What does it mean to "think"? This used to be a hot topic within philosophy. Questions in philosophy of mind these days typically involve more abstruse notions such as "qualia", "the explanatory gap", and the ubiquitous "consciousness". However, due in part to concerns raised in another thread (Searle's Chinese Room Argument...) and in part for entertainment and hopefully education, I'd like to review one well-established response to our anachronistic original question. Most philosophers are sensitive to anthropomorphic criticism, we do not want to limit an activity as neutral as "thinking" to beings which just happen to be this particular contingent result of natural selection on this little speck of a planet. Perhaps animals, or aliens should not be immediately eliminated from the group. However, as soon as we remove the specific substrate (human brains) from our formulation, it seems as though perhaps even a machine may qualify. What machine may be fancy enough to pull off something as advanced as "thought"? Well, many suspect it would be the computer. So, can a computer think? I believe Turing is entirely right to dismiss the "common sense" version of the question. If one does not have a pre-determined set of necessary and sufficient conditions for "thought", it's a mug's game. And no one has yet come up with a widely accepted non-arbitrary definition. Not to mention, that even if one did, one would still likely be subject to the (painfully overblown) "problem of other minds": even if we know what thinking is, how do we know that any humans do it? And since humans are the paradigm case of doing...whatever this activity we call "thinking" is, one is not in an enviable position. Given this conundrum, Turing proposes instead to deflate the issue, by proposing a test which removes the necessity of defining thought in the first place, and instead using a scientific procedure to determine if any agent can accomplish whatever this ability humans call "thinking" can accomplish. He called it "The Imitation Game", it has since become referred to as the "Turing Test". Turing's original description runs thus: Many Turing Tests have been attempted in practice. One such, the Loebner Prize, describes its more modern methodology: (No programs have yet passed the test). As an introduction to the Computational Theory of Mind, we knowledge with functionalism and against anthropocentrism, that whatever our definition of mental phenomena are, they must be substrate neutral. This combined with the mathematical result we call the Church-Turing thesis: that any computable function is Turing Machine computable (all contemporary computers qualify). And we support the methodology of the Turing Test, such that if a computer (formal symbol manipulation system) can chat successfully with a human, we have no reason to deny it entrance to the charmed circle of "conscious". It may turn out, in the end, that not only can computers think, but that we are just such computers ourselves.