Addressing the question in the subject line, "Could our actions be decided by our conscious mind", I'm inclined to say 'yes, of course'.
But before we spin big metaphysical conclusions out of that, we need to think about what "our conscious mind" is referring to. What
is a conscious mind, and what is the relationship between a conscious mind and physical reality and biological brains.
A short summary of various positions in the philosophy of mind.
http://people.tamu.edu/~sdaniel/Notes/mindbrai.html
As for me (I have no authority in these matters), I'm inclined to think that most of these options have some plausibility.
I accept the identity theory as a first approximation. But multi-realizability and some other objections move me towards functionalism, I guess. I'm inclined to identify mind not with the brain or its states
per se, but rather with what the brain is
doing, with the information processing tasks that it's performing. Since organisms (human or otherwise) might perform functionally similar tasks in very different ways, mental states probably shouldn't be identified in a strong logical sense with particular physical states of particular organs.
I don't believe in the existence of mind-substance, so I'm an eliminative materialist in that sense. I'm also inclined to think that our psychologistic vocabulary might not map directly onto brain states very easily. It might be more of a higher level language that we use to make sense of ourselves and others, our running mental model so to speak. Our Windows running atop machine language (brain states) and assembly language (functional states).
I have to say that I'm largely unmoved by David Chalmers and his "hard-problem" argument (it's less a philosophical argument than an intuition that he wants others to share). I think that in the end, the 'hard-problem' won't prove so hard at all.
The SEP's article on Mind-Brain identity theory (by Australia's own JJC Smart!)
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/