DE: Of course it is a matter of isolating a particular part of our reality, namely those particular rules programmed on the computer, and then mapping these isomorphically to the artificial computer reality - since it is not assumed there is a isomorphism between the *entirety* of our reality and the other one (that would be the homomorphism instead). Then we ask, could a reality isomorphic to this isolated part of our reality, namely the rules in the computer, exist? CML: No. The computer is a local construct that varies from point to point in space, yet coheres and persists over time. If all we had were the rules visibly coinciding with the material components and physical behaviors of the machine, we couldn't explain the machine's coherence and persistence. We wouldn't be able to explain how its laws act on matter, or why they are coherent in space and time. Where physical reality is assumed to coincide with the computer, this implies that these deeper explanations are "more than physical", or to put it more formally, that they can only be formulated in a metalanguage of physics called "metaphysics". Now, either the simulation (the program running on the physical machine) is capable of expressing this higher level of explanation, in which case the simulation is indeed self-explanatory and the physical machine a function of it (rather than vice versa), or it is incapable of expressing this higher level of explanation and is therefore a secondary construct. In the first case, the simulated reality is in effect self-simulated and depends on nothing external, in which case it is an SCSPL. In the second case, its existence depends on embedment in an SCSPL and is therefore ontologically secondary. Either way, the CTMU holds true. DE: Let me turn this around a bit. Suppose such a reality as the one (completely) described by the computer could exist. The rules in the computer would be the physical laws of this reality, i e by definition be a complete description of its physical part. Since the description is assumed complete, I come to the conclusion that if you say this reality cannot exist, then you are saying that (computable) realities which are only physical cannot exist. (I assume you say this about non-computable ones as well.) We must add a non-physical part and so, the homomorphism is now so to say the other way around: A complete description of the alternative hypothetical reality (now including non-physical parts) could be a homomorphism to the computer rules (only descriptions of the physical), but not the other way around. CML: This makes no obvious sense. The "reality" simulated inside a computer depends on (1) the physical existence of the computer, and (2) the medium which sustains the physical existence of the computer. Take away (2), and you can forget about (1). On the other hand, you can take away (1) without affecting (2) at all. Since (1) depends on (2) but not vice versa, they are not equivalent and cannot be interchanged; there is no "turning the homomorphism around". The morphism is injective from metalanguage to language, not vice versa. From Link.
How is that preaching? I'm hoping to determine whether or not Langan's views on reality are valid or not.
Then try asking a question about it, asking for some discussion, explaining your view of his work, why you think it valid etc. Currently, as is your normal style, you just quote an extract of his works or some extract of a review of his works, and expect us to fathom your intentions from that alone, while at the same time seemingly letting Langan's work speak for themself... which to me is preaching on your part. It is no different than if one merely quotes passages of a Bible and leaves.
Do you think Langan's view of reality is correct and that his CTMU possibly proves the existence of God?
No. And no. I think Langan's view of reality is unscientific and unfalsifiable. It may be correct and it may not be. He seems to think it is at least logically consistent, but that does not make it necessarily correct.
Since when does philosophy need to be scientific? Popper's demarcation of science vs. pseudoscience was not only unfalsifiable, but it also used language, which, according to CTMU, is not the same thing as reality. Which is worse, a theory that is unfalsifiable or a test for falsifiability that is itself unrealistic? Chris Langan makes more philosophical sense than Popper, even on a bad day. Has anyone else given us a test for determining the difference between philosophy and pseudo-philosophy?
I agree with Sarkus. If you are asking whether I think that Langan has penetrated to the ultimate truth or something, whether he has solved the big questions, I'll say 'no'. I don't think that anyone has. I'm not convinced that Langan is even helpful or interesting in that pursuit. It isn't entirely clear what his view of reality is. It's even less clear (if that's possible) precisely how he arrives at his conclusions. His writing style is so dense and so full of ideosyncratic technical vocabulary of his own invention that it's difficult to get a synoptic picture of it. And you certainly haven't been any help in explaining it, Spellbound. Again, no. My own impression of what Langan is doing is that he's making a simple analogy and then trying to make it seem a lot more complicated than it really is. Reality seems to be composed of parts related in various ways to make up wholes. In language, words combine together through syntax to form expressions. So Langan's brainstorm is that reality is a language. Then the next idea seems to be that language requires or implies mind. So there must be some cosmic mind implicit somehow in reality. Hence, God. I have to say that none of that is convincing to me.
I'd say that pseudo-philosophy consists of big cosmic pronouncements about fundamental questions, the ultimate nature of reality or about the meaning of life, presented oracular-style without convincing justification for what's being said. Real philosophy is the reasoning process that supports and justifies whatever conclusions are being drawn. It may bring us closer to answering the deep and fundamental questions but perhaps more typically ends up uncovering new and hitherto unrecognized problems.
Since when can philosophy "prove" anything? I was asked whether Langan's view of reality is correct and that his CTMU possibly proves the existence of God. So it's not a matter of philosophy needing to be scientific per se, but when asked whether it "possibly proves" something, I require at least that the claim is falsifiable before I even begin to get on to the requirement for "proof".
Pointing to the necessary existence of a larger field of pattern in which all human mental activity (including perception of physical reality etc) must be embedded is one thing. Claiming that such a field of patterns, or some part of it, can be labeled "God" without misleading or even creating invalidities and contradictions ("God" is after all one of the embedded patterns, normally) is another matter. Gregory Bateson pointed to this situation from within a thoroughly reduction established aspect of Western philosophy (the Oriental folks have been using metaphors such as "finger pointing at the moon" for two thousand years) back a while, somewhat more directly, asking for example: given the difference between two shades of green, and the difference between two formulations of lilac perfume, and the difference between two textures of rock surface, and the difference between the timbres of two stops playing a note on a pipe organ, what is the pattern formed by the differences between those differences? That is, it's one thing to bootstrap one's way out of the established arena of valid reductionist analysis (and good for the guy, if he does that solidly and carefully - possibly enlightening) but another thing entirely to assign labels and nomenclature to aspects of the new world
