TheVat
Valued Senior Member
Welcome to NOTUS
If someone posts links and I want to know their provenance then I open them.
A Scourge Against Justice
- Thread starter Tiassa
- Start date
If someone posts links and I want to know their provenance then I open them.
exchemist
Valued Senior Member
Here is Wiki’s description of NOTUS. It appears to be, or is aspiring to be, a serious mainstream journal.Welcome to NOTUS
www.notus.org
If someone posts links and I want to know their provenance then I open them.
To Reiterate & Clarify (Notes on the Obvious)
Compared to all else it's really hard to figure an alternative explanation for why Treasury would attempt this sort of stunt. It's not even a question of risking an appearance of impropriety, but an inevitable impropriety, so if we are to wonder why Phil Alito, there are very few reasons why.
Now, for instance, maybe one doesn't understand the idea of an "appearance of impropriety", but it's kind of important to the American judiciary, so skipping past it isn't really an option. To be clear, it's not just that judges are supposed to avoid impropriety, they are also expected to avoid the appearance of impropriety. Phil Alito's presence at Treasury during litigation before the Supreme Court is an appearance of impropriety; the failure of both Treasury and Justice Alito to acknowledge that conflict of interest is an actual impropriety. This is not something any reasonable analysis of the situation would ignore.
We might consider a source who told a reporter "There's no doubt" Alito was hired "because of who he is", and as Parmalee↑ put it: "The source expressed an opinion, to which they are entitled. Do you have evidence to support, or a strong reason to believe, that Mr Alito did not get the position because of who his father is?"
It's a reasonable question: If Alito was hired for his general merit, then Treasury would have observed the appearance of conflict of interest and Justice Alito would respond appropriately. They did not. As I said, it's not even a question of risking an appearance of impropriety, but an inevitable impropriety. Treasury chose an improper course and tried to hide it.
There are very few reasons under the sun why Treasury would choose this impropriety. And given that it is the sort of impropriety nobody else could get them, yes, it's pretty obvious Phil Alito was hired because of who he is.
And inasmuch as we don't really need an anonymous source to tell us the obvious, it's also important to remember how journalism works: The source can tell us what other reasons Treasury might have for hiring Phil Alito to its office of general counsel, but that's the thing, compared to the inevitability of impropriety, there are very few reasons, and those are winnowed by the fact of attempting to hide the fact, as well as and especially the very particular impropriety Phil Alito brings to the Department.
Compared to all else it's really hard to figure an alternative explanation for why Treasury would attempt this sort of stunt. It's not even a question of risking an appearance of impropriety, but an inevitable impropriety, so if we are to wonder why Phil Alito, there are very few reasons why.
Now, for instance, maybe one doesn't understand the idea of an "appearance of impropriety", but it's kind of important to the American judiciary, so skipping past it isn't really an option. To be clear, it's not just that judges are supposed to avoid impropriety, they are also expected to avoid the appearance of impropriety. Phil Alito's presence at Treasury during litigation before the Supreme Court is an appearance of impropriety; the failure of both Treasury and Justice Alito to acknowledge that conflict of interest is an actual impropriety. This is not something any reasonable analysis of the situation would ignore.
We might consider a source who told a reporter "There's no doubt" Alito was hired "because of who he is", and as Parmalee↑ put it: "The source expressed an opinion, to which they are entitled. Do you have evidence to support, or a strong reason to believe, that Mr Alito did not get the position because of who his father is?"
It's a reasonable question: If Alito was hired for his general merit, then Treasury would have observed the appearance of conflict of interest and Justice Alito would respond appropriately. They did not. As I said, it's not even a question of risking an appearance of impropriety, but an inevitable impropriety. Treasury chose an improper course and tried to hide it.
There are very few reasons under the sun why Treasury would choose this impropriety. And given that it is the sort of impropriety nobody else could get them, yes, it's pretty obvious Phil Alito was hired because of who he is.
And inasmuch as we don't really need an anonymous source to tell us the obvious, it's also important to remember how journalism works: The source can tell us what other reasons Treasury might have for hiring Phil Alito to its office of general counsel, but that's the thing, compared to the inevitability of impropriety, there are very few reasons, and those are winnowed by the fact of attempting to hide the fact, as well as and especially the very particular impropriety Phil Alito brings to the Department.
TheVat
Valued Senior Member
One would expect that an agency, on hiring the son of a scotus justice for legal work, would issue a public acknowledgement of the hire and then state unambiguously that the new hire would not be consulting on any litigation going before scotus. To fail to do this and hide the new hire is, as Tiassa patiently explains, an inevitable impropriety.
Unless someone is arguing that four Treasury staff have engaged in a hoax, and Phil Alito doesn't work there, I'm not sure how one could argue that there is no impropriety and a blatant one at that - indeed, a serious violation of professional ethics.
Unless someone is arguing that four Treasury staff have engaged in a hoax, and Phil Alito doesn't work there, I'm not sure how one could argue that there is no impropriety and a blatant one at that - indeed, a serious violation of professional ethics.
Tiassa:
Who, specifically, was doing the "trying to hide"?
Look, if you're going to make allegations, at least be specific about them. Vaguely throwing shade mostly sounds like whining for the sake of it.
TheVat:
Do we really need to appeal to anonymous sources and a rumour mill to find out who works for Treasury?
Which sort of stunt?
What does the judiciary have to do with the Treasury department?
Was this appearance of impropriety raised before the Court? What was the litigation? Who were the parties? Did any of the lawyers raise the issue of potential conflict of interest? If so, what happened? If not, why not?
Justice Alito doesn't work for the Treasury. Are you talking about a case before the Supreme Court?
Please explain what they tried to hide, how they tried to hide it and why it was an "improper course".
Who, specifically, was doing the "trying to hide"?
What are those very few reasons?
Look, if you're going to make allegations, at least be specific about them. Vaguely throwing shade mostly sounds like whining for the sake of it.
What, exactly, are you alleging? Be specific.
Apparently, you did need about 6 anonymous sources to lead you to whatever these conclusions you have come to are. If you had better sources, why would you quote from a useless article that was, to all intents and purposes, sourceless?
Yes. Usually, journalists have sources.
Great! To which source are you referring? Be specific.
Is that established practice for "agencies"? They put out press releases when they hire the children of sitting judges, do they?
Is that also established practice?
I'm not convinced, yet.
TheVat:
Is somebody arguing that? Who is arguing it?
Has anybody bothered to ask the Treasury whether Phil Alito is working there? Surely any journalist who was worth his salt would be able to pick up a phone and make a simple inquiry.
Do we really need to appeal to anonymous sources and a rumour mill to find out who works for Treasury?
The default position would be "no impropriety". If you - or anybody else - wants to allege impropriety, the onus is on you to make the case.
exchemist
Valued Senior Member
I’m not sure about that. It must be commonplace for the children of judges to enter the legal profession and for some to end up working for the state in some capacity. I can’t see why there should be anything suspect in that, nor any reason to declare it per se.
Surely all that is needed in such cases is for the judge to recuse him or herself from any cases that involve their offspring, whether personally or professionally. Hard for the offspring to do when they have a parent presiding in an appellate court, since their involvement would generally take place before any appeal procedure could be foreseen.
But I admit I have not followed the details of this particular case.
The reason to declare it would surely be to offer transparency, so as to avoid any possible appearance of impropriety? I.e. at the start, the judge/justice can quickly say that it should be known that his son works at the organisation of the plaintiff/defendent etc, but that they in no way influence or benefit from the proceedings etc.
Unfortunately with the SCOTUS there is no obligation to be transparent. Even though one might think that the matter of public confidence in the SCOTUS would influence how one acts, i.e. to support that confidence through transparency, there is no obligation, and recusal is pretty much left to each Justice to determine for themselves. They don't have to justify their decision to anyone, even when directly asked.
As I understand it, in the reported story, no one asked directly because no one even knew that Philip Alito (or "Phil" as some source of indeterminate credibility says he likes to introduce himself as) worked at the Treasury, as counsel and policy adviser.
Noone would expect the offspring to do anything. Any onus would fall squarely on the Justice to act as they deem appropriate according to their ethics. Unfortunately, with the SCOTUS, there is no standard of ethics by which they are obligated. There is no obligation to act in a certain way, to even acknowledge a situation that might raise ethical questions.
And that, in a large part, is the issue here: there is a gap, possibly wider with this SCOTUS than with previous, between the ethical standards that the public might wish to hold them to, and the standards that they actually adhere to.
There is no breaking of any laws here, no obligations that have been broken. Just disappointment by those that would hope the highest court in the USA would adhere to higher standards than they do, let alone to higher standards than others, and to a transparency that would help instil public confidence in that institution.
Ultimately, the optics don't look good here, it seems, whether or not there has been any actual impropriety.
And then there's the question of whether the Treasury dept deliberately tried to keep Philip Alito's employment, and involvement, out of the public eye. If they did, why? One surely doesn't try to keep things hidden unless one has something to hide? But, again, it's mostly (at this stage - i.e. absent any evidence of actual wrongdoing) a matter of optics.
That's my take, at least, cutting through any (deliberate or otherwise) obfuscation.
exchemist
Valued Senior Member
OK thanks for the clarification. But is there, then, any suggestion that Alito fils was involved in a matter that has come before the Supreme Court where Alito père was presiding? After all, the US Treasury is an enormous department of government and no doubt its legal department has hundreds of lawyers working in it, so I would not have thought the mere fact that he worked in it would on its own be something requiring mention.
Nothing requires mentioning, as in obligation. 
As to how close "Phil" got to matters before the court, the head of the Treasury Dept Scott Bessent - he of the smuggest and condescending smile imaginable (I await any suggestions of someone who exceeds him in this regard) - has claimed that the Treasure Dept follows all legal and ethical guidelines, and he expects Alito Snr. does the same. The Treasury dept have claimed that Philip Alito's portfolio is broad within the dept, that he does counsel on policy but, so they claim, not on any matters reasonably expected to go before the Supreme court.
So there would appear to be no actual impropriety (if everyone is to be believed) but that does not remove that there was at least an appearance of impropriety from the outset, one that was failed to be acknowledged by the court, one that Treasury seemed to be happy to keep quiet (if not actively keep hidden), all of which, taken as a whole, does nothing but weaken the public confidence in the SCOTUS. And as such would seem to be itself an act of impropriety, if only the Supreme Court would hold itself to ethical standards that are worthy of the importance of the institution.
So, in summary, it's not necessarily the substance but rather the process that was followed (or not followed in this case).
As to how close "Phil" got to matters before the court, the head of the Treasury Dept Scott Bessent - he of the smuggest and condescending smile imaginable (I await any suggestions of someone who exceeds him in this regard) - has claimed that the Treasure Dept follows all legal and ethical guidelines, and he expects Alito Snr. does the same. The Treasury dept have claimed that Philip Alito's portfolio is broad within the dept, that he does counsel on policy but, so they claim, not on any matters reasonably expected to go before the Supreme court.
So there would appear to be no actual impropriety (if everyone is to be believed) but that does not remove that there was at least an appearance of impropriety from the outset, one that was failed to be acknowledged by the court, one that Treasury seemed to be happy to keep quiet (if not actively keep hidden), all of which, taken as a whole, does nothing but weaken the public confidence in the SCOTUS. And as such would seem to be itself an act of impropriety, if only the Supreme Court would hold itself to ethical standards that are worthy of the importance of the institution.
So, in summary, it's not necessarily the substance but rather the process that was followed (or not followed in this case).
TheVat
Valued Senior Member
Due to time zones, I am late to getting back to this, and I think y'all have sorted through some of this. Yes, it's Alito's job to recuse himself as needed. Though it doesn't have the force of law, CJ Roberts did issue a formal written code of professional ethics for his Court, I think in part to appease some of the public outcry with earlier conflicts of interest. It was a small bandaid for a large wound, as this discussion is making clear. I hardly need argue the importance of judicial recusal for the integrity of the nations highest court.
I think, if I'm understanding the impropriety argument that much turns on the term "general counsel." If Phil is such, then he would likely have the highest profile cases go across his desk, e.g. SCOTUS appeals, which means that Justice Alito père would at minimum need to do a good faith inquiry as to son's weighing in on any case before SCOTUS, with all transparency. As you and others note, it's the lack of transparency which is an ongoing source of harm to the Court.
Thin Skin
This is one of those details. It's not just a matter of those watching from half a world away, because while even Americans who rely on generic doubt as ward against unpleasantness can brush off the moment with a tacit pretense of ceteris paribus, that all else being equal they just don't see it, there is no reason to presume they understand what they are seeing.
SCOTUSblog explains in greater detail:
So, two basic things happened. Supreme Court justices already know each other's opinions; the portion Sotomayor read was not a surprise to anyone on the Court. Justice Alito knew a dissent was coming, but did not expect Sotomayor to hit like she did. The complicated part is the Chief Justice's expectation of comity, collegiality, and respect in the Court's outward face; Alito making a certifiably false statement in order to complain about his colleague is irregular and, toward that comity, inappropriate, but Alito also thinks Sotomayor should not dissent like that. But the basic elements are that Alito was offended by the oral dissent, and, having tacitly expected Sotomayor would not go there, he did not address that part directly in his oral discussion of the decision.
And that's why the whole thing seems startling. Mark Walsh of SCOTUSblog recalls the "closest historical analogue" when, in 2015, Breyer read a dissent against the death penalty, which "prompted a short rebuttal from Justice Antonin Scalia, delivered from the bench (and in a concurrence in print that was, a bit strangely, more colorful than his bench statement)".
Again, the justices know each other's positions and what their concurrences and dissents say. The opinion of the court frequently addresses dissent in its text; the written concurrences and dissents argue with each other. Alito knew an oral dissent was coming. Alito lost his temper in the courtroom; or, perhaps it was a calculated outburst.
Because, let's face it, he knew that part was on the record, and it's a difficult argument to not want to be compared to similar episodes in history. And this is where what happened becomes completely understandable to the proverbial common man: It's the same populist conservative argument that one should be able to undertake a known course without reference to history¹ because it would be morally wrong to recall history.
Infamous history is infamous for a reason. "But I want it!" does not automatically make it admirable. But Justice Alito, knowing that part of Sotomayor's dissent awaited public consumption, chose to not prepare any significant address of the point. This would be approximately what Walsh was speculating when he suggested, "what [Alito] seemed to mean was that he didn't have much notice that she planned to dissent"; i.e., it's one thing to not have enough time, but compared to timely notice, there is also the possibility that there probably isn't enough time to write an admirable or otherwise not infamous rebuttal of the point because the argument just isn't there for him.
The court spokesperson's statement to clarify, that "Justice Alito was notified in advance", and, "It was a misunderstanding on Justice Alito's part", says what it does. If he had known there would be a dissent read, except he did. What part Justice Alito misunderstood will remain mysterious because it must; if there was a more forgiving bothsides available, the statement would have reflected that.²
And what we're left with is the same thin-skinned conservatism that really wants to pretend it is something else.
____________________
Notes:
Rubin, Jordan. "The Roberts Court closes the courthouse door — and the border". MS NOW. 26 June 2026. MS.NOW. 27 June 2026. https://www.ms.now/deadline-white-h...ion-prisoners-guns-border-deadline-newsletter
Totenberg, Nina. "A day after Alito's testy response to Sotomayor's dissent, court says it was a 'misunderstanding'". All Things Considered. 26 June 2026. NPR.org. 27 June 2026. https://www.npr.org/2026/06/26/nx-s1-5872721/supreme-court-alito-sotomayor
Walsh, Mark. "An unusual retort to a dissent from the bench". SCOTUSblog. 25 June 2026. SCOTUSblog.com. 27 June 2026. https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/an-unusual-retort-to-a-dissent-from-the-bench/
This is one of those details. It's not just a matter of those watching from half a world away, because while even Americans who rely on generic doubt as ward against unpleasantness can brush off the moment with a tacit pretense of ceteris paribus, that all else being equal they just don't see it, there is no reason to presume they understand what they are seeing.
After Alito finished his summary of the opinion, he paused, at which point Justice Sotomayor read a summary of her contrary views in dissent. When she finished, however, Justice Alito did not move on to the announcement of his third opinion. Instead, he did something that nobody in the press corps ever remembers happening before. Looking much as if he had just bitten into a lemon, Alito said, "There is much that I would have added to my bench statement had I known there would be a dissent read." And he then went on to a short extemporaneous rebuttal.
What caused the hissy fit? Did Sotomayor really fail to tell him she would have an oral dissent? That really would have been a breach of the court's practices. A justice typically notifies the chief justice and the author of the majority opinion in writing if there is to be an oral dissent.
In response Friday to an inquiry from NPR came this terse statement from the court's public information office.
"Justice Alito was notified in advance by Justice Sotomayor's chambers that she would be reading a dissent from the bench. It was a misunderstanding on Justice Alito's part."
(Totenberg↱)
What caused the hissy fit? Did Sotomayor really fail to tell him she would have an oral dissent? That really would have been a breach of the court's practices. A justice typically notifies the chief justice and the author of the majority opinion in writing if there is to be an oral dissent.
In response Friday to an inquiry from NPR came this terse statement from the court's public information office.
"Justice Alito was notified in advance by Justice Sotomayor's chambers that she would be reading a dissent from the bench. It was a misunderstanding on Justice Alito's part."
(Totenberg↱)
SCOTUSblog explains in greater detail:
Alito pauses, and I am looking down jotting in my notebook ready for him to move on to his third case when another voice sounds from the bench.
Sotomayor, it quickly becomes clear, is delivering an oral dissent in this case, and she opens with something from page 29 of her 35-page opinion, the story of the M.S. St. Louis, the ship that left Nazi Germany in 1939 with some 900 Jewish refugees but was turned away in Cuba, Miami, and Canada before returning to Europe, where 250 of the refugees died in the Holocaust.
This led, after World War II, to a treaty and federal laws meant to avoid such a fate for asylum-seeking refugees. But under the practice at issue in this case, U.S. immigration officers "physically block" asylum seekers just outside ports of entry, Sotomayor says.
"Turn the ship back," she states, hammering home her point.
She takes issue with the majority's conception of "arrive," saying it is perfectly logical to say you have arrived in Washington, D.C., when you have landed at "Reagan National Airport," which is in Virginia. (She uses its "DCA" code in the opinion, but adds from the bench that "I always think I'm still in D.C." while at that close-proximity airport.)
Sotomayor also discusses the federal "metering policy" that limited the number of arriving aliens who would be inspected at ports of entry and how it has led to makeshift camps on the Mexican side of the U.S. border and other "dire humanitarian conditions."
As Sotomayor goes on for 10 minutes, longer than the total of Alito's first two opinion summaries, he at times leans back in his chair and sips from his water cup. When she wraps up, he leans forward and we expect him to move on to his third opinion.
But first, he has a response.
"There is much that I would have added to my bench statement had I known there would be a dissent read," he says. This causes heads to turn in the courtroom. He goes on with a short substantive retort to Sotomayor, paraphrasing his written opinion's point that "the government's policy merely delayed entry by some aliens as a way of improving a situation that both interfered with the proper conduct of inspection and created unsanitary, inhumane, and sometimes dangerous conditions at ports of entry."
He tells the audience to read the opinion and says, "I will move on to the next case."
There is some discussion afterwards in the press room, where those who listened to the audio piped into the Public Information Office caught some or all of Alito's retort, about what he meant by "had I known there would be a dissent read." It seems clear enough he knew when the justices took the bench that Sotomayor planned an oral dissent, because he expectantly paused at the end of his short summary. But what he seemed to mean was that he didn't have much notice that she planned to dissent.
Update: On Friday, the court said that Alito's courtroom reaction to Sotomayor's oral dissent had been a result of a "misunderstanding."
"Justice Alito was notified in advance by Justice Sotomayor's chambers that she would be reading a dissent from the bench," a spokesperson for the court said. "It was a misunderstanding on Justice Alito's part."
While Alito favors short summaries, he does tend to respond to more of the dissent when he knows an oral dissent is coming. (He did this most recently in Louisiana v. Callais in late April, when he responded in some detail to Kagan's oral dissent. But that was a "prebuttal" – he included his responses in his opinion summary, not speaking after her oral dissent.)
(Walsh↱)
Sotomayor, it quickly becomes clear, is delivering an oral dissent in this case, and she opens with something from page 29 of her 35-page opinion, the story of the M.S. St. Louis, the ship that left Nazi Germany in 1939 with some 900 Jewish refugees but was turned away in Cuba, Miami, and Canada before returning to Europe, where 250 of the refugees died in the Holocaust.
This led, after World War II, to a treaty and federal laws meant to avoid such a fate for asylum-seeking refugees. But under the practice at issue in this case, U.S. immigration officers "physically block" asylum seekers just outside ports of entry, Sotomayor says.
"Turn the ship back," she states, hammering home her point.
She takes issue with the majority's conception of "arrive," saying it is perfectly logical to say you have arrived in Washington, D.C., when you have landed at "Reagan National Airport," which is in Virginia. (She uses its "DCA" code in the opinion, but adds from the bench that "I always think I'm still in D.C." while at that close-proximity airport.)
Sotomayor also discusses the federal "metering policy" that limited the number of arriving aliens who would be inspected at ports of entry and how it has led to makeshift camps on the Mexican side of the U.S. border and other "dire humanitarian conditions."
As Sotomayor goes on for 10 minutes, longer than the total of Alito's first two opinion summaries, he at times leans back in his chair and sips from his water cup. When she wraps up, he leans forward and we expect him to move on to his third opinion.
But first, he has a response.
"There is much that I would have added to my bench statement had I known there would be a dissent read," he says. This causes heads to turn in the courtroom. He goes on with a short substantive retort to Sotomayor, paraphrasing his written opinion's point that "the government's policy merely delayed entry by some aliens as a way of improving a situation that both interfered with the proper conduct of inspection and created unsanitary, inhumane, and sometimes dangerous conditions at ports of entry."
He tells the audience to read the opinion and says, "I will move on to the next case."
There is some discussion afterwards in the press room, where those who listened to the audio piped into the Public Information Office caught some or all of Alito's retort, about what he meant by "had I known there would be a dissent read." It seems clear enough he knew when the justices took the bench that Sotomayor planned an oral dissent, because he expectantly paused at the end of his short summary. But what he seemed to mean was that he didn't have much notice that she planned to dissent.
Update: On Friday, the court said that Alito's courtroom reaction to Sotomayor's oral dissent had been a result of a "misunderstanding."
"Justice Alito was notified in advance by Justice Sotomayor's chambers that she would be reading a dissent from the bench," a spokesperson for the court said. "It was a misunderstanding on Justice Alito's part."
While Alito favors short summaries, he does tend to respond to more of the dissent when he knows an oral dissent is coming. (He did this most recently in Louisiana v. Callais in late April, when he responded in some detail to Kagan's oral dissent. But that was a "prebuttal" – he included his responses in his opinion summary, not speaking after her oral dissent.)
(Walsh↱)
So, two basic things happened. Supreme Court justices already know each other's opinions; the portion Sotomayor read was not a surprise to anyone on the Court. Justice Alito knew a dissent was coming, but did not expect Sotomayor to hit like she did. The complicated part is the Chief Justice's expectation of comity, collegiality, and respect in the Court's outward face; Alito making a certifiably false statement in order to complain about his colleague is irregular and, toward that comity, inappropriate, but Alito also thinks Sotomayor should not dissent like that. But the basic elements are that Alito was offended by the oral dissent, and, having tacitly expected Sotomayor would not go there, he did not address that part directly in his oral discussion of the decision.
And that's why the whole thing seems startling. Mark Walsh of SCOTUSblog recalls the "closest historical analogue" when, in 2015, Breyer read a dissent against the death penalty, which "prompted a short rebuttal from Justice Antonin Scalia, delivered from the bench (and in a concurrence in print that was, a bit strangely, more colorful than his bench statement)".
Again, the justices know each other's positions and what their concurrences and dissents say. The opinion of the court frequently addresses dissent in its text; the written concurrences and dissents argue with each other. Alito knew an oral dissent was coming. Alito lost his temper in the courtroom; or, perhaps it was a calculated outburst.
Because, let's face it, he knew that part was on the record, and it's a difficult argument to not want to be compared to similar episodes in history. And this is where what happened becomes completely understandable to the proverbial common man: It's the same populist conservative argument that one should be able to undertake a known course without reference to history¹ because it would be morally wrong to recall history.
Infamous history is infamous for a reason. "But I want it!" does not automatically make it admirable. But Justice Alito, knowing that part of Sotomayor's dissent awaited public consumption, chose to not prepare any significant address of the point. This would be approximately what Walsh was speculating when he suggested, "what [Alito] seemed to mean was that he didn't have much notice that she planned to dissent"; i.e., it's one thing to not have enough time, but compared to timely notice, there is also the possibility that there probably isn't enough time to write an admirable or otherwise not infamous rebuttal of the point because the argument just isn't there for him.
The court spokesperson's statement to clarify, that "Justice Alito was notified in advance", and, "It was a misunderstanding on Justice Alito's part", says what it does. If he had known there would be a dissent read, except he did. What part Justice Alito misunderstood will remain mysterious because it must; if there was a more forgiving bothsides available, the statement would have reflected that.²
And what we're left with is the same thin-skinned conservatism that really wants to pretend it is something else.
____________________
Notes:
¹ We recall here the juxtaposition of knowing and learning from history, to the one, or ignoring and repeating it, to the other.
² To answer an obvious question, we might check with Jordan Rubin↱ of MS NOW: "The audio is released eventually the following term, and it isn't a total secret until then because anyone who shows up to court that day can hear it."
² To answer an obvious question, we might check with Jordan Rubin↱ of MS NOW: "The audio is released eventually the following term, and it isn't a total secret until then because anyone who shows up to court that day can hear it."
Rubin, Jordan. "The Roberts Court closes the courthouse door — and the border". MS NOW. 26 June 2026. MS.NOW. 27 June 2026. https://www.ms.now/deadline-white-h...ion-prisoners-guns-border-deadline-newsletter
Totenberg, Nina. "A day after Alito's testy response to Sotomayor's dissent, court says it was a 'misunderstanding'". All Things Considered. 26 June 2026. NPR.org. 27 June 2026. https://www.npr.org/2026/06/26/nx-s1-5872721/supreme-court-alito-sotomayor
Walsh, Mark. "An unusual retort to a dissent from the bench". SCOTUSblog. 25 June 2026. SCOTUSblog.com. 27 June 2026. https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/an-unusual-retort-to-a-dissent-from-the-bench/
exchemist
Valued Senior Member
But they have given Trump the power to arbitrarily fire the heads of agencies established by Congress. Except the Federal Reserve.
Update: Supreme Court Decides They're Okay With the Constitution As It Is … For Now
The setup:
The milestone after nearly twenty years of open campaigning against the Fourteenth Amendment is that the Supreme Court barely preserved the Constitution, today, in a 5-4 vote that saw Justice Kavanaugh trying to split hairs between siding with the majority and preserving some escape hatch for a future Court to rule the Constitution unconstitutional. The final score was Chief Justice Roberts delivering the opinion with Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson; the main dissent was Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch, with the latter joining dissents filed by Thomas and Alito. Justice Kavanaugh tried to concur in part and dissent in part; it's something of a mess.
New York attorney Jess Coleman↱ observes the "Pretty incredible moment when John Roberts has to scold arch-conservatives Sam Alito and Brett Kavanaugh for creating 'ad hoc exceptions' to birthright citizenship", and suggests, "Originalism is falling apart before our eyes."
Conservative attorney Norman Ornstein↱ observes "that three justices, Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch, directly disregard the clear language of the Constitution, and a fourth, Kavanaugh, disregarded it but relied instead on a law".
The decision↱ is tenuous; if Roberts thought Kavanaugh's logic worked, that might have been the majority opinion.
What might go unnoticed here is how ridiculously presumptive Kavanaugh is being. The most straightforward answer is to point out that Congress did not design, authorize, and implement the Internet, and then remind that there are statutory solutions available to Congress that can address the "significant illegal immigration … that was largely unknown as of 1868 and that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment could not have fully anticipated" (Kavanaugh, 8 (59)).
Congressionally manufactured pretenses of crisis are entirely a question of Congressional prerogative and purview. If the Congress wishes to amend the Constitution, there is a process It can follow; this part is not the job of the Supreme Court. Kavanaugh's complaint is akin to an issue people used to raise in the drug war: When you pass a law to make something illegal, you implicitly and automatically create criminals.
The passage of early drug laws regulating the use and distribution of marijuana, for instance, created a large contingent of illegal marijuana users; alarmism about illegal marijuana use escalated to a tax stamp act in 1937 that began the modern drug war in the U.S.
Similarly, travel across asserted national borders has long existed; the more we regulate that passage, the more people and circumstances Congress declares illegal, the more "significant" the number of "illegal immigrants" will seem. This is the heart of Kavanaugh's argument. One might reasonably suggest that another thing "the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment could not have fully anticipated" was the prospect of such poor governance that Congress might require the Supreme Court to overturn the Constitution itself.
It's almost like nobody in Congress or the Judiciary, except maybe that one guy in 1896, could foresee that the rebels would keep at it this long.
Kavanaugh's maneuver intends to keep the door open to overturning the Constitution.
____________________
Notes:
Supreme Court of the United States. "Syllabus". Trump. v. Barbara. 30 June 2026. SupremeCourt.gov. 30 June 2026. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-365_4hdj.pdf
The setup:
The milestone after nearly twenty years of open campaigning against the Fourteenth Amendment is that the Supreme Court barely preserved the Constitution, today, in a 5-4 vote that saw Justice Kavanaugh trying to split hairs between siding with the majority and preserving some escape hatch for a future Court to rule the Constitution unconstitutional. The final score was Chief Justice Roberts delivering the opinion with Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson; the main dissent was Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch, with the latter joining dissents filed by Thomas and Alito. Justice Kavanaugh tried to concur in part and dissent in part; it's something of a mess.
New York attorney Jess Coleman↱ observes the "Pretty incredible moment when John Roberts has to scold arch-conservatives Sam Alito and Brett Kavanaugh for creating 'ad hoc exceptions' to birthright citizenship", and suggests, "Originalism is falling apart before our eyes."
(¿What does that mean? It is a reference to so-called "Originalists" looking outside originalism in order to justify their doubt of the Constitution. For Chief Justice Roberts, the prestige of the Court is the first and foremost priority; it's one thing if the Court descends into partisanship, but it must be the right kind of partisanship, and it must be done with appropriate appearances of propriety. The Roberts Court has turned sharply against the Originalism that the Court's conservatives have long been known for, even if Originalism is much like Biblical literalism, an impossibility insisted upon by fundamentalists. The wreck of such hope is inevitable, but this Court can inflict irreparable damage before smashing the flaming hulk of a sinking ship onto the rocks.)
Conservative attorney Norman Ornstein↱ observes "that three justices, Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch, directly disregard the clear language of the Constitution, and a fourth, Kavanaugh, disregarded it but relied instead on a law".
(¿What does that mean? While Justice Kavanaugh concurred with the majority to preserve birthright citizenship, he relied on statute to get there while trying to preserve doubt of the Cosntitution. Tom Nichols↱ describes a "side-step". Ryan Goodman↱ explains Kavanaugh's argument is "that the EO violates the federal statute but not the Constitution".)
The decision↱ is tenuous; if Roberts thought Kavanaugh's logic worked, that might have been the majority opinion.
†
What might go unnoticed here is how ridiculously presumptive Kavanaugh is being. The most straightforward answer is to point out that Congress did not design, authorize, and implement the Internet, and then remind that there are statutory solutions available to Congress that can address the "significant illegal immigration … that was largely unknown as of 1868 and that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment could not have fully anticipated" (Kavanaugh, 8 (59)).
Congressionally manufactured pretenses of crisis are entirely a question of Congressional prerogative and purview. If the Congress wishes to amend the Constitution, there is a process It can follow; this part is not the job of the Supreme Court. Kavanaugh's complaint is akin to an issue people used to raise in the drug war: When you pass a law to make something illegal, you implicitly and automatically create criminals.
The passage of early drug laws regulating the use and distribution of marijuana, for instance, created a large contingent of illegal marijuana users; alarmism about illegal marijuana use escalated to a tax stamp act in 1937 that began the modern drug war in the U.S.
Similarly, travel across asserted national borders has long existed; the more we regulate that passage, the more people and circumstances Congress declares illegal, the more "significant" the number of "illegal immigrants" will seem. This is the heart of Kavanaugh's argument. One might reasonably suggest that another thing "the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment could not have fully anticipated" was the prospect of such poor governance that Congress might require the Supreme Court to overturn the Constitution itself.
It's almost like nobody in Congress or the Judiciary, except maybe that one guy in 1896, could foresee that the rebels would keep at it this long.
Kavanaugh's maneuver intends to keep the door open to overturning the Constitution.
____________________
Notes:
Supreme Court of the United States. "Syllabus". Trump. v. Barbara. 30 June 2026. SupremeCourt.gov. 30 June 2026. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-365_4hdj.pdf
Correction
This is not accurate:
I simply read the note wrongly: "THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined. ALITO, J., and GORSUCH, J., filed dissenting opinions."
To be clear: Gorsuch wrote his own dissent, as well as joining Thomas.
This is not accurate:
I simply read the note wrongly: "THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined. ALITO, J., and GORSUCH, J., filed dissenting opinions."
To be clear: Gorsuch wrote his own dissent, as well as joining Thomas.
On Slaughter, Humphrey's Executor, and "Originalism"
Chief Justice John Roberts, 2015Historian George Thomas↱ explains:
The history of the Roberts Court, when understood in perspective, will observe a striking contrast between what the discourse of his time would claim and the results his tenure will have delivered. The sharp difference between rhetoric and function actually precedes the time of the Roberts Court, and is a regular feature of American conservative political argument. The question of how we describe the ethic and legacy of this Chief Justice after his time will be answered in no small part by our willingness to countenance the prospect of will.
Contrary to American populist pretense, one does not become Pope by not knowing what he is talking about. Similarly, one does not achieve the bench of the Chief Justice by not knowing what he is doing. The idea that John Roberts somehow just whoopsie-stumbled into these contradictions by accident of circumstance so utterly beyond his control or even recognition just doesn't work.¹ It's easy enough to wonder, for instance, how Justice Kagan will recall that one time when she was Solicitor General and the Chief Justice was so aghast at government authority.² Compared to the executive-branch bonanza of the Court's spring term, Roberts former prudery looks more like hollow cynicism emblematic of the bad faith that will define his career.
____________________
Notes:
Thomas, George. "An 'Originalist' Court Overturns an Originalist Decision". The Atlantic. 30 June 2026. TheAtlantic.com. 1 July 2026. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/06/scotus-humphreys-originalism/687744/
Chief Justice John Roberts, 2015
In overruling Humphrey's, the Roberts Court is solidifying a formalistic version of the separation of powers that narrows congressional power while expanding presidential power. Its logic points to the idea that all administration functions—not just independent agencies but possibly also the professional civil service—are an inherent part of the executive power and must be brought under the control of the president.
Yet even Roberts cannot swallow the direction of his reasoning. That is why he exempted the Federal Reserve Board from the implications of his decision. In making this exception, Roberts notes that monetary policy at the core of the national bank's mission is not subject "to plenary Presidential control." True. But this is just as true of the regulation of commerce or trade, so why doesn't this logic apply to the Federal Trade Commission?
Humphrey's was a sensible understanding of the separation of powers. It was certainly preferable to Roberts's reasoning in Trump v. Slaughter, which threatens to turn the administration of policy into the president's personal power. The Roberts Court likes to think of itself as originalist, but it is imposing a distinctly modern and stilted understanding of the separation of powers onto the country, while denying Congress power that it has exercised since the founding. That's not originalism, no matter what the Court says.
Yet even Roberts cannot swallow the direction of his reasoning. That is why he exempted the Federal Reserve Board from the implications of his decision. In making this exception, Roberts notes that monetary policy at the core of the national bank's mission is not subject "to plenary Presidential control." True. But this is just as true of the regulation of commerce or trade, so why doesn't this logic apply to the Federal Trade Commission?
Humphrey's was a sensible understanding of the separation of powers. It was certainly preferable to Roberts's reasoning in Trump v. Slaughter, which threatens to turn the administration of policy into the president's personal power. The Roberts Court likes to think of itself as originalist, but it is imposing a distinctly modern and stilted understanding of the separation of powers onto the country, while denying Congress power that it has exercised since the founding. That's not originalism, no matter what the Court says.
The history of the Roberts Court, when understood in perspective, will observe a striking contrast between what the discourse of his time would claim and the results his tenure will have delivered. The sharp difference between rhetoric and function actually precedes the time of the Roberts Court, and is a regular feature of American conservative political argument. The question of how we describe the ethic and legacy of this Chief Justice after his time will be answered in no small part by our willingness to countenance the prospect of will.
Contrary to American populist pretense, one does not become Pope by not knowing what he is talking about. Similarly, one does not achieve the bench of the Chief Justice by not knowing what he is doing. The idea that John Roberts somehow just whoopsie-stumbled into these contradictions by accident of circumstance so utterly beyond his control or even recognition just doesn't work.¹ It's easy enough to wonder, for instance, how Justice Kagan will recall that one time when she was Solicitor General and the Chief Justice was so aghast at government authority.² Compared to the executive-branch bonanza of the Court's spring term, Roberts former prudery looks more like hollow cynicism emblematic of the bad faith that will define his career.
____________________
Notes:
¹ One might as well convert to Catholicism and then lecture the Augustinian Prior General on just cause for war.
² Roberts delivered on that one, as well, in National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Committee. Of note, Vice President J.D. Vance, is running for U.S. Senate in 2028.
² Roberts delivered on that one, as well, in National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Committee. Of note, Vice President J.D. Vance, is running for U.S. Senate in 2028.
Thomas, George. "An 'Originalist' Court Overturns an Originalist Decision". The Atlantic. 30 June 2026. TheAtlantic.com. 1 July 2026. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/06/scotus-humphreys-originalism/687744/
What You Give: On Supremacism, Priority, and Heritage
Ian Millheiser↱ on the Roberts Court:
Actually, what is missing from the long ellipsis is a discussion of the important role of swing justices, compared to commentary by "right=leaning scholar" Richard Re "discussing why 'America's two competing legal cultures' have diverged".
And no such consideration is complete without pretty much standardized warnings to Democrats and liberals to not be too ambitious in trying to fix the problem:
Even still, what follows is a reflection on the "Alitoification of Brett Kavanaugh", how "The Republican justices also abandoned the moral high ground on Roe v. Wade" and "The Supreme Court's 2nd Amendment decisions are illegible even to other federal judges", and the idea that "There's a difference between an illegible Supreme Court decision, and one that is merely wrong", before observing, "The Court's inability to explain itself makes it weak":
The underlying problem is a question of good faith. While it is easy enough to recognize the possibility that the conservative majority lacks good faith, history suggests American conservatives have long been this way.
And toward that, consider the idea of a fallacious defense of free speech. This is one of those, if only, things, because there are reasons why such fallacies attract such sympathy; they are, in their way, pervasive.
The difference is that, compared to some abstract freedom of speech in which all utterance is equal for having been uttered, we might continue to protect fallacy within consequential discussion, or despite even our own declared principles of discourse.
And if this is how it goes at the pub, or on some website, or over Thanksgiving dinner with the crazy↗ uncle↗, then, yeah, that's just kind of how it goes. But here, we're talking about the Supreme Court of the United States, which is probably several valences of importance and effect, at least, above, say, the fallacies of Bigfoot believers at some backwater website. The moral of the story is practical, that there is value in observing the difference between fallacies rejected and fallacies required.
It ought to be obvious that those who cannot afford good faith ought not be pretended to afford good faith. This isn't a moral or political assertion, but functional. Once upon a time, it was easy enough to lament a lack of civics education, and remind the need for critical thinking. And it is the very record of our good faith and critical thinking that is being overruled and incoherently overwritten; the point is to create confusion and uncertainty, as the normal definitions of words objectively describe a different result.
What was once the stuff of barflies and extended-family dinners is now the political agenda of the Supreme Court majority. This goes well beyond creationism, forced school prayer, or even Bigfoot. We know why these political interests refuse history; we can only wonder why those who pretend to not support them would hope to validate and legitimize that refusal. That is to say↗, Looking back, it's easy to wonder if people really were such suckers, or if maybe there was something that was just that much more important to them. Consider the result of their advocacy and pitch; no wonder so many people want to forget the past.¹
It's a classic conundrum: Sinister, or just stupid?
But this is the price of how many lifetimes wasted on fallacy. This is what such priority brings.
____________________
Notes:
Millhiser, Ian. "The Supreme Court can no longer explain itself". Vox. 3 July 2026. Vox.com. 5 July 2026. https://www.vox.com/politics/494282/supreme-court-illegible
"So don’t look at the explanations, a fog of reverse-engineered nonsense to get to a desired result. To understand this Court, you need to ignore the fog and look at the patterns of outcomes ― not what they say, what they do."
―Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI)
Ian Millheiser↱ on the Roberts Court:
The Supreme Court wrapped up its most recent term during a bizarrely haphazard celebration of the United States' 250th birthday. And it has struggled to articulate a coherent vision of the Constitution no less than President Donald Trump has struggled to keep the National Mall's reflecting pool clear during that celebration.
The Court isn't just the most powerful institution in the United States — the only body capable of overriding both Congress and the president. It is supposed to be the caretaker of something sacred and eternal. As Justice Antonin Scalia once wrote, the whole purpose of a written constitution is "to prevent the law from reflecting certain changes in original values that the society adopting the Constitution thinks fundamentally undesirable."
That is, the Constitution fixes in place certain rights and governmental structures that are not supposed to change just because someone loses an election or because a few seats on the Supreme Court change hands. The right to free speech, the rule establishing that people born in the US are Americans, and the idea that all Americans, including the president, are subject to the same laws are abiding principles that should survive a change in administration or in the Court's makeup.
But this Court does not simply overrule foundational precedents so often it is difficult to keep track; its work is increasingly illegible to people — even lawyers — who do not share the Republican justices' values. I am grateful that I no longer practice law, because one of a lawyer's primary duties is to advise clients on whether something they plan to do in the future is legal. And this Court's interpretations of the law are often too opaque and unpredictable to allow lawyers to advise clients on what the law will be tomorrow ....
.... Today … the Court is dominated by a coalition made up of two camps: very conservative Republicans and fiendishly conservative Republicans. Republican legal elites spend their time crafting legal theories that sound fantastical or even farcical to lawyers who do not belong to their tribe. And when the Supreme Court embraces these theories, they are often impenetrable even to other federal judges.
The Court isn't just the most powerful institution in the United States — the only body capable of overriding both Congress and the president. It is supposed to be the caretaker of something sacred and eternal. As Justice Antonin Scalia once wrote, the whole purpose of a written constitution is "to prevent the law from reflecting certain changes in original values that the society adopting the Constitution thinks fundamentally undesirable."
That is, the Constitution fixes in place certain rights and governmental structures that are not supposed to change just because someone loses an election or because a few seats on the Supreme Court change hands. The right to free speech, the rule establishing that people born in the US are Americans, and the idea that all Americans, including the president, are subject to the same laws are abiding principles that should survive a change in administration or in the Court's makeup.
But this Court does not simply overrule foundational precedents so often it is difficult to keep track; its work is increasingly illegible to people — even lawyers — who do not share the Republican justices' values. I am grateful that I no longer practice law, because one of a lawyer's primary duties is to advise clients on whether something they plan to do in the future is legal. And this Court's interpretations of the law are often too opaque and unpredictable to allow lawyers to advise clients on what the law will be tomorrow ....
.... Today … the Court is dominated by a coalition made up of two camps: very conservative Republicans and fiendishly conservative Republicans. Republican legal elites spend their time crafting legal theories that sound fantastical or even farcical to lawyers who do not belong to their tribe. And when the Supreme Court embraces these theories, they are often impenetrable even to other federal judges.
Actually, what is missing from the long ellipsis is a discussion of the important role of swing justices, compared to commentary by "right=leaning scholar" Richard Re "discussing why 'America's two competing legal cultures' have diverged".
And no such consideration is complete without pretty much standardized warnings to Democrats and liberals to not be too ambitious in trying to fix the problem:
A few shifts in the Court's makeup could bring even more disruption, as the new guard casts aside decisions they find repulsive or that they simply cannot comprehend.
In the worst case scenario for this Court, Democratic lawmakers who believe that the justices have weaponized the law against them could retaliate in ways that the Court cannot defend itself against.
In the worst case scenario for this Court, Democratic lawmakers who believe that the justices have weaponized the law against them could retaliate in ways that the Court cannot defend itself against.
Even still, what follows is a reflection on the "Alitoification of Brett Kavanaugh", how "The Republican justices also abandoned the moral high ground on Roe v. Wade" and "The Supreme Court's 2nd Amendment decisions are illegible even to other federal judges", and the idea that "There's a difference between an illegible Supreme Court decision, and one that is merely wrong", before observing, "The Court's inability to explain itself makes it weak":
In a 2023 interview, Justice Alito complained that his Court is "being hammered daily" by critics of its decisions, and he claimed that lawyers have an obligation to close ranks around him. "The idea has always been that judges are not supposed to respond to criticisms," Alito said, "but if the courts are being unfairly attacked, the organized bar will come to their defense."
Instead, Alito lamented, some lawyers have "participated to some degree in these attacks."
Unlike Alito, I do not believe that I gave up my First Amendment right to criticize my own government when I swore the oath that admitted me to the bar. But even if I wanted to defend this Court's behavior, I often do not know how.
How am I supposed to explain a shadow docket decision that the Court hasn't even bothered to explain itself? How do I defend justices who've abandoned principles that they've advocated for decades, and who, again, did so without explaining why? How can I even articulate an argument in favor of Alito's position that the Constitution, which has guaranteed citizenship to nearly everyone born in the United States for 158 years, suddenly does not?
Nor am I the only one who is experiencing this discomfort and who is beginning to question whether this Court should continue to wield the enormous influence it has over hundreds of millions of people's lives.
Instead, Alito lamented, some lawyers have "participated to some degree in these attacks."
Unlike Alito, I do not believe that I gave up my First Amendment right to criticize my own government when I swore the oath that admitted me to the bar. But even if I wanted to defend this Court's behavior, I often do not know how.
How am I supposed to explain a shadow docket decision that the Court hasn't even bothered to explain itself? How do I defend justices who've abandoned principles that they've advocated for decades, and who, again, did so without explaining why? How can I even articulate an argument in favor of Alito's position that the Constitution, which has guaranteed citizenship to nearly everyone born in the United States for 158 years, suddenly does not?
Nor am I the only one who is experiencing this discomfort and who is beginning to question whether this Court should continue to wield the enormous influence it has over hundreds of millions of people's lives.
†
The underlying problem is a question of good faith. While it is easy enough to recognize the possibility that the conservative majority lacks good faith, history suggests American conservatives have long been this way.
And toward that, consider the idea of a fallacious defense of free speech. This is one of those, if only, things, because there are reasons why such fallacies attract such sympathy; they are, in their way, pervasive.
The difference is that, compared to some abstract freedom of speech in which all utterance is equal for having been uttered, we might continue to protect fallacy within consequential discussion, or despite even our own declared principles of discourse.
And if this is how it goes at the pub, or on some website, or over Thanksgiving dinner with the crazy↗ uncle↗, then, yeah, that's just kind of how it goes. But here, we're talking about the Supreme Court of the United States, which is probably several valences of importance and effect, at least, above, say, the fallacies of Bigfoot believers at some backwater website. The moral of the story is practical, that there is value in observing the difference between fallacies rejected and fallacies required.
It ought to be obvious that those who cannot afford good faith ought not be pretended to afford good faith. This isn't a moral or political assertion, but functional. Once upon a time, it was easy enough to lament a lack of civics education, and remind the need for critical thinking. And it is the very record of our good faith and critical thinking that is being overruled and incoherently overwritten; the point is to create confusion and uncertainty, as the normal definitions of words objectively describe a different result.
What was once the stuff of barflies and extended-family dinners is now the political agenda of the Supreme Court majority. This goes well beyond creationism, forced school prayer, or even Bigfoot. We know why these political interests refuse history; we can only wonder why those who pretend to not support them would hope to validate and legitimize that refusal. That is to say↗, Looking back, it's easy to wonder if people really were such suckers, or if maybe there was something that was just that much more important to them. Consider the result of their advocacy and pitch; no wonder so many people want to forget the past.¹
It's a classic conundrum: Sinister, or just stupid?
But this is the price of how many lifetimes wasted on fallacy. This is what such priority brings.
____________________
Notes:
¹ see also, "Supremacism and the Right Wing: Republicans and the American Right Wing" #99↗ (2026)—
—and, oh, yeah, there's also "The Epstein files" #195↗ (2025): "Then again, no wonder conservatives forget history." It's the sort of thing that will just keep coming up.
「It's the thing about politics: Someone says something, someone else says something else, and it's hard to know who's right, except sometimes it is kind of like when the one says science and the other says young-Earth creationism because God is great; if you look beyond the mere fact of being told two different things, you might be able to discern a little bit about who's right, or who to believe, or, at least, who is making believe, pretending, insupportable, &c.
You don't suddenly become ignorant and unable to remember science just because another person told you the Earth is six-thousand years old. Just like you don't need to be confused just because your favorite celebrity wants to rehash rightist-Christianist propaganda like it's new. Just like you don't need to forget history because someone you don't like happens to coincide with the right answer.」
You don't suddenly become ignorant and unable to remember science just because another person told you the Earth is six-thousand years old. Just like you don't need to be confused just because your favorite celebrity wants to rehash rightist-Christianist propaganda like it's new. Just like you don't need to forget history because someone you don't like happens to coincide with the right answer.」
—and, oh, yeah, there's also "The Epstein files" #195↗ (2025): "Then again, no wonder conservatives forget history." It's the sort of thing that will just keep coming up.
Millhiser, Ian. "The Supreme Court can no longer explain itself". Vox. 3 July 2026. Vox.com. 5 July 2026. https://www.vox.com/politics/494282/supreme-court-illegible