Frontline on Afghanistan: The War Briefing

We won the war in Europe in less than three years using vastly inferior weapons and equipment than we have today. Yet the US has been in Afg for over six years and we're no closer to victory than we were five years ago. Now that simply has to tell you something, don't it?

We fought in Vietnam in almost the exact same ways as we're using now in Afg, and we finally had to pull out after 10 years of "playing around" in the jungles and swamps and mountains. We refused to fight a war, we just played at war ....just like you're doing in Afg. We lost in Vietnam, we'll lose in Afg and Iraq for almost exactly the same reasons ....we refuse to fight because we're a bunch of mamby-pamby doo-gooders and we're scared of hurting someone's feelings in the rest of the world.

And it's so strange to me that we can't, or refuse, to see that.

With Hussien Osama as the new president, the wars in Afg and Iraq are over ....and we'll pull out with our tails stuck between our legs just like we did in Vietnam.

Baron Max

 

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It's just excuses for not winning a war, that's all. And don't get me wrong, I can understand why we want to make such excuses ...we've become weak and ineffective as a military force, largely because of the mamb-pamby liberal attitudes that have become prevalent in the US. We have an odd need to be all things to all people, to make everyone happy. And it ain't gonna' work.

Baron Max

 

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You seem to keep forgetting that the Germans invaded from another country, wearing uniforms, moving in massed formations, speaking a different language.

The Taliban are mostly locals who don't wear uniforms and look and speak like the local population. They only fight when the odds are in their favor and then disappear back into the population. The Afgans are not like the French who wecomed and supported the Allies as they pushed the German army out. The Taliban is not a a foreigh invading army that plays by the rules.
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One of the reasons we did so poorly in Viet Nam is because it took too long for our military to realze it's not 1943 anymore.

 

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Ahh, but you forgot one important thing in your list ....they also hid in French towns and cities, in French farmhouses and barns, in French fields and pastures. And they used those French structures for cover from hostile fire. See, not much different to the Taliban and extremists in Afg, or the terrorists and insurgents in Iraq. Hmm?

You are so wrong that I'm tempted to not even respond. But I'll do so because you're so fuckin' ignorant that I just can't let you walk around the streets being so fuckin' ignorant!!

The reason we lost in Vietnam is because we DIDN'T fight like 1943. If we had, we'd have been done with that war in a year. We tried to be the nice guys to all people, all the time. And we tried to coddle the nosey fuckin' press.

We fought the enemy, beat the shit outta' him, drove him off, ....then left and gave all that territory right back to him. And then the next week, we'd go out to the same area, beat the shit outta' him, chase him off, .....then leave and let him move right back into the same territory. And we did that for 10 years and never learned one single thing from it. We're doing the same things now in Afg and Iraq. And in the end, we'll crawl off with our tails between our legs once again ...because we're unwilling to fight a war as it should be fought ...blood, guts and lots of destruction and death.

Read some decent history ..not just the "history" that's written by the mamby-pamby, doo-gooder, liberal, non-violent folks of the world. Try to find a real history without the bullshit of liberalism in it.

Baron Max

 

I see that you didn't address the differences in alignment between the local population and the hostile parties in each respective conflict, like the guy you're responding to pointed out. Why not?

 

Ah, so you don't know it. Fine, you'll figure it out eventually. The Pashtun are not a people who will give in. You could always kill all of them, I guess.

 

Because it should be the same ...you don't fight a war by worrying about someone not liking you! You don't have to shoot some of those people, like we didn't shoot the French if we could help it, but there's not much difference.

In France and Belgium, if the Germans were in some town or city, that town got smashed by artillery and bombs and grenades and rifle fire ...until the Germans quit firing. No would worried about who liked who or why.

And, .....we were done and home in less than three years. Don't that tell you nothing? Do you not learn anything from history?

In Afg, where practically everyone is cheering for the insurgents, then why worry about them? If you're taking enemy fire from some house/structure in a village, you blow the livin' shit outta' that structure. Kill everyone and everything in it until you're no longer taking fire. Afterward, you can worry about who likes who and why. Maybe if y'all take that approach, then more of the Afg will openly dislike you, then you can just blow hell outta' everything and not worry at all about "the people".

What we're trying to do in Afg is to be all things to all people. We tried that in Vietnam and it caused more harm than good. If we'd just blown through that county with all the firepower available, we'd have won and we'd have been home in a year. As it was, we fucked around over there for 10 years, then slinked back home in shame .....just like you're gonna' do in a few more months or years.

IF you do nothing else, learn from history.

Baron Max

 

So, is that to say that all Pashtun are all alike??

If so, that sure would make fighting those people easier. Perhaps you can tell President Bush and Secretary Gates that observation?

Baron Max

 

I think all Americans are also probably like that. Or do you think killing a sufficient number of Americans would make them more agreeable to a foreign society taking over theirs?

Historically, the Afghanis are not very good at following other people. Its not something that works with them. But, its your money and blood to spend. However, one would wonder exactly what the aim is here. They are not going to become a different people from what they are.

 

Chewbacca defense so soon? You're getting lazy.

The blatantly obvious difference that you continue to miss is that the ETO wasn't a counterinsurgency fight. There were no hearts and minds that needed winning. The local populations were already on our side. Iraq and Afghanistan, not so much.

 

The ol' hearts n' minds excuse, huh? A catch phrase invented, I think, as an excuse for not fighting and winning the war in Vietnam. A phrase that actually means "politicians won't allow the military to fight a war - even tho they sent us here to fight a war". A phrase, maybe, to mean "this is war where we can't kill anyone or hurt any buildings".

Okay, but let's be sure that we're talking about the same people. You're worried about winning the hearts n' minds of ...people who have been killing and blowing up their own countrymen for thousands of years, right? People who now, regularly, blow up and kill their own countrymen? ...over some minor little infraction or something that pisses them off? Those people?

Those are the people whose hearts n' minds you actually want to win?

I'm most curious ..."when/if" you should ever win those hearts n' minds, would you be willing to trust people like that with your life? Remember now, they kill and blow up their OWN countrymen, yet you're going to win their hearts n' minds. Echo, just how naive do you think I am?

In WW II, we didn't worry about hearts n' minds. In Tunisia, in Sicily, in Italy, in France or in Belgium, no one worried about hearts n' minds ...we worked at winning the war. And ya' know what, we did win the war.

In Vietnam, we worried about winning hearts n' minds, too, which essentially tied our hands behind our backs - it forced us not to fight the war. .....and we lost that war for that very reason. And we won the hearts n' minds of very fuckin' few people in those 10 years and more.

And ya' know what? The few people whose hearts n' minds we did win, we abandoned them when we tucked tail and ran. And you expect other people of the world to trust us? Even if some Pashtuns begin to like us, they know that we're gonna' tuck tail and run ...they might live in mud huts, but they ain't stupid. They know we're gonna' abandon them when things get tough or when president Osama takes office soon.

Hearts n' minds, huh? Pashtuns can't win the hearts n' minds of even other Pashtuns, yet you think you can do it?

Baron Max

 

Baron, you're pissing into the wind. You're arguing against facts that are well understood and commonly accepted in the international warfighting community by professional counterinsurgents like David Kilcullen, GEN Petraeus, COL H.R. McMaster, et al. and doing so in a most ignorant and dogmatic manner. If you're so utterly convinced that the coalition just needs to take the kid gloves off and crack some heads, I'm not going to bother trying to convince you otherwise. The facile comparisons you're making between WWII, Vietnam, and the GWOT assure me that you're really too confused to be discussing this.

For some actual content, here is a summary of COL McMaster's work in Tal Afar with the 3rd ACR. McMaster, like Kilcullen and the rest of Petraeus's brain trust, was one of the first to advocate a "clear, hold, build" COIN strategy in Iraq and the first to implement it operationally. Tal Afar in 2005 was one of the few areas in Iraq where we were actually fighting a proper COIN campaign, and the results spoke loud and clear. With the supporting manpower of the 2007 surge force, COL McMaster's archetype was extrapolated to other areas of Iraq with good result. There is ample empirical evidence supporting the case that defies everything you've been arguing thus far.

If you really want a detailed analysis from a slightly more arcane perspective, the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College has something here. (PDF)

Kilcullen has made some great posts over at Small Wars Journal since he's been working for the US military, which are rounded up here.

You've been led to water.

 

Yep, and isn't that what "they" said about man ever flying? Or about the Earth being flat? Or about the Earth being the center of the universe? Or a myriad of other such "...well understood and commonly accepted..." issues?

What is it, Echo? Following the ol' party line is the easiest approach?

What's really interesting to me is first, how "they" arrived at all these wonderous counter-insurgency tactics. And second, where they've ever worked anywhere in the world. You say "facts", yet where have they ever been proven? I know of no place where such tactics or methods have worked, yet "they" know that it will work. How?

Yes, on a very small, very limited situation. But not all things can be expanded with the same results. And the results in all of Afg is practically proof that the tactics aren't working. Yet you hold stauncely to them as if they're proven tactics?

I have great regard for General Petraeus, but not for those tactics! I respect him for being able to hold to those confining, political tactics even in the face of continued problems with those same tactics.

So tell me, Echo, where have these tactics ever worked in the world? Where have they been proven as a viable method of war?

Baron Max

 

Malayan Emergency. That was hard!

If you had any idea of the situation on the ground in Afghanistan you wouldn't be embarassing yourself like this. Hell, if you had even read the first post in this thread or watched the Frontline documentary that started it, you would know that the COIN strategy in Afghanistan has lacked effectiveness due to insufficient resources (mostly diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian) being committed to shoring up our military successes.

Something else for you to not read:

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200810/afghan

 

Taliban are the Pashtun. Its like saying:



The Christians are well aware that the center of gravity in Europe is the rural white district and village...

 

Echo3Romeo, David Kilcullen, GEN Petraeus, COL H.R. McMaster, are not using the Hearts and Minds strategies that were inflicted on us in Vietnam, the strategy your are talking about is far and away different than what was employed in Vietnam.

In Vietnam, the major missing peace was the take and hold part, and that is straight out of conventional war in WWII, you take the ground and you don't let the enemy have it back.

There were battle grounds in Vietnam that I fought over 3 time, we would go in and kill a shit load of NVA, and then pick up and let them have it right back.

There was one valley on the Lao border that I lifted troops into 4 time in the course of a year, and after every fight we pulled back and the NVA flowed right back in and rebuild their structure.

That is what Baron is talking about.

In Iraq if my observations are correct we started out using almost the same strategies as Vietnam after the Initial War was over and the insurgence started, and the country turned into a quagmire, we would go into a area and wack a mole, get done and pull back, which allowed the terrorist right back in and any one seen as having helped the Americans was dealt with in a exemplarily manner, so the Terrorist were working their own hearts and minds, break their hearts and make them mind.

It was only after Gen. Petraeus, and his brain trust came in was there a change in strategy, and, "That Was the Take and Hold," when we moved into a area, once we had it we didn't give it back to the Terrorist, we secured it, stabilized it, and kept it that way, and then and only then with the surge did we really make progress in the situation, because then we could work the Hearts and Minds, that works well when the enemy can't come right back in when you leave, the people find they like thing peaceful at heart, and they don't have to worry about getting their minds blown out the back of their head.

 

Never heard of, so I'll have to do some reading.
However, since I haven't heard of it, my best guess is that it was extremely limited in size, duration and population. I know of no other way where "hearts n' minds" could possibly work.

I did read that article! But it changed nothing of my thinking or experience.
But the remainder of your comment tells the exact same story as Vietnam ...insufficient resources and existing resources used incorrectly! See? Right there, Echo, in that one sentence, you've practically foretold of the US/UN defeat in Afg. Amazing that I got through to you ......finally!

Welcome to the lessons of the Vietnam War! I'm so fuckin' glad to see that you've finally seen the truth behind that idiotic ideal of "Hearts n' Minds" bullshit.
Funny, though, shouldn't those lessons have been taught a few years earlier? And, of course, the lessons from WW II re-taught to show how a fuckin' war should be fought?

You're pretty good, Echo, ...late as hell, but good. Those are the lessons that you should have learned from the Vietnam War. Why did you and the US military wait so damned long? Hell, if you'd just asked me, I could have told you all about it. "Hearts n' Minds"? A nice little fairy tale that sounds good on news bits and in congressional hearings. But the reality is .....pppppfffftttt! All bullshit.

But I am glad, even after all this time and wasted energy, you've learned the lessons of war.

Seriously, Echo, read some of the better histories of the Vietnam War, you'll begin to see so many similarities. But remember, read good books, not those written by military haters, or by those overly liberal historians trying to push their own idiotic ideals. There are many good ones by smart military leaders of that time.

Baron Max

 

Understatement of the millenium. You could start by watching David Kilcullen's interview on Charlie Rose. Pay attention starting around 11:20 where he talks about the logic behind the troop surge to Iraq, and proceeds to explain the troop surge and the commitment timetables over the next ten minutes. There are also some good interviews with COL McMaster and GEN Petraeus, whose words should sound familiar to anyone who has been reading my posts. (I realize their wisdom has no traction with you but I'm putting them in here for others.)

 

As much as I would love to continue this thread, my time to do so has nearly expired. The wounded shoulder that has been keeping me sitting behind a desk for nearly 18 months has been operated on and rehabilitated to the point where I'm finally medically fit to deploy again. I'm headed back to Afghanistan on Tuesday with a new ANGLICO team. Which is hilariously ironic given the subject of this thread, but since a number of people have asked, I wanted to let them know and this seems like as good a place as any.

I may not get another chance to post until I've been downrange for a while, and even then seldom to never, as my line of work keeps me outside the wire quite a bit. I'll probably spend a lot of my time in the Ghan sleeping on rocks at 9,000 feet and hidng my shit in a plastic bag, not buttoned up in an air conditioned trailer at Bagram with satellite internet. Without breaking OPSEC I can say that I will not be doing the year long tour that people are used to. This will be my seventh tour overseas since 9/11, and fourth in Afghanistan itself. It is a truly beautiful country and the history of the area is fascinating. I wish I could visit under different circumstances. Maybe one day.

Keep it real, ladies.

 

Borderline comical, that.

Food for thought: why is it that the US local allies in these wars of occupation - the people we are liberating or whatever - don't fight as hard on our side as they do on the other side ?

Note that they do in other kinds of alliances: the Afghans on our side fought very hard against the Soviets, the Philippinos on our side fought very against the Japanese, the French on our side fought much harder than the French on the German occupation side.