Proof that the Christian god cannot exist

[Dywyddyr]

What prediction?

God's knowledge is a prediction. An infallible one (if he's omniscient).

Make up your mind is it knowledge, or a guess?

Try to keep up. I said IF it's knowledge (which is what the claim for god is) then...

Are saying there is a natural law that calculate pre-knowledge = pe-destination?

Huh?

Or is this just a possible outcome?

If it is knowledge (one more time) then it's THE ONLY outcome. As has been said.

[Dywyddyr]

You've changed the word to one which doesn't include seeing the future, and time loops.

That would be incorrect -as quoted:

Determinism is the general philosophical thesis that states that for everything that happens there are conditions such that, given them, nothing else could happen.

Since god is claimed to be perfect in knowledge then he must have perfect knowledge of what every outcome MUST (will) be. He has checked this. There can be NO OTHER OPTION.
His omniscience includes, by definition, knowledge of every cause and therefore every effect.
Therefore he knows exactly how things will turn out: still a fixed future.

[Jan Ardena]

God's knowledge is a prediction. An infallible one (if he's omniscient).


Try to keep up. I said IF it's knowledge (which is what the claim for god is) then...


Huh?


If it is knowledge (one more time) then it's THE ONLY outcome. As has been said.

Therefore ''knowledge'' affects outcomes. That is what you're saying.
My question is How does it?

All you are currently telling me is THAT IT DOES as if it is a forgone conclusion we take for granted.

So once again; How is pre-knowledge linked to pre-destination?


jan.

[Pincho Paxton]

That would be incorrect -as quoted:

Since god is claimed to be perfect in knowledge then he must have perfect knowledge of what every outcome MUST (will) be. He has checked this. There can be NO OTHER OPTION.
His omniscience includes, by definition, knowledge of every cause and therefore every effect.
Therefore he knows exactly how things will turn out: still a fixed future.

I already agreed that that version does not allow Free Will, only time loops allow free will. You are playing Chinese Whispers with the words you are using, and swapping them around now. You chose Predestination, from time loop, and then Determinism from Predestination. By the time you get to the third word, the meaning has changed.

[Dywyddyr]

Therefore ''knowledge'' affects outcomes. That is what you're saying.

No I am not.

My question is How does it?

You tell me, it's not my claim.

So once again; How is pre-knowledge linked to pre-destination?

Ho hum, I'll repeat this again:
The only way the future can be known for certain is if it is fixed.
That means predestination (or, okay, [pre]determinism).
If the future is not fixed then the outcome cannot be known it can only be guessed at or estimated.

This is why I have repeatedly stated: If the knowledge itself is at all available then the future must be fixed.

[Dywyddyr]

only time loops allow free will.

No they do not. And you have done nothing toward demonstrating this, merely claiming it.

You are playing Chinese Whispers with the words you are using, and swapping them around now. You chose Predestination, from time loop, and then Determinism from Predestination. By the time you get to the third word, the meaning has changed.

One more time: you're the one playing with words.
There is NO EFFECTIVE DIFFERENCE.
Yes, I wrote predestination not determinism. Mea culpa.
Where is the practical difference?
I have also stated, many times, that the knowledge itself means the future is fixed (regardless of "method") and regardless of how that knowledge is obtained (and even whether it's obtained or not).

[Jan Ardena]

Dywyddyr,


[QUOTE]No I am not.


You tell me, it's not my claim.[quote]


It's not my claim, and you're the one making all the noise.

Ho hum, I'll repeat this again:
The only way the future can be known for certain is if it is fixed.

Oh hum, unsupported claim.

That means predestination (or, okay [pre]determinsim).

A mere derivitive of your unsupported claim.

If the future is not fixed then the outcome cannot be known it can only be guessed at or estimated.

Should we take your word for it?
Or can you elaborate on why this is the case?
Or is it, ''just is that way''?
Is that based on your knowledge or something else?

This is why I have repeatedly stated: If the knowledge itself is at all available then the future must be fixed.

Yes, you keep repeating yourself, most probably to avoid questions where you
have to actually think about what you are saying.

You've got nothing Dyw, but wishful thinking.
What a waste of time.

Bye
jan.

[Dywyddyr]

It's not my claim, and you're the one making all the noise.

So your point is that neither of us made that claim. Okay.

Oh hum, unsupported claim.

Really?
How can it be known if it's variable?

A mere derivitive of your unsupported claim.

Go ahead, I'm dying to hear this.^

Should we take your word for it?
Or can you elaborate on why this is the case?
Or is it, ''just is that way''?
Is that based on your knowledge or something else?

Which part of "can only be estimated or estimated" did you miss?
Does simple logic fail you?
The only way a fully definitive correct and final answer can be given is if there is only one answer.

Yes, you keep repeating yourself, most probably to avoid questions where you have to actually think about what you are saying.

Really? Then ask one.

You've got nothing Dyw, but wishful thinking.

And all you have is claims that I'm doing so.
You have so far presented NOTHING whatsoever.

Bye

Well at least you're running away before you resort to lies again.
As they say: thank heaven for small mercies.

[wynn]

No duress required.

I bring up duress because in ordinary law, duress is seen as a factor that diminishes free will.

If a person is recognized to have done something under duress (such as hitting back someone who assaulted them), then they are not judged by the same principles as they would would such duress not be present.

[wynn]

How many more times?
If god knows BEFORE THE CHOICE was made then he cannot choose anything other than what god knows he will.

If the future is known then it is fixed. If it is fixed there is no free will.

If he cannot do otherwise then he has no choice.

It's quite simple: if he cannot make any other choice then free will does not exist.

Nothing to do with "changing his mind". If he cannot do other than what god knows he will do then he has no free will.

I don't think this is a complete analysis, and I think that because of its incompleteness, arrives at the wrong conclusion.


If I want to do A, I will do everything in my power to do A.


To say that my free will is limited by my desires, my values, my beliefs, is absurd.
To say that my desires, my values, my beliefs are blocking my free will, is absurd.

My free will can only operate within the givens of my desires, my values, my beliefs.

It is only within the domain of my desires, my values, my beliefs that my free will can operate at all. It does not apply outside of them.


And of course, God, or other fairly knowledgeable beings may know my desires, my values, my beliefs, and they may know the outcomes of my actions - but that does not do away with or diminish my desires, my values, my beliefs, or my actions.


I still think that you are operating out of the idea that true free will would be one where there are no givens - no identity, no desires, no values, no beliefs.


I think your analysis is incomplete, as it neglects to acknowledge what is necessary for free will to operate at all; namely desires, values, beliefs.

Your assumption seems to be that free will would exist only if there would be no identity whatsoever, nothing preset, no givens.

I don't think that's what I'm assuming.

I.e. I may have a predilection for apples, but I could decide to go, just this once, for a pear.

If you love apples, you will strive to eat apples and you will enjoy eating them.

However, you may also become convinced of some health benefits of pears, so on occasion you will eat pears - but you will not enjoy them (that is if your true nature is to love apples at the exclusion of any other fruit).

[wynn]

If the scope for free will is contained within the parameters of certain constraints (based on previous use of free will) you have a system where free will can co-exist with providence.

For instance if you are in a jail that serves only apples, apples is all you will get once your free will lands you there. Or if you use your free will to board a plane to London, you won't be going to Paris.

In this way the consequences of our free will shape the environment that we utilize it in the future (call it karma).

In this way, conditioned existence offers a very marginal scope for free will since existence is mostly about reaping the consequences of previous acts.

I don't think the above is a complete analysis and I don't think it addresses the aspect of the free will problem that Dyw is bringing up.

[wynn]

Dyw, why is it so important that you are right?

This is a discussion forum, not a session in political correctness!

[Dywyddyr]

To say that my free will is limited by my desires, my values, my beliefs, is absurd.
To say that my desires, my values, my beliefs are blocking my free will, is absurd.
My free will can only operate within the givens of my desires, my values, my beliefs.
It is only within the domain of my desires, my values, my beliefs that my free will can operate at all. It does not apply outside of them.
And of course, God, or other fairly knowledgeable beings may know my desires, my values, my beliefs, and they may know the outcomes of my actions - but that does not do away with or diminish my desires, my values, my beliefs, or my actions.

All of this still boils down to: we actually don't have a choice - we WILL pick A regardless of what we tell ourselves.

I still think that you are operating out of the idea that true free will would be one where there are no givens - no identity, no desires, no values, no beliefs.

I don't see that it matters in the end (although, again, I'm not sure I agree). We have no actual "choice" in the matter.

I think your analysis is incomplete, as it neglects to acknowledge what is necessary for free will to operate at all; namely desires, values, beliefs.

I don't see that as relevant. For the reasons given.

If you love apples, you will strive to eat apples and you will enjoy eating them.
However, you may also become convinced of some health benefits of pears, so on occasion you will eat pears - but you will not enjoy them (that is if your true nature is to love aples at the exclusion of any other fruit).

Yet the switch would not be, as you explained earlier, a matter of CHOICE - it's just the (inevitable, sole possible) outcome of the circumstances.

If there is only one possible outcome then where lies the choice?

[wynn]

(On the other hand, how do I know that I wasn't predisposed to choose a pear this time? )

I can't quite put my finger on this, but something doesn't seem right with this.

You appear to be introducing a basic and complex epistemic (and ontological) doubt.

The way your line of reasoning goes, one would have to be an extreme epistemic egoist to resolve this doubt.
I've posted about extreme epistemic egoism before. (Extreme) epistemic egoism is an internally illogical position.

Perhaps read Richard Foley's "Intellectual trust in oneself and others" and other works on epistemic ego(t)ism.

[wynn]

All of this still boils down to: we actually don't have a choice - we WILL pick A regardless of what we tell ourselves.

What do you mean by this "regardless of what we tell ourselves"?

If there is only one possible outcome then where lies the choice?

If we are satisfied with what we do, then the problem of choice does not exist.

[Dywyddyr]

I can't quite put my finger on this, but something doesn't seem right with this.

Oh, that one.
On that particular occasion I was being somewhat flippant (i.e. we can't[?] know if we truly have free will or just a satisfying illusion of it).
But your argument here:

Originally Posted by Signal
To say that my free will is limited by my desires, my values, my beliefs, is absurd.
To say that my desires, my values, my beliefs are blocking my free will, is absurd.
My free will can only operate within the givens of my desires, my values, my beliefs.
It is only within the domain of my desires, my values, my beliefs that my free will can operate at all. It does not apply outside of them.
And of course, God, or other fairly knowledgeable beings may know my desires, my values, my beliefs, and they may know the outcomes of my actions - but that does not do away with or diminish my desires, my values, my beliefs, or my actions.

does (to me) indicate that we don't.

I.e. our desires etc are essentially preset, which leads us on to other things that affect those desires, all of which is totally transparent to god (supposedly) but, in the end, lead to one outcome only on each possible decision.

You appear to be introducing a basic and complex epistemic (and ontological) doubt.

Meh, certainly. And essentially fruitless methinks.

Perhaps read Richard Foley's "Intellectual trust in oneself and others" and other works on epistemic ego(t)ism.

I'll try to get a copy.

(Edit: good grief!! I just checked Amazon - sixty quid!?! Time to start haunting university town second-hand bookshops I think.)

[Aqueous Id]

If there is only one possible outcome then where lies the choice?

Touche I would say. Well said, memorable.
So the other side, forced by logic to accept this, is left with the very troubling ramifications:

(a) free will is an illusion; followed by: God is a trickster, or
(b) God isn't what he/she/it is cracked up to be; followed by: religion is a trickster

sounds plausible to me.

[wynn]

Oh, that one.
On that particular occasion I was being somewhat flippant (i.e. we can't[?] know if we truly have free will or just a satisfying illusion of it.

But your argument here:

does (to me) indicate that we don't.

I.e. our desires etc are essentially preset, which leads us on to other things that affect those desires, all of which is totally transparent to god (supposedly) but, in the end, lead to one outcome only on each possible decision.

That you think my argument here indicates that we don't have free will,
to me indicates that you believe free will would only apply if we had no desires etc.


It is precisely when we act in line with our desires that we feel we have free will.
It is also when we act in line with our desires that we feel the most happy.

People feel constrained, limited, as if stripped of their free will when they cannot act on their desires. And they are unhappy in such cases.

Meh, certainly. And essentially fruitless methinks.

Apparently not, because it does cause unease, so it must be addressed somehow, and in a way that doesn't cause additional unease.

(Edit: good grief!! I just checked Amazon - sixty quid!?! Time to start haunting university town second-hand bookshops I think.)

Just borrow it at a library.

[Dywyddyr]

What do you mean by this "regardless of what we tell ourselves"?

We may be utterly convinced that we have free will, and could have picked a pear if we'd so decided at the time, but the "reality" would be that we really couldn't have.

If we are satisfied with what we do, then the problem of choice does not exist.

Ooh! Different topic altogether, isn't it?
And, then again, if we're dissatisfied with what we do, what "options" do we have?

Your argument (the one quoted) also shows that god is not required for us to have no free will (which has been argued on Sci before now - we're just "robots") but, interestingly (although far short of being proven) could also argue against god's existence.
If we HAD been created without choice surely a benevolent god would have made sure we were happy with whatever we do since we can't change it anyway. Making us capable of ending up in situations )through no actual decision/ fault of our own) that we dislike is somewhat sadistic.
"Yeah, sure you're miserable, and sure it was inevitable that you'd end like this. I want you to suffer".

[Dywyddyr]

I didn't exactly reply to this part of your post Squirrel, but since Signal thought it worth responding...

Dyw, why is it so important that you are right?

Tch. Really!
Didn't you see the post where I stated I was asking for refutation?
It's not (and never, ever, has been) important that I'm right, but rather that I get to a "right answer" regardless of where it comes from.
And that "getting to" can, and often has, included being led to it by someone else.

It's just "unfortunate" in this thread that so far the arguments against all seem flawed.
(Which, of course includes Jan's superb and nearly overwhelming rebuttal: "You've got nothing Dyw, but wishful thinking" ).