What qualifies as science?

You're right of course and I used the wrong term. But I hope it did convey the differences between a waterline and an electric line. In "off the water continues to press against the valve and fills the pipe, perhaps to breaking point. OTOH disconnect an electrical circuit the, the current just disappears leaving perhaps some residue. But it certainly does not cannot build up, there is noting to connect to or flow to at all. No fuse has ever blown from no current. A "short circuit", yes. Yet the potential remains as a latent ability.
Turn the switch to "on" and nearly instantly (depending on the length and thickness of the wire) there it is again, a steady flow of current.

 

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There are no wires without trillions of electrical charges moving around in them. What's a dead wire?

If either one is relevant here, yes.

Not with caterpillars.

What "it" are you talking about?
What is "inherent" about possibilities (one class of meanings for "potential") that only exist in certain contexts?

Electrical potential does not exist before itself.

What's "mathematical" about the existence of a future?

 

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The relationship between the variables that are expressed in the equations on the physicist's chalkboard appear to be preserved when physical reality is interrogated in experiments or observations. There's an isomorphism there, an identity of abstract form. I think that abstract form is what Write4U wants to call a 'function' and I'm not convinced that he's wrong.

Sure, I won't argue with that. I'm just saying that the mathematics on the chalkboard seems to capture something of the form, the structure, of how the things that all those concepts refer to fit together and interrelate quantitatively in reality.

In our understanding perhaps. I'm less convinced that whatever the concepts refer to is more fundamental or somehow prior ontologically. I'm willing to say that the universe most likely behaved in accordance with the 'laws of physics' long before human beings existed or had scientific concepts, and will continue to do so long after we are extinct. Cosmologists certainly assume that when they make their speculations. The formal structure seems to be inherent in what reality is. (That's one of the many places where physics slides over into metaphysics.)

I certainly agree with that. It's obviously true of biological science (which was the science I studied in university). I certainly don't want to say that all of science, or all of reality, is nothing but mathematics. But I do think that it's undeniable that a formal structure exists in reality itself (reality isn't chaos) that our mathematical concepts are peculiarly capable of capturing and seem very akin to. (We still don't even know what mathematics is or even how human beings know about it.)

 

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In order for any physical event to occur, it would seem to have to be possible. Not just logically possible, but physically possible. It will (arguably) have to conform to the principles (the 'laws') of physics.

The more that the values of preceeding variables are specified, the more the range of physically possible outcomes is constrained. Push that to its limit and you get causal determinism.

So I agree that the formal principles of physics (seem to) define what is physically possible in our universe, those events that have the potential of happening. Combined with values for all the variables, they might (arguably) define physical actuality. (There are going to be issues regarding emergence, reducibility and perhaps quantum uncertainty.)

(I think that it's way too early for me to form any conclusions about the ultimate nature of reality. I'm just speculating about the kind of metaphysics seemingly implied by physical science, without necessarily committing myself to its truth.)

 

I fully buy the idea that there is order in reality that we try to capture in our models, by means of mathematics where we can. That seems indisputable. If that is what you mean by a "formal structure" then I have no issue with that.

What I do have an issue with is the notion that physical reality is mathematics. That seems to me to be several steps too far, for the reasons I have given. It seems to me that mathematics can describe the relations between conceptual entities, but those conceptual entities have to be described, by non-mathematical means, first, in order to be comprehensible to humanity. Since mathematics is by itself inherently abstract, it seems to me there has to be this step of recognising the apparent existence of physical concepts, before mathematics can be brought to bear. Surely these physical entities, whatever they are, and how ever imperfectly expressed by current human models of them, must first exist for there to be any sense in statements about them obeying any sort of order, whether mathematical or otherwise. If that is so, then there must be more to physical reality than mere mathematics.

 

The latter is obviously possible. The former depends on the definition of the word gay one uses. But what does this have to do with the fundamental abstract common denominator? You have pointed out a difference between the two, not a common denominator.

Right, so you say that "an evolutionary process of word morphing" is the fundamental abstract common denominator between the different definitions of the word "gay". You are clearly referring to the changing over time of the usage of the word; its etymology. This explanation of the term "fundamental abstract common denominator" appears to be in conflict with your post #480, where you said:

So please tell me: how is "that which may become reality" (which refers to physicality) the same as "an evolutionary process of word morphing" (which refers to etymology)? In other words, how can "the fundamental abstract common denominator" of different definitions of a word be a useful concept if it refers to a common feature of the definitions in one instance, but to the history of said definitions in another? Please give your definition of "fundamental abstract common denominator".

(Note: You are clearly referencing the etymology of the word here.)

 

The common denominator : In your example, although the terms are unrelated, it is politically acceptable to both sides. Fundamentally the word "gay" is neutral in regard the sexual orientation of the person, but is equitable to a commonly observed behavior. It is a euphemism

The definition of "queer" is also used to identify homosexuals, but is from the perspective of a "straight" person, and a common denominator can be found in that euphemism such as "different from the norm".
But being called a "queer" attains a derogatory meaning to a homosexual person, who sees him/herself as a normal person (which they are), but who is attracted to persons of the same sex.
But I have already stated that the word "gay", in context of homosexuality, is a misnomer, a colloquialisms.

Is it wonder the bible speaks of "confounding language"?

The original point I was making is that in conversational language there need not necessarily be underlying commonality.
French words for things are not the same as the English word for the same things, even as they mean exactly the same thing. The commonality lies in the thing these different words describe, but need to be translated (qualified).

But in science, we use a consistent symbolized language (the scribbles on the blackboard), which demand absolute clarity.

However the narrative has a certain freedom of explaining the underlying laws of nature, by using examples of the various expressions of those laws and the occasional use of a colloquialism.

I agree that the exact proper use of narrative terms is preferential, but if accompanied by a scientific symbolic equation, then even an approximate narrative or a colloquialism can be understood , in that context.

"Spooky action at a distance" does not have any scientific meaning in and of itself, but if used in context of "entanglement", we understand the meaning of that phrase.

But that does not mean that; spooky action = entanglement.

 

So the common denominator for the two definitions of "gay" is that both definitions are politically acceptable to both sides. OK.

I guess that also answers my question as to what the common denominator of the different definitions of "potential" is. So when you said that had something to do with "that which may become reality", you were mistaken. OK.

How can you find a common denominator between one thing? Don't you need (at least) two things to find common denominators? (Edit: Already answered below.)

Ah, you're seeing the non-insulting version of "queer" and the derogatory version of "queer" as two distinct definitions of the word. OK.

Seeing that there are multiple known translation mistakes in various editions of the bible, I'd say that the bible is in multiple ways a good example of "confounding language".

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Are you suggesting that "conversational" definitions of words don't count when trying to establish common denominators? How does one determine whether a certain definition is "conversational"?

...Are you being confounded by language now? Of course the French write down different scribbles than the English do! But this has no bearing on or is in any way relevant to our discussion.

Indeed, so the next time you use scientific terms, please provide that absolute clarity!

Yes, but whenever somebody doesn't understand the approximate narrative or a colloquialism, the speaker has to be able to switch to the clear language of science and explain it in those unambiguous terms. Depending on approximations and colloquialisms is not only bad form, it's a terrible idea communication-wise.

It depends on the context. For example, Newtonian gravity can also be called "spooky action at a distance", because it is infinitely fast. However, that's obviously not entanglement. In the context of Quantum Mechanics, usually "spooky action at a distance" indeed refers to "entanglement", so the two are then used equivalently. Just note that "entanglement" is the official term, while "spooky action at a distance" is an Einstein quote. The choice between these two can change the tone of the text, so they in that sense not equal.

 

Push that to its limit and you get errors of prediction.

1) The values for all the variables cannot be combined like that, according to the formal principles involved.
2) This basic description often holds for several different and conflicting sets of formal principles in any given situation, and it also holds for things like cartoon explications of physical patterns or "laws". Are we prepared to say that the universe behaves according to the behavior of pixels in an animated youtube cartoon?

 

OK, I concede that not all definitions of the same word have an immediate logical common denominator.
But what difference does it make? Words are human inventions and there many reasons why a specific words has in fact two specific definitions, and in themselves have no common denominator.

But as long as we can devise categories and synonyms of words , it is likely that they have a fundamental common denominator.

 

Not just one - a collection or cloud or them, from which each metaphorical use draws on a selection or aspect.

 

I can agree with that. But that does not negate my argument that sometimes many of these selections and aspects are derived from a deeper underlying commonality, a common denominator. Synonyms almost always describe the same fundamental phenomena, but from a different perspective

• and
  http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ab13#ixzz4w8XTHBkT

 

Then we agree there!

Do the different definitions of the word "potential" as you use them have a common denominator?

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Likely, sure, but not necessarily.

 

In context that all things were, are, and will be preceded by a potential, can you think of one?

 

What does all this discussion of word meaning have to do with the applicability of mathematics to the physical world?

And what does the applicability of mathematics to the physical world have to do with what does and doesn't qualify as science, the thread's original topic?

Things seem to meandering in a stream-of-consciousness fashion.

 

I see potential as a latent or expressed value or ability, which would indicate a mathematical foundation how an event becomes expressed.

If my viewpoint is correct, it would be a form of mathematical function.

Perhaps that may seem so at the face of it, but in context of a latent or expressed mathematical function (including brain functions), the term common denominator would hold true, even as there exist several types of potential.

The thrust of the argument that potential always precedes expression in our reality, mostly that which we can observe, and more subtly the hierarchy of orders from pure potential (the sum of all probabilities) from which implicates (specific forms of potential) form, some with a low degree of probability, some with a high degree of probability of becoming expressed .
when the sum of probabilities adds up to 100%, at that instant the event is explicated.
In that respect IMO, we are still discussing in context of science and it's relationship to our symbolic scientific translations of observed reality and how this actually happens in reality.

 

Is there any need for all uses of the word 'potential' to have a common denominator, provided that one's intended meaning when using the word is reasonably clear?

In the context of this thread, 'potential' seems very close to 'possibility'. If something has the potential of occurring, then one would seem to be asserting the possibility of it occurring.

There are different kinds of possibility. Logical possibility is a loose one. Physical possibility is much more restrictive, where a physical event is only possible if it is consistent with the laws of nature along with existing conditions.

That's where we seem to encounter your 'functions', in discovering and describing the 'laws of nature'.

Trying to understand what's happening there does indeed return us closer to the original topic of the thread, since physics at least is concerned with doing exactly that. (It's less clear that biology is.)

 

Please stop shifting the burden of proof. You are making the claim that all definitions of the word "potential" have a fundamental abstract common denominator, not me.

Additionally, you have just restricted the question to only certain definitions of the word "potential". For example, you've excluded the electric potential. You have changed the question.

So I will ask you again: do the different definitions of the word "potential" as you use them have a common denominator?

 

I think that sounds very much like possibility. As I suggested in posts #504 and 517, I don't have any problem with using the word 'potential' that way. It seems like a very natural usage to me.

Not necessarily. Only if those possibilities are governed logically in a rule-like way.

I agree that the laws of nature, both as expressed in chalk in physics classrooms and in the relationship between observed variables in nature, do seem to take a form very similar to mathematical functions.

I'm not sure that biologists use the word 'function' in quite the same way that mathematicians do. For biologists, 'function' is more teleological, it describes what role something is playing in a biological organism, its 'purpose' in other words. The function of the heart is to pump blood, the function of a particular brain structure is storing and organizing memory or whatever it might be.

In order for something to actually happen in physical reality, it would have to be physically possible for that event to happen in those circumstances. That would seem to be a matter of both the applicable 'laws of physics' and the circumstances. (The more precisely we specify the circumstances, the more we restrict the range of what might conceivably happen.)

Another way of saying that might be to say that the 'potential' for event A happening would have to exist in those particular circumstances in order for event A to actually happen. (Without necessarily reifying potentials into peculiar kinds of existants.)

 

I don't see that, especially in terms such as "potential".

Even in your example of synonyms, much more closely related than metaphors, we see that some of the "different perspectives" seem to involve phenomena quite as "fundamental" to each word as the identities. The words "shut" and "close", offered as synonyms in your link, for instance: the senses of "shut" referring to a bifurcating hinged barrier of some rigidity, "close" referring not so much to a barrier as a confined volume, seem as fundamental to the meanings of these words as the circumstance that they can sometimes refer to the same action or object.