Boys, Men, and the Politics of Generational Futility

Tiassa

Let us not launch the boat ...
Valued Senior Member
One More Time Around

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Follow the bouncing ball; the setup, here, has to do with "Andrew Tate discourse … in the wake of a Wall Street Journal article by a high school student named Eli Thompson discussing the appeal of the repugnant manosphere grifter to many of his classmates during what the WSJ editors call a 'confusing time for young men.'"

David Futrelle↱ reflects:

… the article is hardly an endorsement of Tate; far from it. Thompson, who attends an all-boys Catholic school in Chicago, is well aware that Tate is a pernicious misogynistic ass, and he makes his distaste for the manosphere idol quite clear.

But his criticism of Tate is often frustratingly indirect. He doesn't always fully own his critiques, instead putting them in the mouths of anonymous classmates … You obviously agree with these things, dude, so why not simply say this?

The real problem with the piece, though, is that Thompson's framing of the issues surrounding teen boys today largely replicates the rhetoric of those who promote the notion of a "boy crisis" as a way to blame feminism for woes that are in reality caused by patriarchy–and by the decade-long backlash against feminism, which has led many teen boys and young men to reject the idea of gender equality.

And there is a lot to unpack in that, and part of the point is that there is a lot. But it's also important to start with the generational stuff:

Thompson complains that

「Being a teenage man today feels like standing in a hallway with a dozen doors, each leading somewhere different, and no one telling you which to pick.」

Yeah, I'm pretty sure that's how it's felt for a lot of teenagers–boys and girls and others–for a long time now. It certainly felt that way when I was in high school. The teenage years have traditionally been a time of "storm and stress" in Western culture.

But having choices, as confusing as it is, is certainly preferable to the coercive certainties of life in, say, the 1950s, when everyone (in the middle class at least) was expected to rush into early marriage and a premature "maturity." Teen boys were pushed to become providers at an early age; teen girls were expected to become mothers immediately after high school or college, and either live out the rest of their lives isolated in the home or at work at a job where they were underpaid and subordinate to men. Lesbians and gay men were forced into the closet and conformity with compulsory heterosexuality; the closest the culture came to recognizing trans people came when Milton Berle dressed as a woman on TV. This–minus the drag performances–is the "trad life" that many conservatives, and to some degree Tate himself, fetishize.

And, sure, a note to internationals and latecomers: He's not wrong. Well, okay, something about the drag performances is actually acceptable in that context, but psychoanalyzing the question is its own nightmarish discussion. Still, uncertainty in youth, want of a user manual, is hardly a new circumstance. But it's also a familiar starting point.

Thompson continues:

「At my school, we're hit with a barrage of mixed messages every day. In history class, we're taught about equality and the importance of respecting women as peers, often through lessons on past struggles for civil rights and suffrage. In English class, we dive into texts that unpack our privilege as white men; we are urged to feel some guilt for the inequities of the world, even if we didn't create them ourselves.」

Well, no, teen boys didn't create "the inequities of the world." But they benefit from them in many ways–especially the sorts of boys who attend private schools. And even at that age, unless they are preternaturally egalitarian, the chances are pretty good that these boys have helped to reproduce these inequalities, often without even realizing it. Framing the issue the way Thompson and many other commenters frame it leaves the impression that bringing up the inequities is sort of, kind of, as bad as the inequities themselves.

It's true, we could get the same from a bunch of old dudes whining about cancel culture, or silencing, shaming, even political correctness; it's the stuff of the "intellectual dark web"↑.

So, let's make this point: That one cannot discern the difference between awareness and feeling guilt is significant. As Futrelle observes, "Framing the issue the way Thompson and many other commenters frame it leaves the impression that bringing up the inequities is sort of, kind of, as bad as the inequities themselves."

This isn't new. Four years ago↗, for instance, I noted of the CRT scare:

Is it true that a man's salary offer is, by habit, higher than the woman who would be doing his job? In these United States, it is likely true. If it is true, does that make him feel bad? And to what degree is that bad feeling his own infliction upon himself? And does he teach it to his son? Does the history of wage discrimination make his son feel badly about being a boy?

And have you heard the one about chasing out the black people and putting a lake where they used to live? What if the history of Lake Lanier, or Central Park↱ makes some white person feel badly about being white?

Those ought to be silly questions, I know. But the delicate sensitivities of certain supremacists have long relied on wider sympathy in order to carry on as they have.

And it remains true, if a person feels badly for being white, or male, or Christian, or somehow being a beneficiary of injustice, that is entirely their own.

†​

But there is also the question of the "boy crisis" itself. Futrelle notes, "Talk of a 'boy crisis' also obscures the often enormous difficulties teen girls deal with on a daily basis". Rising sexual violence, prevalence of eating disorders and body shame. And it's true boys die by suicide significantly more often, but girls report chronic sadness and suicidality at twice the rate boys do. And then there is the lament about how "more women than men are graduating high school and going to college, which can feel a little like we've lost ground before we've even started", and it starts to feel like the young WSJ author, Thompson, is commiting a public act of self-harm. Futrelle explains:

This is a major "boy crisis" talking point. But this is a misleading way to frame the issues, as the college attendance and graduation rates for boys vary enormously depending on race and class (and in just the ways you'd suspect). As sociologist Michael Kimmel notes, white middle class boys are only slightly less likely to go to college than white middle class girls, with only a 2% college enrollment gap (51% female vs. 49% male). Black male students, meanwhile, comprise just 37% of Black college attendees. Yet the discourse around the "boy crisis" often seems to revolve around the problems faced by white, middle class boys.

Part of the challenge is that the young man is reaching out from a misinformed circumstance. If nothing else, this is what people need to notice and understand. Inasmuch as Thompson becomes an icon of symptom, the tragedy of such self-inflicted curses is that they are avoidable and preventable. On this point, the WSJ editorial summary, "we take our role models where we can find them", is practically a confession. Per Futrelle: "There are plenty of role models for boys out there who aren't screamingly misogynistic con men who have been accused, quite credibly, of multiple rapes and human trafficking."

There is a reason it feels familiar; 2014↗, for instance, in the wake of the Isla Vista murder spree. The thing is, Thompson, the student writing for WSJ, is coming from a perspective laden with the same expectations as the pickup artists who preceded the mgtows who preceded the incels. Compared to the WSJ summary of followers flocking, does the persistence of the pitch suggest market saturation or easy attraction? That is to say, how is this the circumstance from which Thompson is reaching out?
____________________

Notes:

Futrelle, David. "Andrew Tate isn't the only role model out there for teen boys". We Hunted The Mammoth. 5 May 2025. WeHuntedTheMammoth.com. 6 May 2025. https://www.wehuntedthemammoth.com/...-the-only-role-model-out-there-for-teen-boys/

See Also:

Thompson, Eli. "Boys at My High School Love the Tate Brothers. Here’s Why." The Wall Street Journal. 2 May 2025. WSJ.com. 6 May 2025. https://www.wsj.com/lifestyle/relat...ool-love-the-tate-brothers-heres-why-6b1df184

 
It does seem worse in the sense that the memetic proliferation engine AKA the internet can amplify the fringy-est views and flood their smartphone feeds. High schools need a mandatory course on applying critical thinking skills while you have an information firehose pointed at your face.

I.e. bring back information gatekeepers.
 
Young or old, the working class male is lost (Democrats Have a Man Problem). And as that initially suggests, perhaps a major obstacle in terms of winning the proletariat "dude" population back is the prohibition of masculine themes.

However, the classic "revolution" against a bourgeois establishment -- or whatever staid and oppressive governance -- still appeals to aggressive manhood urges, while also being non-gender behind the overall "socioeconomic reform" cloak. Wherein all members are encouraged to rally with angry pitchforks -- it's a "rebellious" spirit or expression thing, but in a generic, not exclusively male way that yet provides a sufficient vent for the testosterone ego.

In contrast to when instead the "state" and its institutions slash outlets have long since been remolded by the counterculture and at least symbolically accommodates the recommendations of utopia-seeking scholars. When such an enlightened establishment reigns, only the "great unwashed" themselves largely remain to rebuke on the basis of their many misogynistic and LGBT+ phobic biases and hate-laden traits. Which undermines the very point of trying to win those proles back as voters.

Trump and his successors would probably have to be in charge of the establishment for at least another decade or more in order for the latter to fully "bloom" into a persistent maltreatment of most people -- or IOW regress to some condition prior to the cultural makeover and reforms after the mid-20th century.

And when that happens, the intelligentsia will once again have its leverage and classic tyrannical target for attracting and rousing the working class. And though not a "direct masculine theme", the energy of the crusade and rebellion against despotism will nevertheless feed and satisfy the starved, inner bellicosity of those rank and file males.

Though the revolution must be akin to the much older types of defiance dating back to the 19th and early 20th centuries, and not the New Left version of the late 1960s and early '70s. The "hippie" activists of that era were destined to be executives, business magnates, faculty members, authors, artists, journalists, researchers, etc. Not the blue collar and agrarian set (many of the latter probably even took a pipe wrench swing occasionally at some of the budding humanities representatives of that day -- i.e., flower children). ;)

But in the other context, an adequate class-struggle menace of historical order can make a fellowship or united sibling-hood of the oddest bedfellows.
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