.

 

[James R]

Tiassa:

I'll just skip over the usual personal insults and slights that you seem to need to add to every post you make when talking to me. They are not worth wasting more of my time on.

It's like when you say, "You can put electrons in a bottle (create lightning in a bottle)". That one "can't put gravity in a bottle" is a distraction; something else I said was that it depends on what you mean by "produce a bottle full of energy", because inasmuch as it can be done, I would expect you will say that doesn't count, but only because you're already aware that one can produce energy inside a bottle, so to speak. Just like putting the red petal or the anthocyanin in the bottle wouldn't count. So that's not what you mean. What remains mysterious is what you mean.

There's nothing mysterious about what I mean. I gave you a simple (first order) test for distinguishing attributes from entities. If you're still confused, I don't know how much more I can help you. I've spent most of this thread patiently trying to educate arfa brane about this. I doubt you've read through all of that. Now you want me to start the process again just for you, it seems.

Now, I thought I did a pretty good job in my last reply to you, filling you in and trying to get you up to speed on what arfa and I have been arguing about. But it seems you're stuck in approximately the same place he is.

Maybe I'm just wrong when I think that this stuff ought not be hard for most people. Maybe most people have a trouble distinguishing entities from attributes, concepts from objects etc. Maybe the people I mix with most often are outliers, and you and arfa represent the norm. It's a surprising discovery, if so.

Anyway, the point is that it reads like a word game when you say↑ "it is mistake to think of charge as a 'real physical thing' that is in the electron". As I said, part of a thing's existential realness is that it does something.

What you said doesn't address my point (from the thing you quoted), at all. Can't you see that?

Did you not understand what you quoted from me? If you did, why the non sequitur response? Why not engage with what I wrote, instead?

And this, too. The word game you're playing—

....

—is ridiculous.

You're following arfa's playbook - attempting argument by ridicule or argument from incredulity. You need to do better than that.

When you turn your back and walk away, because you have errands to run, the sunlight still falls on the rose that reflects the wavelengths we describe as red.

Not in dispute (at least, for the purposes of this current debate). Note your wording, though: the wavelengths we describe as red. Interesting that "we" are somehow involved, again, in this rose, despite your assertion that the redness is entirely to be found in the rose.

"Red" is as much something we do as "rojo" or "rouge", but the word we use to describe it doesn't change what it is.

You missed the point, again. This is not an argument about language or the words we use to label things.

Meanwhile, saying, "There is no value in your retreading common ground", is just you ducking and dodging. You went one place with it, I went another, and when you put on your haughty airs—"There is no value in your retreading common ground. The fact that you thought it necessary shows that you didn't understand what I told you."—in order to simply skip over the difference.

If you were coming to this argument in good faith, I presumed you would have taken some time to read what came before - you know, so you would be up to speed on what arfa and I have been arguing about, and so you could usefully contribute.

Instead, it seems you've just jumped in, not having bothered to find out what the discussion is about, and now you expect me to get you up to speed by repeating the things I have already spent many posts explaining to arfa.

Of course, you're not coming to this in good faith, so it doesn't matter to you that you're trying to make me jump through those hoops again. In fact, that might be your aim, for all I know.

If you could take your focus off trying to one-up me, for a moment, you might actually learn something. But I don't think you want to do that.

Wow, James, it's almost like you skipped over the three paragraphs↑ that started with, "Notice how relativistic these measurements are?" just so you could wag and huff.

I skipped over them because they were irrelevant. None of what you wrote about the relativity of velocity is in dispute. Therefore, there's no reason to side-track into that, here.

That "mass" and "rose" are not synonyms is an obvious point, but also your own fallacy. The simple fact is that the rose is made up of cells, and then molecules, and then atoms, so, yes, the mass of the rose is the rose insofar as it is not that tree over there, or the lake a mile yonder.

You missed the point, again.

The fact that a rose is made of cells and molecules etc. is not in dispute. The fact that the mass of the rose is not the mass of that tree over there is not in dispute.

Previously, in my discussion with arfa - I'm not sure whether I repeated for your benefit, but I might have - I paid careful attention to two different uses of the word "mass". But here you are, apparently conflating the two, still.

Usage #1: sometimes people say "a mass" or "a weight", when they mean a specific object. "I went to the gym and lifted some big weights". This is not the usage of the word "mass" that is in dispute here.
Usage #2: physicists use the word "mass" to refer to a number: "That barbell has a mass of 100 kilograms."

Usage #2 refers to an attribute of the barbell. Usage #1 refers to the barbell itself. The barbell is not its mass, in the Usage #2 sense. Usage #2 "mass" is an attribute of the barbell. On the other hand, usage #1, referring to a barbell as a "mass" (or more commonly a "weight"), is referring to an entity - the barbell.

Let's not have you confusing Usage #1 and usage #2 again in this discussion. Okay?

Now, think about your statement "the mass of the rose is the rose". Is your use of the word "mass" there a usage #1 or a usage #2? Are you talking about the entity, or the attribute?

If you're not sure, you shouldn't be having this discussion, and you especially shouldn't be trying argue that I am wrong or have argued "fallaciously".

Do you understand what I've just put to you? Please let me know, because this is important if you and I are going to have a good faith discussion about this.

 

[James R]

Nothing about this straightforward, existential fact requires that mass and rose be synonymous.

Usage #1, yes. But I have been talking about Usage #2 with arfa.

Do you understand what this discussion is about, yet?

What is the scientific definition of beauty?

There isn't one. It doesn't matter. The point is: beauty is an attribute, not an entity.

There is a scientific definition of red.

We might say something like "red light has wavelengths in the range 600 to 700 nanometres", sure. But even that is a pretty fuzzy definition. (Is somebody really going to quibble and say "That light has a wavelength of 599 nanometres, so it's definitely not red!"?)

But it doesn't really matter. Having a scientific definition doesn't make something an entity, in the sense I have defined it.

Those attributes have fundamentally different relationships with the entity.

Yes, different attributes have different relationships to entities. So what?

arfa's confusion here - and yours too, it seems - is more basic. You're both apparently having trouble telling the difference between the entities and the attributes. This, despite the fact that I have offered you a simple thought-experiment you could use to decide which is which. That is, I have given you an operation definition to distinguish the two, which is something every good physicist wants when he defines things.

Remember what we're actually discussing, here. I've already said: In what sense is the charge a physical thing? In the sense that it is. In this case, in the sense that it does something.

Compare the competing definitions of "physical thing:

James R: a physical thing is something you can put in a bottle and look at.
arfa brane: a physical thing is something that has physical units.
Tiassa: a physical thing is .... ?​

Now, you have yet to tell me what your definition is. Now would be a good time for you to do that.

You claim charge is a physical thing. Okay. How so? Explain. Would this be a fair repesentation of your definition, then:

Tiassa: a physical thing is something that does something.​

If so, then okay. It's a start, I guess. But it does nothing to clearly distinguish attributes from entities. Do you have anything more specific to offer?

Remember, the injury of a lightning strike is not caused by the kinetic impact of all those electrons. We come up to a question of what you mean↑ by not seeing any charge. What we see of the lightning is an effect of the underlying expression of charge, akin to what said charge did when interacting with that person over there.

I think I'll skip over the details of how a lightning strike causes injury, because that will take us too far into the weeds.

What I mean by not seeing any charge is very simple: you can't put charge into a bottle by itself and look at it.

See my definition of "physical thing", above.

Now, you claim that lightning is "an effect of the underlying expression of charge". What does that mean? How does charge express itself? If charge isn't something we can see directly, then what is it? A metaphor? A concept (God forbid)? What?

We can put an electron in a bottle and look at it (in principle). But we can't put the electron's charge in a bottle (by itself) and look at it. If we put an electron in a bottle and look for its charge, we'll see nothing. Charge has no substance. It can't be seen. It doesn't "express itself". Charge is a concept we use to describe how the electron behaves. That is, it is a useful concept for describing what we see when we look at electrons (interacting with other things). Charge is part of a conceptual model. It's in your head, not in the electron.

But part of the question, here, is your definition. Meanwhile, if you think it's almost arbitrary, then we ought not wonder that your own definition is styled to be so preclusive.

See above for my definition. (Remember: baby steps before you run the 1500 metres.)

Now it's your turn. Give me your best definition of "physical thing". See if you can do better than arfa brane. Go.

Oh, it's just a question of which subatomic particles are real physical things.

For the purposes of this discussion, I am happy to concede that all subatomic particles are real things.

What I said is that you're being difficult and fallacious. Your narrow definition seems just a little too easy.

Baby steps. Once you have demonstrated you can get to first base on what this discussion is about, then we can add nuance, if you like.

Remember, James, one specialty you have long demonstrated is talking down to people.

Sadly, when you talk to an expert, the expert will sometimes talk down to you.

If you're unwilling to learn from experts - including being talked down to on occasion - then you're probably going to remain uneducated.

 

[arfa brane]

The idea you seem to be grasping for here is the idea of "space" as a "thing". From experience, we know that different things can be in different places. To quantify that notion, we invent a concept called "distance", and an operational set of instructions for determining, in any instance, the specific number to be associated with the concept "the distance between objects A and B".

Is "distance" something you can put in a bottle? No. Distance is a concept.

What about "space", then? Space is usually defined, approproximately, as an absence of "stuff" or "things".

But in the second sentence above, you clearly state that "different things can be in different places". But then these different places must be concepts to line up with the distance between them being a concept. That is, if I put two (different!) billiard balls on a billiard table, in two different places, their positions and the distance between them is a concept? It's not real because I can't put any of them in . . . a bottle?

Or are you just going around in circles? It sure looks like it.

It's a good question. I think they are all on a similar footing. I don't question the existence of time; it seems to be a part of my everyday experience. Nor do I question the existence of distance or area or volume, of course.

But don't they fail the bottle test? What do you mean by "existence"?
You mean in the sense units of time and distance also "exist"?

A collection of attributes is not an object; it is a description of an object.

A rose is red, has a pleasant smell, the stem has thorns and green leaves. That's a description. A real rose is not a description. Ok?

When you eat an apple, do you taste the mass, charge and spin?

Wow. A completely meaningless question! Good one James.

I have offered you a very clear operational way to distinguish attributes from entities. Your response has been to more or less fail to engage with this at all. Instead, you have variously tried to laugh it off, to substitute personal insults for argument, to rely on argument from incredulity (or ignorance), and finally to say that you don't even understand what was put to you.

Yes, that's how I'm engaging with it; it's how I usually engage with bullshit.

 

[James R]

But in the second sentence above, you clearly state that "different things can be in different places". But then these different places must be concepts to line up with the distance between them being a concept.

No. Places aren't concepts. The distance between places is the concept.

I covered this quite adequately in my previous post. Probably you didn't understand the careful explanation I gave you regarding "space". Oh well.

That is, if I put two (different!) billiard balls on a billiard table, in two different places, their positions and the distance between them is a concept?

There's space between the balls. That is not a concept. You can see it. But you can't see any distance. As for "positions", it depends what you mean; we'd have to dig down to find out. Since that's mostly a waste of time with you, I'm going to leave it alone, for now. But the issue that arises is similar to the different usages of the word "mass", which I explained to Tiassa, above (and to you, earlier, though - of course - you didn't understand it, either time).

It's not real because I can't put any of them in . . . a bottle?

The bottle test is not a test to find whether things are real. Distance is real. Beauty is real. Concepts aren't unreal, just because they are in your head rather than in a bottle.

Or are you just going around in circles? It sure looks like it.

You think that because you still don't understand what we're discussing - even after all this time, with many careful explanations to break it down for you.

I guess it's some kind of mental block with you. If you're for real, I must admit I'm a little worried for you.

But don't they fail the bottle test?

Yes they do. That doesn't mean they aren't "real". Concepts are real.

What do you mean by "existence"?

Really? Does it matter?

Do you think I mean something different by "existence" than you do?

Tell me what you mean by "existence", and I'll tell you if I agree. I seem to be doing all the work here. Maybe time for you to start making an effort.

A rose is red, has a pleasant smell, the stem has thorns and green leaves. That's a description. A real rose is not a description. Ok?

The attributes are red, pleasant, green etc. The entities are the rose, the stem, the thorns, the leaves. This isn't hard.

Wow. A completely meaningless question! Good one James.

It's because you refuse to think that you remain stuck.

Yes, that's how I'm engaging with it; it's how I usually engage with bullshit.

Why don't you stop? Clearly, you're never going to understand. For starters, you'd have to want to try.

 

[arfa brane]

No. Places aren't concepts. The distance between places is the concept.

That's crazy. How do you even arrive at two different places without a distance--a one dimensional space--between them?
It's true in Euclidean geometry that a finite line can be defined (described, specified) by two different points.
Is a set of two points equivalent, mathematically, to a line? What if the plane is physical?

But you can't see any distance.

Yes I can. I can estimate the distance from me to somewhere else, like the kitchen sink, say. By looking at it.

As for "positions", it depends what you mean; we'd have to dig down to find out. Since that's mostly a waste of time with you, I'm going to leave it alone, for now. But the issue that arises is similar to the different usages of the word "mass", which I explained to Tiassa, above (and to you, earlier, though - of course - you didn't understand it, either time).

Weasel words. You seem to be keen portray simple things as being mysterious, their secrets known to only a few.

The bottle test is not a test to find whether things are real. Distance is real. Beauty is real. Concepts aren't unreal, just because they are in your head rather than in a bottle.

?? What do you mean "real"? Like the way physical units in a physics lab are real? Like, there really is a physics lab, it really has real equipment in it. Real people do real experiments; that kind of real?

You think that because you still don't understand what we're discussing - even after all this time, with many careful explanations to break it down for you.

I guess it's some kind of mental block with you. If you're for real, I must admit I'm a little worried for you.

This from the person who has claimed that thoughts aren't physical. You seem to have quite a different interpretation of that word, and a few others. Most people I think would agree that "real" and "physical" mean about the same thing.

Oh well.

 

[James R]

arfa brane:

That's crazy. How do you even arrive at two different places without a distance--a one dimensional space--between them?
It's true in Euclidean geometry that a finite line can be defined (described, specified) by two different points.
Is a set of two points equivalent, mathematically, to a line? What if the plane is physical?

See? You're stuck again because you didn't take in what I told you previously. Here it is again. Maybe this time it will stick? (Not holding out high hopes here.)

The idea you seem to be grasping for here is the idea of "space" as a "thing". From experience, we know that different things can be in different places. To quantify that notion, we invent a concept called "distance", and an operational set of instructions for determining, in any instance, the specific number to be associated with the concept "the distance between objects A and B".

Is "distance" something you can put in a bottle? No. Distance is a concept.

What about "space", then? Space is usually defined, approproximately, as an absence of "stuff" or "things". Can we put "nothing" in a bottle? Well, at a stretch, maybe we can. But I'm not sure you want to go down the path of trying to define "nothing" as a "physical thing".​

Yes I can. I can estimate the distance from me to somewhere else, like the kitchen sink, say. By looking at it.

That estimate of the distance will be a concept in your head: "That sink looks to be about 1 metre away." You can't see a metre anywhere. All you see is the space between yourself and the sink.

Weasel words. You seem to be keen portray simple things as being mysterious, their secrets known to only a few.

Quite the contrary. I have revealed the secrets to you, right here in this thread, in many different helpful ways, all carefully explained and pitched at a level where I am confident the average primary school child could grasp them.

Unfortunately, due to whatever mental block you have, you can't understand anything I've told you.

?? What do you mean "real"?

No, arfa. We're not doing that.

I see what you did, there. I specifically asked you in my previous post to put in some effort and to define what you mean by "existence", if you think it is important. You ignored that reasonable request. I'm not going to play your game until you put in some effort of your own.

Like the way physical units in a physics lab are real?

Physical units are in your head, not in the physics lab. You can't see 27 kilograms, or 13 Joules, or 19.5 lumens, or 10.6 kilogram metres squared per second.

Like, there really is a physics lab, it really has real equipment in it. Real people do real experiments; that kind of real?

Can you put a physics lab in a bottle?
Can you put people in a bottle?

This isn't hard. See if you can answer these questions for yourself. Try. Think.

This from the person who has claimed that thoughts aren't physical.

Tell me why you think thoughts are physical. They don't even have physical units, so even using your silly definition of "physically real", they seem to be a non-starter.

You seem to have quite a different interpretation of that word, and a few others. Most people I think would agree that "real" and "physical" mean about the same thing.

You explicit didn't agree with that contention, earlier. You said "physical" means "anything with physical units". Using your definition, physics labs and roses aren't physically real.

Have you changed your mind, now?

Oh well.

You're never going to get this, are you? Oh well.

 

[arfa brane]

Tell me why you think thoughts are physical. They don't even have physical units, so even using your silly definition of "physically real", they seem to be a non-starter.

I think that because information has a physical basis--you can't store information without atoms or fundamental particles.
This is, in a way, supported by the observation that "nothing", i.e. empty space, is without structure--there is nowhere to store information s.t. it is "remembered" or remains stable.
Ergo it follows that processing information is physical. Cells process a lot of information; neural cells communicate with each other; what else can thoughts be but physical?
Unless there is something wrong with the idea of a physical brain, with physical cells in it.

Can you put a physics lab in a bottle?
Can you put people in a bottle?

This isn't hard. See if you can answer these questions for yourself. Try. Think.

What the hell is it with you and goddam bottles?

That estimate of the distance will be a concept in your head: "That sink looks to be about 1 metre away." You can't see a metre anywhere. All you see is the space between yourself and the sink.

This looks very much like you contradicting yourself. I see the space between = I estimate the distance. It's one of the reasons I can see (thanks evolution!) . . .

p.s. to anyone: "real", "exist", "physical". You might have these in the same pigeonhole. I prefer to derogate the first two; there's too much philosophy entangled with.
Then I can say, energy might not really exist, but it's still physical.

 

[Tiassa]

I'll just skip over the usual personal insults and slights that you seem to need to add to every post you make when talking to me. They are not worth wasting more of my time on.

Hi, James. In this post, I will just skip over your usual dishonesty and insults in order to engage the relevant, scientific discussion you posted in good faith.

 

[arfa brane]

And about entities and attributes. It seems that these are choices we make, not definitive or other than axiomatic choices.

For instance. James agrees electrons are real, meaning physical. Their mass and charge have physical units; mass and charge are quantized, so is electron spin. These three are all attributes of "real" electrons. But so what?

Are electrons attributes? Of what? Oh yeah, the universe . . .

Is the universe real? Is it an attribute of something else? Where do you stop; or start?
Oh yeah, you choose where.

 

[arfa brane]

We can put an electron in a bottle and look at it (in principle). But we can't put the electron's charge in a bottle (by itself) and look at it. If we put an electron in a bottle and look for its charge, we'll see nothing. Charge has no substance. It can't be seen. It doesn't "express itself". Charge is a concept we use to describe how the electron behaves. That is, it is a useful concept for describing what we see when we look at electrons (interacting with other things). Charge is part of a conceptual model. It's in your head, not in the electron.

'Sigh". I've looked this over a few times and I can't decipher it.

But it seems to start going off the rails in the second sentence: "But we can't put the electron's charge in a bottle (by itself) and look at it. "

Right. You can't put the red of a rose in a bottle--it's kind of stuck to the rose, so you'll need to put the rose in the bottle if you want to see red.

You can't "see" the charge of an electron unless you have an electron (in a bottle). And how would you see that electrons even have a charge? How did Milliken do it? How does an electroscope "work"; what does it measure?
What I think I'm looking at is a classical failure of logic, in James R's argument about what he thinks ontology means.
I say the attributes of some entity are the entity. You can't discount any of them or you don't have the entity any more. James thinks he can juggle with this.

Time can't be seen. It doesn't "express itself".
. . . (so what)

 

[James R]

I think that because information has a physical basis--you can't store information without atoms or fundamental particles.

Seems reasonable.

What the hell is it with you and goddam bottles?

Well, if you didn't just skip over the main point, each time, and pretend not to see it, maybe you'd start to have an inkling.

But that would require you to have a discussion in good faith. Both you and Tiassa are apparently beyond that.

This looks very much like you contradicting yourself. I see the space between = I estimate the distance.

Those are not the same thing. If you hadn't skipped over most of my previous post, perhaps you would have started to understand why.

How are you ever going to learn if you just ignore stuff?

p.s. to anyone: "real", "exist", "physical". You might have these in the same pigeonhole. I prefer to derogate the first two; there's too much philosophy entangled with.
Then I can say, energy might not really exist, but it's still physical.

The term you have been using up until now is "physically real".

If this you backing off just a tad, then? Now you have that energy might not be "physically real", but it's physical.

Is there just a hint here that something got through to you, after all?

 

[James R]

Tiassa:

I'm not at all surprised at your non-response. Clearly, you were out of your depth from the start. You've made a wise choice to back out, before you make yourself look even more incompetent (on this topic).

Next time, perhaps you'll think a little more carefully before you bounce in and presume to start lecturing me about physics or philosophy.

 

[James R]

And about entities and attributes. It seems that these are choices we make, not definitive or other than axiomatic choices.

In the sense that the words "entity" and "attribute" require definitions, I suppose so.

For instance. James agrees electrons are real, meaning physical. Their mass and charge have physical units; mass and charge are quantized, so is electron spin. These three are all attributes of "real" electrons. But so what?

I have explained the "so what" many times. The bottom line "so what" is that your claim that energy is not "just a number (with some units)" is in error.

Are electrons attributes? Of what? Oh yeah, the universe . . .

No. Electrons are not descriptive properties of the universe, which is essentially how I have consistently used the word "attribute" throughout this discussion. You're still making the same basic category error.

Is the universe real? Is it an attribute of something else? Where do you stop; or start?
Oh yeah, you choose where.

Well, okay. So what are you arguing about?

'Sigh". I've looked this over a few times and I can't decipher it.

Yes. You're obviously stuck, as I noted previously.

But it seems to start going off the rails in the second sentence: "But we can't put the electron's charge in a bottle (by itself) and look at it. "

Right. You can't put the red of a rose in a bottle--it's kind of stuck to the rose, so you'll need to put the rose in the bottle if you want to see red.

Good observation! So, there's a hint there. What are these "attribute" things, exactly, and how - if at all - are they to be distinguished from "entities"? Could it, just possibly, have something to do with your notion that attributes are somehow "stuck" to entities? Keep thinking.

You can't "see" the charge of an electron unless you have an electron (in a bottle).

You can't see it even if you have an electron in a bottle. Charge isn't something that can be seen. Not just visibly seen, by the way. Charge is not something that can be directly detected, in any way. Charge has to be inferred. Defined and then assigned. Just like the red of a rose.

And how would you see that electrons even have a charge? How did Milliken do it? How does an electroscope "work"; what does it measure?

Milliken observed oil drops suspended in an electric field. He couldn't see the charge. He couldn't see the field. He couldn't directly measure the charge using his apparatus. What he could do is to see how much voltage he needed to apply to suspend the oil drops. Then, he could do some theoretical calculations and deduce things about the theoretical concept we call charge.
An electroscope works because electrons repel each other. We can model this using the concept we call charge. We find, empirically, that "like charges repel". But, note carefully, that's a statement about a model. The connecting statement about the entities is that electrons repel each other.

What I think I'm looking at is a classical failure of logic, in James R's argument about what he thinks ontology means.

Don't be ridiculous. You have completely failed to even start to demonstrate any "failure of logic" on my part. You haven't even tried to do that.

I say the attributes of some entity are the entity.

That's the same as Tiassa's "the mass of the rose is the rose". Just a straightforward, easy-to-spot category error. Your problem is that you have no criterion for distinguishing attributes from entities. No wonder you're so hopelessly confused.

You can't discount any of them or you don't have the entity any more.

You're saying, essentially, that a rose cannot exist without ideas like mass and charge and spin. But those ideas haven't been with us forever. Two of them are actually very recent inventions.

You might like to ask yourself: was it possible for roses to exist in ancient Greece? (The ancient Greeks knew nothing of spin or charge.)

Even you should be able to work this out, if you think about it.

Time can't be seen. It doesn't "express itself".
. . . (so what)

Is there something you want to discuss?

 

[arfa brane]

You're saying, essentially, that a rose cannot exist without ideas like mass and charge and spin. But those ideas haven't been with us forever. Two of them are actually very recent inventions.

I get this far through your post, and you seem to be talking complete rubbish here.

A rose has mass, because the plant cells making up the rose have mass, because the atoms making up the molecules in the cells have mass, because . . .
This is not an idea, and without the mass there are no atoms, no molecules, no cells and no rose. If mass is an attribute, then attributes are clearly not separate. You are juggling that idea around; that you can separate out attributes somehow and call them ideas.

It's just confusing. It doesn't make any real sense. It's a waste of time.

 

[arfa brane]

Milliken observed oil drops suspended in an electric field. He couldn't see the charge. He couldn't see the field. He couldn't directly measure the charge using his apparatus. What he could do is to see how much voltage he needed to apply to suspend the oil drops. Then, he could do some theoretical calculations and deduce things about the theoretical concept we call charge.
An electroscope works because electrons repel each other. We can model this using the concept we call charge. We find, empirically, that "like charges repel". But, note carefully, that's a statement about a model. The connecting statement about the entities is that electrons repel each other.

Milliken observed something--electrons stuck to oil drops interacting with an electric field. Charge interacts with other charge, electron-wise.
Suspending some oil drops is clearly an operation, a measurement. Measurements are physical, James.

Electrons repel each other because of their charge, not because of a model or a concept. Milliken wasn't measuring a concept.
Jesus H.