cole grey: "Inaccuracies, misimpressions, and misapprehensions" may be considered false.
I don't think I was challenging the veracity of the concepts themselves, but juxtaposed alongside their opposites these hi-light assessment of pursuance: one is either accurate or not
in retrospect. Therefore, to be accurate or inaccurate during one's pursuance is not pertinent—it is the
method of our approach to the pursuance of a situation, person, or thing that is. And how can Method be false or correct without a full inspection of its handiwork
afterwards to prove it?!
kriminal: I was saying the mind was flawed, in the sense that it is capable of producing mutually exclusive beliefs on the same subject with roughly the same information.
If one
deliberately assumes an incorrect observation and proceeds to act upon it, deceiving everyone else in the process and corrupting—not, in this case, a situation, person, or thing—but the entity of their distinctiveness... then I would think that that person has a flawed character. But can a person deliberately assume a correct observation?: concepts don't always translate into their crude antitheses.
(Q): The mind cannot be flawed due to its ability to find a variety of conclusions to one answer. On the contrary, that ability is an asset and is the crux of the scientific method; the need to falsify.
—assuming that those answers lend justice to the merits of an entity. And assuming that that entity is also multifaceted. But some entities are jealous lovers—they will not desire to dilute the significance of their description.
Hipparchia: [...] that they could hold two contradictory thoughts in their mind at the same time.
Hence they are not committed to the truth—they are evaluating two positions.
This sounded like nonsense at first, but then I thought about it and was reminded of the way drawings or photographs can trick your mind as to the perspective. You know, like looking at craters on the moon. If the light is from a certain angle they look like domes, not depressions.
That is, aligning one's self to a
position: casting value—exercising disposition.
So I wonder if this ability to simultaneously believe to mutally exclusive things [...]
Believe?
[...] may not be part of what allows us to be imaginative and versatile in our thinking.
Or quite simply, allows us to be calculating and prudent in our regard but never quite committed; not allowing ourselves a full impact of substance; never reaching a sense of
finality. But then again, justice isn't always the motivating factor.